ORDER B. D. Agarwal, J. -The present petition under I Art. 226 of the Constitution is directed against the decision of the consolidation authorities under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The decision rendered by the authorities is in respect of Khata Nos. 82 and 203 (except 11 plots area 9 Bighas 3 Biswas and 10 Dhoors which have been held to be exclusively of the petitioners) of village Lohandi, Khata Nos. 53 and 112 of village Majhiyari and half share in consolidation khata No. 52 of village Majhiyari. 2. In the basic consolidation records, the names of the petitioners were recorded as tenure-holders of Khata Nos. 82 and 203 of village Lohandi and Khata Nos. 53 and 112 of village Majhiyari while the names of the petitioners together with Raj Narain and another were recorded as tenure-holders of Khata No. 52. The opposite parties Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 (hereinafter referred to as the opposite parties) filed objection under Section 9-A of the Act claiming themselves to be the daughters of one Ram Prasad who is alleged to have had half share in khata No. 82 of village Lohandi. The case further was that on the death of Ram Prasad, his widow Smt. Bodari inherited the property and after the death of Smt. Bodari, the opposite parties were in possession as co-tenure-holders and their names ought to have been entered in the records who were wrongly omitted to be so entered and a similar objection in respect of Khata No. 203 of village Lohandi was also filed by the opposite parties. Three further objections were filed in respect of three Khatas of village Majhiyari. 3. The dispute thus relates to five Khatas in which the names of the petitioners were entered in the basic year. 4. The Consolidation Officer, Rampur, Tahsil Karchhana, District Allahabad, by his order dated 8-4-1971, held that the opposite parties had l/6th share in Khata No. 52, l/3rd share in Khata No. 53 and one-half share in Khata No. 112 of village Majhiyari. 4. The Consolidation Officer, Rampur, Tahsil Karchhana, District Allahabad, by his order dated 8-4-1971, held that the opposite parties had l/6th share in Khata No. 52, l/3rd share in Khata No. 53 and one-half share in Khata No. 112 of village Majhiyari. The Consolidation Officer Jari, Tahsil Karchhana, District Allahabad, to whom the other objections had been transferred, by his order dated 30th June, 71 held that the opposite parties together had one-half share in Khata No. 203 (except 11 plots area 9 Bighas, 3 Biswas and 10 Dhoors) The other objections came up for decision before the Consolidation Officer, Karchhana, who by his order dated 27th September, 71 dismissed the objection of the opposite parties and held the petitioners to be the sole tenure-holders of Khata No. 82 of village Lohandi. 5. The appeals were filed by the petitioners in respect of the decisions relating to three Khatas of village Majhiyari and Khata No. 203 of village Lohandi in so far as they were against them. The opposite parties also filed appeals in respect of Khata Nos. 52 and 53 of village Majhiyari and in respect of Khata No. 82 of village Lohandi wherein the claim of the opposite parties was dismissed. No appeal was filed in respect of 11 plots, area 9 Bighas, 3 Biswas and 10 Dhoors which had been held to be the sole, holding of the petitioners. AH these appeals were consolidated and were heard together by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation who by his order dated January 10, 1972 dismissed the appeals of the petitioners, except in respect of Khata Nos. 52 and 53 of village Majhiyari wherein he held that there was no necessity to decide shares of the parties. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation allowed the appeals of the opposite parties in respect of Khata No. 82 of village Lohandi wherein they were held to be co-tenure-holders. 6. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed two revisions in respect of Khatas of the two villages. The Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated 3rd November, 1972 dismissed the revisions. Hence the present petition was filed by the petitioners in this court. 7. It would be useful at this stage to reproduce the relevant pedigree, which is given below: 8. 6. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed two revisions in respect of Khatas of the two villages. The Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated 3rd November, 1972 dismissed the revisions. Hence the present petition was filed by the petitioners in this court. 7. It would be useful at this stage to reproduce the relevant pedigree, which is given below: 8. The petitioners case throughout was that the opposite parties are not daughters of Ram Prasad but are the daughters of Smt. Anupa and Sheo Bodh of village Dhandhua, Tahsil Meja, District Allahabad and that Smt. Bodari had died 5 years before Ram Prasad, Ram Prasad died in 1958. It may be noticed that Smt. Sumera is alive. The petitioners case has been that she gifted her one-third share to Lutawan by registered gift-deed dated September 3, 1945 registered on September 8, 1945 in all the Khatas in which she was co-tenure-holder or to co-grove-holder. This gift-deed thus relates to one-third share of the branch of Ram Sundar in all the plots in dispute. 9. On the death of Ram Prasad mutation proceedings were started. Smt. Anupa filed objection alleging that she was widow of Ram Prasad and four daughters namely, the opposite parties from Ram Prasad. The further case set up by her was that she was the heir of Ram Prasad. The opposite parties her daughters were heirs of Ram Prasad and after these daughters, their sons would be the heirs. It was denied that Sahdeo, the petitioner, was heir. In these proceedings, the evidence was led. Smt. Anupa was examined on oath who stated that the opposite parties were her daughter. A report was made by the Naib Tahsildar which was accepted by the assistant Collector First Class, who by his order dated 8-1-1969 ordered mutation in favour of Sahdeo, the petitioner No. 1. The petitioners case further had been that Smt Bodari died before the death of Ram Prasad when Ram Prasad and his wife had gone on pilgrimage to Badrinath. Smt. Bodari made no claim in the mutation proceedings after the death of Ram Prasad. The opposite parties on 8th July, 1965 filed a suit under S 229-B/176 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act claiming to be the heirs of Ram Prasad, as his daughters. In this suit, upon a reference made by the court, the Panches gave an award. The opposite parties on 8th July, 1965 filed a suit under S 229-B/176 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act claiming to be the heirs of Ram Prasad, as his daughters. In this suit, upon a reference made by the court, the Panches gave an award. The petitioners filed objection to the award raising various objections. The Assistant Collector, First Class, by his order dated 28th January, 1966 made the award a rule of court and the objections filed by the petitioners were rejected. Thereupon the petitioners filed appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division which was also dismissed. A second appeal was thereafter filed by the petitioners before the Board of Revenue. On the date of hearing, it having been brought to the notice of the Board of Revenue that the village was under consolidation operations. both the appeal and the suit were declared abated under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act. 10. Sri V.K.S. Chaudhari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has made four submissions. Firstly, he has contended that the Assistant Collector 1st Class, which was revenue court, had no jurisdiction to refer the matter to arbitration and, consequently, all the proceedings consequent to this reference were of no consequence. The second submission is that the Board of Revenue having directed abatement of the appeal along with the suit under Section 5 (2) of the Act, the judgments of both the Assistant Collector First Class as well as the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad became non est and the proceedings in the suit itself stood wiped off and hence neither the award nor the judgments can be looked into or relied upon. The next submission is that the gift-deed dated September 1945 by Smt. Sumera in favour of Cutaway was a gift-deed by a co-tenant in favour of another co-tenant and such a gift-deed was permissible in law in this connection, he has placed reliance upon Section 33 (2) (c) of the U. P. Tenancy Act. It is submitted that the observation to the contrary as if such a gift deed was not permissible is against law. It is submitted that the observation to the contrary as if such a gift deed was not permissible is against law. Lastly, the learned counsel has submitted that the judgments of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation suffer from a manifest error of law in as much as they have failed to consider important relevant evidence led by the petitioners in support of their case and has proceeded on certain assumptions which are not borne out from the record. In this connection he has made particular reference to objection filed by Smt. Anupa in the mutation case as also to the statement of Smt. Dulari, a true copy" of which has been annexed as annexure X to the writ petition. This statement, according to the learned counsel, has been misconstrued and wholly contrary wrong inference has been drawn. He has pointed out other material also but it appears unnecessary to refer to them herein. 11. After having heard learned counsel for both the parties, I am of the opinion that the judgment and orders of Deputy Director of Consolidation as also that of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation cannot be sustained and the matter requires to be sent back for decision afresh. 12. In regard to first submission, learned counsel has urged that under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, the order referring a dispute to arbitration can only be made by a court as defined in sub-section (c) of Section 2 of the Act, which does not include within its definition revenue court. For this purpose, he has relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Bithal Das Khanna v. Sri Nath Das Khanna (AIR 1949 All 360): (1947 All L.T 594) wherein it has been held that for the purpose of Arbitration Act the word 'Court as used therein does not include a revenue court. The learned counsel for the opposite parties relied upon the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in Hakim Ali v. Board of Revenue, (1977 Rev Dec 147): (1977 All LJ 380). In that case the Board of Revenue referred the dispute involved in second appeal before it to arbitration of a sole arbitrator. The learned counsel for the opposite parties relied upon the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in Hakim Ali v. Board of Revenue, (1977 Rev Dec 147): (1977 All LJ 380). In that case the Board of Revenue referred the dispute involved in second appeal before it to arbitration of a sole arbitrator. The power of the Board to so refer the matter to arbitration was challenged, on the same ground as has been done by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the present case. The learned single Judge rejected this argument after noticing the provisions of Section 47 of the Arbitration Act and Sections 203 to 206 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. It was held that the provisions contained in Sections 203 to 206 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act were statutory provisions relating to Arbitration and applying Section 47 of the Arbitration Act it was held that the provisions of the Arbitration Act applied to arbitration proceedings contemplated by U. P. Land Revenue Act. Learned single Judge also held that Sections 203 to 206 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act were also applicable to cases coming up before the Revenue court under U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 13. Shri V.K.S. Chaudhan then urged that Sections 203 to 206 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act contained in Chap. IX of the U. P. Land Revenue Act do not apply to cases under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and hence these provisions contemplating a reference to arbitration cannot be taken aid of in the present case. He submits that the view taken by the learned single Judge in the case of Hakim Ali (supra) is not legally correct and Sections 293 and 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act were brought to the notice of the learned single Judge. I find force in the submission of the learned counsel. Section 293 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act reads thus : Section 293 "provisions of U. P. Act III of 1901 applied to applications and proceedings under this chapter:- The provisions of Chapters IX and X of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act 1901. I find force in the submission of the learned counsel. Section 293 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act reads thus : Section 293 "provisions of U. P. Act III of 1901 applied to applications and proceedings under this chapter:- The provisions of Chapters IX and X of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act 1901. as amended by this Act shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with provision of this Act, apply to applications and proceedings made or taken under this chapter" 14. On the clear language of this section, the provisions of Chapter IX of the Land Revenue Act have been applied to proceedings under Chapter X of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Section 229-B is contained in Chapter VIII of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Section 341 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provides that unless otherwise expressly provided by or under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the provisions of the Civil P. C. shall apply to proceedings under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 15. It is thus clear, in my opinion, that Chapter IX of the U. P. Land Revenue Act and for that matter even Chanter X of U. P. Land Revenue Act which are procedural provisions are applicable to proceedings under Chap. X of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The view taken by the learned single Judge in the case of Hakim Ali, (1977 All LJ 380) (supra) thus does not lay down the correct law. A reference to a larger Bench may have been desirable but for the fact that the judgment of the learned single Judge was rendered in the absence of the material section having been brought to his notice. As already noticed, these provisions, according to my opinion, clearly lead to a contrary conclusion. See Sada Shiva v. State, (1970 All WR (HC) 699). 16. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Assistant Collector First Class had no jurisdiction to have referred the matter for arbitration by the panches and consequently his order making award the rule of the court is of no consequence in law. 17. I also find force in the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 16. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Assistant Collector First Class had no jurisdiction to have referred the matter for arbitration by the panches and consequently his order making award the rule of the court is of no consequence in law. 17. I also find force in the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Board of Revenue by its order declared both the appeal and the suit as abated, and, as such, the judgments passed in the suit and the appeal will be deemed to be wiped off and became non est. It was not open for the consolidation authorities to have placed reliance thereon. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel in this connection upon a Division Bench decision of this court in Ram Garib v. Bhagwati Din, (1976) 2 RD 47) as also upon the decision of the learned single Judge of this court in Kamta Misra v. G.P. Dubey, (1967 Rev Dec 261) : (1967 All LJ 438). These cases do support the submission of the learned counsel. 18. It has been contended on behalf of the opposite parties that in any case the judgment in the proceedings under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act could be taken into account for its probative value. Nothing has been placed before me to support this submission made by the learned counsel. As already noticed, in the case of Ram Garib (supra) it has been held that as a result of the order of abatement the judgment and decree in the suit stand wiped off and hence became non est. Hence, I am of the opinion that the consolidation authorities erred in placing reliance upon these judgments. 19. Before proceeding further I must dispose of the submission made by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that no appeal could have been filed by the petitioners against the order of the Assistant Collector directing award to be made the rule of the Court. Provisions of the Arbitration Act were also referred to. The answer, in my opinion, is not far to seek. It is unnecessary to go to refer to the provisions of the Arbitration Act - for sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 331 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act clearly provided for appeal and second appeal in these circumstances. 20. The answer, in my opinion, is not far to seek. It is unnecessary to go to refer to the provisions of the Arbitration Act - for sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 331 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act clearly provided for appeal and second appeal in these circumstances. 20. In regard to the next submission, I find that the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, took the view that the case based on the gift-deed dated Sep. 3, 1945 was not pleaded by the petitioners. This view is belied from the correct position on the record. I have been taken through the material on record in this connection. It appears clear that the case based on the gift-deed dated Sept. 3, 1945 executed by Smt. Sumera was taken up on behalf of the petitioners throughout. Since the matter is now being sent back for decision afresh, the plea will be decided. 20-A. As regards the last submission, I have briefly noticed above some of the material circumstances which according to the counsel for the petitioner were not taken into consideration by the consolidation authorities. I refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of these assertions since the matter is being sent back for fresh decision. 21. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation in his appellate judgment has expressly noted its agreement with the submission made on behalf of the opposite parties that the award as well as the order directing award to be made a rule of court became final and there was nothing illegal therein. Thus after having so agreed with the submission made on behalf of the opposite parties the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation, merely proceeded to discuss the other evidence in regard to which the learned counsel for the petitioner had made his submission as noted above that the material circumstances were failed to be taken into account. In these circumstances it cannot but be said that the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation rested to great extent on the award and the judgments in the case under Section 229-B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Having held that the reference made to arbitration was without jurisdiction and that the award and the judgments in that case were non est, it is not possible to sustain the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation. Having held that the reference made to arbitration was without jurisdiction and that the award and the judgments in that case were non est, it is not possible to sustain the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has merely in two sentences noted his agreement with the view taken by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation without giving any reasons of his own. In this situation the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation also cannot be sustained. 22. It, therefore, appears necessary to send back the matter for fresh decision by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation. He will not take into consideration either the award or judgment of the Assistant Collector First Class in the case under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act nor the judgment in appeal by the Additional Commissioner. The case will now be decided by him afresh after considering evidence already led by the parties and record his decision upon the pleas already raised and which are pressed before him now. 23. In the result, therefore, this writ petition succeeds. The judgments and orders dated 10th Jan. 1972 of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation and that of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 3rd November, 1972 are quashed. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation will now decide the appeals before him afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. 24. In the circumstances, the parties I shall bear their own costs.