Judgment Sudhindra Mohan Guha, J. This Criminal Revision arises out of an application under Ss. 401 and 397 read with S. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code filed by All India Reporter Ltd. and others for quashing the order dated 9.3.79 passed by Shri A.K. Bishi, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Sealdah in C. No. 171 of 1979 issuing summons against the petitioners on the complaint of Shri Srish Chandra Nath, opposite party No. 1 and also the proceedings in that very case. 2. That complaint was filed on the allegations that the complainant while practising at Gauhati in or about 1955, the Company (petitioners) approached him through its representative to purchase 12 shares on full payment on condition that they would supply AIR journal month by month free of cost and carriage in lieu of dividend and/or other benefits, till the life time of the shareholder and would pay dividend and other benefits after his death to his heirs or transferee if the A.I.R. journal was no longer needed. The complainant agreed and paid Rs.1200/- for 12 N.C. preference shares in January, 1955. On receipt of the amount the Company began to send A.I.R. journal month by month free of cost and carriage since then. The complaint would not have agreed to become a share-holder and part with his money, but for representation. 3. On 15.9.55 the accused Nos. 5, 6 and 7 sent three share certificates, two on transfer from unknown persons and one for self showing, each of the 12 shares divided into two parts-Rs.5/- against each share as “paid” and Rs.95/- as “advance call paid”, although there was no such stipulation at the time of purchase of shares. 4. Similarly another share certificate dated 4.5.1969 for four more shares purchased in January, 1969 was signed by accused No. 4 as well. 5. Thereafter, by letter dated 12.2.75 the accused demanded that 11 more shares of Rs.100/- each be purchased by complainant raising his share investment to Rs.2700/-. The complainant by his letter dated 25.2.76 protested and refused to pay more. 6. The accused having received the full amount of share money could not in law split up the shares into two parts. The accused fraudulently induced the complainant to invest money in shares in 1955 and 1969 and thus committed the offence under S. 420 I.P.C. and S. 68 of the Companies Act. 6. The accused having received the full amount of share money could not in law split up the shares into two parts. The accused fraudulently induced the complainant to invest money in shares in 1955 and 1969 and thus committed the offence under S. 420 I.P.C. and S. 68 of the Companies Act. By a letter 22.3.79 the accused Nos. 2 and 3 intimated that they would not henceforward supply A.I.R. jounral to the complainant free of costs and carriage and deducted illegally Rs.228/- as cost for the increased of the price of costs from 1974 upto 1978 and sent a demand draft for Rs.1292/- and misappropriated Rs.308 to themselves and as such they were guilty of offence under S. 406 I.P.C. 7. The petitioners in support of their contention that there was no prima facie case for issue of summons against them, submit that in the years 1955 the price of A.I.R. journal Rs.9/- per part and annual subscription thereof was Rs.108/- plus packing and carriage. If a person held 12 preference shares the share capital paid on each share was and is Rs.5/-. The holder of preference shares would also choose to pay an amounts of Rs.95/- on each share as advance cost under the Articles of Association of the Company. The payment of this advance cost was not to be treated as a loan repayable by the Company, but shall be treated as paid on shares within the meaning and for the purpose of S. 426 of the Companies Act, 1956 in case a share-holder held 12 preference shares in the year 1955, on which he had paid advocate cost at the rate of Rs.95/- on each such share on the said amount of Rs.114/- he was either entitled to receive Rs.6840 or was entitled to receive the monthly A.I.R. parts priced at Rs.9/- or to receive any other publications of petitioner Company worth Rs.109/-, both in lieu of cash interest. The complainant by his latter dated 15.12.1954 addressed to the petitioner company desired to know the annual subscription of A.I.R. for the year 1955 (Annexure 3). The complainant by his latter dated 15.12.1954 addressed to the petitioner company desired to know the annual subscription of A.I.R. for the year 1955 (Annexure 3). He was duly informed of the existing system and the rate and thereafter the complainant contended Shri Kalidas Wadhya, the petitioner Company’s representative at Gauhati who addressed a communication dated 17.2.1955 to the petitioner Company informing it that the complainant had paid an amount of Rs.1096-4-0 by chque along with the share transfer application from signed by the transferor and the transferee. It was further stated that the complainant had already paid to the petitioner Company an amount of Rs.114-12-0 and that the total amount paid was Rs.1211/-. The petitioner Company adjusted Rs.1200/- towards the advance call and share amount and Rs.9/- towards January, 1955 part and the sum of Rs.2/- to be appropriated for the collection charges. The representative further instructed that the complainant be sent A.I.R. journal free of all charges and that the script for 12 shares be sent to him as early as possible. The complainant was said to have signed it by way of confirmation. His signature dated 17.2.1955 appeared in the margin of the letter. A copy of the said communication along with its Photostat copy is filed as Annexure 5 and a copy of the share transfer application is filed as Annexure 6. 8. Till the end of 1958 the complainant was not only receiving A.I.R. part regularly in view of case interest on the advance cost on the 12 shares held by him, but he was also receiving the Company’s balance sheets and annual report from the year 1955. 9. From January, 1969 the price of the AIR monthly part was increased from Rs.9/- to Rs.12/-. It was proposed by the petitioner Company to the complainant that instead of sending Rs.36/- each year to the Company he may purchase four more preference shares by paying an amount of Rs.5/- on each share as application money and Rs.95/- on each share as advance costs, thus entitling him to an additional annual benefit of Rs.36/- in the from of publication in lieu of case interest entitling him to receive A.I.R. publication wroth Rs.144/- on the 16 shares. 10. The complainant agreed to the terms and sent a cheque of Rs.150/- and the balance sum of Rs.250/- was prayed to be paid in four instalments. 10. The complainant agreed to the terms and sent a cheque of Rs.150/- and the balance sum of Rs.250/- was prayed to be paid in four instalments. Accordingly, the complainant duly filed in the share application from for four shares and signed it on 4.2.1969 (vide Annexure 10). On receipt of the aforesaid share application from the petitioner Company intimated the complainant that our of the amount of Rs.150/- an amount of Rs.20/- was adjusted towards the share application money of four preference shares and that amount of Rs.130/- was adjusted towards advance call amount of Rs.380/- on the fore shares (vide Annexure 11). The Company’s representative at Calcutta by his letter dated 7.6.1969 also intimated the petitioner that the complainant had paid the sum of Rs.160/- towards his share account (vide Annexure 12). Thereafter the complainant by his letter dated 15.7.1969 forwarded a cheque for Rs.100/- completing the full payment of advance costs on the aforesaid fore shares (Annexure 14). By a letter dated 31.12.1969 the petitioner Company forwarded the share certificate for four preference shares allotted to the complainant (vide Annexure 17). 11. On 17.2.75 the petitioner Company intimated the complainant opposite party No. 1 that the price of AIR part had been increased from Rs.15/- to Rs.20/- from 1.1.75 and that he was entitled to receive AIR parts worth Rs.144/- only per year in lieu of case interest payable on the advance cost paid on 16 share and that on account of the above increases in price of AIR it was then suggested to purchase 11 more additional shares of Rs.1100/- (vide Annexure 19). But by letter dated 25.2.75 (Annexure 20) the complainant refused to take the additional shares for the reasons stated therein and informed the Company that the shares duly paid up and that the agreement was meaning less. He took a stand that the petitioner Company was bound to supply him free of cost the AIR monthly parts so long as he remained a share-holder. 12. He took a stand that the petitioner Company was bound to supply him free of cost the AIR monthly parts so long as he remained a share-holder. 12. In the above circumstance the petitioner Company filed a Civil Suit No. 371 of 1975 in the Court of 9th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur for declaration that it having tendered the amount of advance call of Rs.1520/- to the complainant the contract under which the plaintiff was supplying AIR journal to him in lieu of case interest on the advance call deposit of Rs.1520/- had been lawfully terminated by the petitioner Company and the liability of the petitioner Company to supply the AIR journal in lieu of cash interest of Rs.1520/- had come to an end and that the petitioner Company was no more liable to supply the AIR journal or any other Publication of the Company or any cash interest to the complainant. 13. Before filing the suit two money orders, each for Rs.760/- totaling to Rs.1520/- were sent to the complainant returning the advance calls paid on the 16 shares. The money orders of course of were refused. The suit was eventually decreed on 12.1.1979. 14. In the above fact and circumstance Mr. Jitendra Nath Ghosh, learned Advocate for the petitioners, contends that here was absolutely no prima facie case for issuing summons against the petitioners and the fact itself warrants quashing of the criminal proceeding by this Court. Mr. Srish Chandra Nath, the complainant/opposite party no. 1, who appears in person, questions the very jurisdiction of this Court to entertain such as application. It is contended by him that the impugned order being interlocutory in nature no Revision would lie against such an order, as it is burred under S. 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to him power under S. 482 is not to be exercised by this defeating the bar. He of course admits that it is the principal of law that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject matter, but where there is an express provision barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers. To meet his arguments Mr. Ghosh refers to the decision of Amar Nath & Ors. v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1977 SC 2185 . To meet his arguments Mr. Ghosh refers to the decision of Amar Nath & Ors. v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1977 SC 2185 . It is held therein that the order of the Magistrate summoning the appellants was one which was a matter of moment. If the appellants were not summoned then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellant to face a trial without proper application of mind could not be held to be an interlocutory matter, but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial. That being the position a Revision against the order was fully under S. 397(1) or under S. 482 because the scope of both these sections in the matter of this kind is more less the same. Relying on this decision Mr. Ghosh contends that the issue of summons cannot be taken to be an interlocutory order in the strictest sense of the term. It is vital importance because under such order the petitioners were to face a criminal trial in the Court of the Magistrate. So, according to him the petitioners have every right to move this court for quashing an order of such nature which puts the petitioners into a jeopardy of criminal proceedings. Mr. Ghosh in support if his argument also relies on the decision in the case of Trilok Singh & ors. V. Satya Deo Tripathi reported in AIR 1979 SC 850 , that the petitioners have every right to move the Court for quashing the proceeding in a criminal court before appearance. Mr. Nath on the other hand contends that it was for the opposite parties to appear first before the learned magistrate and then to challenge his order. He also distinguished the facts and circumstance of the present case from that reported in AIR 1979 SC 850 . But the fact may be different but the law enunciated by their Lordship of the Supreme Court would be applicable to the case in hand. In the case referred to above on behalf of the respondents it was argued that the appellants filed a petition in the High Court for quashing the proceeding before issuance of the summons was premature and the High Court could not quash it. In the case referred to above on behalf of the respondents it was argued that the appellants filed a petition in the High Court for quashing the proceeding before issuance of the summons was premature and the High Court could not quash it. Their Lordships rejected the contention and held that the proceeding initiated was clearly an abuse of the process of the Court. It was not a case where any process ought to have been directed to be issued against the accused. On the settled principles of law, it was a very suitable case where the criminal proceeding ought to have been quashed by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power. Thus having regard to the principal enunciated by their Lordships, we do not propose to reject the application filed by the opposite parties in limine and as such we propose to enter into the merits of the case. 15. As to the merits of the case, it is argued by Mr. Ghosh that the petitioners are not aware want representation had been made by their representative, Kalidas Wadhwa. But would appear from annexure 5, letters to the petitioners company along with share transfer application from duly sighed by the complainant that he was aware that the amount paid by him towards advance calls as also share money which was remitted to the transferors. This fact was said to have been suppressed willfully, deliberately and mala fide from the trial magistrate. He refers to annexure 10. Regarding the four shares of which an application was made by the complainant, it is contended that he was consciously and fully aware that on each of those four preference shares he had paid Rs.20/- as application money and a further amount of Rs.380/- towards advance calls so as to derive the benefit of receiving AIR. Journal, without payment of the difference every year amounting to RS.36/- between the amount of the benefits receivable by him, viz. Rs.108/- and the enhanced annual subscription of Rs.144/- per year. Thus the complainant is said to have been fully aware as to how much was the share money, i.e. Rs.60/- and as to how much was the advance calls, i.e. Rs.1140/-, on the 12 shares held by him on transfer. Rs.108/- and the enhanced annual subscription of Rs.144/- per year. Thus the complainant is said to have been fully aware as to how much was the share money, i.e. Rs.60/- and as to how much was the advance calls, i.e. Rs.1140/-, on the 12 shares held by him on transfer. The action on the part of the complainant in purchasing four more preference shares by way of allotment was clearly indicative of the falsity if his claim that the was given to understand by Kalidas Wadhwa on behalf of the petitioner company or otherwise that on his acquisition of 12 preference shares in 1955 he would be entitled to life long supply of monthly AIR parts free of cost. In the above facts and circumstance of the case, it is contended by Mr. Ghosh that all the facts alleged at the most would amount to civil dispute and never a criminal case. 16. It is further argued that the alleged representation was made or inducement was offered to the complainant at Gauhati and not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court s at Calcutta and as such the learned Magistrate was without jurisdiction to issue summons. In reply it is contended by Mr. Nath that the earlier representation may be made at Gauhati, payment might have also been made Gauhati but actual cheating was detected or had taken place in Calcutta by the letter dated 22.3.79. By this letter is was made clear that the petitioners would not thenceforward supply AIR journal to the complainant free of cost and carriage as stipulated in 1955. According to him the court of the Magistrate at Sealdah was the proper Court to entertain the criminal proceeding for cheating. 17. But we are of opinion that the offence under S. 420 IPC is to be tried at the place where fraudulent misrepresentation or deception took place or where as a consequence thereof the complainant was induced to deliver property. Admittedly the earlier representation on the basis of which payment had been made were made at Gauhati and not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Sealdah. In this view of the matter in agreement with Mr. Ghosh, we would hold that the learned Magistrate at Sealdah was not competent to issue summons against the petitioners. 18. Admittedly the earlier representation on the basis of which payment had been made were made at Gauhati and not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Sealdah. In this view of the matter in agreement with Mr. Ghosh, we would hold that the learned Magistrate at Sealdah was not competent to issue summons against the petitioners. 18. Again as to the allegation regarding representation made by the representative of the AIR whereby the complainant claims to have been cheated and fraudulently induced to part with money for purchasing shares, there is nothing writing. But some idea can be had from annexure 5 and 6. The petitioners versions again find support from the fact that in 1969 the complainant purchased four more shares. Annexures, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 may be referred to. Thus the complainant in order to bring a charge under S. 420 IPC was to establish that the accused persons had dishonest intention at the time of agreement entered into. On the materials on record, it would not be appear that the accused persons, i.e. the present petitioners had any dishonest intention to cheat the complainant when their representative approached him. A breach of contract or breach of faith would not come on the edge of penal law and its remedy lies in civil courts. 19. As to the charge under S. 406 IPC it can be said that there was absolutely no trust in this case. Money was paid for purchase of certain shares under a contract. If there be a dispute as to the breach of such contract, then also the remedy lies in civil courts. 20. Lastly it is contended by Mr. Ghosh that a suit on the subject-matter was filed against opposite party No. 1 by the petitioner and in fact a decree was passed, though ex parte. If now the opposite party No. 1 be allowed to proceed with the criminal case, it would be abuse of the court. In reply it is contended by Mr. Nath that there is no bar to proceed with a criminal case simultaneously with a suit in a civil court. But in the case, as to the subject matter there was already a suit and the complainant suffered a decree. A decree does not lose its sanctity being ex parte. It is binding on the parties, until set aside. Nath that there is no bar to proceed with a criminal case simultaneously with a suit in a civil court. But in the case, as to the subject matter there was already a suit and the complainant suffered a decree. A decree does not lose its sanctity being ex parte. It is binding on the parties, until set aside. In the case of Kaviraj Vasudevan v. State reported in 1970 Cr. LJ 632 a suit was filed in civil court before institution of proceeding under S. 406 IPC over the same subject matter and decreed. In that case it is held by Justice N.C. Talukdar that continuance of proceeding of criminal court would be unwarranted and untenable. The facts and circumstance of the present case, being amount similar to that reported in 1970 Cr. LJ 632, we are of the same views expressed by Justice N.C. Talukdar. Thus we agree with the contentions of Mr. Ghosh that after the decree passed against the complainant, he should not be allowed to proceed with the criminal case over the same subject-matter. 21. On the findings discussed above, we are of the opinion that this application under S. 401 and 397 read with S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be allowed. The Rule is made absolute. The order dated 9.3.79 issuing summons by Sri A.K. Bishi, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, Sealdah against the petitioners in case No. 171 of 1979 is set aside, and the proceeding in that very case pending in his file be quashed. 22. Oral prayer for leaved for to appeal to the Supreme Court is made by Mr. Nath. But the same is rejected. N.C. Mukherji, J. : I agree. Application under Ss. 401 and 397 read with S. 482, allowed Rule made absolute.