ORDER A.N. Verma, J. - This is a landlords petition. It is directed against orders passed by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 rejecting an application filed by the petitioner under Section 16 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this petition are that the petitioner is the owner of the building situate at Moradabad. A portion of his building was in occupation of one Mashooq Ali. This was numbered as 95. Mashooq Ali vacated the said accommodation in the year 1975. Various individuals moved applications for allotment of the portion. The petitioner also joined in the proceedings by applying for release of that portion. Vacancy was notified on 6-9-75 thereupon, the Rent Control Inspector submitted a report on 9-2-1976 to the effect that the accommodation which was the subject matter of these proceedings did not have any roof and was, therefore not an accommodation within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. 3. The then Rent Control & Eviction Officer passed an order dated 21-6-1976, rejecting the application of the petitioner for release as well as those filed by the others for the allotment of the accommodation on the preliminary ground that the building was not an allottable accommodation. Nothing happened thereafter for some time. Subsequently in the year 1977-78, it appears, once again some individuals made applications for allotment of the ground floor portion of the accommodation No. 95. The Landlord once again joined in the proceedings and applied for the release of the accommodation by means of application dated 23-1-1978. 4. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer considered the application of the petitioner for the release of the accommodation and rejected it by the order dated 14-3-1978. He held that the landlord did not bona fide require the accommodation for the purpose set up by him. The petitioner thereupon filed a revision under Section 18 of the Act which has been dismissed by the learned District Judge, Moradabad. Hence this petition. 5. Before the Learned District Judge, amongst the other grounds, one of the points urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the order passed by Sri Ajab Singh, the then Rent Control & Eviction Officer dated 21-6-1976, holding that the building in question did not constitute an allottable accommodation, barred the jurisdiction of the Rent Control & Eviction Officer to treat the building as open for allotment. The learned Dist. Judge overruled this objection on a variety of grounds. On merits, the learned District Judge held that he found no infirmity, or illegality in the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer dated 14-3-1978. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner first submitted that the learned District Judge was wrong in taking the view that the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer was not open to appeal or revision. I find no substance in this submission. The observations made by the Learned District Judge to the effect that the impugned order was not appealable or revisable have obviously been misunderstood by the learned counsel for the petitioner. These observations have to be read in the context. So read, it is obvious that the learned District Judge was referring to the order passed by Ajab Singh on 21-6-1976, by which it was held that the building which was the subject matter of these proceedings was not allottable. The words "impugned order" in the judgment of the learned District Judge obviously mean, in the setting, the order passed by Sri Ajab Singh. As mentioned above the observations of the learned District Judge have to be construed in that context. There is, therefore, no substance in the first point. 7. Learned counsel next contended that the application of the landlord was founded upon two grounds, that is, on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition, and was required for being demolished and reconstructed, and on the ground that the landlord needed it for his personal use consisting of stacking of bricks. The prescribed Authority, therefore, committed an error of jurisdiction in not considering the first of these two grounds. The learned District Judge was, therefore, competent to set aside the order even under Section 18 of the Act. I find no substance in this ground either. A copy of the application moved by the petitioner under Section 16 of the Act has been annexed to the writ petition and is marked Annexure "4". A perusal of the application leaves no manner of doubt that the application was substantially based only on the second of the aforesaid two grounds and not on the first ground. A copy of the application moved by the petitioner under Section 16 of the Act has been annexed to the writ petition and is marked Annexure "4". A perusal of the application leaves no manner of doubt that the application was substantially based only on the second of the aforesaid two grounds and not on the first ground. Learned Counsel for the petitioner laid considerable emphasis on the observations made by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer himself suggesting that he himself treated the application of the petitioner as was founded on both the grounds. I do not think much weight can be attached to the observations made by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer. The fact that the Rent Control & Eviction Officer did not address himself to the question whether the building was in a dilapidated condition or not confirms that the application was treated by him only as one founded upon the ground mentioned above and not on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition which was required for being demolished and reconstructed. Learned counsel also invited my attention to the written statement, which was filed on behalf of the contesting prospective allottee and on its basis sought to urge that even the prospective allottee took the application of the petitioner as founded on both the grounds. I find no substance in this argument. If the application itself did not disclose that it was founded at all on the ground that the building was needed for being demolished and reconstructed, the written statement cannot have much relevance. Furthermore, it is significant that the petitioner has not made any categorical averment in the writ petition that a specific argument was addressed before the revisional court to the effect that the building was required also on the ground that it was in a dilapidated condition, and that it was required for being demolished and reconstructed, and that the point was urged on behalf of the petitioner by his counsel but was not considered. Even the grounds of revision have not been filed with the petition. Besides, there is neither a letter nor an affidavit of counsel appearing for the petitioner suggesting that the point was urged but was not considered by the learned District Judge. Even the grounds of revision have not been filed with the petition. Besides, there is neither a letter nor an affidavit of counsel appearing for the petitioner suggesting that the point was urged but was not considered by the learned District Judge. Under these circumstances, I shall assume that the learned District Judge rightly dismissed the petitioner's revision, and that the prescribed Authority committed no error in not giving any finding on the question whether or not the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required for being demolished. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer (Sri Ajab Singh) on 21-6-1976, operated as res judicata and barred the present Rent Control & Eviction Officer from allotting the accommodation. The submission is without any substance. In the first place, the learned District Judge has observed that the dispute involved in the present case is in regard to the ground floor portion of the building. This specific portion of the building was not in dispute in the previous inquiry. There is therefore, no question of the previous order operating as res judicata. Furthermore, the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer dated 21-6-1976, did not contain an adjudication of any substantive rights of the parties. The Prescribed authority on the previous occasion found that at that time having regard to the state of the building, which was in dispute before him, it did not seem to be allottable accommodation. It consequently rejected the application of the petitioner for release as well as of the others. Such an order did not confer or vest any rights on the landlord. At any rate, the learned District Judge is right in taking the view that whether a building is at a particular time an accommodation which can be allotted, by its nature is not a matter, on which a previous administrative order rendered at a different time can operate as res judicata. The present allottee was at any rate, no party to the previous proceedings. The view taken by the learned District Judge on the facts of the present case is thus perfectly reasonable and correct. 9. Learned counsel cited various decisions in support of his contention that the principles of res judicata are also applicable to administrative proceedings or proceedings of the present nature. The view taken by the learned District Judge on the facts of the present case is thus perfectly reasonable and correct. 9. Learned counsel cited various decisions in support of his contention that the principles of res judicata are also applicable to administrative proceedings or proceedings of the present nature. There can be no dispute about the proposition laid down in various cases cited by the learned counsel, but these have no relevance to the present controversy. On the facts of the present case, the learned District Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the previous order passed by Sri Ajab Singh cannot bar the jurisdiction of the authority to allot the accommodation. 10. In view of what has been stated above, I find no merits in this petition. It is consequently dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The stay order is hereby vacated. 11. The petitioner is, however, granted a month's time to vacate the premises in dispute.