JUDGMENT S.J. Hyder, J. - There is a Trust in the city of Bareilly known as Sahu Rameshwar Dhart Larth Trust. The Trust is registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Kunwar Suraj Autar is the Secretary of the Society. The two connected writ petitions have been filed by Kunwar Suraj Autar in his capacity as Secretary of thus Society. 2. The facts relating to the writ petitions may now be mentioned. The trust aforesaid runs a women's degree college at Bareilly which is known as Sahu Gopinath Girls' Degree College li was initially affiliated to the Agra University. The U.P. Legislature passed the U.P., University Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Under the provisions of the said Act a new University known as Rohalkhaad University with its seat at Bareilly was constituted With effect from both February, 1975. The college was thereafter affiliated to the Rohilkhand University. It may however be stated that the main events concerning the two writ petitions occurred while the college was still affiliated to the Agra University. The Agra University or its Vice-Chancellor have, however, not been impleaded as parties to the petitions. The effect of this shall be considered by us later in this judgment. 3. Kumari Mithlesh Misra respondent 3 was appointed as Lecturer in the Department of Political Science in the College on probation for a period of one year. She assumed charge of her duties on September 29, 1973. On July 27, 1974 the Committee of Management of.the College passed a resolution proposing to terminate the service of Kumari Mithlesh Mishra. The said proposal was submitted to the Vice-Chancellor of Agra University for his approval by a letter dated August 20, 1974 With remarkable alacrity the Registrar of the University conveyed the approval of the Vice-Chancellor to the Management of the College by bis letter dated August 24, 1974. The Management of the College then served a notice on Kumari Mithlesh Mishra terminating her services. 4. The Principal of the College on 6th September, 1974 addressed a letter dated September 6, 1974 to the Assistant Registrar (Affiliation) of the Agra University inviting his attention to the letter dated 20th August, 1974 seeking approval for the termination of services of Kumari Mishra. 4. The Principal of the College on 6th September, 1974 addressed a letter dated September 6, 1974 to the Assistant Registrar (Affiliation) of the Agra University inviting his attention to the letter dated 20th August, 1974 seeking approval for the termination of services of Kumari Mishra. It was stated in the letter oi the Principal that on account of to epigraphical error, the date of the meeting of the Managing Committee, which had proposed the termination of the services of Kumari Mishra, had been wrongly mentioned as 27-4-1974 instead of 27-7-1974. 5. In the meanwhile Kumari Mithlesh Mishra also made representation to the Vice-Chancellor, Agra University against his order dated August 22, 1974 by which he had accorded approval to the termination of the petitioner's services. The Vice-Chancellor again looked into the matter and by an order dated 12th October 1974. He set aside his order dated August 22,'1974. This time the Vice-Chancellor disapproved of the proposed of the Management to terminate the services of Kumari Mithlesh Mishra. The order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 12th October, 1974 was communicated to the Management of the College by a registered letter dated October 14, 1974. The Management of the College felt dissatisfied with the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated October 12, 1974. It accordingly made representation against the said order to the Chancellor made under Section 63 of the Act. The Chancellor rejected the Management's representation by an order passed on June 23, 1975 The management was of the view that the order passed by the.Chancellor required reconsideration. It accordingly unsaved a review application before hin which did of find favour with the Chancellor. The Chancellor accordingly rejected the review application by his order dated January 3, 1376. 6. The turn which the events had taken dismissed the Management of the College. The Management therefore filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 1 of 1976 before this court and sought the relief that the orders of the Vice Chancellor passed on 12th October, 1974 and by the Chancellor on June 23, 1975 and January 3, 1976 may be quashed. The writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge of this court by bis judgment and order dated April 22, 1976 The Management of the College then preferred Special Appeal no. The writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge of this court by bis judgment and order dated April 22, 1976 The Management of the College then preferred Special Appeal no. 289 of 1976, against the decision of the single Judge dated April 22, 1976 The said special appeal was allowed by a bench of this court by its 6rder dated August 31, 1976. In the body of the judgment of the division bench of this court dated August 31, 1976 it was observed that the main question for consideration of the Chancellor was whether the Vice-Chancellor had any power to review his order according approval to the termination of the services of Km. Misra and to substitute a fresh order in its place. The court further held that the Chancellor committed- an error of law in not deciding the said question. In consequence the order of the Chancellor dated June 23.1.1975 was quashed the said special appeal, and the case was remanded to the Chancellor with the following directions : "Chancellor will decide the representation made by the Management afresh in the tight of the observation made above. If the Chancellor considers fit he may give parties an opportunity of being heard before he passes an order It is despicable that the decision be given at an early date." 7. After the decision in the special appeal referred to above the matter was reconsidered by the Chancellor. He rejected the representation of the Management of the College by his order dated December 29, 1976. The Management of the College again approached the Chancellor with the request to review his order dated December 29, 1976. This application was rejected by the Chancellor by his order dated 26-2-1977. On February 22, 1977 the Vice-Chancellor of the Rohilkhand University passed an order directing the Management of the College to reinstate Km. Mithlesh Mishra and to pay her the entire arrears of salary treating the order terminating her services as non est. 8. The Management of the College neither reinstated Km. Mithlesh Misra nor did it pay the arrears of salary due to her. On April 16, 1977 (he Registrar of the Rohiikhand University, Bareilly addressed a letter to the college inviting, its attention to the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated February 22, 1977 and seeking information to what action had been taken on the basis of the said communication. Mithlesh Misra nor did it pay the arrears of salary due to her. On April 16, 1977 (he Registrar of the Rohiikhand University, Bareilly addressed a letter to the college inviting, its attention to the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated February 22, 1977 and seeking information to what action had been taken on the basis of the said communication. The said letter of the Registrar is dated April 18, 1 977. District Inspector of Schools, Bareilly in his turn sent a communication to the college on April 25, 1977 and directed it to implement the order of the Vice- Chancellor dated February 22, 1977. On April 29, 1977 the Deputy Director of Education, Bareilly sent a letter to the college stating therein that since the pay bill of Km. Mishra had not been submitted to the department the Collage should show cause why action should nit be taken against it under Section 6l D of the Act. In the meanwhile the Management of the College had instituted the connected Writ Petition no. 487 of 1977 which was pending before this court. Accordingly the Management of the College informed the Deputy Director of Education, Bareilly this since the above writ petition Was pending before this court it was not proper for the Education Department to take any corrective steps against the College. On receipt of this litter the Deputy Director of Education passed an order of May 20, 1977 taking over the salary payment account of the College and directed that the same shall in future be operated by the District Inspector of Schools. The order of the Vice-Chancellor dated February 22, 1977 was put in executing under sub section (3) of Section 68A of the Act and in the said execution proceedings the Management of the College hied objections. 9. There is no serious dispute between the parties in so far as the fact a herein above stated are concerned. 10. In Writ Petition No. 487 of 1977 filed on behalf of the Management of the College the relief sought is that this court may issue a writ of certiorari calling for the record of the case and after perusing the same to quash the orders of the Chancellor dated 29-12-1976 and February 26, 1977 and that of the Vice-Chancellor dated 22nd February, 1977 and 13/14th October, 1971. A further relief sought is that Section 68 A inserted in the Act by means of amendment may be declared ultra vires. The relief sought by the Management in the other Writ Petition no. 835 of 1977 are that this court may quash the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated May 20, 1977 and a writ of mandamus may be issued against respondents commanding them not to take any further action in pursuance of the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated May 20, 1977. 11. As already pointed out the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University has not been impleaded as a party in the Writ Petition no. 487 of 1977. At the same time Km. Mithelesh Misra has not been impleaded as a party in Civil. Misc. Writ Petition No. 835 of 1977. 12. At the very outset it may be stated that no arguments were addressed to us on behalf of the petitioner in support of Civil Misc. Writ No. 835 of 1977. Moreover we were not invited at the hearing of the writ petition to strike down Section 68-A inserted under the U. P. State Universities Act by means of amendment. The only point canvassed before us related to the validity of the orders of the Chancellor dated December 29, 1975 and February 26, 1977 and that of the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University dated 12/14th October, 1974. 13. We think it proper to certain provisions of the U. P. State University Act, 1973 and the relevant statutes which were in force at the time. Reference to the said provisions of law will help in consideration of the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. 14. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act defines an affiliated college to mean an institution affiliated to the University in accordance with the Act and Statutes of that University. Sub section (18) of the said section provides "Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations" mean respectively the Statutes. Ordinances and the Regulations of the University. Sub-section (19) of the section defines a teacher as under : "Teacher means a person employed for imparting instructions or guiding or conducting research in the University or in an institute or any constituent, affiliated or associated college and includes a Principal or a Director." 15. Chapter VI of the Act deals with appointments and conditions of service of teacher and officers. Chapter VI of the Act deals with appointments and conditions of service of teacher and officers. The said Chapter consists of Sections 31 to jo, both inclusive. Section 31 of the Act is concerned with the appointment octanes. The said section inter He provides that subject to the provision of the Act a teachers of the University and teacher of an affiliated or associate 1 College (other than a College maintained exclusively by the Mate Government or a local authority) shall be appointed by the Executive Council or the Management if the affiliated or associated College, as the case may be, on the recommendations of the Selection Committee Sub-section (2) of the said section directs that appointment of every such teacher shall in the first instance be 'been probation for one year which may be extended for a period not exceeding a further period of one year. Sub-section (2) of Section 35 contains the direction that every decision of the Management of the College to dismiss or remove a teacher or to reduce him in rank or to punish him in any other manner, shall before it is communicated to him, be reported to the Vice-Chan-caller and shall not take effect unless it has been approved. 16. Chapter IX of the Act bears the heading "Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations and it consists of Sections 19 to 53, both inclusive. Section 49 of the Act in so far as it is relevant fir the purposes of this case is quoted below; - "49. Subject to the provisions of this Act the Statutes may provide for any matter relating to the University and shall in particular provide (a)..................... (b)............... (c)................... (d) Qualifications and recruitment (including minimum qualifications and experience) of members and ether teachers of the University and of affiliated and associated colleges, the maintenance by them of the annual academic progress report, the rules of conduct to be observed by them and their emoluments and other conditions of service including provisions relating to compulsory retirement." 17. (b)............... (c)................... (d) Qualifications and recruitment (including minimum qualifications and experience) of members and ether teachers of the University and of affiliated and associated colleges, the maintenance by them of the annual academic progress report, the rules of conduct to be observed by them and their emoluments and other conditions of service including provisions relating to compulsory retirement." 17. Section 50 of the Act inter alia provides that the First Statutes of the University shall be made by the State Government after notification in the Gazette and that in case of an existing University, for so long as the first Statutes are not so made, Statutes as in force immediately before the commencement of the Act shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act shall continue in force. 18. Section 68 of the Act inter alia lass down that if any question arises whether any decision of any authority or an officer of the University is in conformity with the Act or Statutes or the Ordinances made thereunder, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor and the decision of the Chancellor therein shall be final. Further the said provisions concerns on the Chancellor the powers in exceptional circumstances to review any decision made by him under the section. 19. Section 13 of the Act deals with the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor. It inter alia lays down that the Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall exercise general supervision and control over the affairs of the University, including the constituent college and the institutes maintained by the University and its affiliated and associated colleges. The said section further provides that it shall be the duty of the Vice-Chancellor to ensure the faithful observance of the provisions of the Act, Statutes and the Ordinances and he shall without prejudice to the powers of the Chancellor under Section 10 possess all such powers as may be necessary in that behalf. 20. Clauses (7) and (8) of the Statute 30 of the Agra University appearing under Chapter XVIII of the Statutes of Agra University may be extracted in extenso : - "7. 20. Clauses (7) and (8) of the Statute 30 of the Agra University appearing under Chapter XVIII of the Statutes of Agra University may be extracted in extenso : - "7. In case of members of the staff of colleges who are appointed temporarily or on probation services of member of staff can be terminal d only by giving to the other party at least one calender month's notice before April 30 in writing or by paying to the other party a sum equivalent to one month's salary. The period of one month's notice referred to therefore shall not include summer vacation or any part thereof and the member of the staff concerned shall be entitled to receive his/her salary for May and June only when he/she is put in continuous service in the college for not less than 8 months before the summer vacations The teacher may similarly terminate his/her' appointment by submitting one month's notice in writing to the Committee or paying a sum equal to his/her salary for one month. The period of one month's notice shall not induce sumer vacations or any part thereof." "8. In case of teacher appointed on probation which in no case shall exceed two years if by the end of the period of probation no notice of termination or removal from service as provided for above has been received by the teacher. He/She will ipso facto be confirmed - in his/her appointment, provided further that the termination or removal from service of teacher on probation shall not take effect except with the previous appeal of the Vice-Chancellor. 21. The Statutes extracted above were framed under the provisions of the Agra University Act. It is not in controversy that new Statutes had not been framed by the State Government under the provisions of the U. P. Universities Act, 1973 and as such the Statutes framed under the Agra Universities Act wee in force at the relevant time." 22. The position with regard to a probationer teacher which emerges from a reading of Sections 31 and 35 of the Act read with clauses (7) and (8) of Statute 30 of the Agra University contained in Chapter XVIII may now be stated The appointment of a teacher in the first instance has to be on probation for one year which may be extended for a period not exceeding one year. The Management Committee of the College has no jurisdiction to extend the period of probation for any further period. In case the Management decides to dismiss or remove a teacher such a decision, before it is communicated to him, shall be reported to the Vice-Chancellor and it shall not take effect unless such approval is forthcoming. Before terminating the services of a probationer one calender month's notice in writing has to be served on him/her before April 30, or one month's salary is to be paid to him/her in lieu of such notice. The said period of one month shall not include summer vacations- If a is such notice is not served on the teacher concerned he/she will be deemed to be ipso facto confirmed on the expiry of two years from his/her appointment. It is in the light of these mandatory rules embodied in the Act and the Statutes that the submissions made on behalf of the parties are to be considered. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly contended that the Vice-Chancellor had no power to review his order approving the termination of services of Km. Misra which was communicated to the Management of the College by the Registrar by his/her dated August 22, 1974 According to him the powers which the Vice-Chancellor exercises under sub-section (2) of Section 35 quasi judicial power and under the provisions of the Act no powers of review have been conferred on the Vice-Chancellor. He further submitted Anatola reading of the provisions of the Act it could not be held to at any powers to repetition order passed by him earlier vested in the Vice Chancellor by implication. He submitted that order of the Vice Chancellor which was communicated to the Management on August 22, 1974 was not vitiated by misrepresentation or fraud. He drew our attention to the fact that the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University has omitted to file, for reasons best known to himself, a counter-affidavit rebutting the averments made in the were petition. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the Vice-Chancellor could not the subsequent events into account it while recalling his earlier order by the impugned order dated October 14, 1974 It was all pressed upon us. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the Vice-Chancellor could not the subsequent events into account it while recalling his earlier order by the impugned order dated October 14, 1974 It was all pressed upon us. that even if it be assumed that the earlier order pissed by the Vice-Chancellor which communicated to the Management by the Registrar through his later dared August it, 1974, was in any way vitiated by any representation or fraud, the Vice-Chancellor could and recall the said order alter giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It was contented that the Vice-Chancellor has committed manifest error of jurisdiction in passing the order dated October 14, 1974 behind the back of the petitioner m without affording it any opportunity to the petitioner to be heard in support of the earlier order. It was also faintly contended on behalf of the petitioner that clauses (7) and (8) of Statute 30 contained in Chapter XVIII of the Statutes of the Agra University were inconsistent with the provisions contained in the U. P. Universities Act, 1973 and was on that account void and could not be deemed to be in force by virtue of Section 50 of the Act. 24. The submissions made on behalf of the petitioner have been controverted by the learned counsels appearing for the respondents. We shall deal with their submissions at the appropriate place wherever considered necessary. 25. There was considerable controversy at the bar about the nature of the powers which the Vice-Chancellor possess under sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Act. As already stated according to the petitioner the said powers are of a quasi-judicial character, and there is nothing in the provisions and the Act or the Statutes framed thereunder which empowers the Vice-Chancellor to review an order pasted by him in the exercise of the said powers. On behalf of the respondents on the other hand it was contended that the said powers are purely of .an administrative nature and Vice-Chancellor could recalls an order passed by him approving the termination of services of a teacher, in this connection oui1 attention was invited to Section 22 of the General Clauses Act. The learned counsels appearing for the parties placed their respective points of view with considerable warmth and imgeniuty and cited a number of decisions in support of their arguments. The learned counsels appearing for the parties placed their respective points of view with considerable warmth and imgeniuty and cited a number of decisions in support of their arguments. We do not, however, propose to enter into this controversy as the two writ petitions can be conveniently disposed of on other grounds. For the moment we assume, without deciding, that the powers conferred on the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 (2) of the Act are of quasi judicial nature It is on the basis of this assumption that we shall examine the contentions advanced on be half of the parties. 26. The termination of the service of a teacher is a cumulative effect of three distinct steps in the case of an affiliated college. In the first place there must be a decision by the Managing Committee of a college to terminate the services of a teacher conceder. In the second place the decision taken by the Managing Committee should be approved by the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 (2) of the Act. In the third place one calender month's notice expiring before 30th April in each year should be served on the teacher or he should be paid a sum equipment to one month's salary before that date. In any of the conditions stated above is not fulfilled relationship of master and servant subsisting between the teacher and the affiliated college does rot come to an end. This is the effect of mandatory provisions of law which we have already considered. 27. Another point which has to be borne in mind is that the Vice-Chancellor is under a legal obligation to see that the provisions of the Act, Statutes and the Ordinances framed thereunder are faithfully observed. He further enjoys all necessary powers to achieve the aforesaid end. Where Vice-Chancellor on account of any mistake or fraud or mala fides passes an order, which on the face of it is in contravention with the provisions of the Act and the Statutes and the Ordinance ; it cannot be said that he is exercising his jurisdiction irregularly or wrongfully. In that were he should be usurping a power which he does not posses. In other words his decision which violates any mandatory provisions of law which he is under a duty to obey would have no existence in the eyes of law and shall be totally inoperative. In that were he should be usurping a power which he does not posses. In other words his decision which violates any mandatory provisions of law which he is under a duty to obey would have no existence in the eyes of law and shall be totally inoperative. It is admitted in the writ petition that the decision to terminate the services of Km. Misra was taken by the Management on July 27. 1974. A letter seeking approval of the Vice-Chancellor was written on August 20, 1974 and the approval was granted on August 22, 1974, A notice to terminate the services of the teacher was addressed to her on August 24,1974. The sequence of events clearly goes to show that the entire procedure adopted by the management to get rid of Km. Misra was in contravention of the mandatory provisions of the Statutes referred to above. The Vice-Chancellor being under a legal duty to enforce the Statutes which has been framed for the benefit of the teachers. He could not have accorded his approval to the proposed termination to Km. Misra's services. The order passed by him on August 22 1974 was therefore non est. 28. The matter may be looked into from another stand point. In case the Vice-Chancellor commits an honest error or mistake in according approval to the termination of service of a teacher under Section 35 (2) of the Act and he subsequently discover es that the order passed by him is in the teeth of the provisions of the Act or the Statutes he has all necessary powers to correct the Said error. The conferment of such wide powers on the Vice-Chancellor under Section 13 of the Act in our opinion includes the power to review the order which has been erroneously passed by him and which runs counter to the provisions of the Act. Statutes and the Ordinance. Even in the powers conferred on the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 (2) of the Act are assumed to be quasi judicial the power to review can be called out on a fair reading of the provisions of law contained in Section 13 of the Act The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review therefore, wholly unsustainable and cannot be accepted. 29. 29. It was next submitted that Vice-Chancellor could not have reviewed his order dated August 22, 1974 without giving to the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. 30. It is the petitioner's own case that in the letter of the Principal dated August 20, 1974 mention been made that the decision to terminate the services of Km. Misra had been taken by the Committee of Management on August 21. It was after obtaining the order from the Vice-Chancellor approving terminating of service of Km. Misra that the Principal of the College arose another letter dated September 6, 1974 to the Assistant Registrar (Affiliation) of the Agra University informing him that in the letter dated August 20, 1974 a typographical error has o curred and that the date of the meeting of the Committee of Management in which decision to terminate the services of Km Misra was taken was wrongly mentioned as 20 4-1974 instead of 27-7-1974. In the letter dated September 6, 1974 it was also recited that the office copy of the letter dated August 20 1974 had been corrected and similar correction may be made to the original of the said letter which was in the office of the Agra University. In paragraph 15 of the writ petition it is stated that the letter of the Principal dated August 20. 1974 along with connected papers was presented to the vice-Chancellor on behalf of the Management. In paragraph 14 of the counter-affidavit of Km. Mithelesh Misra it has been specifically averred that the Principal of the College misrepresented the case before the Vice-Chancellor for obtaining his approval. It is significant that the Principal of the College has not filed any rejoinder affidavit controverting the said allegations made in the counter-affidavit of Km. Misra. On the other hand the rejoinder affidavit has been filed by one Shri D.K. Agarwal, Office Superintendent of the College. He has stated in the rejoinder affidavit that mention of incorrect date in the matter dated August 20, 1974 about the date of the meeting has no relevance to the controversy in question. 31. In the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated October 12, 1974 it is specifically staged that the letter dated August 20, 1974 was presented to him by, the Principal of the College. 31. In the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated October 12, 1974 it is specifically staged that the letter dated August 20, 1974 was presented to him by, the Principal of the College. This lends considerable support to the contents of Kumari Misra that the Principal of the College misrepresented the facts to the Vice-Chancellor while obtaining his approval. This fact is further fortified by the sequence of events. In case the letter dated August 23, 1974 has been sent by the Principal of the College, with the relevant papers, to the office of the Registrar, Agra University by post the letters Droving the termination of Km. Misra could not have been obtained with alacrity on 24th August 1474. 32. It is in the back around of these facts that we have to examine the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner which we have just now mentioned. This well settled that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules of law. The courts look into various circumstances before coming to the conclusion that a Tribunal or authority has violated such rules. In the instant case according to the petitioner's own case as disclosed in the writ petition and also taken up by film before the Chancellor or the Vice-Chancellor the conclusion is in es capable that the termination of the services of Km. Misra was not in accordance with clauses (7) and (8) of Statute 30 referred to above. We invited learned counsel for the petitioner to place before us facts which the petitioner could have placed before the Vice-Chancellor in order to justify the order dated August 20, 1974 so as to save it from the invalidity arising from the violation of the aforesaid clauses of Statute 30. He was unable to do so. 33. In view of these facts we are of the opinion that giving an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard before passing the order dated October 12, 1974 would have been mete formality and no useful purpose would have been served. 34. Normally speaking we could have been persuaded to hold that the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated October 12, 1974 was void as no opportunity hid been given to the petitioner to be heard in support of the earlier order dated August 22. 1974 which was conveyed to the petitioner through letter of the Registrar dated August 24, 1974. 34. Normally speaking we could have been persuaded to hold that the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated October 12, 1974 was void as no opportunity hid been given to the petitioner to be heard in support of the earlier order dated August 22. 1974 which was conveyed to the petitioner through letter of the Registrar dated August 24, 1974. However, in view of the facts stated above ne see no justification to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner. 35. In the view which we are taken we are supported by the following observations contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. P.K. Roy, ( AIR 1968 SC 850 ) "But the extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jacket of "a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the Statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case (see the decision of this Court in Shri Bhagwan v. Ramchand (1965) 3 SCR 218 at page 222 : AIR 1965 SC 1767 at page 1770". 36. On behalf of the petitioner it has been urged that the Vice Chancellor of the Agra University has not filed any counter-affidavit to explain the circumstances in which he passed the order dated October 12. 1974 impugned in this writ petition. On behalf of this respondents it has been pointed out that since the Vice Chancellor of the Agri University has not been impleaded as a party to these proceedings the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine on that ground alone. The arguments advanced on behalf of the counsel for the respondents placed the counsel for the petitioner on the defensive and he tried to support the propriety or the writ petition by referring it the well known case of Hari Vishnu Komath and others. v. Ahmad Ishaque, ( AIR 1955 SC 233 ) In that case the writ petition was directed against the order passed by the Election Tribunal constituted under the Representation of People Act, 1951. v. Ahmad Ishaque, ( AIR 1955 SC 233 ) In that case the writ petition was directed against the order passed by the Election Tribunal constituted under the Representation of People Act, 1951. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the Election tribunal as it was then constituted under the aforesaid Act was an ad hoc body set up for determination of a particular election petition. Alter After the dentition of the Election Petition entrusted to it for decision the Tribunal became fundus officio and as such the writ of certiorari could not be issued to quash the order of the said Tribunal. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court and it held that writ of certrotari is directed against the record which could be brought up only through human agency. It is issued to the person in authority whose decision has to be reviewed. In the record of the decision of that case has to he reviewed by certiorari then the fact that the Tribunal has become fundus officio subsequent to the decision could have no effect on the jurisdiction of Court to remove the record. It was further observed that a writ of certiorari only demolishes the offending order and the presence of the offending Tribunal before the court thought proper was not necessary for exercising the jurisdiction to render its decision under Article 226 ineffective. 37. In other words the contention of the learned counsel was that since new University has come into existence known as the Rohilkhand University to which the college now stands affiliated it was not necessary for the petitioners to implead the Vice Chancellor of the Agra University as Party to the writ petition. It was conceded by the learned counsel that the Agra University had become functus officio at the time of the filing of the writ petition in so far as the colleges was concerned. 38. We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the writ petition is not improperly constituted on account of the fact that the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University has not been impleaded as respondent. Nevertheless the petitioner is not entitled to blow hot and cold in the same breath. 38. We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the writ petition is not improperly constituted on account of the fact that the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University has not been impleaded as respondent. Nevertheless the petitioner is not entitled to blow hot and cold in the same breath. He cannot be permitted to urge that an adverse inference should be drawn against the respondents as the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University has not filed a counter-affidavit to explain the circumstances in which he passed the impugned order. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University should have given an hearing to the petitioner before passing the order dated October 12. 1974 the petitioner's case is not improved. All that has been said on behalf of the petitioner is that the said order of the Vice-Chancellor is vitiated on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. To remedy a situation like this powers have been conferred on the Chancellor to hear a representation by Section 68 of the Act. The said section provides that the decision of the Chancellor on the question referred to him shall be final. We have already stated that the petitioner actually made such a representation to the Chancellor which has been rejected by him. The order passed by the Vice Chancellor of the Agra University on October 12,1974 has therefore merged in the order of the Chancellor. Even if there was any infirmity in the order of the Vice-Chancellor the same stands cured by the order passed by the Chancellor. 39. At one time there existed some doubt about the interpretation of the decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of State of U.P. v. Mohd Nonh ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ). That case was considered by the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal Rungta v. Government of Orissa, (AIR 1963 SC 1513). Wancho J. speaking for the court observed "We are of the opinion that the facts of Mohd Noon's case, ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) were the special kind and the reasoning of that case would not apply to the facts of the present case" 40. Wancho J. speaking for the court observed "We are of the opinion that the facts of Mohd Noon's case, ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) were the special kind and the reasoning of that case would not apply to the facts of the present case" 40. The case of Mohd Nooh (supra) was again considered by the Supreme Court in the Collector of Customs Calcutta v. East India Commercial Company Ltd., ( AIR 1963 SC 1124 ) . In that case respondent had imported some mineral oil. Out of this quantity Collector of Customs confiscate 150 drains by an order dated September 20. 1950. He also imposed penalty of Rs. 61.000 oh the respondent under the Sea Customs Act. The respondent appealed to the Central Board of Revenue under Section 188 of that Act and that appeal was also dismissed in April 1952. Thereupon the respondent filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was allowed. Oh appeal to the Supreme Court a question of jurisdiction was raised. On behalf of the Collector of Customs it was contended that the order passed by him had merged in the order passed by the Central Board of Revenue which was located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta which had allowed the writ petition. According to the appellant in that case the proceedings before the Calcutta High Court distinguishing the case of Mohd Nooh (supra) accepted this contention and held : - "In law the appellate order of confirmation is as quite efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal of modification. According to the appellant in that case the proceedings before the Calcutta High Court distinguishing the case of Mohd Nooh (supra) accepted this contention and held : - "In law the appellate order of confirmation is as quite efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal of modification. Therefore the appellate authority is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court is seems difficult to hold, even in a case where the appellate authority has confirmed the order of the original authority that the High Court could issue a writ to the original authority which may even have the effect of setting aside the order of the original authority when it cannot issue a writ to the appellate authority which has confirmed the order of the original authority We, therefore, feel that on principle when once the order of an original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority, which is located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order of the latter authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of, and as the High Court cannot issue a writ against the appellate authority for want of territorial jurisdiction, it would not be open to it to issue a writ to the original authority which may be within its territorial jurisdiction once the appeal is disposed of, though it may be that the appellate authority has merely confirmed the order of the original authority and dismissed the appeal". 41. It may be stated here that in the case of Collector of Customs, Calcutta (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with the case which came up for its consideration prior to amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution by the insertion of clause 1-A in the said Article. 42. The Supreme Court again considered the principle of merger in the case of Somnath Sahu v. Secretary to the Government of Orissa, [(1969) 3 SC 384], The appellant in that case was an employee of the Indian Aluminium Company Limited. He was dismissed from service by the appropriate authority. He preferred an appeal before the State Government which was also dismissed on January 2, 1962. Thereupon the appellant in that case filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Orissa High Court which was also dismissed. He then preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court. He was dismissed from service by the appropriate authority. He preferred an appeal before the State Government which was also dismissed on January 2, 1962. Thereupon the appellant in that case filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Orissa High Court which was also dismissed. He then preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court. The said Court assumed in favour of the appellant that the order passed by the appointing authority was illegal but further held that the said order had merged with the appellate order of the State Government and since there was no infirmity in the appellate order petitioner had no right is maintain the writ petition and the appeal preferred by him was accordingly dismissed. 43. The same question again arose before the Supreme Court in Gojer Bros v. Katan Lal. The court after carefully considering all the relevant decisions on the question reaffirmed that when an appeal is preferred against the order of the original authority any infirmity in the order of the original authority it cured by the order of the appellate authority with which the order passed by the original authority merges. 44. On behalf of the petitioner it was also urged that the Chancellor has committed a manifest error in not giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. We do net feel impressed, by this submission. A reading of Section 68 of the Act clearly shows that no personal hearing is provided to the parties under the said provision. It is right to say that opportunity of personal hearing is not a part of the principle of natural justice. No other infirmity in the order of the Chancellor has been brought to our notice. 45. Before parting with this case we may state that after the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 22nd August 1974 it was the petitioner who brought the alleged typographical error in the letter seeking approval of the Vice Chancellor to the termination of the petitioner's service The said letter was written by the Principal of the College on September 6, 1974. Km. Misra made her representation to the Vice-Chancellor as late as October 2, 1974. A reading of the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated October 14, 1974, discloses that the said order was passed on reading of the material placed before him by the petitioner and Km. Misra. Km. Misra made her representation to the Vice-Chancellor as late as October 2, 1974. A reading of the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated October 14, 1974, discloses that the said order was passed on reading of the material placed before him by the petitioner and Km. Misra. The petitioner cannot make grievance of the fact that the Vice-Chancellor did not act in a credulous manner and refused to accept his explanation that the error in the letter dated 20th August, 1974 was a typographical error. Even if the said error was a typographical error the proceedings taken by the petitioner for terminating the service of Km. Misra cannot be said to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Statutes. 46. The petitioner has failed to point out any legal infirmity in clauses (7) and (8) of Statute 30 We find noting therein which may be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The petitioner's contention that clauses C) and (8) of Statute 30 are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act must be rejected. 47. Learnen counsel for the petitioner did not make any submission on behalf of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 835 of 1977. It appears that success of Writ Petition No. 835 of 1977 depends upon the result of Writ Petition No. 787 of 1977. 48. In view of our discussion we hold that the Vice-Chancellor had jurisdiction to review his order dated 22nd August. 1974, as it was obtained on a misrepresentation of facts. We further hold that the Vice-Chancellor should have given an opportunity 10 the petitioner before the order dated October 14, 1977, was passed, but the absence of such opportunity does nor vitiate the order had itself been passed on the material furnished by the Principal of the College. The order of review was passed by the Vice-Chancellor at the instance of the petitioner itself. But even if petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing before the order of review was passed, the defect stood removed by the order of the Chancellor. The petitioner was given full opportunity to make all the representation before the Chancellor. The order of the Chancellor was passed after taking into consideration the submissions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The Chancellor's order does not suffer from any manifest error of law warranting interference by this court. The petitioner was given full opportunity to make all the representation before the Chancellor. The order of the Chancellor was passed after taking into consideration the submissions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The Chancellor's order does not suffer from any manifest error of law warranting interference by this court. No personal order hearing is necessary, to be given by the Chancellor in each case and in the absence of any opportunity being -given to the petitioner the order of the Chancellor is not vitiated as the petitioner was afforded opportunity to make his submissions against the order of the Vice-Chancellor which was the subject-matter of dispute before the Chancellor. Even marits, the petitioner has failed to show that the services of Km. Mithlesh Misra were terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Statutes framed thereunder In our opinion her services were terminated in violation of clauses (7) and (8) of Statute 30 as a result of which the order of termination was rendered invalid. The Chancellor in our opinion rightly refused to interfere with the Vice Chancellor'order. 49. In the result both the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs,