ORDER A. N. Varma, J. -This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is directed against the orders passed by the learned District Judge, Agra dated 12th Feb., 1977 and 13th January, 1978. 2. The relevant facts are these :- The dispute is about a shop of which Haji Gulabuddin was the owner. He died a few days before 22nd January, 1975 on which date the petitioner moved an application for allotment of the said shop on the ground that the shop had fallen vacant. A number of other persons also applied for the allotment of the same. By an order dated 9th May, 1975 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer held that the shop in dispute was neither vacant nor was it likely to fall vacant. On this ground all the applications including that of the petitioner were dismissed. The petitioner filed no appeal against this order. An appeal was, however, filed by respondent No. 10. In this appeal, the petitioner made an application for being impleaded as a respondent. It appears that no orders were passed on this application. The appeal of the respondent No. 10 was dismissed in default on 18th March, 1976. Before the dismissal of the appeal the respondent No. 3 Subhash Chandra made an application for allotment of the shop on the ground that it was likely to fall vacant. On this application the Area Rationing Officer called for a report from the Rent Control Inspector. The Rent Control Inspector reported that the shop was likely to fall vacant. On the basis of the report, the shop was allotted to the respondent No. 3 namely Sri Subhash Chandra. It appears that the landlord had also signified his assent to the shop being allotted to the respondent No. 3 upon the application of the said respondent No. 3. The petitioner, thereafter filed an appeal under Section 18 of the Act before the learned District Judge along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the same. The petitioner also filed an affidavit along with the application for condonation of delay alleging that the order of the allotment had been obtained as a result of misrepresentation of facts and collusion between the allottee and the landlords. The petitioner also filed an affidavit along with the application for condonation of delay alleging that the order of the allotment had been obtained as a result of misrepresentation of facts and collusion between the allottee and the landlords. It was also alleged that the appellant came to know about the order of allotment on 7-4-1976, when he made an application for inspection which resulted in the discovery of the circumstances in which the order of allotment was obtained. The learned District Judge has by the impugned order dated 12-2-1977 rejected the application for condonation of delay. The petitioner, thereafter, filed application for review which has also been dismissed by the learned District Judge by an order dated 13th January, 1978. 3. It is against the aforesaid orders that the present writ petition was filed in this court on 29th March, 1978. By the order dated 12th Feb., 1977 the learned District Judge rejected the application both on the ground that the petitioner was not "aggrieved person" in so far as the present proceedings for allotment commenced on the application of the respondent No. 3 were concerned as well as on the ground that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the view of the learned District Judge that the petitioner was not an aggrieved person was manifestly erroneous in law. Learned counsel also contended that the review application of the petitioner has also been dismissed on the grounds which are untenable. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 on the other hand urged that both the orders under challenge are perfectly legal and proper and call for no interference by this court. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the petition is highly belated having been filed more than one year after the date on which the substantive order was passed. Learned counsel urged that the petitioner ought not to be granted any indulgence for the period during which his review application was pending, inasmuch as, the review petition was on the face of it misconceived, there being no provision for review. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the-parties, I find no merits in this petition. I agree with the learned District Judge that, inasmuch as, the petitioner had filed no appeal against the order passed by the Rent. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the-parties, I find no merits in this petition. I agree with the learned District Judge that, inasmuch as, the petitioner had filed no appeal against the order passed by the Rent. Control & Eviction Officer rejecting the petitioners application for allotment by his order dated 9-5-1975 and further the petitioner not having moved any application for allotment after a vacancy was declared by the subsequent order dated 12th March, 1976 and until the shop was allotted in favour of respondent No. 3 on 19th March, 1976, he cannot be regarded as an aggrieved person. Learned counsel for respondent is right in his submission that under the relevant Rules framed under the aforesaid Act, the fact of. vacancy is notified by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the mode prescribed by law and any one interested in the allotment of the accommodation can make an application. In the present case also the vacancy was duly notified. The petitioner made no application for allotment for full one week. That the matter was pending between the 12th of March, 1976 and 19th March, 1976. The mere fact, therefore, that at some prior stage when an attempt was made to have the shop allotted the petitioner had made an application along with others would not make him an aggrieved person in regard to all future proceedings taken for allotment of the accommodation. Even on the previous occasion when the petitioners application was rejected on 9-5-1975 the petitioner did not choose to file any appeal. Under these circumstances, the learned District Judge cannot be said to have been unjustified in holding that the petitioner was not an aggrieved person entitled to file an appeal. 7. Even if it is held that the petitioner was technically an aggrieved person, I find" absolutely no error in the order of the learned District Judge rejecting the application of the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Learned counsel for the. petitioner was entirely unable to point out any error in the order passed by the learned District Judge holding that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 8. Learned counsel for the. petitioner was entirely unable to point out any error in the order passed by the learned District Judge holding that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 8. I also accept the objection of the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that the petitioner ought to have come to this court at the earliest after the learned District Judge had passed the first order dated 12th Feb., 1977. The proceedings by way of a review petition commenced by the petitioner were entirely misconceived. There is no provision, whatsoever, in U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for a review of an order. Learned counsel placed reliance on Rule 22 (f) in support of his contention that the Act does contain a provision for review. In a case reported in 1978 (UP) RCC 404 a learned Judge of this Court has held that there is no provision for a review, on merits, of any order passed under Section 18 of the aforesaid Act. I agree with the view expressed in the said decision. I am also of the view that Rule 22 (f) of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act only confers powers on the authorities analogous to Section 151 of the C. P. C. which are intended only to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or which may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such a power is entirely different from a power of review on merits. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be given the benefit of the time spent by him in prosecuting a remedy which was ex facie incompetent in law and misconceived. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any error in the order passed by the learned District Judge dated 13th January, 1978. The view taken by the learned District Judge in his order dated 13th January, 1978 is perfectly correct. The petition is, therefore, liable to fail, in any view of the matter. 10. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be, no orders as to costs.