JUDGMENT - Deshpande V.S., J. : - The petitioner is a manufacturing concern. It produces non-ferrous tubes for industrial use. It has about 120 employees including the non-workmen category. Since January 1979, relations between the employers and a section of the workmen, actual strength of whom is a matter of dispute, have become strained because of their demand for better service conditions. These workmen are alleged to have indulged in, go-slow tactics, threats to the officers and acts of assaults on members of the managerial staff and loyal workmen and other acts of violence since January 1979. They went on illegal strike with effect from 13th March 1979. 2. A complaint being Complaint No. 40 was filed by the employers on 11th May 1979, complaining of unfair labour practices on the part of the workmen under Item Nos. 1, 2A and 2B, 5 and 6 of Schedule(III) read with section 27 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971(hereinafter referred to as the Act). Several incidents of violence, claimed to have been indulged in by the work-men, were cited in the complaint, claiming interim relief by way of injunction in terms of Clauses(i), (v) of clause B of para 10 of the complaint. Ad-interim injunction was granted by the Industrial Court on 11th May 1979. The same was confirmed by an exhaustive order dated 18th October 1979 after notice to the workmen. 3. The employers, in the meanwhile, initiated reference proceedings No. 45 of 1979 under section 25 of the Act, on 6-7-1979 for the declaration that the said strike was illegal. The Labour Court tried the reference and declared the strike to be illegal by its order dated 29-l0-1979. The Secretary of the Union representing workmen, present in the Court, immediately informed the Court that the Union was advising the workmen to withdraw this strike. A written note to that effect and advising the workmen to join duties from the next day, was read out by him. The learned Judge endorsed a note thereon directing the employers to take notice of the same. This withdrawal obviously was aimed at getting rid of the illegality as contemplated under section 25(5) of the Act. 4. The next day, on 30-10-1979, the workmen accordingly reported for duty. The learned Judge endorsed a note thereon directing the employers to take notice of the same. This withdrawal obviously was aimed at getting rid of the illegality as contemplated under section 25(5) of the Act. 4. The next day, on 30-10-1979, the workmen accordingly reported for duty. There is a dispute if only seven or all the workmen, so offered to work and reported for duties. The employers, however, showed reluctance to permit the workmen to join duty unless they executed a bond, as a condition precedent, to the following effects:- “I am willing to terminate the strike and resume duties forthwith. Upon resumption of work I am willing to perform my duties sincerely and diligently and continue to give normal output observe normal discipline whilst on duty. I therefore request you to permit me to resume work.” The workmen refused to execute any such bond and insisted on joining duty unconditionally. The employers refused and the stalemate continued. 5. The Union thereupon, filed a Complaint on 26-11-1979 in the Industrial Court, being(ULP) No. 123 of 1979, alleging unfair labour practice on the part of the employers, under Items Nos. 1 and 6 of Schedule II of the Act. According to the Union, the action of the employers in., requiring the workmen to execute the bond as condition precedent for joining the work, and thereby preventing them from work, amounted to “lock out. As the employers resorted to it without giving 14 days advance notice in compliance with-section 24(2), (a) of the Act, the same was illegal. 6. The workmen also made an application for interim reliefs under section 30 of the Act. At the trial of this application for interim reliefs, the workmen relied on the affidavit of one of the workmen Posu Balu Adivasi, while the employers relied on the affidavit of D. T. Shenava, Managing Director of the concern. By his order dated 28th January 1980, the Indus-trial Court held that the Union made out a prima facie case of there being a “lock out” and accordingly directed the employers to allow the workmen to resume their duties within 15 days from the receipt of this order pending the hearing and final disposal of the complaint. The validity of this order is challenged in this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 7. Mr. The validity of this order is challenged in this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 7. Mr. Damania, the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners, contends that the declaration by the Labour Court of the strike being illegal under section 25 of the Act, and withdrawal thereof by the workmen by offering to join the work, to get the illegality wiped out under section 25(5) of the Act, by themselves are not enough, to restore the industrial peace, so essential for proceeding with production. The situation had deteriorated from January 1979 itself. The employers cannot allow the workmen to join work unless there is an assurance from them against the repetition of such incidents of violence and go slow tactics, indulged in by the workmen even before resorting to illegal strike. Reluctance of the employers to accept the workmen without a bond of such assurance, cannot amount to lock out against this back ground. The employers had no desire to stop the work or close their manufacturing concern, or effect any lock out whatsoever as contemplated under the provisions of the Act. But employers find it difficult to allow the workmen to resume duty without necessary assurance. Mr. Damania therefore, contends that finding of the Industrial Court, of a prima facie case of lock out being made out, and directing the petitioners to unconditionally employ them, is unrealistic and unwarranted. 8. The question is, if preventing the workmen from joining duties without executing almost “good conduct bond” amounts a lock out. It is unnecessary to decide whether all or only 52 workmen were on strike and whether only seven or all the workmen on strike reported for duty on 30-10-1979 after Unions declaration of the withdrawal of strike in the Court on 29-10-1979. Mr. Damania conceded that even such preventing of seven workmen, if held to be unjustified, would amount to lock out, against them. Two points arise for consideration. First being, if there is any statutory prohibition against requiring the workmen to execute a good conduct bond. Second being, if there is any justification for insisting on such bond even if there is no such legal prohibition. 9. Dr. Kulkarni, the learned Advocates appearing for the workmen relies on section 27 read with Item 4 of Schedule IV of the Act. Second being, if there is any justification for insisting on such bond even if there is no such legal prohibition. 9. Dr. Kulkarni, the learned Advocates appearing for the workmen relies on section 27 read with Item 4 of Schedule IV of the Act. Section 27 prohibits unfair labour practices, both by employers and employees, while section 28 provides for the trial complaints to that effect and effective reliefs against the same. Schedules II to IV enumerate which acts and omissions amount to unfair labour practices. Item 4 of Schedule IV reads as follows: “To insist upon individual employees, who were -on legal strike, to sign a good conduct-bond, as a pre-condition to allowing them to resume work.” Insisting on a good conduct-bond is no doubt declared under this clause to be an unfair labour practice and is prohibited by section 27 of the Act. Dr. Kulkarni drew our attention to section 25(5) of the Act under which strike declared to be illegal, is to be deemed to be not so illegal, if withdrawn within forty eight hours of such declaration by the Court. Dr. Kulkarni is right in contending that the withdrawal of the strike cannot be nullified by the employers by disallowing them to join on unjustified conditions. The illegal strike, having became legal on its timely withdrawal, insistence on bond, according to Dr. Kulkarni is hit by Item 4. 10. Mr. Damanias answer to this contention is three fold. He firstly contends that, this Item 4 has no application where workmen indulge in illegal strike. He secondly contends that even if the illegality of the strike under the Act is assumed to have been cured under section 25(5) by such supposed withdrawal, Section 25(5) cannot cure the illegality created by other enactments. He thirdly contends that insistence on good conduct bonds on account of reasons unconnected with the strike are outside the pale of this item. 11. Mr. Damanias first contention is based on the distinction, between a legal strike, and a strike declared to be illegal but deemed not to be so illegal on its timely withdrawal, under section 25(5) of the Act, both having different incidence and implications. According to Mr. 11. Mr. Damanias first contention is based on the distinction, between a legal strike, and a strike declared to be illegal but deemed not to be so illegal on its timely withdrawal, under section 25(5) of the Act, both having different incidence and implications. According to Mr. Damania, the act of such withdrawal may save the workmen from penal consequences but cannot relieve the employer from taking steps to avoid repetition of the indiscipline and threats to the persons and the property. This contention is undoubtedly plausible and the true answer depends on the extent and width of the statutory fiction raised under section 25(5) of the Act and, the precise import of the different expressions such as “legal strike”(Item 4 Schedule IV), “strike which is not legal”(Item 8 Schedule IV) “not being a strike which is deemed to be illegal under this Act” [Item 4(b) of Schedule 11], and “the strike not deemed to be illegal” in section 25(5), used in different clauses in different contexts. The decision of this ticklish point does not appear to us to be necessary in this case, as other two points appear to be well founded and show how Dr. Kulkarnis reliance on Item 4 above,1 is misplaced. 12. Admittedly, a settlement reached between a representative Union and the employer on 16-10-1976 was in operation between 7-3-1979 to 30-10-1979, during which period employees continued to be on strike. Section 23(C) of the4 Industrial Disputes Act prohibits employees from going on strike during the operation of any such settlement. Such a strike is illegal under section 24(1), (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The commencement of the strike(1) without 14 days notice and(2) during the operation of settlement, is also illegal under section 24(1), (a) and 24(1), (i) of this Act. Section 25 empowers the Labour Court to declare any such strike to be illegal. It is obvious that the Labour Court can take notice of the illegality arising out of the breach of section 24(1) of this Act, and not the illegality under the Industrial Disputes Act. 13. Section 25 empowers the Labour Court to declare any such strike to be illegal. It is obvious that the Labour Court can take notice of the illegality arising out of the breach of section 24(1) of this Act, and not the illegality under the Industrial Disputes Act. 13. Section 25(5) of the Act reads as follows: “Where any strike or lock out declared to be illegal under this section is withdrawn within forty-eight hours of such declaration, such strike or lock-out shall not, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be illegal under this Act.” The concluding words “under this Act” and preceding words “for the purpose of this Act” only go to emphasise that, it is the illegality created by the breach of section 24(1) of this Act, and not the one created by or under any other Act, that is contemplated to be wiped out under section 25(5) of the Act on withdrawal of the strike. Such withdrawal of the strike cannot wipe out the illegality created by section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The fact.that the act or omission covered by section 24(1), (i) of this Act and section 23(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, happens to be same, is, besides the point and makes no difference to the illegality under section 24(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it being beyond the scope of section 25 of this Act. This continued illegality of the strike makes Item 4 of the Schedule IV, inapplicable to the act of the employers. It is attracted only when strike is legal. 14. There is also much substance in the third contention of Mr. Damania, Unfair labour practice under this item, consists of insisting on bond from the workmen, who were on legal strike. Underlying object in treating it as an unfair labour practice appears to be to extend protection to the workmen against possible humiliation or victimisation for their legitimate trade union activities. The clause has no reference where bond is insisted in a situation de-hors of and unconnected with any such “strike“. There is no nexus between the reasons for such bond and the strike of the workmen in this case. The clause has no reference where bond is insisted in a situation de-hors of and unconnected with any such “strike“. There is no nexus between the reasons for such bond and the strike of the workmen in this case. No such question of humiliation or victimisation can arise when ill-advised workmen are found to be bent on indulging in acts of assaults and violence, intimidation, go slow tactics and other illegal activities in defiance of legal provisions, standing orders, and rules of conduct implicit in accepting jobs by them. Item 4 of Schedule IV is thus inapplicable to the situation in this case on this ground also. 15. Dr. Kulkarni then contends that, making joining the work, conditional on workmens executing a bond amounts to refusal to employ the workmen on its muster roll and consequently to “lock out”. The Industrial Court has accepted this contention saying that what is sought to be imposed under the bond is implicit in the terms of service under which any employee accepts the job. The word “lock out” is not defined under the Act. Section 3(18) however, adopts the definitions set out in the Industrial Disputes Act. The lock out is defined under section 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as follows: “Lock out” means the closing of a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him.” The following classic passage from the Supreme Court judgment in the case of. Karibetta Estate v. Rajamanickam reported in A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 893 quoted by the Industrial Court itself, is illustrative of the basic concept thereof. The relevant portion of it can be conveniently quoted here for ready reference: “Even so the essential character of a lock out continues to be substantially the same. Lock-out can be described as the antithesis of a strike. Just as a strike is a weapon available to the employees for enforcing their industrial demand, a lock out is a weapon available to the employer to persuade by a coercive process the employees, to see his point, of view and to accept his demand.” 16. Lock-out can be described as the antithesis of a strike. Just as a strike is a weapon available to the employees for enforcing their industrial demand, a lock out is a weapon available to the employer to persuade by a coercive process the employees, to see his point, of view and to accept his demand.” 16. Thus mere refusal to employ any number of workmen does not amount to lock out unless, the coercive process involved in it, is aimed at persuading the employers “to see his point of view” and to accept his demands. As seen earlier, the employers insist on execution of this bond to ensure avoidance of the “go slow tactics” and act of assaults and violence alleged to have been indulged in by the workmen from January 1979, even as prelude to the commencement of their illegal strike on 13-3-1979 and continued even during the period of the strike. This according to the employers became indispensable due to the attitude of naked defiance displayed by the workmen throughout, in addition to resorting to illegal strike. In the event of this being true, the employers cannot but be said to have been justified in insisting on such a bond by way of an assurance. By seeking an assurance, not to act in defiance of law and the Rules and, to act according to the terms of the employment, the employers cannot be said to be making any “demands” on the workmen nor can they be said to have any “point of view” excepting what is implicit in the terms of the employment. It is difficult to concieve of any employee having any different view on this point. Any dispute about demand, and need to resort to coercive process arises ordinarily when the demand lacks the sanction of contract or law. Insistence on bond as condition, therefore, cannot amount to refusal to employ or “lock out”. That the legislature should have restricted the prohibition against such bonds to workmen going on “legal strike” under the above Item 4, pre-supposes its awareness of the needs thereof in different situations and permissibility thereof to meet the same. 17. Yet another passage from the judgment of Goswami J. of the Supreme Court in the case of(Priya Laxmi Mills Ltd. v. Mazdoor Mahajan Mandal, Baroda)1,. 17. Yet another passage from the judgment of Goswami J. of the Supreme Court in the case of(Priya Laxmi Mills Ltd. v. Mazdoor Mahajan Mandal, Baroda)1,. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2587, at page 2587.fortifies this view of ours : “It should, however, be made clear that lock out cannot be declared also for reason similar to those described in the present notice of lock out. In that case although, it will be lock-out in another sense, it may not be a lock out within the meaning of section 3(24) of the Act. That kind of a lock-out with the avowed object of preventing violence and threat to life and property may even be justified on facts in a given case. In such a situation it may be difficult to prove that it is an illegal lock-out since in an illegal lock-out the sole object is to compel the workmen to accept the terms of the employer which the workers consider as unreasonable and oppressive.” 18. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of a Division Bench, of which one of us(i.e. myself) was member in, (The Premier Automobiles Ltd.and others v. G. R..Sapre and another)2. Spl. Civil Appln. Nos 878 of 1979 with 1512 of 1979 and Civil Appln. No. 3111of 1979 dated 24-9-1979.Employers therein justified abrupt suspension work without any notice, on the apprehension of threats to their property and personnel at the Kalyan plant. The question whether this amounts to lock out or not was kept open, as it was found on evidence that, though such threat existed at their Kurla plant, there was no evidence of any such threat at the Kalyan plant, stoppage of work at which was the subject matter in dispute. It was also further found that the stoppage of work was aimed at coercing the union to withdraw its claim for recognition at Kurla plant. 19. The only real question is, if the allegations against the workmen are true or just a pretence to deny work to them. The employers appear to have succeeded in making out a good prima facie case of the same being true and for insisting on the bond of good conduct in this case. Mr. Damania drew our attention to the affidavit filed on behalf of the employers in the Industrial Court in reply to the Unions complaint dated 26th November 1979. The employers appear to have succeeded in making out a good prima facie case of the same being true and for insisting on the bond of good conduct in this case. Mr. Damania drew our attention to the affidavit filed on behalf of the employers in the Industrial Court in reply to the Unions complaint dated 26th November 1979. The said affidavit refers to several specific incidents involving acts of assaults and violence on the part of the employees. The affidavit also extensively refers to the “go slow tactics” indulged in by the employees since January 1979. Surprisingly enough, no attempt was made on behalf of the complainant-workmen to refute these allegations. Identical specific allegations were made by the employers in their earlier complaint No. 40 of 1979. It is on the strength of these averments that the Industrial Court was constrained to confirm the injunction by its order dated 18th October 1979. It appears from the said order that even in that complaint, workmen had not cared to refute these allegations by filing any affidavit, though, written statement was filed, without swearing to the averments therein on oath. In these circumstances; we shall have to proceed on the basis that allegations made by the workmen in the said complaint as also in the affidavit filed in reply to the present complaint, of the workmen, out of which this writ application arises, are prima facte true. It also appears that even the order of injunction dated 11-5-1979 passed by the Industrial Court in the employers complaint of unfair labour practice by the employees, could not dissuade the workmen from the illegal strike. The workmen continued in the illegal acts with impunity. This only demonstrates how the implicit assurance in the terms of the employment on which the trial Judge so much relies, has proved to be empty. The employers, in the circumstance appearing on the record at present, were justified in insisting on such good conduct bond from the employees as condition precedent to joining the work. The conclusion would be different if ultimately at the end of the trial facts turned out to be different. 20. Such insistence by the employers on good conduct bond is not without precedent. It is useful to refer to the judgments in the case of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and others v. S.(Taki Belgrami and another)3 1970 Mh. The conclusion would be different if ultimately at the end of the trial facts turned out to be different. 20. Such insistence by the employers on good conduct bond is not without precedent. It is useful to refer to the judgments in the case of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and others v. S.(Taki Belgrami and another)3 1970 Mh. L.J. 734.and in the case of(Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory P. Ltd. v. Motipur Sugar Factory)4. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1803. In both these cases, the employers were driven to ask for such bonds in view of the continued “go slow tactics” and obstruction to production. The Court could not find any fault with the employers. Consequential refusal to take them on work was upheld by the Court. Thus employer was justified on insisting on the bond in the circumstances prima-facie established. 21. This must however, be borne in mind that the dividing line between justified and unjustified insistence on such bonds is very thin. The Court has to scrupulously guard against the danger of this being abused making it just a pretext for coercing workmen to give up their just struggle with legitimate means. 22. Dr. Kulkarni contends that this Act is a special enactment and has the effect of repealing the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act impliedly. We are unable to see any basis for this contention. Schedule I of the Act, to which Dr. Kulkarni drew our attention, only indicates to what extent Industrial Disputes Act stands amended. Plain implication is that the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act remain intact and effective excepting to the extent to which it is amended under Schedule 1. There is nothing in the said amendment to modify section 23 or section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act under which also this strike is found to have been illegal. Dr. Kulkarni also contends that the assent of the President to this enactment has the effect of repealing the Industrial Disputes Act because of Article 254 of the Constitution. The question of attracting Article 254 of the Constitution cannot arise unless conditions indicated in the Article are shown to have been fulfilled. We are unable to see the relevance of Article 254 in this case. 23. The result is that application succeeds, and rule is made absolute. The question of attracting Article 254 of the Constitution cannot arise unless conditions indicated in the Article are shown to have been fulfilled. We are unable to see the relevance of Article 254 in this case. 23. The result is that application succeeds, and rule is made absolute. It is necessary to make it clear that any observations in this judgment will not prevent the Industrial Court from disposing of the main complaint on merits in accordance with law. 24. Rule made absolute. 25. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute -----