JUDGMENT : R.R. Rastogi, J. These two appeals filed by the Defendant Jagdish Prasad Gupta can be conveniently disposed of together. They arise out of two suits filed by the Plaintiffs-Respondents for ejectment of the Defendant-Appellant from two different shops and for recovery of rent and damages. On Pati Ram was owner of the disputed shops and the Defendant-Appellant was the tenant of the same on his behalf. Pati Ram made a transfer of these shops in favour of Plaintiffs who are his daughter-in-law and grand sons, by means of a gift deed dated 10-9-1968 and delivered possession to them. The disputed shops had been built after 1951 and thus U P. Act III of 1947 was not applicable to them. The Defendant fell in arrears of rent and on 30th October, 1969, he was served with a notice of termination of his tenancy. Since he did not comply with that notice, these two suits were filed against him. 2. The Defendant contested the suit. The trial court framed relevant issues and after recording the evidence decreed both of them. Being aggrieved the Defendant-Appellant filed appeals which came up for hearing before the Civil Judge Agra. During the pendency of these appeals the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as “U.P. Act XIII of 1972” came into force with effect from 15th of July, 1972, and the Defendant-Appellant made an application u/s 39 of this Act. The Defendant-Appellant deposited the amount of the rent along with costs of the suit etc. and before the court below it was not disputed on behalf of the Plaintiff-Respondents that the amount so deposited represented the correct amount which the Defendant was required to deposit. The court below, however, did not extend, the benefit of this section to the Defendant for the reason that in his written statement be had denied the title of the Plaintiffs and, in the opinion of the Court below, that denial was “willful and malafide.” In the result the decree passed by the trial court were confirmed. Being aggrieved the Defendant Appellant has filed the present appeals before this Court. 3. Being aggrieved the Defendant Appellant has filed the present appeals before this Court. 3. Two submissions were made before me on behalf of the Defendant Appellant: firstly, that the court below erred in holding that the Defendant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 since he had denied the Plaintiffs' title in his written statement. According to the learned Counsel ejectment of the Defendant had not been sought on the ground of forfeiture and even after the Defendant had taken a plea in his written statement disputing the title of the Plaintiffs to the disputed property, no replication was filed nor was any application given to amend the plaint. In the same connection it was submitted that the denial must precede the filing of the suit and if a denial is made in the written statement only, it would not change the nature of the suit. Another submission made was that the Defendant-Appellant had merely denied the Plaintiff's title with a view to put them to prove their title for his satisfaction and in doing to he had neither set up the title in respect of the property in dispute in himself nor he had supported the title of any other person in respect thereof and thus, there was no forfeiture in the eye of law. 4. After hearing counsel for parties I am of the opinion that the view taken by the court below in this behalf is not correct. Section 39 of U P. Act 13 of 1972 makes provisions for pending suits, for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time. On the date of enforcement of this Act the present suit for eviction of the tenant was pending and it was from a building to which U P. Act III of 1947 did not apply. The Defendant-Appellant did deposit the required amount within the period of one month from the date of the commencement of this Act. The benefit of this section has, however been denied to him on the ground that a decree for eviction could have been passed against him on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to Sub-section (1) or in Clauses (b) to (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20. The benefit of this section has, however been denied to him on the ground that a decree for eviction could have been passed against him on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to Sub-section (1) or in Clauses (b) to (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20. Clause (f) of Sub-section (2) which is relevant for the present purpose reads as under: (2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely-- (f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord, and the latter has not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. It would be seen that Section 20 of this Act like Section 3 of U P. Act 3 of 1947 places a bar on the right of the landlord to file a suit for eviction of his tenant from a property under tenancy. In case the tenant can be attributed with the lapses mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of U P. Act 3 of 1947 or Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the present Act, this bar is lifted. One of these lapses is denial of the title of the landlord by the tenant or renouncing on his part his character as tenant and this conduct of the tenant has not been condoned by the landlord or he has not waived his right of re-entry, for what amounts to forfeiture, it would be necessary to refer to Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. This section provides for “determination of lease. A lease of Immovable property determines by efflux of the time limited thereby ; or by express or Implied surrender or other eventualities mentioned in Clauses (a) to (h) of this section. This section provides for “determination of lease. A lease of Immovable property determines by efflux of the time limited thereby ; or by express or Implied surrender or other eventualities mentioned in Clauses (a) to (h) of this section. Clause (g) provides for determination of lease by forfeiture and it says that a lease of Immovable property determines by forfeiture, that is to say,-(l) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as much by setting up a title in third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lesser may reenter on the happening of such event and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. 5. It would be seen that this clause provides for certain events when forfeiture is said to take place and apart from that in the event of any of the three events mentioned therein occurring the lessor or his transferee is further required to give a notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. On a plain reading of this provision it would be seen that in the instant case the Plaintiffs-Respondents could not have been granted a decree for the eviction of the Defendant-Appellant from the disputed shops on this ground because the latter condition had not been fulfilled. No notice had been given by the Plaintiff-Respondents in writing to the lessee of their intention to determine the lease on the ground of forfeiture. 6. One of the controversies which had been raised in this case in connection with this question is that the denial of the title must precede the filing of the suit. In principle no fault can be found with this proposition, but the answer to the question depends on the fact and circumstances of each case. It is correct that the nature of a suit as set out in the plaint cannot be changed by pleas taken in defence. It cannot be lost sight of that the present suit was filed in 1970 when U P. Act 13 of 1972 had not come into effect. It is correct that the nature of a suit as set out in the plaint cannot be changed by pleas taken in defence. It cannot be lost sight of that the present suit was filed in 1970 when U P. Act 13 of 1972 had not come into effect. U P. Act III of 1947 was not applicable to the disputed properties and under the general provisions contained in the Transfer of Property Act the lease was determined and suits were filed for ejectment of the tenant. The written statement was filed also before U P. Act 13 of 1972 came into effect. This Act became applicable at a time when the matter was pending in the first appeal. That being so, with some justification it can be said that the denial had been made before the benefit of the Act was invoked by the Defendant-Appellant. However, without going into the question further it has to be seen whether or not the pleas set up in paras 3 and 11 of the written statement can amount to forfeiture within the eye of law. It hardly needs mention that the defence taken in the written statement in this behalf is to be read as a whole. Para 3 of the written statement contains the denial of the Defendant to the allegations made in para 3 of the plaint. In para 3 of the plaint it was alleged by the Plaintiffs that Pati Ram executed a gift deed on 10-9-68 in favour of the Plaintiff of his entire property and delivered possession to them and that the gift deed was duly registered and since then the Plaintiffs have been in possession of that property as owners and that all that was within the knowledge of the Defendant and he paid rent to them. It was further stated that Pati Ram had died. In para 3 of the written statement it was stated by the Defendant that Pati Ram did not execute any gift deed in favour of the Plaintiffs on 10-9-1968 or on any other date nor did he deliver possession of his property to the Plaintiffs. At the alleged time of the gift deed Pati Ram was physically not in a condition to execute any gift deed. At the alleged time of the gift deed Pati Ram was physically not in a condition to execute any gift deed. He had been ill and was not in a position to understand any thing and the alleged gift deed does not bear his signature and in case there was any gift deed it must have been obtained by exercise of fraud, undue influence etc. and that it would not create any right in favour of the Plaintiffs. It was also stated that the Defendant paid rent to the Plaintiffs on the fraudulent representation that Pati Ram had made a gift in their favour. He wanted the Plaintiff to show the gift deed to him but they did not do so and stopped accepting rent from him and extended threats to him to file a suit for his ejectment. Thereafter he sent the rent by money order but the same was refused. It was also stated that the Defendant was always willing to pay the rent and he wanted to satisfy himself after seeing the original gift deed that in fact Pati Ram had executed any such gift or not and that the Plaintiffs could realise the rent from him. The averment made in para 11 is prior to the same effect but in brief. 7. My attention has been invited by the learned Counsel for the Defendant Appellant to a decision of this Court in Ram Das v. Lachman Janki 1961 AWR 510 in which the principles governing forfeiture have been elaborated. It has been laid down that “the question of forfeiture of tenancy is often beset with difficulty. There is a plethora of cases, both Indian and foreign on the topic, but a search for an exactly applicable authority would often go unrewarded. It is, therefore, necessary to be clear about the principles that surround and govern forfeiture of tenancy rights.” These principles have been enumerated as under: (1) The denial of the landlord's title must be unequivocal and absolutely definite, for the law strongly leans against forfeiture. (2) When the landlord's title is denied in written, the writing should be construed as a whole without giving undue emphasis to one or the other part of it. (2) When the landlord's title is denied in written, the writing should be construed as a whole without giving undue emphasis to one or the other part of it. The writing should be examined with a view to ascertain whether the writer really intended to renounce his character as lessee by setting up a title to the demised property in himself or in a third party. When the writing consists of a written statement, it should not be over-looked that pleadings in our country are often marked by prolixity and flourish, and in interpreting pleadings due allowance should be made for these inveterate defects. (3) The onus of proving forfeiture of tenancy rights lies on the landlord-Plaintiff and (4) The lessee may in good faith and for his own protection put the transferee of his lessor to strict proof of his title to the demised property before making payment to him. 8. If these principles are applied to the present case, it is difficult to hold that there was forfeiture of tenancy rights. It may be noted that the Defendant-Appellant had taken the disputed shops on rent from Pati Ram. Ho never disputed the title of Pati Ram. The Plaintiff Respondents claimed title to the disputed property in the life time of Pati Ram on the basis of a gift deed executed in their favour by Pati Ram. The Defendant had certainly paid rent to the Plaintiffs directly and bad also sent the same by money orders to them. By implication, therefore, he had accepted the right of the Plaintiffs to realise the rent from him. Now, when in his written statement he disputed the execution of the gift deed as also attributed fraud, misrepresentation etc. in the execution of it, the only purpose could have been to put the Plaintiffs to prove their title for making payment of rent by him to them. If the written statement is read shorn of the flourish contained therein, the substance of the plea would be that the Plaintiffs were put to prove right to realise rent from the Defendant on the basis of the aforesaid gift deed. The Defendant-Appellant did not renounce his character as lessee by setting up a title in third person or by claiming title in himself. 9. The Defendant-Appellant did not renounce his character as lessee by setting up a title in third person or by claiming title in himself. 9. It is, therefore, not possible for me to agree with the court below that this denial was malafide or in any way motivated. 10. From whatever aspect, therefore, the matter is examined, the Defendant Appellant could not have been denied the benefit of Section 39 of U P. Act 13 of 1972. The case would not be covered by Clause (f) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 because a notice for determination of tenancy on the ground of forfeiture as contemplated by Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act read with Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of U P. Act 13 of 1972 had not been given and apart from that the denial of Plaintiff's title in the written statement can not lead to determination of lease by forfeiture of tenancy rights. 11. These appeals, therefore, succeed and are allowed and the judgment and decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside. The suits of the Plaintiffs-Respondents in so far as the relief of ejectment of the Defendant-Appellant from the shops in dispute is concerned, are dismissed. The Plaintiffs-Respondents will be entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited by the, Defendant-Appellant in the two suits. Parties will bear their own costs although.