JUDGMENT-In 1973 the respondent was a Sub-Inspector of Police attached to the Yellowgate Police-Station, Bombay. On July 26, 1973 the respondent's residence at flat No.11, 3rd floor, Amar Bhuvan, French Bridge, Bombay, was searched and several papers and documents taken charge of therefrom. Thereafter other premises with which the respondent was connected were also searched and further papers and documents taken charge of. 2. On July 21, 1973 an offence was registered against the respondent, being Crime Register No. 17 of 1973, under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for having committed criminal misconduct as described in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the said Act, that is, either by himself or by any person on his behalf being in possession, or having at any time during the period of his office been in possession, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account. On November 2, 1974 an application was made to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, under section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (Ordinance No, XXXVIII of 1944), for attachment of 14 items of properties listed in the said application. These properties consisted of a fixed deposit in the Bank of Maharashtra, Girgaon Branch, Bombay, in the name of New Salooni Haircutting Saloon, Goregaon (West) Greater Bombay, in the sum of Rs.70,000, a saving bank account in the respondent's name in the said bank in which the balance was Rs. 315 25 P., chit funds contributions aggregating to Rs. 1,44,000 and two haircutting saloons, namely, the said New Salooni Haircutting Saloon and General Haircutting Saloon situate at Mint Road, Fort, Bombay. In the said application it was alleged that all the said assets and properties were procured by the respondent by corrupt and illegal means, namely, by commission of an offence punishable under section 5 (2) of the said Act. On this application being made to him, the learned Chief Judge on the same day passed an order granting an ad interim attachment and directed notice of the said application to be given to the respondent. The said application for attachment was supported by an affidavit affirmed on the same day by Vijaysingh R. Sawant, an Assistant Inspector of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption and Prohibition Intelligence Bureau, Greater Bombay. The said application for attachment was supported by an affidavit affirmed on the same day by Vijaysingh R. Sawant, an Assistant Inspector of Police attached to the Anti-Corruption and Prohibition Intelligence Bureau, Greater Bombay. On service of the said notice the respondent filed an affidavit in reply affirmed on February 17, 1975. In this affidavit the respondent stated that his father was a man of substance and wealth who owned large plots of agricultural land and immovable properties and that he was the only son of his father and that his father was also carrying on money-lending business and that as the only son on his father's death he inherited all his father's properties and assets. He further stated that several persons used to deposit moneys with him for investing in chit funds. He annexed to his said affidavit a list of these persons and the deposits made by them. The respondent contended in the said affidavit that all these properties and assets were honestly acquired by him either by inheritance or by further investments of moneys inherited by him. The respondent also filed three other affidavits in support of his case, namely, the affidavits of Ramnath Dhanaji Nakade, Eknath Tabaji Dhakane and Bhagwan Raghoji Dhakane. In rejoinder to these affidavits and affidavit affirmed on February 6, 1976 was filed by one Madhukar Shrirang Parulekar, an Assistant Inspector of Police, in which very much the same contentions as were taken in the said application for attachment were repeated. On March 25, 1977 the respondent made an application to the learned Chief Judge stating that both the parties in their respective affidavits had relied upon several documents and papers, but neither side had annexed copies of these documents to their respective affidavits nor had produced them in Court. He then reproduced in his said application sub-section (2) of section 5 of the said Ordinance and prayed that he should be allowed to lead oral and documentary evidence in the attachment proceedings. One would have thought that the State, which was the prosecutor, in a case where it had not even been able to file a charge-sheet for four years would have welcomed the accused stepping into the witness-box and calling his witnesses and exposing himself and his witnesses to cross-examination, but for reasons, the logic of which I am unable to understand, it thought it fit to oppose the said application. This it did by filing an affidavit of the said Parulekar affirmed on July 15, 1977. It is pertinent to note that even at this stage no charge-sheet had been filed before the Criminal Court. In the said affidavit in reply filed by the said Parulekar the main emphasis was placed upon the fact that sanction had been given for the prosecution of the respondent, and time and again in one paragraph after another it was repeated that the Government of Maharashtra after due consideration and examination believed to their entire satisfaction that the respondent had committed the said offence and had sanctioned his prosecution and attachment of the properties in question. It was further contended in the said affidavit that the respondent's said application should not be granted but the notice should be made absolute only on the affidavits on the record. The learned Chief Judge by his order dated July 29, 1977, which is impugned before me, permitted the respondent to produce oral and documentary evidence in support of his case. 1 may mention at this stage that the charge-sheet was filed before the Criminal Court about a year and three months after the passing of the said order, namely, on October 13, 1978, and the case was registered as Criminal Case No. 45 of 1978. 3. At the hearing of this Civil Revision Application it was submitted on behalf of the State that in view of the provisions of the said Ordinance an accused in attachment proceedings under the said Ordinance has no right to lead any evidence or to contend that he has not committed the offence with which he is charged. It was further submitted that to permit him to do so would be to allow two trials to go on at the same time and would greatly prejudice the prosecution in establishing its case before the Criminal Court. Realizing that an argument so extreme was fallacious, the earlier submission was later diluted, and it was contended that the accused in showing cause against an application for attachment can only lead evidence to the extent that the property alleged to be the subject-matter of the offence belonged to him and that he has interest in the property and that it was not procured by means of the offence charged. This argument is as difficult to understand as was the earlier argument, as will be seen when we examine the provisions of the said Ordinance. The Schedule to the said Ordinance lists six offences. By reason of sub-section (1) of section 2 each of these offences is called a "scheduled offence". Entry No. 4A in the said Schedule refers to an offence punishable under section 5 of the said Act. This entry was inserted by Act No. XL of 1964. Section 3 of the said Ordinance deals with applications for attachment of property. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 3 are as follows: "3. Application for attachment of property.- (1) Where the State Government has reason to believe that any person has committed (whether after the commencement of this Ordinance or not) any scheduled offence, the State Government may, whether or not any Court has taken cognisance of the offence, authorise the making of an application to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business, for the attachment under this Ordinance of the money or other property which the State Government believes the said person to have procured by means of the offence, or if such money or property cannot for any reason be attached, of other property of the said person of value as nearly as may be equivalent to that of the aforesaid money or other property. (3) An application under subsection (1) shall be accompanied by one or more affidavits, stating the grounds on which the belief that the said person has committed any scheduled offence is founded, and the amount of money or value of other property believed to have been procured by means of the offence. The application shall also furnish- (a) any information available as to the location for the time being of any such money or other property and shall, if necessary, give particulars, including the estimated value, of other property of the said person; (b) the names and addresses of any other persons believed to have or to be likely to claim any interest or title in the property of the said person. " It is, therefore, pertinent to note that the property in respect of which an application for attachment can be made and which can be attached is "the money or other property which the State Government believes the said person to have procured by means of the offence, or if such money or property cannot for any reason be attached, of other property of the said person of value as nearly as may be equivalent to that of the aforesaid money or other property". Thus, the money or property which can be attached first is the money or other property which the State Government believes has been procured by the accused by means of a scheduled offence. It is only when such money or property cannot be attached that the money or other property of that person of a like value is to be attached. The object of section 3 (I) is thus to prevent the accused from disposing of the money or property which is the ill-gotten gains of an offence committed by him. Section 4 of the said Ordinance deals with the levy of an ad interim attachment. Under sub-section (1) of that section the District Judge is to "pass without delay an ad interim order attaching the money or other property alleged to have been so procured, or if it transpires that such money or other property is not available for attachment, such other property of the said person of equivalent value" as he thinks fit. Under that sub-section the District Judge is bound to do this "unless for reasons to be recorded in writing he is of the opinion that there exist no prima facie grounds for believing that the person in respect of whom the application is made has committed any scheduled offence or that he has procured thereby any money or other property". Thus, there are two contingencies in which a District Judge is not to pass an order of ad interim attachment: (1) where he comes to the conclusion that there exist no prima facie grounds for believing that the accused has committed any scheduled offence, and (2) where he has no prima facie grounds for believing that the accused has procured by the commission of such offence any money or other property. The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 4 of the said Ordinance is relevant and provides as follows: "Provided that the District Judge may if he thinks fit before passing such order, and shall before refusing to pass such order, examine the person or persons making the affidavits accompanying the application." Under this proviso, therefore, it is open to a District Judge to whom an application for attachment is made to take the evidence of the person or persons who have made affidavits in support of the application before he passes an order of ad interim attachment in order to satisfy himself. He is also bound by the wording of that proviso to examine the deponents of these affidavits before he refuses to pass an order of ad interim attachment. Under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 4 the District Judge, when he passes an order of ad interim attachment, is to issue notice to the person whose money or other property is attached, as also to all other person represented to him as having or being likely to claim any interest or title in the property of the person to whom notice of the ad interim attachment has been issued. The notice to the person whose property is being attached is, by the terms of sub-clause (2), to call upon him "to show cause why the order of attachment should not be made absolute.” To the other persons the notice calls upon them to "make objection if he so desires to the attachment of the property or any portion thereof on the ground that he has an interest in such property or portion thereof." Under sub-section (4) of section 4 such an objection can also be raised by a person claiming an interest in the attached property or any portion thereof, even though no notice may have been issued to him. Section 5 of the said Ordinance is important and requires to be set out in extenso. It is as follows: "5. Investigation of objections to attachment.- (1) If no cause is shown and no objections are made under section 4 on or before the specified date, the District Judge shall forthwith pass an order making the ad interim order of attachment absolute. It is as follows: "5. Investigation of objections to attachment.- (1) If no cause is shown and no objections are made under section 4 on or before the specified date, the District Judge shall forthwith pass an order making the ad interim order of attachment absolute. (2) If cause is shown or any objections are made as aforesaid the District Judge shall proceed to investigate the same, and in so doing, as regards the examination of the parties and in all other respects he shall, subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, follow the procedure and exercise all the powers of a Court in hearing a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and any person making an objection under section 4 shall be required to adduce evidence to show that at the date of the attachment he had some interest in the property attached. (3) After investigation under sub-section (2), the District Judge shall pass an order either making the ad interim order of attachment absolute or varying it by releasing a portion of the property from attachment or withdrawing the order: Provided that the District Judge shall not- (a) release from attachment any interest which he is satisfied that the person believed to have committed a scheduled offence has in the property, unless he is also satisfied that there will remain under attachment an amount of the said persons property of value not less than that of the property believed to have been procured by the said person by means of the offence, or (b) withdraw the order of attachment unless he is satisfied that the said person has not by means of the said offence procured any money or other property." 4. Pausing here, it will be seen that the District Judge whose functions in a Presidency town are by reason of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 2 of the said Ordinance to be exercised by the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court is under a statutory obligation to issue an order of ad interim attachment of the money or other property which the State Government believes that the accused has procured by means of an offence, unless he is of the opinion that there exist no prima facie grounds for such belief. The notice which is to issue to the person whose property or money is being. The notice which is to issue to the person whose property or money is being. attached is to show cause why the order of attachment should not be made absolute. Reading together sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 4, the showing of cause by the accused can in almost every case be only with respect to the grounds which, if prima facie entertained by the District Judge, would lead him to refuse an order of ad interim attachment, that is, to show that there exist no prima facie grounds for believing that the accused has committed any scheduled offence or that he has procured any money thereby or other property. These sub-sections take away the very basis of the argument advanced on behalf of the State that the accused can only show cause to the extent that he had not procured the property by means of the offence charged but he cannot argue that there were no prima facie grounds for believing that he had committed any scheduled offence and cannot say that he is not guilty of any such offence. In substance and as put across the Bar this argument amounted to saying that the accused must admit that he has committed a scheduled offence, but the property attached was not procured by means of that offence. To my mind, such an argument needs only to be stated to be rejected, and it is completely negatived by the express terms of the sub-sections which I have referred to earlier. The scope of the investigation by the District Judge where the accused has shown cause or any other person has appeared and claimed interest in the property attached or any portion thereof is defined by section 5 of the said Ordinance. The investigation is to proceed according to the procedure prescribed for the hearing of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in carrying out such investigation the District Judge is to exercise all the powers of the Court in hearing a suit under the Code. This District Judge is to do by the express terms of sub-section (2) of section 5 "as regards the examination of the parties and in all other respects". This District Judge is to do by the express terms of sub-section (2) of section 5 "as regards the examination of the parties and in all other respects". Thus, by the very terms of section 5 (2) the parties to the attachment proceedings are to be examined, which means that they are to be examined on oath, and is, by recording their evidence in the same manner as the evidence of parties would be recorded in a suit before a Civil Court. The argument that such a procedure if allowed to be adopted would lead to two trials and would seriously prejudice the prosecution is equally groundless. It may be that in a fit case the District Judge, if the trial has started or is about to start, may adjourn the hearing before him, or it may be that the appropriate Court may in the exercise of its powers stay the hearing. In this particular case, however, the trial has nowhere commenced and is not likely to commence for two or three years more. The delay is largely due to the dilatory tactics of the prosecution. It is pertinent to note that the charge- sheet was only filed when an application was made by the respondent on September 15, 1978 requesting the Court to withdraw the attachment because no prosecution had commenced. It must also be remembered that any conclusion arrived at in these attachment proceedings can only be prima facie, and is not relevant in the prosecution for the offence, and is not binding upon the Criminal Court, nor does it operate as res judicata. The argument that the prosecution would be prejudiced is misconceived because if at all in a case such as this the prosecution would be benefited, because it would be forewarned of the evidence which the accused wants to lead and be forearmed for the conduct of the prosecution. It would also have an opportunity to cross-examine the accused and his witnesses. 5. Mrs. Shenoi on behalf of the petitioner-State, however, placed considerable emphasis upon sections 10, 12 and 13 of the said Ordinance. These sections are to my mind wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determining the controversy before me. Section 10 deals with the duration of the attachment. 5. Mrs. Shenoi on behalf of the petitioner-State, however, placed considerable emphasis upon sections 10, 12 and 13 of the said Ordinance. These sections are to my mind wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determining the controversy before me. Section 10 deals with the duration of the attachment. It provides that an order of attach ment of property under the said Ordinance is, unless it is withdrawn earlier in accordance with the provisions of the said Ordinance, to continue in force for the period mentioned therein. As we have seen, under sub-section (3) of section 5 the District Judge after investigation is to pass an order either making the ad interim order of attachment absolute, or to vary it by releasing a portion of the property from attachment, or to withdraw the order. Under sub-section (b) of the proviso to section 5 (3) the District Judge is not to withdraw the order of attachment after investigation "unless he is satisfied that the said person has not by means of the said offence procured any money or other property." This provision itself shows that the showing cause by an accused would also include an endeavour by him to satisfy the District Judge that he has not, by means of the offence which he is alleged to have committed, procured any money or other property. The provisions of section 10 come into play only where the order of attachment has not been withdrawn. Where it is withdrawn, there is no scope for the operation of section 10. Section 12 deals with the valuation by the Criminal Court of the amount or value of other property procured by the accused by means of the offence, and section 13 deals with the forfeiture to the Government out of the money or property attached such amount or value as is found in the final judgment or order of the Criminal Court to have been procured by the convicted person by means of the offence, together with the costs of attachment as determined by the District Judge, as also of the amount of fine, if any, imposed upon the accused. The provisions of section I3 would also thus come into play if an order of attachment has not been withdrawn by the District Judge as a result of the investigation held by him under section 5 of the Ordinance. The provisions of section I3 would also thus come into play if an order of attachment has not been withdrawn by the District Judge as a result of the investigation held by him under section 5 of the Ordinance. They also cannot come into play where the District Judge has refused to grant an ad interim order of attachment under section 3 (1) of the Ordinance. The sections of the Ordinance relied upon by Mrs. Shenoi have, therefore, no relevance in determining the scope of the investigation under section 5 the object of which is to determine whether the ad interim attachment should continue or should be withdrawn. 6. In support of her submissions Mrs. Shenoi relied Upon two decisions; one of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court and the other of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In the Patna case, namely, Smt. Suraj Kumari v. The State of Bihar I, the wife of the accused preferred an objection claiming that the attached property was of her absolute ownership. This claim was negatived. She thereafter sought to contend that the accused had not committed any offence because the amounts defalcated belonged not to the State of Bihar but to the Damodar Valley Corporation. She was not allowed to raise this point inasmuch as she had no concern with it nor any locus standi to raise it. While dealing with this contention Misra, J. who delivered the main judgment, said [at p. 233 (1)]: “In my opinion, however, it is difficult to accede to the contention put forward by learned counsel for the appellant, as the procedure laid down under section 5 of the Ordinance is that of a title suit and the burden is thrown upon the objector to show that on the date of attachment the objector is entitled to the property to be attached and if the objector would fail to establish the kind of interest contemplated by clause 2 of section 5, the claim of the objector must be dismissed and the objector could not be permitted to raise any question as to the competence of the proceedings in regard to the property". Misra, J., summarized the conclusions reached by the Court in these terms [at p. 233 (2)]: "In the circumstances, therefore, she' (that is, the wife of the accused) cannot be taken in the eye of law to have any independent interest of her own, which would bring her claim within the ambit of clause 2 of section 5 of the Ordinance. In my opinion, therefore, the learned District Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that the house on the Ratu Road standing on plots Nos. 1148 and 1149, the subject-matter of the proceedings, could not be held to be the personal property of the appellant and as such she had no locus standi to raise objection under section 5 of the Ordinance". I fail to see how this authority in any way supports the petitioners case. We are not concerned here with a third party who is claiming the attached property as belonging to him. We are concerned here with the accused himself. By the express terms of the statute under which the ad interim attachment is levied and under which the investigation is to be carried out, if the District Judge is satisfied that the accused has not by means of any scheduled offence procured money or other property, he is to withdraw the attachment on that property. This he has to do after investigation in the manner provided by sub-section (2) of section 5 of the said Ordinance, namely, by examining parties and exercising all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure while hearing a civil suit. 7. The Andhra Pradesh case relied upon by Mrs, Shenoi is State of Hyderabad v. K. Venkateswara Rao2. Mrs. Shenoi relied upon the following observations made in that case by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court [at p. 1356 (2)]: "Adverting to the next submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent, I do not think that there is any short-circuiting of the procedure prescribed under section 4 (2) of the Ordinance in this case. It is no doubt true that the respondent can show cause why the ad interim attachment order should not be made absolute. It is no doubt true that the respondent can show cause why the ad interim attachment order should not be made absolute. But that does not mean that he is entitled to ask the Court to go into the question that he has not committed the scheduled offence or that he has not procured the main or other property by illegal means. That is the matter which has to be investigated in the Court of Special Judge which has already taken cognizance of the offence under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is now pending as C. C. 6 of 1971. When a special Court has been constituted and power has been conferred upon that Court under Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, to go into this question, the same enquiry cannot be conducted by the District Court". With respect to the learned Judge who decided that case, I am unable to agree with the view he has expressed. The learned Judge has overlooked all the relevant provisions in that behalf of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944. The learned Judge has overlooked the scope of an investigation under section 5 of the said Ordinance and of a trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The object of the first is for determining whether an ad interim attachment should be made absolute or not, which would depend upon whether satisfactory cause has or has not been shown as provided by the proviso to section 5 (3). In the case of an accused section 5 (3) provides that the attachment is to be withdrawn if the accused satisfied the District Judge that the money or other property attached has not been procured by means of the scheduled offence with which he has been charged. The scope of a criminal trial is to punish the offender. The scope of both these proceedings is thus wholly different, and it cannot be said that while the accused has a statutory right under the said Ordinance to show cause in the manner statutorily provided therein, he should not be allowed to do so because he would also be tried for the said offence in a Criminal Court. The scope of both these proceedings is thus wholly different, and it cannot be said that while the accused has a statutory right under the said Ordinance to show cause in the manner statutorily provided therein, he should not be allowed to do so because he would also be tried for the said offence in a Criminal Court. The real question before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, however, was whether the High Court could exercise the powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and stay the proceedings under section 5 of the Ordinance during the disposal of the said criminal case. That is a question with which I am not concerned. 8. For the reasons set out above, I bold that the learned Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, exercised his jurisdiction properly in passing the impugned order and that the said order is correct in law. I accordingly dismiss this Civil Revision Application and discharge the rule with costs. Revision application dismissed.