JUDGMENT This application has been taken out by the defendant, Modula India, for an order granting leave to the petitioner to pay the arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 15,000/- by monthly instalments of Rupees 1,000/- along with current rents. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff against the defendant, inter alia, for a decree for vacant and peaceful possession of flat no. 3 of the ground floor of premises No. 3E, Camac Street, Calcutta; a decree for Rs. 40,950.00/- towards the arrears of rent; a decree for mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 75/- per diem and for other consequential reliefs. The writ of summons was served on the defendant on 25th September, 1979 and the defendant entered appearance through Duby & Company on 26th November, 1979. Thereafter on 25th October, 1979 the petitioner took out an application for leave to pay or deposit the arrears of rent for the months from March 1978 by instalment of Rs. 1,000/- per month and for other consequential relief. On 13th November, 1979 the plaintiff took out an application for final judgment and no order was passed on the plaintiff’s application for final judgment. Mr. Justice A.N. Sen, as he then was, on 18th of December, 1979 directed the defendant on its application to pay the arrears of rent for the sum of Rs. 23,000/- in the following manner :- Rs. 8,000/- by the end of December, 1979, Rs. 5,000/- by the end of January, 1980, Rs. 5,000/- by the end of February, 1980, Rs. 5,000/- by the end of March, 1980. 2. Pursuant to the said order the petitioner paid to the Advocate-on-record of the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 8,000/-. Thereafter the petitioner forwarded a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to M/s. T.C. Roy and Company on 29th January, 1980 on account of rent for the month of January pursuant to the order dated December 18, 1979. Thereafter the petitioner has failed to make any payment under the said order and have stated in the petition that because of the market position of the petitioner’s business the petitioner is not in a position to pay in terms of the order dated December 18, 1979; hence the present application has been taken out for an order enabling the petitioner to pay the arrears of rent by monthly instalment of Rs. 1,000/- only and also for enhancing the time to make such instalment payments. 3. Mr. Ajoy Nath Roy appeared in support of this application and submitted that under Section 17(2A) of the West Bengal Premise. Tenancy Act, the Court has ample power to extend the time for payment of the arrears of rent and in that respect he craved reference to a case reported in (1) 78 C.W.N. 435, where R.N. Bhattacharyya, J. held that "the Court has power to extend the time for the deposit of arrears of rent more than once under section 17(2A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 if an application is made within the extended time and the Court thinks it expedient or necessary for the ends of justice to do so. 4. Mr. Ajoy Nath Roy submitted that save and except the case reported in 78 C.W.N. 435, there are no other decisions on this point. 5. Mr. Ranjan Deb, Barrister-at-law, appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and submitted that inasmuch as the petitioner has failed to deposit or pay the second instalment under order dated 18th December, 1979 within the time fixed thereunder the defence of the defendant against delivery of possession is liable to be struck out and the suit should be allowed to be proceeded ex-parte against the petitioner. 6. Mr. Ranjan Deb further submitted that the plaintiff does not admit that the petitioner is under stringent circumstances or is unable to pay but he submits that the defendant is only gaining time and have no intention to pay the arrears of rent. 7. 6. Mr. Ranjan Deb further submitted that the plaintiff does not admit that the petitioner is under stringent circumstances or is unable to pay but he submits that the defendant is only gaining time and have no intention to pay the arrears of rent. 7. Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 provides that "on a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in Section 13, he tenant shall subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or where he appears in the suit or proceed ins without the writ of summons being served on him, within one month of his appearance deposit in Court or with the Controller or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made defaults including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of eight and one third percent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of deposit, and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. Section 17(2A) provides that "notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section 1 or Sub-section 2, on the application of the tenant, the Court may by order-(a) extend the time specified in Sub-section 1 or Sub-section 2 for the deposit or payment of any amount referred to therein; (b) having regard to the circumstances of the tenant as also of the landlord and the total sum inclusive of interest required to be deposited or paid under Sub-section 1 on account of default in the payment of rent, permit the tenant to deposit or pay such sum in such instalments and by such dates as the Court may fix." Section 17(2B) provides that "no application for extension of time for the deposit or payment of any amount under clause (a) of Sub-section (2A) shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified therefor in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), and no application for permission to pay in instalment under Clause (b) of Sub-section (2A) shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified in Sub-section (1) for the deposit or payment of the amount due on account of default in the payment of rent". Section 17(3) provides that "if a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) within the time specified therefor or within such extended time as may be allowed under Clause (a) of Sub-Section (2A) or fails to deposit or pay any instalment permitted under Clause (b) of Sub-section (2A) within the time fixed therefor, the Court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit." 8. By construing these provisions as quoted above this it would appear that there cannot be any successive application for extension of time for the purpose of making payment of the arrears of rent by instalments. Moreover no such application can be entertained by a court if made beyond a period of one month as envisaged under the section. In the present case the petitioner did apply within the period of one month for extension of time and also for payment by instalments. Moreover no such application can be entertained by a court if made beyond a period of one month as envisaged under the section. In the present case the petitioner did apply within the period of one month for extension of time and also for payment by instalments. Once such application having been made within the period specified under the Act no further application can be entertained again and again within the extended period otherwise the whole purpose of the provisions of the said Act will be defeated as it will appear from the sections quoted above that in case of default being made by the tenant of not making payment of arrears of rent within a month from the date of appearance and/or service of the summons or within the extended period as envisaged under section 17(2A), under section 17(3) the defence is liable to be struck out and the plaintiff is entitled to get an ex-parte decree. If it is construed that applications after applications can be made by a litigant then the whole purpose providing penalty clause would be meaningless as to take advantage of that or to avoid default the tenant will go on taking out applications after applications within the extended period and by that device would be able to defeat and/or inordinately delay the claim of the plaintiff. There is no statutory power given under the Act itself for such extension being granted beyond the period as envisaged under sections 17(2A) and 17(2B). The language of the provisions quoted above are very clear and it would appear that no power has been given under the said Act for enlargement of the time except as provided in the sections referred to above. As it is a special enactment the general provisions of the power of the court to enlarge time under section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code or under Chapter 38, Rule 46 of the High Court Rules cannot be availed of by a party. More so when there is an express provision of law the inherent power of the court under section 151 also cannot be invoked. 9. More so when there is an express provision of law the inherent power of the court under section 151 also cannot be invoked. 9. In the case reported in (2) AIR 1964 SC 993 at paragraph 19 it has been held that "it is common ground that the inherent power of the court cannot override the express provisions of law; in other words, if there are specified provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exorcised in relation to matter the inherent power of the court cannot be invoked in order to the cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The prohibition contained in the Code need not be expressed but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates." 10. It would appear that the learned Judge in the case reported in 78 C.W.N. 435 did not deal without section 17(2B) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Hence the principle as laid down in the said case has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case. 11. The well established principle of law is that where there are special provisions expressly or impliedly barring the Court to do something, cannot be by-passed by the provisions of the general law. More so, when the statute provides a particular mode no other mode can be adopted to defeat the object and the provisions of the special statute. 12. In the case reported (3) 1975 (1) S.C.C Cases 559 at 565 it has been held that "where the power is given to do certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other method of performance are necessarily forbidden. This rule has stood the test of time. It was applied by the Privy Council in (4) Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor, reported in 61 Indian Appeal 372 and later by this Court in several cases. This rule applies whether "where indeed the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do a thing in particular manner did not imply prohibition to do it in any other". 13. This rule applies whether "where indeed the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do a thing in particular manner did not imply prohibition to do it in any other". 13. While construing Sections 17(2A) and 17(2B) one will have to find out whether the provisions are mandatory or directory and the Court will have to find out the real intention of the legislature by construing the whole scope, purport and effect of the Act. 14. It has been further provided in that case : "Thus the first point to be considered is whether the requirements of these provisions are mandatory or directory. "No universal Rule", said Lord Campell "can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the Courts of justice to try to get at real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope. Such intention of the legislature is therefore to be ascertained upon the review of the language, subject matter and provision in relation to the general object intended to be secured, mischief, if any, to be prevented and the remedy to be permitted by the Act." 15. By construing the provision as contained in Sub-sections (2A) and (2B) of Section 17 it would appear that no application for extension of time for deposit of rent of any amount under sub-section (2A) shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified therefor. The time specified is one month and the present application was taken out beyond the period of one month. Hence I am of the view that the provisions as contained in sub-sections (2A) and (2B) of Section 17 are mandatory and the Court has no power to entertain an application for payment by instalment unless and until such application is taken out before the expiry of the time specified in sub-section (1), i.e., within a month from the service of the writ of summons on him or within one month from his appearance. The language of sub- section (2B) of Section 17 is clear and unambiguous which lays down in no uncertain terms that no application for extension of time shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). 16. The language of sub- section (2B) of Section 17 is clear and unambiguous which lays down in no uncertain terms that no application for extension of time shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). 16. The case reported in 78 C.W.N. 435 is not an authority so far the facts of this case are concerned. The learned Judge in the said case did not deal with sub-section (2B) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. However such application can be entertained provided such applications are made within the period specified in the said section. 17. In the facts of this case it would appear that even the tenant did not comply with the order passed on his first application directing him to pay and or deposit the arrears of rent by instalment. Save and except making one payment of such instalment the petitioner has hopelessly failed to pay the balance amount within the time specified. I am unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that before the expiry of the extended period the petitioner can go on taking out application after application for extension of time to pay the arrears by instalment. If such a view of the construction of Sub-sections (2A) and (2B) of Section 17 is accepted then the whole purpose of making such provisions under the Act would be defeated. In my view the object of the said Act is not to live any latitude to a tenant who makes default again and again inspite of extension of time being granted by Court under Sub-section (2A) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Hence I pass no order on this application.