JUDGMENT D.S. Misra, Member - This is a reference dated August 8, 1973 made by Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division by which he has recommended to the Board that the revision filed by Ram Charan and others be rejected. Against it an objection has been filed on behalf of Ram Charan, revisionist. 2. The facts giving rise to this revision are the Chheda Lal had filed a suit under Section 209, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against Ram Charan and others in which Gopal was also a party. Gopal died and an application was presented on behalf of Chheda Lal on November 3, 1970 that he came to know of the death of Gopal only on October 19, 1970. Prior to it he could not know of it because he was away in connection with his medical treatment. He had also filed an application for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He had also given an affidavit in support of the application and had filed a medical certificate. This application was allowed by the trial court. Against it a revision was filed by Ram Charan before the Additional Commissioner and it that revision application a reference has been made by the Additional Commissioner that the said revision be rejected. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist (objector) and the learned counsel for the opposite parties. I have also perused the record. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued that this application was filed beyond the period of limitation. Gopal had died on October 18, 1969 and this application was presented on November 3, 1970 and, therefore, the suit had abated. He has further contended that he (Gopal) had died sometimes during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the appeal itself had abated, and said that the learned Additional Commissioner was wrong in holding that by allowing substitution application the abatement automatically was set aside. 5. Pressing his points, he further argued that on the death of a party under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C., the suit abates unless it is set aside by means of an application presented under the provisions of Order 22, Rule 9. In this case, no such application under Order 22, Rule 9 was given and therefore the abatement could not automatically be set aside. 6. In this case, no such application under Order 22, Rule 9 was given and therefore the abatement could not automatically be set aside. 6. The learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, argued that there is nothing on record to show that Gopal died during the pendency of the appeal. The application for substitution was given before the trial court. The trial court believed the affidavit given by the plaintiff, condoned the delay and allowed the substitution application. This was a judicial discretion which could not be interfered with in revision. He also argued that by allowing the substitution application, the abatement automatically got set aside. 7. I have anxiously considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties. Now two questions of law before me arise concerning this reference. Firstly, whether the judicial discretion exercised by the trial court in condoning the delay and allowing the substitution application can be interfered with in these revisional proceedings, and secondly, whether the abatement automatically got set aside by allowing the substitution application. 8. As regards the first question, I am of the view that a judicial discretion is exercised by a trial court before whom the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act and for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased is presented, and the trail court after considering the material before it passes and order on the said application and, therefore, such a discretion which has judiciously been exercised by the trial court in allowing the substitution application and condoning the delay for grounds to be stated by it cannot be reversed in revisional proceedings. This view finds support with the pronouncement of the Board reported in 1977 R.D. at page 356, in which it was held by the Board that condonation of delay was entirely a matter of judicial discretion of Court concerned and was not liable to interference in revision. 9. As regards the second question, I am of the view that the order for condoning the delay and allowing the substitution application itself implies that the abatement has been set aside. This view also finds support with the pronouncement of the Hon'ble High Court reported in A.I.R 1972 Alld. 456. The High Court held in the said pronouncement that a prayer for setting aside the abatement is implicit in the prayer for substitution. 10. This view also finds support with the pronouncement of the Hon'ble High Court reported in A.I.R 1972 Alld. 456. The High Court held in the said pronouncement that a prayer for setting aside the abatement is implicit in the prayer for substitution. 10. In the instant case, on consideration of the evidence before it, the trial court thought it fit and in the interest of justice that the delay should be condoned and substitution application be allowed. This judicial discretion of the Court, therefore, cannot be interfered with at this revisional stage. Likewise, I find that the learned Additional Commissioner has rightly held that by allowing the substitution application the abatement automatically got set aside. 11. I as such find that the order of the trial court was in consonance with law and justice and the order of the learned Additional Commissioner was perfectly within the bounds of law and suffered from no illegality. The objection raised by Ram Charan, revisionist, therefore appear to be without any force. The recommendation of the learned Additional Commissioner is, therefore, accepted and the revision filed by Ram Charan is hereby rejected.