ORDER R.S. Singh, J. - These three writ petitions are directed against the common order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation modifying the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 2. The facts of the case in brief are that in the basic year Khatauni, Khata No. 241 consisting of Plots Nos. 860 and 868 was recorded in the names of Majibullah and Shafiullah respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (herein-after referred to as respondents) as tenure-holders. On the other Khata No. 248 consisting of Plots Nos. 488, 471 and 441, the names of the petitioners and on the remaining plots of this khata, the names of both the contesting parties were recorded as tenure-holders. The respondents filed an objection under Section 9-A (2), U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in respect of the plots of Khata No. 248, which were exclusively recorded in the name of the petitioners. It was alleged that these plots are ancestral and the respondents are co-tenure-holders and are in possession according to their shares. Another objection was filed by the petitioners that they are the sole tenure-holders of plot No. 868 and co-tenure-holders with the respondents of plot No. 860 of Khata No. 241. They further asserted that the plots of khata No. 248, which are exclusively recorded in their names, were acquired by Karim Bux, father of the 1st wife of Mohd. Bux and not by Mohd. Bux, the common ancestor of the parties. The respondents have, therefore, got no concern with these plots. There was also dispute about the share in respect of other plots. 3. The Consolidation Officer held that the entry of plots Nos. 860 and 868 in the name of the respondents will continue as it is. In plots Nos. 488, 489, 472, 471 and 741 of Khata No. 248, the respondents were given no share whereas in the remaining plots of Khata No. 248, the respondents were given ? share. Against the order of the Consolidation Officer, three appeals were filed by three sets of parties. All the three appeals were dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The aggrieved parties filed three revisions against the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), which were partly allowed and the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was modified by the Dy. Director of Consolidation. The order of the Dy. All the three appeals were dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The aggrieved parties filed three revisions against the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), which were partly allowed and the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was modified by the Dy. Director of Consolidation. The order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation has been challenged before this court in the aforesaid three writ petitions, one filed on behalf of the petitioners and the other two on behalf of the respondents. 4. Plots Nos. 860 and 868 were originally recorded in the name of Mohd. Bux, the common ancestor of the parties in the year 1282F, but in 1320F, plot No. 860 was recorded in the name of Mohd. Sahriff, the ancestor of the respondents and plot No. 868 was recorded in the name of Munaf and Mohsim ancestors of the petitioners. On the basis of this entry of 1320F and rejecting the case of respondents of subsequent re-partition after 1320F, the Dy. Director of Consolidation held that the petitioners are the tenure-holders of plot No. 868 and respondents are tenure-holders of plot No. 860. 5. According to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, they are also the sole tenure-holders of plot No. 868. It was further contended that they are exclusively recorded over this plot right from 1334F up to the present date and there is presumption about the correctness of the revenue entries after the vesting of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act (hereinafter referred to as Act). The Dy. Director of Consolidation has erred in law in rejecting the entry of 1334F on the ground that the case of repartition as set up by the respondents has not been proved. 6. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the Dy. Director of Consolidation has rightly rejected the entry of 1334F as the case of re-partition, as set up by the respondents has not been proved and secondly it was made without any basis of order when in the settlement Khatauni of 1320F they were solely recorded and there is also presumption about the correctness of the settlement entry of 1320F. Therefore, the Dy. Director of Consolidation has rightly declared the petitioners to be sole tenure-holders of plot No. 868. 7. Therefore, the Dy. Director of Consolidation has rightly declared the petitioners to be sole tenure-holders of plot No. 868. 7. There is no dispute about the fact that in the settlement entry of 1320F, the ancestors of the petitioners were solely recorded on plot No. 868. But right from 1334F up to the present date, the names of the respondent's ancestors and thereafter, the names of the respondents are alone recorded. No doubt, there is presumption about the correctness of the settlement entry in view of Section 57 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, but in view of Section 44 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, there is also presumption about the annual entries after the vesting of the Act. The Dy. Director of Consolidation has taken into consideration about the presumption of correctness in respect of settlement entry of 1320F only and has not taken into consideration about the correctness of the entries subsequent to the date of vesting. This fact cannot be ignored that the names of the respondents are coming down in revenue papers for over 50 years and the names of the petitioners did not find place in the revenue papers during this long period in any, capacity. The parties admittedly separated more than 50 years ago. There is no finding of the Dy. Director of Consolidation or any Consolidation Authority that the petitioners had been in possession and were paying rent to the Zamindar and thereafter, paying land revenue to the State during this long period. Therefore, merely on the basis of the fact that the names of the petitioners ancestors were recorded in the settlement year of 1320F, it cannot be presumed that their rights are still subsisting. The petitioners did not take any step to get their names entered over this plot either before the date of vesting or subsequent to the date of vesting. In view of Section 44 of the Act, the entry subsequent to the vesting of the Act will be presumed to be correct. Moreover, in absence of any finding of possession and payment of rent the presumption of the correctness of entries subsequent to the date of vesting cannot be rebutted only because in 1320F the names of the ancestors of the respondents were recorded. Therefore the Dy. Director of Consolidation has committed an error in declaring the petitioners to be the tenure-holders of plot No. 868. 8. Therefore the Dy. Director of Consolidation has committed an error in declaring the petitioners to be the tenure-holders of plot No. 868. 8. In respect of Plots Nos. 488, 489, 471, 472 and 741 of Khata No. 248, the contention of learned counsel for the respondent is that it belonged of Mohd. Bux, the common ancestor of the parties. Therefore, they are also the co-tenure-holders. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that in compromise dated 18-12-1911 in a mutation case, Nasir one of the respondents in that case admitted in his statement that these plots also belonged to Mohd. Bux. But these documents have not been considered by the Dy. Director of Consolidation. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents does not appear to be correct. From the judgment of the Dy. Director of Consolidation it appears that he has considered the compromise but rejected it on the ground that it was not proved. The statement of Nasir has been annexed in the writ petition, which does not prove the petitioner's case. The Dy. Director of Consolidation has rightly held that it originally belonged to Karim Bux, father of the first wife of Mohd. Bux. Therefore, after the death of Karim Bux, his daughter's son Mohsim, the father of petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 and Munaf, grandfather of petitioners Nos. 4 to 6 inherited these plots and the respondents have no share in it. 9. In respect of the other plots of Khata No. 248, the dispute between the parties is regarding share. The Dy. Director of Consolidation held that on the death of Mohd. Bux, ?th share will go to his widow Rahmatunisha and ? share will be equally distributed between his three sons including Mohd. Sharif, father of the respondents as according to Mohammadan Law, a son who was conceived has also been allowed share in the property of his father, although Mohd. Sharif was not given any share by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on the ground that he was not born at the time of death of his father Mohd. Bux. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that when the inheritance opened on the death of Mohd. Bux, the tenancy was inherited by his sons, the ancestors of the petitioners, who were present and they cannot be divested on the birth of Mohd. Bux. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that when the inheritance opened on the death of Mohd. Bux, the tenancy was inherited by his sons, the ancestors of the petitioners, who were present and they cannot be divested on the birth of Mohd. Sharif, which took place after the death of Mohd. Bux. It was further contended that it was a tenancy land, which would be governed by Tenancy law and not by Personal Law. 11. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that a child conceived in the womb of the mother will be deemed to be in existence at the time of the death of the father, if born alive and will get a share in the property of his father like already born sons. The Mohammadan Law also provides according to para. 269 (A) of the Anglo Muhammadan Law by Sir Roland Knyvet Wilson and Tyabji's Commentary on Muslim Law and in the outlines of Mohammadan Law by Fyzee that every person, including a child in the womb, provided it is born alive, is entitled to inherit unless there is specific rule of exclusion. It has been further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that this law is also applicable in a case of tenancy land as well. Moreover, in this case Mohd. Bux admittedly died before 1901 and according to the provisions of the Tenancy Act in force at that time, the inheritance of the tenancy was also governed by the Personal Law. 12. The question for consideration is whether the posthumous son is an heir and can inherit the property of his father. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, a posthumous son is not an heir and only the sons already born will inherit the property of their father. He placed reliance on two decisions of the learned single Judge of this court on Ramjus v. Board of Revenue (1963 RD 189) and Mangali Prasad v. Ram Balak (1956 All LJ 693), wherein it was held that where a person, who was in womb when the succession to tenancy opened that circumstance would not invest him with the right of succession under the Tenancy Act. 13. 13. But a contrary view has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court reported in Ram Dayal v. Bhim Sen (1965 All LJ 1142), wherein it has been held that the general rule is that an estate is not held in abeyance on the death of this owner. It vests in its heir then living. This rule would also apply to Section 35, U.P. Tenancy Act. According to all civilised systems of jurisprudence, a child in embryo at the death of the holder of the proprietary interest, if born alive after his death is deemed to be living at his death and will be entitled to inherit. 14. The same view was also expressed in Deo Narain Singh v. Ganga Prasad, AIR 1915 All 65 : (13 All LJ 69) wherein it was held by the Division Bench of this court that Hindu son subsequently born alive is competent to contest an alienation made by the father when the son was in his mothers womb. 15. This point while considering the case under the Hindu, Muslim, Roman, English and other mature jurisprudences, has been elaborately dealt with by Sri Asutosh Mookerjee, J. in Kusum Kumari Dasi v. Dasrathi Sinha (AIR 1921 Cal 487), wherein it has been observed as under:- "The right of succession under Hindu Law is a right, which vests immediately on the death of the owner of the property and cannot, in any circumstances, remain in abeyance in the expectation of the birth of a preferable heir. To this fundamental rule, there is an apparent exception in a case of child already conceived and in the womb of its mother and it is well settled that a child who is in the mothers womb at the time of the death, is in contemplation of law actually existing and will on his birth devest the estate of any person with a title inferior to his own who has taken in the meantime." The same view has been expressed in Dhan, Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1967 All LJ 802) wherein it has been held that a child once conceived will be deemed to be in existence. He will be deemed to be a member of the family since the date of his conception, even though he may have been born subsequent to the death of the father. He will be deemed to be a member of the family since the date of his conception, even though he may have been born subsequent to the death of the father. For the purpose of safeguarding property interest a child in ventre sa mera is deemed to be born on the date of his conception. 16. From the above discussions, it is perfectly clear that a child once conceived is deemed to be in existence at the time of inheritance, if born alive even after the death of his father. This is according to the Hindu, Muslim, Roman, English and other mature jurisprudences. Therefore, a child utero matris is a child in a case, i. e. in existence and this principle is applicable in the cases governed by Personal Law as well as Tenancy Law. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, is therefore, not acceptable and the view taken by the Dy. Director of Consolidation on this point is correct. 17. In view of what has been discussed above, the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation in respect of plot No. 868 deserves to be quashed and rest of the order deserves to be maintained. 18. In the result, the writ petition No. 7500 of 1971 is dismissed whereas the other two writ petitions are hereby allowed in part. The order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation dated 23-10-1970 is quashed in respect of plot No. 868 of Khata No. 241. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.