ORDER 1. Opposite parties 2 to 12 are members of the Committee of Management of the District Co-operative Bank Limited, Meerut a society registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (now on to be referred to as the Act) and the petitioner No. l un-disputably was at the relevant time Chairman of that Committee. At a meeting of the Committee of Management held on 24th December, 1979, it passed a resolution purporting to act in exercise of powers under Rule 454 of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Rules 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) removing petitioner No. 1 from the membership of the Committee. Aggrieved by the action of the Committee of Management, petitioner No. 1 applied to the registrar under Section 70 of the Act, raising a dispute regarding the validity of the aforesaid resolution removing him from the membership of the Committee of Management. The District Magistrate exercising the powers of Registrar of Co-operative Societies referred the dispute raised by the petitioner for decision to the Additional District Magistrate (Finance) appointed as an Arbitrator under the Act. By means of an Award dated 11th Aug. 1980, the Arbitrator held that the resolution removing the petitioner No. 1 from the membership of the Committee of the Management was illegal and set aside the resolution of the Committee. The Arbitrator went on to direct the members of the Committee of Management who figured as opposite parties in the arbitration proceedings "to consider the issue of the discontinuing the membership of Sri Madan Pal Singh in a meeting to be called for the purpose after issuing the agenda (including this item) and after compliance of the rules and the law laid down." The Award dated 11th August, 1980, directed the members of the Committee of Management to call a meeting within a fortnight. The Arbitrator went on to direct that till the decision of the said meeting Sri Yasmin Qureshi, who, it appears, had started functioning as officiating Chairman, shall continue to act as such. In pursuance of the directions issued by the Arbitrator in the Award a second meeting of the Committee was held on the 23rd August, 1980. The Arbitrator went on to direct that till the decision of the said meeting Sri Yasmin Qureshi, who, it appears, had started functioning as officiating Chairman, shall continue to act as such. In pursuance of the directions issued by the Arbitrator in the Award a second meeting of the Committee was held on the 23rd August, 1980. The only item on the agenda for this meeting was consideration of the question of removal of the petitioner from the membership of the Committee of Management under Rule 454 of the Rules in accordance with the directions of the Arbitrator. 2. A resolution was passed at the meeting by the Committee of the Management that after due consideration the Committee had come to the conclusion that in the conduct of the affairs of the Bank the petitioner had not exercised the prudence and diligence of an ordinary man of business had thus acted in disregard of Rule 115 and consequently was disqualified under Rule 453 from continuing as a member of the Committee. The resolution went on to state that in consequence of the conclusion arrived at Sri Madan Pal Singh (the petitioner) was removed from the membership of the Committee. The resolution further was to the effect that since Sri Madan Pal Singh had ceased to be a member of the Committee he stood automatically removed from the Office of Chairman of the Society and steps should be taken immediately to elect another Chairman. By means of this petition the petitioner Madan Pal Singh as well as the Meerut District Co-operative Bank Limited through him pray for a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the resolution dated 23-8-1980, passed by the Committee of Management as well as that part of the award of the Arbitrator dated 11th August, 1980 which directed the Bank to convene a second meeting and to treat in the meanwhile Shri Yasmin Qureshi as Officiating Chairman. There is a further prayer for issue of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Arbitrator who has been impleaded as respondent No. 1 not to give effect to his order dated 11-8-1980 and restraining the respondents from interfering with the functioning of the petitioner No. 1 as Chairman of the Committee of Management of the Bank. 3. 3. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar and Sri A. K. Sharma, Advocates before the admission of the petition put in appearance on behalf of the opposite parties 2 to 12 while the Standing Counsel has represented respondent No. 1. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the merits of this petition and in view of the joint request made by them we are proceeding to decide this petition finally in accordance with the Rules of this Court. 5. Shri R. C. Srivastava, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner has contended that the dispute referred for decision to the arbitrator was as to whether the petitioner had been validly removed from the membership of the Committee of Management by means of the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 24th December, 1979 and once the arbitrator arrived at the conclusion that the removal of the petitioner by means of the resolution challenged was illegal he ceased to have any power under the provisions of the Act to issue directions to the Committee of Management to convene a fresh meeting for the purposes of considering the question of removal of the petitioner from its membership within the period specified by him and further directing that in the meanwhile Shri Yasmin Qureshi shall continue to function as the Chairman of the Committee. It was urged that as soon as the resolution of the Committee of Management removing the petitioner from the Committee of Management was set aside the petitioner automatically was restored to his office as a member of the Committee of Management and became entitled to function as its Chairman and the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to direct that the Vice-Chairman shall continue to function as the Officiating Chairman of the Committee of Management. It was further contended that apart from deciding the dispute that had been referred to him the Arbitrator had no power to issue directions of the Committee of Management to convene a meeting for consideration of the question of the removal of the petitioner from the membership of the Committee of the Management within the period specified. It was further contended that apart from deciding the dispute that had been referred to him the Arbitrator had no power to issue directions of the Committee of Management to convene a meeting for consideration of the question of the removal of the petitioner from the membership of the Committee of the Management within the period specified. It was also urged that the action of the Committee of Management in removing petitioner No. 1 from its membership on the ground that he had acted in disregard of R. 115 of the Rules was beyond the purview of Rule 454 which merely empowered the Committee of Management to remove from its membership any individual member on the ground that he had incurred one of the disqualifications enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 453. 6. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel who represented the contesting members of the Committee of Management, was unable to contend with any degree of force that it was open to the Committee of Management in exercise of power under Rule 454 to remove from its membership petitioner No. 1 because it held the opinion that he had acted in disregard of Rule 115. 7. In our judgment respondents 2 to 12 had no jurisdiction acting as members of the Committee of Management to remove petitioner No. 1 from its membership on the ground that he had violated Rule 115. He was an 'Officer of the Society within the meaning of Section 2 (o) of the Act. Assuming he had violated Rule 115 he could be removed from his office only in accordance with Section 38 of the Act. The Committee of Management could take action against petitioner No. 1 under Rule 454 only if it found that he had incurred one of the disqualifications mentioned in Rule 453, sub-rule (1). The impugned resolution contains no such finding. The Committee consequently acted beyond its statutory limitations. 8. Learned counsel for respondents 2 to 12 contended that if the petitioners had a grievance against the resolution of the Committee they had a remedy available under the Act itself under Section 70 thereof and since they had not exhausted the statutory alternative remedy this Court should decline to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. There are two sound reasons in our opinion for rejecting this submission. There are two sound reasons in our opinion for rejecting this submission. In the first place once before against a similar illegal act petitioner No. 1 had to go through the process of arbitration proceedings which only resulted in an order which illegally kept him out of an elective office, wholly unjustifiable and secondly the petition is also directed against that part of the Award itself of which the impugned resolution is merely the consequence. 9. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, also has contended that if the petitioner was aggrieved against the Award of the Arbitrator inasmuch as it directed the Committee of Management to hold a meeting for consideration of the question of the removal of the petitioner from its membership within the period specified, he had a right of appeal under Section 98 of the Act and since he had not pursued that remedy this Court should not interfere with the Award of the Arbitrator under Article 226 of the Constitution and the consequent resolution. In our view the petitioner had no right of appeal against that part of the Award of the Arbitrator by which he directed the Committee of Management to convene a meeting for considering the question of removal of the petitioner under R. 454 of Rules, and the continuance of Shri Yasmin Qureshi, as Officiating Chairman. The right of appeal to an aggrieved party under Section 98 of the Act is limited to the nature of Awards, orders and decisions provided for in sub-clauses (a) to (n) of sub-section (1) of that provision. Sub-cls. (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (k), (j)(1), (m) and (n) concern themselves with orders passed by the Registrar. Sub-clauses (c) and (j) deal with decisions of Co-operative Societies and orders passed by the liquidator of a Society of the nature envisaged in those provisions. The order of the Arbitrator under challenge does not attract any of the above-mentioned sub-clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 98. Learned Counsel relied on sub-clause (h) for the purpose of supporting his argument that the petitioner had a right of appeal. Section 98 (1) (h) gives a right of appeal against "an award made by an arbitrator or board of arbitrators under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 71". Learned Counsel relied on sub-clause (h) for the purpose of supporting his argument that the petitioner had a right of appeal. Section 98 (1) (h) gives a right of appeal against "an award made by an arbitrator or board of arbitrators under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 71". Section 70 (1) provides for reference to an arbitrator of disputes relating to the constitution, management or business of a Society between such parties as are mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) thereof. The dispute raised by petitioner No. 1 was regarding the legality of the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 11th August 1980. The order of the Arbitrator setting aside the resolution alone amounted to an award within the meaning of Section 71 (4) of the Act. The questions as to whether a second meeting should be held by the Committee to consider the question of removal of petitioner No. 1 and whether till such time Shri Yasmin Qureshi should continue as Officiating Chairman was not in dispute, and did not form part of the reference. The part of the order thus giving directions regarding these matters did not constitute an award within the meaning of Section 71 (4). In as far as it was held that the resolution of Committee was illegal the award being in his favour obviously he was not aggrieved. It was obviously not an order under Section 71 (2). We consequently conclude that petitioner 'No. 1 had no right of appeal. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner next contended that the order directing the Committee of Management to hold a fresh meeting within the period specified amounts to exercise of powers of the nature contemplated by Section 19A of the U. P. General Clauses Act. This contention also, in our opinion, is unsound and must be rejected. Section 19-A of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 merely provides:- "Where by any Uttar Pradesh Act, a power is given to a person, officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of any act or thing, all such powers shall be deemed to be given as are necessary to enable that person, Officer or functionary to do or enforce the doing of the act or thing." The arbitrator has under the Act powers to decide a dispute referred to him for arbitration. Section 19-A merely empowers him to do all such things as may be necessary for effectively deciding the dispute referred to him. As the dispute had been decided by the arbitrator in the instant case he ceased to have any power under Section 19-A of the Act to issue directions, of the nature under consideration for the future. Having decided the dispute referred to him in favour of petitioner No. 1 he became functus officio and the nature of directions issued by him cannot by any stretch of imagination be characterised as necessary for enforcing his Award. 11. It was further urged by learned counsel for the contesting respondents that assuming that the directions issued by the Arbitrator were illegal, since the Co-operative Society which was a private organisation acting bona fide had in pursuance of the Award already passed a resolution removing the petitioner from the membership of the Committee of Management, it was not open to this Court to issue a writ quashing the resolution. In support of his contention learned counsel placed reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal v. Union of India, ( AIR 1957 SC 529 : (1957 All LJ 682)). The observations relied upon in our opinion are of no assistance to the contesting respondents. The contention raised before the Supreme Court in that decision was that if on the basis of an illegal order passed by a statutory authority in exercise of statutory powers a private individual has already entered in possession of the disputed property a writ of mandamus could not issue to or an order in the nature of mandamus be made against him for his ejectment. This contention was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the following words:- "The eviction of Jagan Nath was in contravention of the express provisions of Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction) Act. His eviction, therefore, was illegal. He was entitled to be evicted in due course of law and a writ of mandamus could issue to or an order in the nature of mandamus could be made against the Union of India to restore possession of the property to Jagan Nath from which he had been evicted if the property was still in possession of the Union of India. The property in dispute, however, is in possession of the appellant Normally, a writ of mandamus does not issue to or an order in the nature of mandamus is not made against a private individual. Such an order is made against a person directing him to do some particular thing specified in the order, which appertains to his office and is in the nature of a public duty (Hals-burys Laws of England, Vol. 11, Lord Simonds Edition, P. 84). If it had been proved that the Union of India and the appellant had colluded and the transaction between them was merely colourable, entered into with a view to deprive Jagan Nath of his rights, jurisdiction to issue a writ to or make an order in the nature of mandamus against the appellant might be said to exist in a Court. We have not been able to find a direct authority to cover a case like the one before us, but it would appear that so far as election to an office is concerned, a mandamus to restore, admit, or elect to an office will not be granted unless the office is vacant. If the office is in fact full, proceedings must be taken by way of injunction or election petition to oust the party in possession and that a mandamus will go only on the supposition that there is nobody holding the office in question " 12. In the instant case in the first place the petitioner is not praying for any writ of mandamus against a society or any individual member of the Committee of Management and secondly it is nobodys case that the offices occupied by the petitioner as a member of the Committee of Management and its Chairman have been filled in by anyone else. The observations made by the Supreme Court as extracted above thus clearly have no application to the facts of this case. 13. It was ultimately contended that the Co-operative Society is not a statutory body and consequently no writ can issue against it for quashing the resolution passed by its Committee of Management. In support of his contention, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on certain observations in The Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Narayan Rath, ( AIR 1977 SC 112 ). In support of his contention, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on certain observations in The Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Narayan Rath, ( AIR 1977 SC 112 ). We have examined this decision and in our opinion it cannot be considered an authority for the proposition urged. The Supreme Court specifically in that case declined to decide this question though raised as would appear from the observations contained in paragraph 6 of the judgment as reported in the "All India Reporter". A Full Bench of this Court in Aley Ahmad Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools ( AIR 1977 All 539 : (1977 All LJ 952)) has taken the view after considering various authorities including the decision of the Supreme Court in Praga Tools Corporation v. C. V. Imanual ( AIR 1969 SC 1306 at PP. 1309-10) that if a non-statutory body is required to act in accordance with statutory provisions and acts in disregard or in contravention of such provisions it is amenable to a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Full Bench made specific reference to a decision of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ram Swarup v. Madhya Pradesh State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. (AIR 1976 Madh Pra 152) wherein the view was taken that:- "Normally such societies (Co-operative Societies registered under the provisions of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960) will not be amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court except in cases where according to the provisions of the statute or rules or regulations framed under the Act by which the Society is governed, there is a statutory or public duty imposed on it, and the enforcement of which is being sought." 14. The Full Bench of this Court in the above mentioned case expressly agreed with the enunciation of law by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ram Swarup v. Madhya Pradesh State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. (supra). The power of the Committee of Management to remove a person from its membership is governed by statutory provisions. Rule 454 specifically provides the conditions under which alone the Committee of Management can remove one of its members. In the instant case the resolution of the Committee of Management to remove the petitioner from its membership is in excess of the power available to it by statutory Rule 454. Rule 454 specifically provides the conditions under which alone the Committee of Management can remove one of its members. In the instant case the resolution of the Committee of Management to remove the petitioner from its membership is in excess of the power available to it by statutory Rule 454. Under the circumstances, we are clearly of the view that a writ can issue quashing the resolution passed by respondents 2 to 12. 15. For the reasons given above, this writ petition is allowed. The Award of the Arbitrator (respondent No. 1) dated 11th August, 1980 in as far as he issued directions for holding a meeting of the Committee of Management within 15 days of the Award for considering the issue of discontinuing the membership of the petitioner No. 1 and for the continuance of Sri Yasmin Qureshi as Officiating Chairman in the meanwhile is hereby quashed. The consequential resolution passed by the Committee of Management dated 23rd August, 1980 is also quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled to their costs from the contesting respondents 2 to 12.