JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J. - By means of this petition, the petitioner Hira Lal Gaur, who was employed at the relevant time as Lecturer in History at the Maharajganj Higher Secondary School, Maharajganj, Azamgarh (hereinafter referred to as the School) prays for a writ of certioari, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash an order of the District Inspector of Schools addressed to the Manager of the School drawing his attention to a letter of the Deputy Director of Education of the Region concerned dated 7th December, 1979 dealing with the subject of reinstatement of Respondent no. 7 Mahesh Das to the post of Lecturer in History and payment of salary to him for the period during which he was on leave. This letter further contains a statement to the effect that the petitioner's appointment had been approved by the District Inspector of Schools on a purely temporary basis whose services could be terminated without notice at any time. The petitioner also prays for quashing of the notice dated 21st January, 1980 served on him under the signature of the Manager of the School intimating to him that he had been appointed on a purely temporary basis and since his services were no longer required the same shall stand terminated with effect from 22nd January, 1980. 2. The petitioner prays for the above-mentioned reliefs on the allegations that he hid been appointed as a Lecturer in History on the 20th August, 1976 and had been working as such till the service on him of the impugned notice under the signature of Manager of the School. It is stated in the petition that one Rajendra Prasad Singh, who was a permanent Lecturer in History at the School, resigned. Though subsequently he withdrew his letter of resignation, the Receiver appointed by this Cour at the relevant time and functioning as the Committee of Management declined to accept the withdrawal of the resignation and treated Rajendra Prasad Singh's service as having come to an end. This led to litigation between Rajendra Prasad Singh and the School, according to the petitioner which was still pending in this Court in appeal. According to the petitioner since the post held by Rajendra Prisad Singh was vacant, Respondent no. 7 Mahesh Das. This led to litigation between Rajendra Prasad Singh and the School, according to the petitioner which was still pending in this Court in appeal. According to the petitioner since the post held by Rajendra Prisad Singh was vacant, Respondent no. 7 Mahesh Das. a permanent teacher in the L. T. grade was temporarily promoted to the post of Lecturer in History but since Mahesh Das was sentenced to life imprisonment in a murder case he remained unconfirmed on that post. It is stated that the post once occupied by Rajendra Prasad Singh and Muherh Das remained unfilled hence a fresh post of Lecturer in History was created by the Director of Education on the 23rd June, 1976. The petitioner claims that the Receiver after all the formalities had been gone through appointed him as Lecturer in History on the 20th August, lv76 and he was subsequently confirmed. The order terminating the petitioner's services by the impugned notice has been challenged by him on various grounds which shall be dealt with by us later. 3. The petition has been contested by means of counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools, the Committee of Management as well as by Mahesh Das. In response to the counter-affidavit, the petitioner has filed rejoinder-affidavits, and reference to the allegations contained in the affidavits shall be made as and when necessary. 4. From the affidavits exchanged between the parties, it appears that according to the petitioner apart from the post once occupied by Rajendra Prasad Singh Which was in dispute on account of litigation, a fresh post of Lecturer was created by the Director of Education in June 1976 and the petitioner had been appointed on that post and was subsequently made permanent. On the other hand, according to the case set up by the Committee of Management which has contested this petition both Mahesh Das as well as the petitioner was only appointed in a temporary capacity to the post which was held by Rajendra Prasad Singh during the period the litigation was pending between the School on the one hand and Rajendra Prasad Singh on the other- According to Mahesh Das he had been appointed as a Lecturer in 1970 and was subsequently confirmed some time in the year 1973 but since he was falsely implicated in a murder case and got involved in a murder trial the Management treated him as having been suspended during the period when he was in prison and the petitioner had been appointed in the vacancy which fell due on account of his suspension during the period of the trial. Mahesh Das claims that he has a right to be reinstated on his appeal having been allowed by this Court and his conviction having been set aside. The case put forward on behalf of Mahesh Das is that since the petitioner had been appointed only for the period when he was under suspension himself is entitled to reinstatement and the services of the petitioner have been rightly terminated. 5. For a consideration of the question as to whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief or not the nature of the tenure on which Rajendra Prasad Singh, Mahesh Das and the petitioner were appointed Lecturer and their status at the time when the notice terminating the petitioner's service was served has to be examined. 6. We shall first of all consider as to whether the petitioner was appointed on a post other than the one held by Rajendra Prasad Singh and was confirmed on that post or not. For reasons to be act out presently, in our opinion it is not possible to hold either that the petitioner was appointed to a new post of Lecturer in History sanctioned by the Director of Education apart from the post substantively held by Rajendra Prasad Singh or that he had been confirmed on that post of any stage before his services were terminated by means of the notice under challenge. The petitioner has abstained from filing the letter by which he was appointed as a Lecturer in the School There is no document on record showing either that any post of Lecturer in History was ever sanctioned by the Director of Education except the one substantively occupied by Rajendra Prasad Singh or that the petitioner was ever confirmed on that po9t. On the other hand with the rejoinder-affidavit filed by the petitioner in response to the counter affidavit filed by Mahesh Das as Annexure-I has been annexed a letter issued under the signature of the Deputy Director of Education of the Region purporting to be on behalf of the Director of Education of some date in June 1976 which clearly indicate that the Director of Education after consideration of demand made on behalf of the Committee of Management of the School declined to sanction any fresh post and intimated to the District Inspector of School that the School should continue to function on its existing staff. The Inspector of Schools by means of this letter had been clearly directed to accord approval only to a temporary appointment to the past of Lecturer in History in the School since in the opinion of the Director of Education there was no clear vacancy in that post. This annexure filed by the petitioner itself militates against the claim made by him that a fresh post of Lecturer in History was sanctioned on which he was appointed and subsequently conflicted If the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools, who is impleaded as one of the opposite-parties, it is steed that the petitioner had been appointed purely in a temporary capacity in place of Mahesh Das. Annexed to the counter-affidavit verified by Sri Permanand Singh a Note and Drafter in the office of the District Inspector of Schools, is a true copy of the order which the District Inspector of Schools accorded approval to the appointment of the petitioner in a temporary capacity as Lecturer in History on the condition that his services were liable to be terminated any time without notice. This letter is dated 16th August, 1976. The genuineness of copy of this letter is not challenged. This letter is dated 16th August, 1976. The genuineness of copy of this letter is not challenged. Mahesh Das is Paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit states that while he was working as a Lecturer in History in the School in June 1974 he was falsely implicated in a case under Section 302, I. P. G. and on account of his involvement in the criminal case the Receiver who was, as already stated, functioning as the Committee of Management of the School under orders of this Court treated him as suspended and during the period of his suspension Hira Lal Gaur, the petitioner, was appointed as a Lecturer in History as a temporary measure. It is asserted that the petitioner's appointment was not in a clear vacancy on a substantive post created by the Deputy Director of Education. A copy of the letter dated 20th August, 1976, by which the petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer in History has been filed as Annexure C.A. 2 to the counter-affidavit of Mahesh Das and it clearly shows that the petitioner had been appointed in a purely temporary capacity and his services were liable to be terminated without notice. This letter has been issued under the signature of Sri B.R. Singh, the Principal of the School, for and on behalf of the appointing authority. 7. On the material on record discussed above, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner had not been appointed on any fresh post sanctioned by the Director of Education apart from the one substantively Held by Rajendra Prasad Singh and that he was never confirmed as a Lecturer. 8. We have next to consider the question as to in what capacity Rajendra Prasad Singh was employed as a Lecturer in History and the nature of his tenure. It has been admitted by the petitioner that Rajendra Prasad Singh was a permanent Lecturer in History. His case is that he was appointed on a post different from the one held by Rajendra Prasad Singh. In March, 1970 Rajendra Prasad Singh, according to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Committee of Management sent a letter of resignation to the Receiver of the School which was to take effect on the 8th July, 1970. His case is that he was appointed on a post different from the one held by Rajendra Prasad Singh. In March, 1970 Rajendra Prasad Singh, according to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Committee of Management sent a letter of resignation to the Receiver of the School which was to take effect on the 8th July, 1970. In spite of the fact that before the letter of resignation became effective Rajendra Prasad Singh withdrew his resignation, the Receiver accepted the resignation and directed his being relieved from the post on 8th July, 1970. Rajendra Prasad Singh consequently instituted suit no. 322 of 1970 for a declaration against the School authorities that the order of the Receiver terminating his services was null and void and that he still continued to be in the service of the School. There was a further prayer for a permanent injunction restraining the Management of the School from stopping him from working as a Lecturer in the School. By a decree dated 22 and March 1971 the Trial Court granted a declaration to the effect that the acceptance of resignation of Rajendra Piasad Singh was invalid and of no effect in the eye of 0 law and that he continued to be in the service of the School as a Lecturer in History. The Management appealed against the decree of the Trial Court but interim order appears to have been granted by the Court of first appeal as well as in the second appeal in this Court the decree of the Trial Court was upheld. The second appeal filed by the Management ultimately was dismissed by this Court on the 30th June, 1980 and the decree of the Trial Court merged in the decree of this Court. It is thus clear that on the post on which the petitioner or respondent no. 7 Mahesh Das had at one time or the other functioned as a Lecturer in History Rajendra Prasad Simgh has always hern entitled to act as a Lecturer. It does not appeal that till the 30th January, 1980 when this petition was presented in this Court Rajendra Prasad Singh had reported for joining at the School as a Lecturer in History. It does not appeal that till the 30th January, 1980 when this petition was presented in this Court Rajendra Prasad Singh had reported for joining at the School as a Lecturer in History. A letter purporting to be signed by Rajendra Prasad Singh dated 20th July, 1980 had been presented before us for perusual by the learned counsel representing the Committee of Management by which he has demanded to be reinstated to his post as Lecturer in view of the decree of this Court. He has also made a demand by means of this letter for payment of the entire salary found to be due to him during the pendency of the litigation and even prior to that date as a sequence of the illegal acceptance of bis letter of registration. Assuming that this letter is one signed by Rajendra Prasad Singh this demand was made long after the writ petition had been presented in this Court and after the service on him of the notice terminating the petitioner's services. This though Rajendra Prasad Singh is entitled to be reinstated to the post of Lecturer he has not joined his post and in any event he had not done so till the date when the petitioner's services were terminated by means of the notice under challenge. 9. As far as Mahesh Das (respondent no. 7) is concerned, he was admittedly, permanent teacher of the School in the L. T. grade. In paragraph of the counter-affidavit, he asserts that he was a permanent teacher at the School and had been promoted to the post of Lecturer on the 18th July, 1970 and that his appointment as Lecturer in History had been duly approved by the District Inspector of Schools. In support of this assertion he has filed Annexure C.A. 1, a letter dated 18th July, 1970 addressed by the Headmaster of the School, to him stating that with reference to his application dated 20th June, 1970 for the post of Lecturer in History he had been directed to inform him that he had been promoted to the Lecturer's grade on Government approved scale temporarily subject to the approval of the District Inspector of Schools vide Receiver's order dated 17th July, 197". There is nothing on record to show that after this letter was issued any time till 1972 Mahesh Das's promotion as Lecturer ever received the approval of the District Inspector of Schools, Annexure R. A. 1 to the counter affidavit filed by Sri Bankey Singh acting as pairokar of respondent no. 3 leaves no room for doubt that the promotion of the petitioner,in July, 1970 to the pest of Lecturer in History at the School received the approval of the District Inspector of Schools From Annexure R. A. 1 referred to above it appears that on 11th July, 1972 Mahesh Das applied to the receiver through the Principal of the School stating that since July, 1970 when Rajendra Prasad Singh resigned from the post of Lecturer it History he had been working as such on that post. In that application Mahesn Das states that since the case of Rajendra Prasad was in litigation he could not be promoted to the post of Lecturer inspite of the fact that he had made an application for that purpose. There is thus a clear admission by him that till the date of the application the post of Lecturer in History was vacant though Mahesh Das was working on that post. In this application a request had been made by Mahesh Das for being promoted as Lecturer either in a temporary or permanent capacity. On the same dale the Principal of the School forwarded the application to the receiver with the remark that Mahesh Das was working as Lecturer in History since July, 1970 and that till the final decision of Rajendra Prasad Singh he may be promoted to the post temporarily. On the same date the receiver on the recommendation of the principal passed an order to the following effect : - "He is appointed temporarily as Lecturer of History vice Sri Rajendra Prasad Singh till the case of the tatter is finally settled". 10. There is nothing on record to show that the promotion of Mahesh Das to the post of Lecturer as a consequence of the order of the receiver dated 11th July, 1972 ever received the approval of We District inspector of Schools. 10. There is nothing on record to show that the promotion of Mahesh Das to the post of Lecturer as a consequence of the order of the receiver dated 11th July, 1972 ever received the approval of We District inspector of Schools. It may be assumed that the receiver acting as the Committee of Management intended to appoint Mahesh Das as a Lecturer in History in a temporary capacity till such time as Rajendra Prasad Singh did not join his post but his rights have to be determined on the basis of the latter of appointment and the order passed by the receiver. From what has been discussed above, if is clear that Mahesh Das was appointed only in a temporary capacity as Lecturer in History till the decision of the suit instituted by Rajendra Prasad Singh. Rajendra Prasad Singh's suit was ultimately decided on 3Cth June, 1980. In view of the recommendation made by the Principal which was accepted by the receiver by means of the order quoted above after the 30th June, 1980 when Rajendra Prasad Singh's suit was ultimately decided in appeal, he ceased to have any right to continue on that post even though the School authorities might have allowed him to continue to function as a Lecturer in History. 11. As a consequence of the decision of the relative cases of Rajendra Prasad Singh, Mahesh Das and the petitioner Hira Lal Gaur, the position that emerges is that it is Rajendra Prasad Singh who is entitled to be reinstated to the post of Lecturer in History but he has not yet joined his post and consequently in fact the vacancy to the post of Lecturer continued till at least the date when the petitioner was served with the impugned notice. Mahesh Das was acquitted in appeal by this Court in the murder case in which he had been convicted by the Trial Court on the 22nd September, 1978. He was released from prison, according to the material on record, on the 4th November, 1978 and submitted a joining report to the Principal of the School on the 6th November, 1978. Since difficulties were created in this joining the post which was at the time occupied by the petitioner he made representations to the Deputy Director of Education and the District Inspector of Schools. Since difficulties were created in this joining the post which was at the time occupied by the petitioner he made representations to the Deputy Director of Education and the District Inspector of Schools. The Committee of Management also made a reference to the District Inspector of Schools seeking his advice regarding the claim of Mahesh Das to be reinstated since the post was already held by the petitioner even though in a purely temporary capacity. It was on the basis of the representations made by Mahesh Das that on the 7th December, 1979 the Deputy Director of Education of the Region concerned wrote to the District inspector of Schools a letter intimating that Mahesh Das had represented to him, that in spite of the fact that he had been acquitted in appeal by this Court in the case under Section 302 I. P. C , in which he had been falsely implicated, his request for reinstatement had remained unheeded by the receiver. By means of this letter the Deputy Director of Education required the District Inspector of Schools to take appropriate steps regarding the case of Mahesh Das and to intimate to him at an early date as to why Mahesh Das had not been allowed to take charge as Lecturer in History. Along with this letter, the Deputy Director of Education sent the original representation made by Mahesh Das as well as a copy of the judgment of this Court. On the 27th December, 1979 on receipt of the letter of the Deputy Director of Education mentioned above the District Inspector of Schools wrote to the receiver of the School, which had by then become an Intermediate College, inviting his attention to the contents of the Deputy Director's letter dated 7th December, 1979 and requesting him to implement the directions of the Deputy Director of Education and to intimate to him the action that had been taken in compliance therewith. This letter went to draw the attention of the receiver to the fact that the appointment of Sri Hira Lal Gaur, the petitioner, had been approved by him by means of the letter dated 16th August, 1976 in a purely temporary capacity and his services were liable to be terminated without notice. This letter went to draw the attention of the receiver to the fact that the appointment of Sri Hira Lal Gaur, the petitioner, had been approved by him by means of the letter dated 16th August, 1976 in a purely temporary capacity and his services were liable to be terminated without notice. The Manager was requested to take steps in accordance with the approval granted for the appointment of the petitioner as a Lecturer in History suggesting thereby that it was open to the Management to reinstate Mahesh Das who had been acquitted by this Court and to terminate the services of the petitioner since he has been appointed only in a purely temporary capacity and his services were liable to be terminated even without notice. It appears that as a consequence of the suggestion contained in the letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 27th December, 1979 the Manager of the College served on the petitioner the notice dated 21st January, 1980 which is also the subject-matter of challenge in this petition, 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that ;he petitioner was cither a permanent lecturer or in any event a temporary lecturer and consequently his services could be terminated only after complying with the requirement of Regulation 26 of Chapter III of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, if he is found to be permanent and Regulation 25 in case he is found to be a temporary lecturer. It was urged that if this Court accepts the petitioner's claim that he was a permanent lecturer, his services could be terminated only by giving him three months' notice or three months' pay in lieu thereof. In the alternative, it was contended that in case this Court was of the view that the petitioner was a temporary employee, his services could be terminated only by giving him one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu thereof in compliance with Regulation 25. We have already held that the petitioner was not a permanent lecturer and consequently Regulation 26 would not apply to his case. On the other hand, on behalf of Mahesh Das it was urged by Sri R.P. Singh Advocate, that the petitioner's case is covered by Regulation 24 and consequently no prior notice was needed for terminating his services. We have already held that the petitioner was not a permanent lecturer and consequently Regulation 26 would not apply to his case. On the other hand, on behalf of Mahesh Das it was urged by Sri R.P. Singh Advocate, that the petitioner's case is covered by Regulation 24 and consequently no prior notice was needed for terminating his services. Before considering the respective contentions raised by the counsel for the parties, we shall first deal with certain other contentions that were raised cy the learned counsel for the petitioner. 13. It was first contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice by which the petitioner's services were terminated was in disregard of the principles of natural justice since he had been provided no opportunity of showing cause against such termination. In support of his contention that he was to be heard before an order was passed which had adversely affected him, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ]. The observations made by the Supreme Court it Maneka Gandhi's case must be read in the light of the facts of that case. Maneka Gandhi invoked the powers of the Supremo Court under Article 32 of the Constitution against the action taken by the passport authority impounding her passport in exercise of powers under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Passports Act, 1967 in the interest of the general public. The order of impounding did not disclose the grounds which persuaded the authority concerned to conclude that impounding of the petitioner's passport was in the interest of the general public. On behalf Maneka Gandhi inter alia it was urged that Section 10 (3) (c) was void being violative of Article 14 since it conferred arbitrary powers to impound the petitioner's passport without providing for an opportunity to the party affected to be heard before passing of the impounding order. In answer to the writ petition, a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Government of India disclosing the reasons why it was considered necessary to impounding her passport "in the interest of the general public". The majority opinion of the Supreme Court while repelling the contentions based on fundamental rights held that the no good enough reason had been shown for cancellation of the petitioner's passport. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court while repelling the contentions based on fundamental rights held that the no good enough reason had been shown for cancellation of the petitioner's passport. In the alternative, it was held that the order WAS unsustainable since Maneka Gandhi, had no opportunity of showing that the grounds, for impounding her passport either did not exist or had no bearing on public interest. Maneka Gandhi was a citizen seeking relief against a State action which adversely affected her and it was in this context that the Supreme Court held that there was a duty cast on the respondents to the writ petition to give her an opportunity to be heard taking into account the nature of the function they were performing. The petitioner is seeking no relief against any action taken by the State or any authority of the State. He is an employee of a private institution and normally his case would covered by the ordinary law governing master and servant relationship. Even if termination of his services is found to be illegal, he, in the normal course, would have been entitled to no relief except to damages for wrongful dismissal. He can challenge such an order only if it is contrary to some statutory safeguards. A person who is employed in a purely temporary capacity has no right to the post and to be heard in compliance with the requirement of principles of natural justice if his services are terminated in accordance with the condition of service applicable to him or any statutory provisions permitting termination of his service. The first contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner consequently has no merits and is rejected. 14. It was next contended that the Management had taken no independent action of its own and bad merely complied with the orders of the District Inspector of Schools and hence the notice was liable to be struck down. In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhartji, ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ]. The material on record, however does not bear out that the Committee of Management actually mechanically carried out an order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. Mahesh Das pressing for his reinstatement. The material on record, however does not bear out that the Committee of Management actually mechanically carried out an order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. Mahesh Das pressing for his reinstatement. The Committee of Management consequently sought advice from the District Inspector of Schools on the one hand and on the other Mahesh Das had also made a representation to the Deputy Director of Education as mentioned above. The District Inspector of Schools merely drew the attention of the Manager to the fact that the petitioner's services had been approved only in a purely temporary capacity and were liable to be terminated even without notice. It was open to the Committee of Management if it was of the opinion that Mahesh Das was not entitled to reinstatement to decline to reinstate him and as a consequence to terminate the petitioner's services. The fact that the Management sought the advice of the District Inspector of Schools and the latter gave some advice does not mean that the action taken by the Management is either under the orders of the District Inspector of Schools or that it was necessarily not its own action. 15. The only question thus surviving consideration is that if the petitioner's services had been terminated without complying with the requirement of Regulation 25, the notice terminating his service is liable to quashed. Regulation 24 on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel representing Mahesh Das and Regulation 25 on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner both deal with the termination of service of temporary employees though in different situations. Regulation 24 runs as follows: - "The services of an employee appointed as a temporary measure for a definite period or in a leave vacancy or in vacancy occurring for part of the session shall unless extended according to law, terminate on the expiry of the period for which he was appointed or when the vacancy comes to an end, whichever is earlier, and no prior notice, shall be needed for such termination". 16. 16. Regulation 24, as quoted above is attracted only in case of temporary employees who have either been appointed for a definite period or in a leave vacancy or in a vacancy occurring for a part of the session The letter of appointment of the petitioner as well as the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools according approval to his appointment disclose that he was appointed in a temporary capacity but without any definite period being laid down. Neither Rajendra Prasad Singh nor Mahesh Das were on leave and consequently the petitioner cannot be said to have been appointed (SC) the petitioner cannot be said to have created either on account of the litigation between Rajendra Prasad Singh and the Management or on account of imprisonment of Mahesh Das cannot be described as one occurring for part of the session. It is thus clear that the petitioner's case cannot be governed by Regulation 24 of Chapter III of the Intermediate Education Act. 17. Regulation 25 deals with cases of termination of services of temporary employees other than those covered by Regulation 24. It is, in our opinion, Regulation 25 that will apply to the petitioner's case. The notice impugned was issued to the petitioner on 21st January, 1980 terminating his services on the next day that is 22nd January, 1980. The petitioner was neither given one month's notice before the termination of his services nor was he given or offered one month's pay in lieu thereof. A Division Bench of this Court in Ram Phal Singh v. Chandra Dutt Sharma, Special Appeal No. 174 of 1975 decided on 11th August, 1975 held that giving of one month's notice or in the alternative one month's pay in lieu thereof is a condition precedent to the termination of the services of a temporary employee under Regulation 25 and in the absence of this condition precedent having been complied with, a notice terminating the services of an employee would be invalid and contrary to law. The decision in Ram Phal Singh's case is binding on us. 18. For the reasons given above, this petition is hereby allowed. The notice issued by the Prabandhak of the College to the petitioner dated 21st January, 1980 terminating his services with effect from 22nd January, 1980 is quashed. Opposite-party no. The decision in Ram Phal Singh's case is binding on us. 18. For the reasons given above, this petition is hereby allowed. The notice issued by the Prabandhak of the College to the petitioner dated 21st January, 1980 terminating his services with effect from 22nd January, 1980 is quashed. Opposite-party no. 3 is directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service till such time as his services are validly terminated in accordance with Regulation 25. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XXXIX, Rule 2 and Order XLIII (U.P. Kshettra Samiti and aila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961, Section 239 - Appeal against order granting temporary injunction - By such injunction Nagar Mahapalika was restrained from interfering with petitioner's right of business and profession of skinning dead animals and tanning, storing bones, horns and hides etc. of those dead animals in spite of fact that petitioner's licence was not renewed - Appellate Court allowing appeal holding that petitioner bad no prima facie case for such injunction - Propriety of Appellate Court's order - Held, there was no error in that order - Injunction rightly not sustained