JUDGMENT Per Dayal, J. - This writ petition arises out of demand made under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for payment of special contribution under Chap. V-A of the Act. The petitioner started its factory in the year 1966 and was principal employer within the meaning of S. 2 (17) of the Act. Exemptions to some of the factories were granted by the Central Government under S. 73F of the aforesaid Act. The petitioner's factory, however, was not granted any exemption. At a later stage demands for payment of special contribution were made from the petitioner by annexures 5 and 10 of the writ petition. By annexure 5 the amount payable by the petitioner was determined under S. 73(3) readwith S. 45A of the said Act. It is not disputed that the petitioner did not file any return as required, therefore, the assessment had to be made by respondent 1 on the basis of enquiry made by an Inspector. The determination was made by annexure 5 to the writ petition on 27 June 1973. The petitioner thereafter wrote letters to respondent 1 praying for condonation of delay and in the alternative for instalments for payment of special contribution. This request was not accepted by respondent 1 and finally a recovery certificate, dated 4 October 1973, annexure 15, was issued against the petitioner. The petitioner has challenged the demand notices and recovery certificate on three grounds: 2. Firstly, the petitioner contended that it was held by Employees' State Insurance Corporation itself that Muzaffarnagar, where the petitioner's factory was situate was a sparse area, i.e., where there was less than 500 persons insurable under the Act. He argued that as some of the factories have been granted exemption under S. 73F of the said Act on that ground the petitioners too should have been granted an exemption. Respondent 1 was not entitled to recover any amount from the petitioner as petitioner's factory was situate in the same area. This argument, in our opinion, has no force. Section 73-F says that exemption is to be granted in respect of any Industry by the Central Government. It is not disputed that the petitioner never applied for any exemption nor any exemption was granted to it. This argument, in our opinion, has no force. Section 73-F says that exemption is to be granted in respect of any Industry by the Central Government. It is not disputed that the petitioner never applied for any exemption nor any exemption was granted to it. In these circumstances, the first ground fails and the petitioner cannot claim any exemption from the operation of the Act under S. 73-F thereof. 3. Second ground raised by the learned counsel for petitioner was about limitation. Learned counsel contended that the amount of special contribution payable under the Act became due as soon as liability of employer to pay wages accrued under S. 73-A (4) of the Act. He argued that under Art. 113 of the Limitation Act the limitation was three years from the date when the right to sue accrued. The right to sue could accrue on the date when the amount fell due under Sub-sec. (4) of S. 73A as mentioned above. Learned counsel relied upon New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ran and another, [A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 1637]. That was a case where licence fee or rent was sought to be recovered under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1958. The contention of the New Delhi Municipal Committee was that the rent though due for more than three years may not be recoverable by filing a suit, but the right was not extinguished. Under S. 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act the amount could be recovered as arrears of land revenue after it was determined under S. 7 thereof. It was held by the Supreme Court that the amount to be recoverable must be legally recoverable. In that case r/o it was held that any suit instituted on the date when the special officer made his order under S. 7 (1) would have been barred by time. In these circumstances, the claim of the New Delhi Municipal Committee was negatived. 4. In our case the situation is different. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon R. C. Jall Parsi and others v. Union of India and others, (A.I.R. 1962 S. C. 1281), That was a case for recovery of statutory cess of transport of coal. In these circumstances, the claim of the New Delhi Municipal Committee was negatived. 4. In our case the situation is different. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon R. C. Jall Parsi and others v. Union of India and others, (A.I.R. 1962 S. C. 1281), That was a case for recovery of statutory cess of transport of coal. After considering the limitation for payment of various dues it was held : "There is no other specific article in the Limitation Act applicable to such a suit and, therefore, it would be governed only by the residuary Art. 120 of the said Act. Under the said article, time runs from the time when the right to sue accrues. It follows that when a suit for recovery of a statutory cess is filed by the Central Government, the period of limitation of sixty years under Art. 149 should be computed when the right to sue accrues." The right to sue accrued in the present case when the defendant refused to pay cess when demanded. Under the Limitation Act, 1963, the equivalent article is Art. 113 and starting point is the same "when the right to sue accrues." 5. Learned counsel for the respondent further relied upon Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bhopal v. Central Press and another, (1977-I L. L. N. 628), That case was for realisation of the dues under S. 45A read with S. 44 of the said Act. It held in Para. 3, at pages 629 and 630 : "...the scheme of the Act, after the amendment by Act 44 of 1966 is that the Corporation itself should, in a case where there is omission on the part of the employer to maintain records in accordance with S. 44 of the Act, determine the amount of contributions, on the strength of such information as it may collect. It can then make the demand under S. 45-A. If the employer refuses to comply with the demand so made, the matter can coma up before the Employees' Insurance Court under S. 75 of the Act. . . . " In our case Sections 44 and 45A are applicable by virtue of S. 73G of the Act. Admittedly no return was filed by the petitioner and the amount had to be determined after inspection of and collecting necessary data by respondent 1. . . . " In our case Sections 44 and 45A are applicable by virtue of S. 73G of the Act. Admittedly no return was filed by the petitioner and the amount had to be determined after inspection of and collecting necessary data by respondent 1. This was done and by letter, dated 27 June 1973, the order was communicated to the petitioner. A demand was also made by the same letter. Thereafter a demand was again made on 6 September 1973, by letter, a copy of which has been filed as annexure 10. Taking annexure 5 to the writ petition, i.e., the letter, dated 27 June 1973, as the starting point of limitation, the recovery certificate issued on 4 October 1973 (annexure 15 to the writ petition), was within time. Consequently the objection about limitation also fails and has to be rejected. 6. Lastly, it was urged that the amount claimed by the respondent from the petitioner was a fee and not a tax and unless there was quid pro quo respondent 1 was not entitled to recover any amount from the petitioner. It was alleged that no service has been rendered to the petitioner or his employees for the period for which the demand was made and as such the same was liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on Anand Kumar Bindal v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation and others, (A. I. R. 1957 All. 136). In this case, the levy of special contribution under Chap. V-A of the Act was challenged. It was contended that it was a fee and not tax and unless there was a corresponding service rendered, the same could not be claimed. The Division Bench deciding the aforesaid case repelled this contention and held the levy under Chap. V-A of the aforesaid Act was in the nature of tax and not fee. In view of that decision this plea also fails. 7. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.