ORDER B. D. Agarwal, J. - The petitioners and the respondents 3 to 13 in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution are descendants of a common ancestor, namely, Mahesh Tewari. The dispute is between the descendants of the branches of Lok, Jagran and Gopal, sons of Sheo Tewari on the one hand and Deoki, son of Sheo Tewari. In the basic year names of all the parties were recorded over the land in dispute. During proceedings under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') the respondents 3 to 5 filed an application under Section 12B of the Act for partition of the land in dispute comprised in various khatas, namely, khata No. 6 of village Puchhari and khatas Nos. 11, 12 and 62 of village Neerupur, pargana, tehsil and district Ballia. The Share claimed by respondents 3 to 5 was to the extent of 3/10 in the khatas in dispute. The petitioners contested the claim of the respondents and it was asserted that various transfers took place between the members of the family as a result of which the share of the petitioners had increased and it was prayed that the partition be made accordingly. The petitioners filed a number of documents including sale-deed dated 6th May, 1916, executed by Padam Tewari in favour of Chandrika and Bandhan and sale-deed dated 9th September, 1935, executed by Padam Tewari in favour of Gajadhar Tewari. Oral evidence was also adduced. The Consolidation Officer, by his judgment and order dated 15-4-1963 rejected the claim of the respondents 3 to 5 as had been advanced by them, and, it was held that they were entitled to only ?th share in some plots and 27/1.60 share in the remaining plots, as a result of various transfers made inter se by the members of the family. The appeal was preferred against this order by the respondents 3 to 5. This appeal was filed under Section 12C of the Act as it was on the statute book prior to U.P. Act No. 8 of 1963. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, by his judgment and order dated 8th August, 1963, allowed the appeal and the order of the Consolidation Officer was set aside. It was held that the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were entitled to 3/10 share in the land in dispute. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, by his judgment and order dated 8th August, 1963, allowed the appeal and the order of the Consolidation Officer was set aside. It was held that the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were entitled to 3/10 share in the land in dispute. Thereupon the petitioners approached this court by means of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution (Writ Petn. No. 4271 of 1963). One of the grounds, inter alia, on which the challenge was based was that the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, had manifestly erred in not taking into consideration the various documents filed before him on the basis of which it was sought to be proved by the petitioner that the extent of the share in their favour had increased. Those documents were filed by the petitioners in this writ petition. This court by its judgment and order dated 30th September, 1970, allowed the writ petition and the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, dated 8th August, 1963 was quashed and he was directed to re-consider the shares of the respective parties in view of the observations made in the judgment. 2. When the case went back to the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation as a result of the aforesaid judgment of this court, a plea based on Section 11-A of the Act was raised on behalf of the respondents. This plea found favour with the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, with the result that he held that the previous order passed by his predecessor dated 8th August, 1963, was held to be proper by him and as not calling for any interference. It may be noticed at this stage that it is this very order of his predecessor dated 8th August, 1963, which has been quashed by this court and the correctness or otherwise of that order of his predecessor was not up for consideration before him. What perhaps was intended by him by his order was that because of his acceptance of the plea of the respondents based on Section 11A of the Act, it was unnecessary to deliver a judgment on merits, which necessarily ruled out any consideration of the two sale-deeds, as directed by this Court. 3. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present petition in this court, impugning the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, dated 20th May, 1972. 4. 3. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present petition in this court, impugning the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, dated 20th May, 1972. 4. Sri Shyam Narain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has made three submissions before me. Firstly, he has submitted that the impugned order is in direct violation of the orders of this court passed in the earlier writ petition, namely, writ petn. No. 4271 of 1963. I am unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel. The order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, as noticed above, no doubt is couched in curious terms. When this court had quashed the order dated 8th August, 1963, passed by his predecessor, that order ceased to exist. The question of that order being proper or improper or as to whether that order called for any interference was not for the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation to decide. That question had already been decided in the writ petition. But, that apart, the impugned order when read in totality, substantially can be read to mean that what was intended by him was that in view of his acceptance of the plea based on Section 11A of the Act raised by the respondents, it became unnecessary to take into consideration the two sale-deeds as directed by this court in the earlier writ petition, with the result that the earlier order of his predecessor dated 8th August, 1963, would remain in substance intact. 5. It has next been contended by Sri Shyam Narain that the plea under Section 11A of the Act, which, in fact, incorporates the principle of res judicata was a plea which could and ought to have been raised by the respondents at the earlier stage which gave rise to the writ petn. No. 4271 and this plea cannot be permitted now after the matter has been remanded by this court. 6. It is true that such a plea could have been raised by the respondents at the earlier stage. There was nothing to prevent him from doing so. That plea was never raised. The matter came up to this court finally in the writ petition No. 4271 of 1963. Even before this court, as the judgment shows, no such plea was raised. The plea was raised for the first time when the matter went back to the Assistant Settlement Officer. That plea was never raised. The matter came up to this court finally in the writ petition No. 4271 of 1963. Even before this court, as the judgment shows, no such plea was raised. The plea was raised for the first time when the matter went back to the Assistant Settlement Officer. Consolidation as consequence to this Court's order dated 30th September, 1970. It is well accepted that the principles of res judicata are attracted in subsequent stages of the same proceedings. If authority is needed reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Y.B. Patil v. Y.L. Patil, AIR 1977 SC 392 . In my view, therefore, it would not be permissible for the respondents to have raised this plea under Section 11-A of the Act before the Assistant Settlement Officer. Consolidation. This submission of the learned counsel, thus, has merit. 7. Though, having found merit in the second submission of the learned counsel it is not necessary to adjudicate upon the merits of the plea under Section 11A in order to dispose of this writ petition, but I am disposed to decide this question on merits also. Sri Shyam Narain has contended that in accepting the plea based on Section 11A of the Act, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, has manifestly erred in law inasmuch as he has failed to notice the distinction between relevant provisions as existing prior to and subsequent to the amendment having been incorporated in the Act as a result of U.P. Act No. 8 of 1963 which came into effect on 8th March 1963. 8. Counsel for both the parties have taken me through the relevant provisions as they existed before and after the Amending Act and after having heard the learned counsel, I am of the opinion that even on merits the plea raised on behalf of the respondents based on Section 11A of the Act has no substance. 9. The Scheme of the provisions of the Act as existing before 8th March 1963, so far as they are relevant for the present purposes, appears to be that Section 8 dealt with the revision of the field book and current annual register. It did not deal with the determination of shares in the joint holdings. 9. The Scheme of the provisions of the Act as existing before 8th March 1963, so far as they are relevant for the present purposes, appears to be that Section 8 dealt with the revision of the field book and current annual register. It did not deal with the determination of shares in the joint holdings. What apparently was required under this provision was that in these records the names of the co-tenure-holders would be shown in cases of joint holdings. Section 9 which dealt with correction of records apart from contemplating correction of mistakes and disputes discovered under Section 8, also contemplated the decision of objections relating to disputes pertaining to correctness or nature of the entries in the extracts and also pointing out any omissions therefrom. It is noticeable that it did not deal with the determination of any specific shares of the individual tenure-holders in the joint holdings. Section 10 dealt with the revision of records and re-survey. Section 12B specifically dealt with the partition of joint holdings. An application under this section was contemplated by any of the joint-holders. The Consolidation Officer was authorised to decide such an application, namely, the dispute about partition. Section 12C entitled the person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer to file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, whose decision was made final under the Act. Section 11A as it then was, barred the raising of any question in respect of land which might or ought to have been raised under Section 9, but had not been raised, at any future stage of the consolidation proceedings. 10. It would thus be seen that under the provisions as existing prior to 8th March, 1963, it was only at the stage of Section 12B where the dispute of specific shares of individual tenure-holders could be determined, and Section 9 did not contemplate any determination in this regard. 11. Hence, Section 11 A, on its term as it then stood, could not come in the way of a tenure-holder to raise questions relating to specific shares at the stage of Section 12B of the Act which, in fact, was the right stage when such a dispute could be raised and decided as was done in the instant case. 12. After 8th March, 1963, the position stood altered. Section 8 was suitably amended. 12. After 8th March, 1963, the position stood altered. Section 8 was suitably amended. Clauses (iii) and (iv) sub-section (1) of Section 8 are relevant in this regard. Section 9 specially permits raising the plea of specific shares to individual tenure-holders in the joint-holdings for the purposes of effecting partitions. Disputes relating to specific shares were to be determined at the stage of Section 9 and this intent of the legislature was clearly given effect to in the aforesaid provisions. Section 11A was suitably amended. This further finds support from the fact that Sections 12B and 12C, both were deleted by U.P. Act No. 8 of 1963. 13. Admittedly, in view of the transitory provision in clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 47 of U.P. Act No. 8 of 1963, the present proceedings would be governed in accordance with the provision of the Act as it stood before its amendment by the aforesaid amending Act. I have already held that Section 11A as it then stood, could not bar a dispute being raised in respect of specific shares of individual tenure-holders in joint holdings. Such a dispute could rightly be raised in an application under Section 12B of the Act, as was in fact done in the instant case. The view of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, hence, that the petitioners were barred from raising such a dispute, on account of Section 11A, suffers from a manifest error of law. This writ petition, hence, succeeds and is allowed with costs against the contesting respondents. The judgment and order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, dated 20th May, 1972, is quashed. He is directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law as directed by this court by its judgment and order dated 30th September. 1970, in C.M. Writ No. 4271 of 1963. Since the matter is already too old, he is directed to decide this appeal with three months of the date of filing of certified copy of this judgment by either party.