M. K. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) AGGRIEVED by an order of dropping the proceedings on the ground that there was no valid sanction against the accused who stood his trial before the learned Special Judge Rajkot in Special Case No. 9 of 1976 passed on 15th November 1977 the State has preferred this appeal. ( 2 ) SEVERAL issues were raised by the learned Special Judge including an issue as to whether previous valid sanction of the authority competent to remove the accused from the office as provided under sec. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (the Act) was secured and though the learned Judge on other issues came to the conclusion that the prosecution had established that the accused demanded and accepted the illegal gratification and committed the offence of criminal misconduct as defined under sec. 6 of the Act on the technical ground with regard to the sanction he held that there was no legal and valid sanction accorded by the authority competent to remove the accused from service as provided under sec. 6 of the Act and therefore the proceedings were vitiated and he ordered them to be dropped. Hence this appeal by the State. ( 3 ) NOW in the instant case what happened was that a meeting of the Gujarat Electricity Board which is the competent authority to appoint as well as remove the accused was convened on 24th February 1979 as is evident from the minutes of the proceedings at Ex. 23. It is also evident that on the agenda. the subject was Suspension of Shri S. S. Ambawani Superintending Engineer (Construction) Gondal and specifically the question with regard to sanction to prosecute was not set out. But it appears that the Board after considering the question of suspension and deciding to approve and ratify the earlier suspension order passed on 17th February 1976 which order had been issued after getting the concurrence of the full time members present then decided that as and when the A. C. B would prosecute the accused under the provisions of the Act and the I. P. Code the Board was required to give sanction under sec. 6 (1) (c) of the Act and it was observed that it was necessary for the Board to delegate powers to the Chairman to accord such sanction for prosecution of the accused and the Board ultimately passed a resolution delegating the powers to the Chairman to accord sanction for prosecuting the accused under the provisions of the Act and of the Indian Penal Code whenever asked for by the A. C. B. ( 4 ) THE Board is a statutory corporation established under the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 and as sec. 12 of the said Act provides"the Board shall be a body corporate by the name notified under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 5 have perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable and shall by the said name sue and be sued". IT would be thus clear that the sanction required to be granted under the Act should be a sanction granted by the Board itself by a decision taken by the Board itself and in the absence of any such power authorising the Board to delegate its powers to accord sanctions the Board would not be competent to delegate such powers to sanction prosecution under the Act. Under the Act as provided under sec. 6 (1) (c)"no court shall take cognizance of an offence Punishable under sec. 161 or sec. 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec (3-A) of sec. 5 of this Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with previous sanction (a) x x x (b) x x x (c) in the case of any other person of the authority competent to remove him from his office. THE sanction therefore required would be of the Board which is the authority competent to remove the accused from his office. ( 5 ) MR. Bhairaviya the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that the learned Judge erred in taking too technical a view of the matter and in dropping the proceedings on the ground of absence of a valid sanction because in that instant case it was the Board itself which had after applying its mind on going through the report submitted by the A. C. B. decided to prosecute the accused and the meres formal part viz. of signing the order of sanction was left to the Chairman. of signing the order of sanction was left to the Chairman. ( 6 ) WE are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Bhairaviya. This is not a case in which the Board has applied its mind to the question of sanction and after having decided to accord sanction has in fact accorded the same and been left a mere formal part of signing the order of sanction to the Chairman. It may be noticed that on the agenda of the meeting the specific subject was the question of considering suspension of the accused. In the light of that question the matter which was before the Board was considered and the Board did take a considered decision to pass an order of suspension and it did so by ratifying the previous order which was passed by taking the concurrence of the fulltime members. It then merely decided to delegate its powers to accord sanction for prosecution to the Chairman as and when the A. C. B. asked for the same in future if the State decided to prosecute the accused. The resolution which was passed and which is at Ex. 24 also in clear terms says that the Board delegated its powers to the Chairman to accord sanction for prosecuting the accused under the provisions of the Act/i. P. C. if se requested by the A. C. B. ( 7 ) IF a statutory function is to be performed by a statutory body the body itself has to perform the same and it cannot delegate its powers to any office bearer or any other person unless the statute by a specific provision clothes the body with such powers. Mr. Bhairaviya has not been able to show us any such provision clothing the Board with powers to delegate its function with regard to according sanction for prosecution under the Act and in the absence of such powers the sanction granted as per Ex. 25 by the Chairman of the Board in pursuance of the purported delegation in his favour in this behalf is not a valid sanction under the Act. ( 8 ) MR. Nanavati the learned advocate appearing for the respondentaccused drew our attention in this respect to the Management of D. T. U. v. Shri B. B. L. Hajelay and Another A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2452. . . . . . . . . . . . ( 8 ) MR. Nanavati the learned advocate appearing for the respondentaccused drew our attention in this respect to the Management of D. T. U. v. Shri B. B. L. Hajelay and Another A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2452. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . And the following observations may also be noted which are at page 2455 :-"it is therefore clear that a protection which is given to an employee by the statute cannot be nullified by rule; and regulations authorised by the statute itself. In the words any regulation made by the Corporation which would have authorised the Assistant General Manager to remove respondent No. 2 from service would have been inoperative qua respondent No. 2 as his appointing authority was the Gen. Manager (transport)". THUS if the accused was appointed and/or removable by the Board any resolution passed by the Board delegating its powers of removal or the powers to sanction prosecution to the Chairman or any other person would not be effective an operative qua the accused. ( 9 ) IT would have been a different case if the Board has itself applied its mind after receiving the request from the A. C. B. for sanction and taken a decision to accord sanction to prosecute and then left the formal part with regard to authentication of such an order or decision of the Board by the signature of the Chairman as provided by sec. 13 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. But this is not the case here. Here the Board has abdicated its function in favour of the Chairman and in anticipation of receiving a request for sanction it has delegated its powers to accord sanction to the Chairman. This was not permissible to the Board and it had no authority under the statute to delegate such powers. A sanction to be valid under the Act has to be a sanction by the authority competent to remove the accused. The sanction at Ex. This was not permissible to the Board and it had no authority under the statute to delegate such powers. A sanction to be valid under the Act has to be a sanction by the authority competent to remove the accused. The sanction at Ex. 25 is not such sanction accorded by Board itself but it is a sanction accorded by the Chairman by virtue of purported delegation of powers by the Board in favour of the Chairman to accord such a sanction which purported delegation was made much before any request from the A. C. B. was received by the Board for sanction. The learned Judge therefore in our opinion was perfectly justified in dropping the proceedings and as there is no valid sanction the court would not be competent to take cognizance of the offence and the appeal therefore is bound to fail. ( 10 ) BEFORE we part with this judgment we deem it necessary to draw pointed attention of all the Special Judges in the State to the situation which has arisen is the instant case where after over two years the case finally fails on a technical ground. Previous sanction by the competent authority is a condition precedent to the courts taking cognizance of the offence as required by sec. 6 of the Act. If this aspect was borne in mind valuable public time and labour spent in recording evidence and in hearing the arguments and deciding other issues could have been avoided. It would be expedient in such cases when there is a serious challenge to the order according sanction that the learned Special Judge tries and decides that issue first without recording evidence on other issues so that much of duplication which would be the probable result from the proceedings being quashed on the ground of want of valid sanction could be avoided. ( 11 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. .