JUDGMENT R.R. Rastogi, J. - This second appeal has been filed by Rati Ram one of the defendants against the judgment and decree passed by the 1st Addl. Civil Judge, Meerut, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents Rajvir and Jaivir, sons of Ram Saran, defendant No. 3. At the time of the filing of the suit on 6-4-1967, the plaintiffs were minors and filed the suit through their next friend. During the pendency of the suit they attained majority. The case of the plaintiffs was that they and the father Ram Saran constituted a joint Hindu family. Their grandfather Kale was possessed of jamindari property and Sir and Khudkast land and since the plaintiffs had been conceived at the time of enforcement of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 they had a right in that property by birth and after the enforcement of the said Act they along with their father Ram Saran became Bhumidhars of the Sir and Khudkast, though in the revenue record of rights only Ram Sarans name was entered. Subsequently, as a result of consolidation proceedings the disputed plot No. 868, area 2 Bighas 2 biswas 10 biswanis situated in village Dadri in the Tehsil of Sardhana, District Meerut was allotted in the chak of their father and it was numbered as 238. It was alleged that defendant Rati Ram obtained a sale deed of the said plot from Ram Saran on 27-8-1965. According to the plaintiffs there was no legal necessity for executing the said sale deed and it was also without consideration and hence they were not bound by it and since on its basis defendant No. 1 was interfering in their possession, they filed the suit for cancellation of the sale deed and for permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from interfering in their possession. 2. The defendant-appellant contested the suit and pleaded that the disputed sale deed was not fictitious nor without consideration and defendant No. 2 was fully competent to execute it. The jurisdiction of the civil court was disputed and it was asserted that the contesting defendant was in possession of the disputed plot. 3. 2. The defendant-appellant contested the suit and pleaded that the disputed sale deed was not fictitious nor without consideration and defendant No. 2 was fully competent to execute it. The jurisdiction of the civil court was disputed and it was asserted that the contesting defendant was in possession of the disputed plot. 3. The trial court framed the relevant issues and held that the plaintiffs had acquired Bhumidhari rights in the disputed plot by birth, that the sale deed was for legal necessity and for consideration and even if it was without legal necessity, it was valid to the extent of the share of defendant No. 2. The trial court further held that the plaintiff were not in possession of the disputed plot. On the question of jurisdiction the finding was given in the affirmative. In the result, the suit was decreed for cancellation of the sale deed to the extent of two-thirds share of the plaintiffs and was dismissed in respect of other reliefs. From that decisions the defendant-appellant preferred an appeal and it was urged on his behalf that the plaintiffs had not acquired any right in the disputed property by birth and even if they had acquired any such right, their father as karta of the family was fully competent to dispose it of any (sic) lastly that the civil court had no jurisdiction, on all these three points the lower appellate court agreed with the trial court and dismissed the appeal; hence this further appeal. 4. The first submission made before me on behalf of the defendant-appellant was that the plaintiffs-respondents had failed to establish that they had acquired rights in the disputed land by birth. I do not find any substance in this contention. It has been found as a fact by the court below that the disputed land was Sir and Khudkast of plaintiff's grandfather Kale and after his death it belonged to the joint family of the plaintiff and their father and on the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act since the plaintiffs had been born, they acquired rights in the disputed land by birth. The aforesaid findings are findings of fact which cannot be assailed before this court. The aforesaid findings are findings of fact which cannot be assailed before this court. Therefore, it has to be upheld that the plaintiffs acquired a right in the disputed land by birth and since it was Sir and Khudkast, on the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 they became Bhumidhars thereof. 5. The next submission made was that as a result of consolidation operations the disputed land was allotted in the chak of plaintiff's father and since the plaintiffs did not raise any objection in those proceedings, the present suit is barred by Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a decision of a learned single Judge of this court (C.S.P. Singh, J.) in Ram Pal Singh v. Khandey, (1976 All WC 229). In that case a suit had been filed for cancellation of a sale deed executed by the father of the plaintiff on the ground that he was a co-Bhumidhar. Prior to the filing of the suit consolidation proceedings had become final in which the plaintiff's father alone was shown as Bhumidhar and no objection was filed by the plaintiff under Section 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The view taken was that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the Act. From the side of the plaintiffs respondents my attention has been invited to certain earlier decisions also a later decision wherein a contrary view has been taken. Before adverting to those decisions, the relevant provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act may be read. 6. Under the Consolidation of Holdings Act title of interested persons is determined in respect of the area for which a notification is issued under Section 4 (2) of the Act. Thereafter the holding of each tenure-holder is consolidated in one or more compact areas called chaks. When these proceedings are over a notification is issued under Section 52 closing the consolidation operations. Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act provides for abatement of proceedings pending on the date when the notification under Sec. 4 (2) is published. Thereafter the holding of each tenure-holder is consolidated in one or more compact areas called chaks. When these proceedings are over a notification is issued under Section 52 closing the consolidation operations. Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act provides for abatement of proceedings pending on the date when the notification under Sec. 4 (2) is published. These proceedings are for correction of records and every suit or proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest lying in the area for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority would abate. Section 49 which provides for bar to civil court jurisdiction reads:- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying within an area for which a notification has been issued under sub- section (2) of Section 4 or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matter for which proceedings could or ought to have been taken under this Act. 7. It is now well settled that in case of an ex-intermediary's ancestral Sir and Khudkast, the son of the intermediary conceived before July 1, 1952 would get an interest in the land by virtue of his birth inasmuch as devolution would be governed by Hindu Law. See Chetanya Raj Singh v. 2nd Additional Civil Judge, Aligarh, (1977 All WC 289), which has been approved by a Full Bench in Ram Charan v. State of U.P., ( AIR 1979 All 114 ) : (1979 All LJ 166) (FB). Those cases were under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. Section 38-B of that Act enables the prescribed Authority to ignore the earlier decision of any other court. Such decision would not operate as res judicata in ceiling proceedings. Those cases were under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. Section 38-B of that Act enables the prescribed Authority to ignore the earlier decision of any other court. Such decision would not operate as res judicata in ceiling proceedings. However, these decisions were followed in a case under the Consolidation of Holdings Act by a learned single Judge (K.N. Goyal, J.) in Raj Bahadur Singh v. Board of Revenue (1979 RD 50). In that case the view taken is that where members of a joint Hindu family were peacefully in joint possession and did not desire any partition or where cosharers were under a family arrangement peacefully in separate possession over their respective areas and did not desire any change in the recorded entry, the consolidation authorities were not required to record their respective shares or necessarily to effect partition, even if not required for ensuring proper consolidation or that if the non-recorded coparceners did not seek to get their names or shares specified, their title should get extinguished. The view taken in this case, of course, runs contrary to the view taken in Ram Pal Singh's case (1976 All WC 229) (supra). Since there are Division Bench cases which lend support to the view taken in Raj Bahadur Singh's case, in my opinion, Ram Pal Singh's case will not have binding effect on this court. As noted above, the view taken in Chetanya Raj Singh's case (1977 All WC 289) that in case of an ex-intermediary, in ancestral Sir and Khudkasht the son of the intermediary conceived before July 1, 1951, would get an interest by birth has been approved by the Full Bench in Ram Charans case (1979 All LJ 166) (supra). Apart from this in Thakur Sant Bux v. S.C. Singh (1965 RD 4171 it was ruled by a Division Bench of this court that consolidation authorities are not competent to determine questions of title in proceedings under Section 27 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and that being so, Sec. 49 would not come in the way if a person decides to file a regular suit to establish his title. The same view was taken in Hussain Abbas v. Brij Lal, reported at page 406 in the same Volume. The same view was taken in Hussain Abbas v. Brij Lal, reported at page 406 in the same Volume. Further in Ram Lal v. State of U.P. 1978 All WC 713 : (1978 All LJ 1197) where of course the scope and construction of Section 10 (2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act was involved, it was held that: "A declaration by the Consolidation Authorities that a tenure-holder or a Bhumidhar of a holding which was ancestral Sir and Khudkasht was not a declaration that his son had no interest in it. The person declared as Bhumidhar could hold the land on his behalf as also on behalf of his son. Thus, the ratio of this case is that since in the consolidation proceedings no dispute is raised nor any decision is reached in regard to the interest of the recorded tenure-holder's son in such holding, it cannot be said that the son cannot later claim that the holding being ancestral Sir and Khudkasht, he was entitled to have an interest in it. I may also refer to Rishal Singh v. Board of Revenue (1970 All WC 123) where a learned Judge of this Court held that Section 49 bars the adjudication of rights through a suit irrespective of the question as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant raises the question of title and that the rights determined in consolidation proceedings, either after or without contest, are final. It was further held that the cause of action for a suit for partition is not dependent on the determination of the rights of the parties. In consolidation proceedings the rights of the parties are determined and co-sharers have a right to claim partition even after the closure of the consolidation proceedings. This decision has been approved by a Division Bench in Rakesh Kumar v. Board of Revenue, (1972 All WR (HC) 338) : (1972 All LJ 769). In consolidation proceedings the rights of the parties are determined and co-sharers have a right to claim partition even after the closure of the consolidation proceedings. This decision has been approved by a Division Bench in Rakesh Kumar v. Board of Revenue, (1972 All WR (HC) 338) : (1972 All LJ 769). In my opinion therefore, where members of a joint Hindu family are peacefully in joint possession of their holding and the name of one of the members of the family or the Karta of the family alone is recorded in the papers, unless there arises an occasion during the course of the consolidation operations which necessitates an action by the unrecorded co-sharers or coparceners to file an objection and seek entry of their names as well on the holding, it cannot be said that merely because the chak has been prepared in the name of the recorded tenure-holder the rights and interest of the unrecorded co-sharers or coparceners would stand extinguished in the holding. On this view of the matter, in cannot be said that Section 49 stood as a bar to the present suit. 8. It may also be noted that no such plea was taken by the defendant appellant in his written statement nor any issue was framed on it. The plea taken in the written statement was that the purpose of the suit was to obtain a declaration of rights in respect of the disputed holding and it was only the revenue court which had jurisdiction to decide this question and that the relief for cancellation claimed in the suit was only to deprive the revenue court of its jurisdiction. On plaint's own allegations there was no necessity for the relief of cancellation and, therefore, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. Even before the lower appellate court this very plea was urged and not that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. However, because it was a purely legal plea it was allowed to be raised for the first time in second appeal and for the reasons given above, I am not inclined to accept it. 9. Lastly, a feeble attempt was also made on behalf of the appellant to canvass that the remedy of the plaintiffs respondents was to file a suit for possession of or partition before the revenue court. 9. Lastly, a feeble attempt was also made on behalf of the appellant to canvass that the remedy of the plaintiffs respondents was to file a suit for possession of or partition before the revenue court. I am not inclined to accept this contention because on the allegations contained in the plaint, the relief of cancellation of sale deed was certainly a necessary relief and that could be granted only by the Civil Court. 10. The appeal thus fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs to plaintiffs respondent Nos. 1 and 2.