JUDGMENT D.N. Jha, J. - This is plaintiff's second appeal directed against the judgment and decree dated 18-9-1974 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Faizabad, allowing the defendant's appeal and dismissing the plaintiff's suit for arrears of salary with interest. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for arrears of salary on the allegations that in 1949 the was appointed as Superintendent of the District Physical Culture Committee at Kanpur by means of letter dated 31-5-1949. He joined his duties at Kanpur on 1-7-1949 after completion of six weeks training. There was a great mess in financial matters when the plaintiff had joined and Government had suffered a loss to the tune of Rs. 2 lakhs. Two criminal cases had been initiated against the plaintiff and his Clerk Gopal Dass Kapoor for misappropriation and falsification of accounts. The plaintiff was suspended by the Government on 18-9-1950. The plaintiff was run down in Sessions Trial No. 111 of 1951 and he was acquitted on 7-4-1952 Gopaldas Kapoor, however was convicted. In the other Sessions Trial No. 133 of 1951 also the plaintiff and his Clerk Gopal Dass Kapoor were convicted vide judgment dated 8-10-1955 but on appeal the plaintiff was acquitted by the High Court vide its judgment dated 17-2-1958. The suspension order against the plaintiff-appellant was withdrawn on 23-5-1958 and he was reinstated with full pay and allowances vide the order contained in Annexure II. The plaintiff was thereafter temporarily appointed as District Organizer, Prantiya Raksha Dal, in the scale of Rs. 150-8-230-EB-12-350. The plaintiff reported for duty at Hardoi and the period during which he had remained under suspension was counted towards leave, increment and pension, regarding fixation of his pay a separate order was issued. By letter dated 24-11-1958 it was ordered that the plaintiff would be deemed to have been appointed as District Organiser, Prantiya Raksha Dal, with effect from October, 1952 and his pay was fixed at Rs. 190/- per month and his increment was to fall due from 1-10-1958. The District Planning Officer. Hardoi, submitted two separate bills for arrears of salary of the plaintiff during the period of suspension from 19-9-1950 to 30-9-1952 and October 1952 to May, 1958 for Rs. 2386.73 and Rs. 10,768.30, respectively. 190/- per month and his increment was to fall due from 1-10-1958. The District Planning Officer. Hardoi, submitted two separate bills for arrears of salary of the plaintiff during the period of suspension from 19-9-1950 to 30-9-1952 and October 1952 to May, 1958 for Rs. 2386.73 and Rs. 10,768.30, respectively. While the payment of the aforesaid two bills was pending with the Government for preaudit and sanction, formal disciplinary proceedings were started against the plaintiff-appellant on account of negligence resulting in misappropriation and embezzlement of Government funds. The charge-sheet dated 13-1-1961 attached as Annexure VI to the plaint was served on the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted his explanation on 3-4-1961 vide Annexure VII. Vide order dated 3-7-1961 it was held that the charges of negligence etc. were found proved and on these findings it was ordered that a sum of Rs. 13,155.3 P. then due to the plaintiff towards arrears of pay for the period he remained under suspension be recovered from him. It is alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff made a representation to the Government against the said punishment but that representation was rejected by the Government on 21-7-1962 which was communicated to the plaintiff on 4-8-1962 at Faizabad. It was in these circumstances that the plaintiff filed the suit after serving a notice dated 25-4-1964 under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code In para 25 of the plaint the disciplinary proceedings held against him were also questioned but, however, no relief specifically had been prayed. 3. The suit was resisted by the State of Uttar Pradesh and it was asserted that the proceedings against the plaintiff were legal and no suit could be filed to challenge these proceedings. It was asserted that due to the negligence and laxity on the part of the plaintiff in discharge of his duties as Superintendent. Physical Culture at Kanpur, the Government was put to a loss of Rs. 2 lakhs. It was further contended that the suit for arrears of salary was barred by limitation and the Civil Court at Faizabad had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. 4. The learned trial court held that the Court had jurisdiction and the suit was governed by Article 7, Limitation Act, 1963. 2 lakhs. It was further contended that the suit for arrears of salary was barred by limitation and the Civil Court at Faizabad had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. 4. The learned trial court held that the Court had jurisdiction and the suit was governed by Article 7, Limitation Act, 1963. The cause of action for the suit accrued to the plaintiff after his representation for entitlement of pay and allowances was finally rejected by the Government and communicated to the plaintiff on 4-8-1962. He also held that the order passed in the departmental proceedings was not open to challenge on merits. He, however, held that the enquiry proceedings on account of similarity of charges in the criminal case and in view of various observations made in the judgment were in violation of para 73 of the Manual of Government Orders and they were beyond the scope of the authority of the enquiry officer, it was further held that the plaintiff was entitled to get arrears as claimed with interest and he was also entitled to a declaration although no relief was claimed in the suit to the effect that the departmental proceedings dated 3-7-1961 were beyond the scope of enquiry officer and the order was unlawful. On these findings he decreed the plaintiff's suit. He directed that the plaintiff shall pay additional court fee on the declaratory relief and in default of payment of the said court-fee the plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed. The State of Uttar Pradesh feeling aggrieved by the decree went up in appeal and the learned first appellate court reversed the finding on the question of limitation and held that the suit was barred by limitation. He also held that it was not open to the court of law to enter into and examine the finding arrived in the departmental proceedings as it is only if there has been breach of any statutory duty imposed by law in making the enquiry or in passing the punishment order that in such case only the Civil Court can interfere. He further expressed the view that no declaration was needed for the purpose of enforcing the claim for arrears of salary. Lastly, he also held that interest by way of damages cannot be awarded. Therefore, no interest could be awarded. He further expressed the view that no declaration was needed for the purpose of enforcing the claim for arrears of salary. Lastly, he also held that interest by way of damages cannot be awarded. Therefore, no interest could be awarded. On the basis of these findings he allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit after setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. This is how this second appeal has been brought before this Court. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the lower appellate court committed a legal error in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff as time-barred. In my opinion, the submission has force. It is well settled in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1962 SC 8 ) that the word "wage" appearing in Article 102, Limitation Act, 1908, corresponding to Article 7, Limitation Act, 1963, included salary. This was precisely the view expressed by the Federal Court in Punjab Province v. Tara Chand (AIR 1947 FC 23) wherein it had been observed that Article 102 of the old Limitation Act would apply to suits filed with respect to arrears of salary because wages include salary and this article, therefore, would apply as there is no other provision in the schedule for the said purpose. The Government servant, therefore, had the right to maintain a suit in a court of law for recovery of arrears of pay which had become due to him. There is no error in the judgment of the first appellate court so far as it has observed that Article 7, Limitation Act, 1963, was attracted. The lower appellate court in fact committed an error in consideration of the starting point of limitation under Article 7. Limitation Act. It may be mentioned that in the above mentioned cases the question had neither been raised nor decided. The Supreme Court, however, in the case of Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State of Mysore (supra) held that the suit of the plaintiff would be governed by the date when the right to salary would accrue but when the right to sue for salary would accrue was not decided as it was in all probabilities not raised. The Supreme Court, however, in the case of Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State of Mysore (supra) held that the suit of the plaintiff would be governed by the date when the right to salary would accrue but when the right to sue for salary would accrue was not decided as it was in all probabilities not raised. It was for the first time raised in the case of State of Madras v. A.V. Anantharaman ( AIR 1963 Mad 425 ) and it was held that right to sue would accrue only after the order of dismissal of the employee was set aside or he was reinstated by the appointing authority. Until this stage is reached the right to recover arrears of salary does not accrue at all. The right to recover arrears of salary would accrue only after an order of dismissal has been set aside. The Supreme Court in Maimoona Khatun v. State of U.P. (1980) 3 SCC 578 : (1980 Lab IC 1109) considered the Madras case and held that:- "In the case of the dismissal of a public servant which has been subsequently set aside, as in the present case, the right to recover arrears of salary would accrue only when that order of dismissal has been set aside either in departmental appeal or by a Civil Court." In all probabilities this case was not cited before the lower appellate court and therefore, it committed an error in placing reliance on the case of Sakal Deep Sahai Srivastava v. Union of India ( AIR 1974 SC 338 ): (1974 Lab IC 580) and Jai Chand Sawhnev v. Union of India ( (1969) 3 SCC 642 ). These cases came up for consideration before the Supreme Court while deciding the case of Maimoona Khatun v. State of U.P. (1980 Lab IC 1109) (SC) (supra) and the Supreme Court considered the specific question and distinguished these earlier decisions and expounded the law regarding as to when the right to sue actually accrues. 6. These features of the legal proposition have to be borne in mind in appreciating the plaintiff's case. In the instant case the plaintiff was suspended on 18-9-1950 and was sent up for trial in the two sessions cases for embezzlement. He was acquitted of all the charges vide orders dated 7-4-1952 (Exhibit 6) and 17-2-1958 (Exhibit 7). 6. These features of the legal proposition have to be borne in mind in appreciating the plaintiff's case. In the instant case the plaintiff was suspended on 18-9-1950 and was sent up for trial in the two sessions cases for embezzlement. He was acquitted of all the charges vide orders dated 7-4-1952 (Exhibit 6) and 17-2-1958 (Exhibit 7). The plaintiff after his acquittal was reinstated on 23-5-1958 with full pay and allowance vide the order contained in Annexure II to the plaint. It is also not denied that the salary bills for the period were prepared but he could not receive the amount as the bills were sent for pre-audit. It was during this intervening period that the plaintiff was subjected to a departmental enquiry with respect to the same subject matter and vide order passed on 3-7-1961 it was held that the charges were found proved and it was ordered that a sum of Rs. 13,155.3 P. then due to the plaintiff as arrears of salary be recovered. Therefore, the plaintiff could not have filed a suit for arrears of salary earlier as there was no order for non-payment of the same. The plaintiff after receiving the order dated 3-7-1961 preferred a representation which was rejected on 21-7-1962. It was in these circumstances that the plaintiff filed the present suit on 2-7-1964 after expiry of the statutory period of notice. The limitation, therefore, in my opinion, could not be computed from the year 1958 as observed by the lower appellate court but it should have been computed when he was denied the payment vide order dated 3-7-1961. Thus, keeping in mind the entire facts and circumstances and applying the latest law expounded by the Supreme Court there can be no other inference than to hold that the suit was within limitation. The finding, therefore, on this aspect of the case cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside in view of the aforesaid discussion. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, argued that it was not open to the trial court to sit in appeal over the judgment passed by the enquiry tribunal and, therefore. when no declaration had been prayed by the plaintiff the trial court erred in granting the declaration. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, argued that it was not open to the trial court to sit in appeal over the judgment passed by the enquiry tribunal and, therefore. when no declaration had been prayed by the plaintiff the trial court erred in granting the declaration. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant argued that since the charge-sheet had been submitted in derogation of para 73 of the Manual of Government Orders the court would certainly set aside the order on finding that there was procedural illegality. He further maintained that the relief can be suitably moulded by the court if after appreciation of evidence it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so required. I have given my anxious consideration to the argument advanced at the Bar and I have no hesitation in observing that the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant deserves serious consideration. It may be observed that if the criminal proceedings end in acquittal it is still open to the superior authorities to draw up departmental proceedings against him in respect of his conduct in the criminal case and punish him. Para 73 of the Manual of Government Orders reads as under:- "73. When an official has been prosecuted in a criminal court, and has after trial, on the merits of the case, been declared innocent of the charge brought against him, the verdict should be accepted as final, and the man should not be punished departmentally if the offence for which he was tried constitutes the sole ground for punishment. If, however, the official be acquitted on technical grounds, or if the facts established by the judicial investigation show that his character or conduct as an official has been such as to make it undesirable that his services should be retained by Government, the head of the office to which he belongs may, in the exercise of the authority vested in him by the rules of the department and after making a full record of the reasons, take departmental cognizance of such character or conduct." 8. In the instant case it is not disputed that the plaintiff even to this date continues to be in service. It is therefore, clear that it was not intended by the appointing authority not to retain the plaintiff in service. In the instant case it is not disputed that the plaintiff even to this date continues to be in service. It is therefore, clear that it was not intended by the appointing authority not to retain the plaintiff in service. A perusal of the facts and findings given in the judgments Exhibits 9 and 7 would clearly go to show that the authorities of the headquarters at Lucknow or the local head and officer in charge Sri S.C. Singha, Additional District Magistrate, had not entrusted the plaintiff with those duties for the alleged negligence of which the plaintiff was charge-sheeted, the charge-sheet being Annexure VI to the plaint. The negligence, if any was that of Sri S.C. Singha, Additional District Magistrate, or the officers of the headquarters at Lucknow. The plaintiff's job as Superintendent seems to have been to set up Akharas and other health giving outdoor activities. The supervision of the staff and office of the P.C.C. was the responsibility of the Additional District Magistrate. That is why no rules or instructions were laid down by which the plaintiff as Superintendent of the outdoor activities, such as setting up of Akharas was also made the Superintendent of the indoor activities of the staff of the P.C.C. The learned trial court has undoubtedly in its judgment considered the charges Nos. 1 to 4 and has given a detailed discussion which in fact was not necessary. But, however, that would not reveal that he acted like an appellate court. A reading of the judgment shows that all the time he was having in mind Para 73 of the Manual of Government Orders. I have no hesitation in observing that the enquiry was wholly uncalled for specially in view of the clear-cut findings recorded in the judgments pronounced in the two sessions trials. There is not an iota of evidence from which any suspicion with respect to the conduct or involvement of the plaintiff could be fixed with respect to the amount embezzled in the said department. It appears that the plaintiff was only made a scapegoat and an effort had been made to withhold the arrears of salary about which payment had been ordered earlier while reinstating the plaintiff. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, fails. 9. It appears that the plaintiff was only made a scapegoat and an effort had been made to withhold the arrears of salary about which payment had been ordered earlier while reinstating the plaintiff. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, fails. 9. It may, however, be mentioned that the learned lower appellate court itself held that it was not necessary to give a declaration and even without it the suit could be decided but since it has been contended that a relief for declaration had not been claimed, therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to decree the suit, it is necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter also. In para. 25 of the plaint the disciplinary proceedings held against the plaintiff have been pointedly questioned. The plea, therefore, had specifically been raised and parties were aware because an issue had been framed that such a plea was involved in the trial. Therefore, merely because the relief had not been expressly sought in the suit would necessarily not disentitle the party from being granted a decree. Once it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to a certain decree there is no bar in the jurisdiction of the court in granting the above prayed relief. It has been held in Bhondoo v. Udatoo ( AIR 1970 All 307 ) that the appellate court has as wide a jurisdiction as the trial court in granting relief and it is now settled law that while disposing of a suit the trial court has power to mould the relief and to grant such appropriate decree as is called for by the merits of the case. Under Order 41, Rule 33 the appellate court has also the power to pass any decree which ought to have been passed or made as the case may require and this power may be exercised by the court in favour of all or any of the respondents also although such respondents may not have filed any appeal or objection. I, therefore, see no substance in the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that the plaintiff was not entitled to the salary as Claimed in the suit because unless the order passed in the enquiry had not been declared void the right to sue for a decree did not exist. 10. I, therefore, see no substance in the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that the plaintiff was not entitled to the salary as Claimed in the suit because unless the order passed in the enquiry had not been declared void the right to sue for a decree did not exist. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion in my opinion the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court cannot be sustained and deserve to be set aside. 11. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court are restored with costs.