JUDGMENT - M.L. PENDSE, J.:---This petition has been filed under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the relief sought is that the award dated March 31, 1975 be declared null and void or it may be set aside and quashed. 2. The facts which have given rise to the filling of this petition are as follows : The respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and husband of the petitioner are real brothers. The respondent No. 3. is their mother. The parties carried on business in partnership under the name and style of Messrs. Datamatics Corporation and the terms and conditions on which the partnership subsisted were reduced in writing in a deed of partnership dated December 26, 1969. The firm was carrying on business under three distinct divisions, viz., (1) Training, (2) Computer system, and (3) Staffing. The partnership had Head Office at Bombay and several other Offices at Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, Bangalore and Ahmedabad. At all these places, the business was carried on into the premises which were taken on lease. In respect of three divisions, the parties used to maintain separate books of accounts at each office and balance-sheets used to be drawn up in respect of each of the divisions separately. The audited balance-sheet of each of the divisions ultimately merged in the balance-sheet of the firm referred to as Head Office. 3. The disputes and differences arose between the parties some time in the beginning of the year 1974 and ultimately the parties agreed to refer their disputes to the sole arbitration of Mr C.M. Mehta, the Solicitor of M/s. Gagrat Company. The agreement of reference was reduced to writing on April 23, 1974. The terms of the agreement, inter alia provided that the sole arbitrator was to have summary powers. It further provided that the Arbitrator was entitled to award total or partial dissolution of the firm and distribute the assets between the partners and to award compensation and take accounts. The arbitrator was also authorised to distribute the name and goodwill of the firms and also benefit of tendency rights. The arbitrator was authorised to impose any restriction upon any party from carrying on business in respect of any decision in future .The Arbitrator was also authorised to consult an expert on any of the issues pending before him. 4. Mr. The arbitrator was authorised to impose any restriction upon any party from carrying on business in respect of any decision in future .The Arbitrator was also authorised to consult an expert on any of the issues pending before him. 4. Mr. Mehta entered upon the reference and the parties appeared before him and produced information sought by him. During the course of the proceedings, the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 delivered to the Arbitrator letter on March 27,1975 confirming they were willing to withdraw from the partnership from April 1,1975 on their receiving Rs. 45,000/-, Rs. 96,000/-, Rs. 10,000/-, and Rs. 5,000/- respectively. In view of this decision of respondents Nos. 2 to 5, the dispute survived, before the Arbitrator only between the petitioner and respondent No. 1. During the course of the hearing, it was agreed between the parties that with effect from April 1, 1974, the training division should be taken over and allotted to respondent No. 1 exclusively, while the computering and staffing division should be allotted to the petitioner. The petitioner and respondent No.1 accordingly took over the business and agreed to maintain separate account in respect of the division allotted to them. 5. The arbitrator made his Award on March 31, 1975. The arbitrator as per the arrangement arrived at between the parties allotted the business of computering and staffing divisions to the petitioner on April 1, 1974, while the training division was allotted to respondent No. 1. The Arbitrator prohibited the petitioner from carrying on business in the name of "Datamatics Corporation" for a period of two years and also prohibited from using the word "Corporation " in any name in which she will carry on business, for a period of two years from the date of the award. The Arbitrator also imposed the same restriction on respondent No. 1 in respect of the divisions which were allotted to him. The office premises in Bombay were allotted to the petitioner, while tenancy rights in respect of the premises outside Bombay were given to respondent No. 1. The cash and balance-sheets of each division as on April 1, 1974 were allotted to the allottee of the divisions. The Arbitrator found on making the valuation of all the assets and liabilities that the petitioner was liable to pay Rs. 2,51,524/- to respondent No.1. The petitioner was directed to pay the amounts claimed by respondents Nos. The cash and balance-sheets of each division as on April 1, 1974 were allotted to the allottee of the divisions. The Arbitrator found on making the valuation of all the assets and liabilities that the petitioner was liable to pay Rs. 2,51,524/- to respondent No.1. The petitioner was directed to pay the amounts claimed by respondents Nos. 2 to 5, while the petitioner and respondent No. 1 were made jointly responsible for payment of income tax and other taxes due from respondents No. 2 to 4 in respect of profits earned by them in the firm prior to March 31, 1974. 6. The present petition has been filed to challenge the legality of the said award. It is claimed by the petitioner that the award is null and void as it purports or operates to create the right, title and interest in leases or tenancy rights of the value of more than Rs. 100/- and is not registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. The petitioner claims that the award is required to be set aside as it is an incomplete award and the arbitrator has failed to take into account the entire assets and liabilities of the firms. The grievances is made in respect of the direction given by the arbitrator prohibiting the use of the expression "Corporation" for a period of two years. The petitioner also complained that the amount of Rs. 2,51,524/- arrived at by the Arbitrator is on an erroneous basis and the petitioner was foisted with the liability of payment to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 without any rational ground. One more grievance is made in respect of grant of household expenses to respondent No. 1. In answer to this petition, the respondent No.1. has filed an affidavit traversing each and every challenge made by the petitioner . It is claimed that the arbitrator has not committed any illegality and there is no error apparent on the face of the award entitling the petitioner to claim relief. The respondent No. 1 also denied that the award requires registration. 7. In view of these rival contentions the following points arise for my determination : Sr. No. Points Answer. 1. Whether the award is null and void for want of In the negative. registration under the provisions of Registration Act, 1908 ? 2. Whether the award requires to be set aside on In the negative. 7. In view of these rival contentions the following points arise for my determination : Sr. No. Points Answer. 1. Whether the award is null and void for want of In the negative. registration under the provisions of Registration Act, 1908 ? 2. Whether the award requires to be set aside on In the negative. the ground that the Arbitrator has not taken into account all the assets and liabilities of the firm ? 3. Whether the Arbitrator committed any illegality In the negative. in imposng restraint on the petitioner from using the name of the irms for a period of two years ? 4. Whether the award should be set aside on In the negative. the ground that the Arbitrator has arrived at the sum of Rs. 2,51,524/- by adopting improper and incorrect method ? 5. Whether the award should be quashed on In the negative. the ground that the petitioner was alone made liable to pay the amounts to the retiring partners ? 6. Whether the directions for payment of In the negative. household expenses was beyond the ambit and terms of reference ? 8. The first submission of Mr. Nain, the learned consulate appearing in support of the petition, is that the award is null and void as it purports to create right, title and interest in various immovable properties or leases of the value of more than Rs. 100/- and is not registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. The firm has taken various premises on lease in Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta, Ahmedabad, Bangalore and Madras. It is not clear from the record whether the firm was a contractual tenant or a statutory tenant. The terms of reference require the Arbitrator to distribute the benefit of the tenancy rights. By paragraph 10 of the award the Arbitrator has awarded the interest of the firm in the leased premises in Bombay to the petitioner, while the interest in the leased premises at other places has been allotted to respondent No.1. Mr. Nain submits that as the value of various tenancy rights dealt by the arbitrator was several lakhs of Rupees and as the award creates or assigns the interest of leased property in favour of the parties , the provisions of section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act are clearly attracted. In answer to this submission, Mr. Mr. Nain submits that as the value of various tenancy rights dealt by the arbitrator was several lakhs of Rupees and as the award creates or assigns the interest of leased property in favour of the parties , the provisions of section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act are clearly attracted. In answer to this submission, Mr. Mehta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, submitted that the award does not require any registration because on dissolution of the firm, the assets which is allotted to the partners is merely a movable property. It is also urged that there is no material available in the award to indicate that the value of the tenancy right was in excess of Rs. 100/- . Mr. Mehta also invited my attention to a decision of Chief Justice Chagla in Civil Revision Application No. 183 of 1951 decided on April 17,1952 in support of his submission that it is not permissible to speculate of the value of the property unless such value is mentioned in the document or the award itself. The learned Counsel submitted that it is not permissible to assume that the value of the tenancy right was in excess of Rs. 100/- 9. In regard to the question whether the award required registration, Mr. Mehta placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Addanki Narayannappa and another v. Bhaskara Krishnapppa (dead) and there other his heirs and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 1300. In that case the members of the two joint families had entered into partnership business of building of hulling rice etc. Subsequently, a document styled as Karar was executed between the two families. This document was unregistered and recorded the fact the partnership had come to end and that one of the families had given up their share in the machines etc., and their share is made over to the other family by way of adjustment. Subsequently, a suit for dissolution of partnership and account was brought by the membership of the family who had relinquished the interest. In the suit, it was claimed that since the partnership assets included immovable property, the document regarding relinquishment was compulsorily registerable under section 17 of the Registration Act. Subsequently, a suit for dissolution of partnership and account was brought by the membership of the family who had relinquished the interest. In the suit, it was claimed that since the partnership assets included immovable property, the document regarding relinquishment was compulsorily registerable under section 17 of the Registration Act. The Supreme Court negatived the submission and hold that the interest of the partners in the partnership assets was movable property and the document, evidencing the relinquishment of that interest was not compulsorily registerable. Mr. Justice Mudholkar who spoke for the Bench further observed that during the subsistence of the partnership, no partner can deal with any portion of the property, nor can he assign his interest in a specific item of the partnership property. During the subsistence of the partnership, the partner may assign a share to another and in that case what the assignee would get is only that which is permitted by section 29(1) of the Partnership Act i.e. to say the right to receive the share of profits of the assignor and accept the account of profits agreed to by the partners. This judgment undoubtedly supports the submission of Mr. Mehta that the interest of the partners in a partnership assets is a movable property. In the present case, the partnership assets was a leasehold right and by dissolution of the partnership concern, the Arbitrator has allotted those leasehold rights exclusively to the petitioner and respondent No.1. The question for may determination is whether the interest of the partners in such leasehold assets of the firm is an immovable property or merely a movable property. In view of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, it must be hold that the partnership asset which included the leasehold rights were merely movable property and by allotment of such leasehold interest exclusively in favour of one or the other partner would not amount to creating a right title and interest in any immovable property. In that case, the provisions of section 7 of the Registration Act are not at all, attracted. There is one more fact of the matter which also which also cannot be ignored. In Bombay, leasehold interests are regulated by the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and that Act prohibits creation of any interest in the leasehold rights in favour of the strangers. There is one more fact of the matter which also which also cannot be ignored. In Bombay, leasehold interests are regulated by the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and that Act prohibits creation of any interest in the leasehold rights in favour of the strangers. The identical provision are also prevalent in Rent Control Act enacted by various other States in which the firm was holding the leasehold rights. In view of such prohibition of creating interest, it is not permissible to create any interest in the leasehold rights in disregard to the landlord. In the present case, the tenancy rights were standing in the name of the firm and the partners of the firm had clearly interest in it . The arbitrator has merely assigned the tenancy rights to the petitioner and respondent No.1 on dissolution and, in my judgment, it is impossible to hold that the interest in the immovable property is created by the terms of the award. It must also be noticed that there is nothing in the award to indicate that the value of the leasehold rights was more than Rs. 100/- in absence of that material, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of section 17 of the registration Act are attracted. 10. Mr. Nain placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ratan Lal Sharma v. Purshottam Harit)2, reported in A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1066 and it is necessary to set out the facts involved in that case before appreciating the submission of Mr. Nain. The partnership concern known as "New Bengal Engineering Works" was commanded by R.L Sharma and Purshottam Harit in December 1962. On August 22, 1963, after the parties have fallen out, an agreement was arrived at to refer the disputes to the arbitrators. The Arbitrators gave their award and the factory premises and the properties were exclusively allotted to Dr. Ratan Sharma. He was also made liable to pay the liabilities of the firm Dr. Sharma directed to pay an amount of Rs. 17,000/- to Purshottam Harit. The tenancy rights were also transferred in favour of Dr. Sharma. There were certain debtors of the firm and the award provided that the sum if realised shall be divided equally between the two partners. He was also made liable to pay the liabilities of the firm Dr. Sharma directed to pay an amount of Rs. 17,000/- to Purshottam Harit. The tenancy rights were also transferred in favour of Dr. Sharma. There were certain debtors of the firm and the award provided that the sum if realised shall be divided equally between the two partners. An application was filed for setting aside the award but the learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application but declined the request of the appellant to proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award. The refusal to pronounce the judgment was because according to the learned Judge the award created interest in favour of the appellant over immovable property worth Rs. 100/- and required registration. The appellant carried an appeal before the Supreme Court but the appeal ended in dismissal. Mr. Justice Dwivedi, speaking for the Bench, observed in paragraph 4 of the judgment that it is not well settled that the share of a partner in the assets of the partnership which has also immovable properties and the assignments of such share does not require registration under section 17 of the Registration Act. The learned Judge further observed that the award in the case before them did not seek to assign the share of the respondent to the appellant either in express words or by necessary implication. After this observation, the Supreme Court has set out the relevant terms of the award. Paragraph 6 of the Supreme Court judgment reads as follows : "Now the award does not transfer the share of the respondent, interpreted in the aforesaid sense, to the appellant in the express words. Nor such is the necessary intendment of the award. It expressly makes an exclusive allotment of the partnership assets including the factory and liabilities to the appellant. It goes further and makes him "absolutely entitled to the same" in consideration of a sum of Rs. 17,000/- plus half of the amount of Rs. 1924.88 to the respondent and the appellants renouncement of the right to share in the amounts already received by the respondent. So in express words it purports to create rights in immovable property worth about Rs. 100/- in favour of the appellant. It would accordingly require registration under section 17, Registration Act. As it unregistered, Court could not look in to it. So in express words it purports to create rights in immovable property worth about Rs. 100/- in favour of the appellant. It would accordingly require registration under section 17, Registration Act. As it unregistered, Court could not look in to it. If the Court could not, as we hold, look in to it. Section 17, Registration Act presupposes an award which can be validly looked into by the Court. The appellant cannot successfully invoke section 17." From the observation of the Supreme Court on this paragraph, it is urged by Mr. Nain that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Addanki Narayanappa and another v. Bhaskara Krishnappa)3 , reported in A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 1300 is no longer a good law. It is of possible to accept the submission because the Supreme Court in paragraph 4 has not only referred to the previous judgement but has approved the correctness of the same. Mr. Nain then submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier case can be easily distinguished on the ground that when the entire assets of a partner are allotted to another partner, then even though such assest include immovable property, it would not require registration but in case certain assets of the firm are not distributed and if the total of the entire assets of the partnership includes immovable property then registration is a must. Relying upon the facts in the judgment of Mr. Justice Dwivedi, it is urged that the award provides that certain sums to be recovered from the debtors are to be equally divided between the partners and in respect of those sums, the distribution was not complete. Mr. Nain submits that in such cases, the Supreme Court has laid down that the award requires registration if the assets include immovable property of a value of Rs. 100/- . It is not possible to accept this submission. In the first instance, the judgment of Mr. Justice Dwivedi nowhere makes departure from the ratio laid down by the earlier Supreme Court judgement. Secondly, what Mr. Nain claims to be dictum of the judgment the entire judgement nowhere indicates that nearly because certain debuts due to the firm are yet to be recovered and divided, it is necessary to register the award because the rights in immovable property are awarded. Mr. Nain reads something more in the judgement of Mr. Secondly, what Mr. Nain claims to be dictum of the judgment the entire judgement nowhere indicates that nearly because certain debuts due to the firm are yet to be recovered and divided, it is necessary to register the award because the rights in immovable property are awarded. Mr. Nain reads something more in the judgement of Mr. Justice Dwivedi when it is not there. The judgment of Mr. Justice Dwivedi nowhere laid down the ratio which makes any departure from the earlier judgement. In view of this conclusion, the first submission of Mr. Nain that the award is null and void for want of registration must fail. 11. The second ground of attack against this award is that the Arbitrator has failed to take into account all the assets and liabilities of the firm and that has resulted into an incomplete award. In this connection, the relevant challenge is to be found in grounds (g) and (h) of the petition. In paragraph (g), it is claimed that the partnership has to pay to the petitioners husband Dr. Kanodia and Lalit Kanodia, the sums of Rs. 60, 552/- and Rs. 32, 287/- respectively. It is claimed that the Arbitrator has made no provision for the payment and discharge of those liabilities. Mr. Mehta has pointed out that paragraph 21 of the award clearly takes into account all the liabilities of the firm. As various arguments are advanced on the contents of paragraph 21 of the award and that paragraph appears to be king-pin of the entire award, it is desirable to set out paragraph 21 of the award at this stage : " I award and direct that Mrs. Asha Kanodia do pay to Mr. Vijay kumar a sum of Rs. 2,51, 524/- (Rupees Two Lakhs fifty one thousand five hundred and twenty four only) as difference in the valuation of the assets of the said firm distributed between them and after adjustment of liabilities of the said firm and the adjustment of the household expenses till 31st March, 1974." 12. Mr. Nain submitted that the balance-sheets of the Head Office on March 31, 1974 clearly evidence the liabilities in connection with this amounts and the Arbitrator has made no provision whatsoever about the payment of the same. In this connection , it must be stated that Mr. Mr. Nain submitted that the balance-sheets of the Head Office on March 31, 1974 clearly evidence the liabilities in connection with this amounts and the Arbitrator has made no provision whatsoever about the payment of the same. In this connection , it must be stated that Mr. Nain wanted to rely upon certain material on record to point out that the award is incomplete. I did not permit Mr. Nain to place reliance on any documents on the record maintained by the Arbitrator . It is now well-settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court that the award can be set aside on the ground of error of law on the face of the award only when in award or in document incorporated with it, there is found some legal proposition which is basis of award and which is erroneous. In other words, the error must be apparent on the face of the award and not on record. It is not permissible for a party to resort to any of the documents to challenge the legality of the award unless such document is incorporated in the award itself. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in the cases of (Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture Private Ltd.)3 , reported in A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 1082 and in the case of (M/s. Allen Berry and co. Private Ltd. v. The Union of India)4 , reported in A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 696 was not seriously disputed by Mr. Nain but Mr. Nain submitted that unless the award specifically makes provision for payment of liabilities, it must be assumed, that the Arbitrator has failed to discharge his duties. In my judgment the submission is not correct. Paragraph 21 of the award clearly indicates that the Arbitrator has found the amount due from the petitioner to respondent No. 1 after taking into account all the assets and liabilities of the award. Paragraph 27 of the award also provide that the liabilities of the partnership relating to the divisions allotted to either the respondent No. 1 or the petitioner are to be borne by them respectively. That also indicates that the liabilities incurred by respective divisions are to be borne by the partner to whom those divisions are allotted. Mr. Paragraph 27 of the award also provide that the liabilities of the partnership relating to the divisions allotted to either the respondent No. 1 or the petitioner are to be borne by them respectively. That also indicates that the liabilities incurred by respective divisions are to be borne by the partner to whom those divisions are allotted. Mr. Nain then submitted that this liability is shown into the accounts of the Head Office and these accounts are independent of the three divisions. This submission is without any merit because in paragraph 9 of the petition, the petitioner had unequivocally stated that the balance sheets of all three divisions ultimately merged in the balance sheet of the firm referred to as the Head Office. This statement establishes that there are no separate accounts of the Head Office but it merely reflects the accounts of the three divisions. In my judgment, the submission of Mr. Nain that the award is incomplete because the liabilities of the husband of the petitioner and lalit Kanodia are not provided, is erroneous. 13. Mr. Nain then submitted by reference to ground (h) that the award does not divide all the assets and liabilities of the firm, and three instances are mentioned in this connection. The first is an amount of Rs. 9,565.76 which is an amount in hand at Bank in the Head Office of the firm. Mr. Mehta stated that after the award has been declared , the petitioner has withdrawn this amount. There is no serious challenge to this statement of Mr. Mehta and as the amount is withdrawn by the petitioner, I need not deal with this submission in detail. The second instance is about Rs. 38, 441.61 which is recoverable from the firm of M/s John Mulvaney and Company Private Limited. This is a sister concern of the firm of M/s. Datamatics Corporation and in respect of this concern also the matter was referred to the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator has passed an award. The Present award does not make any reference to this amount for the obvious reasons, because the amount is to be recovered from this sister concern and the parties to the present disputes are also partners in that concern. The last amount is Rs. 4000/- which was an amount of deposit lying with the Presidency Post Master, Bombay. Mr. The Present award does not make any reference to this amount for the obvious reasons, because the amount is to be recovered from this sister concern and the parties to the present disputes are also partners in that concern. The last amount is Rs. 4000/- which was an amount of deposit lying with the Presidency Post Master, Bombay. Mr. Mehta submits that no provisions is made in the award in respect of this amount because the same was already withdrawn. Mr. Nain did not dispute the statement. These are the only three instances about which the petitioner claims that the Arbitrator has made no provision. Apart from the fact that the amounts involved in two of the instances are withdrawn by the petitioner and the third amount is in respect of sister concern, I am not inclined to set aside the award on the ground of incompleteness. In my judgment, the arbitrator has taken all these facts in to account while arriving at the figure which the petitioner is made liable to pay to the respondent No. 1 in paragraph 21 of the award. It cannot be overlooked that it is not permissible to enter i to details of the record to find out the accuracy of the amounts arrived at by the Arbitrator. In this connection , I must also make reference to as decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Smt. Santo Sila Devi another v. Dhirendra Nath Sen others)5 , reported in A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1677 where the Supreme Court has laid down certain basic principles in respect of setting aside the award. The Supreme court has observed : "Before, dealing with this point it is necessary to emphasis certain basic positions. The first of them is that a Court should approach an award with a desire to support it, if that is reasonably possible, rather than to destroy it by calling it illegal ( See Selby v. Whitbread and Co.)6, (1917) 1 KB 736 at p. 748, Besides it is obvious that unless the reference to arbitration specifically so requires the Arbitrator is not bound to deal with each claim or matter separately, but can deliver a consolidated award. The legal position is clear that unless so specifically required an award need not formally express the decision of the arbitrator on each matter of difference. The legal position is clear that unless so specifically required an award need not formally express the decision of the arbitrator on each matter of difference. Vide (Re Brown and the Croydon Canal Co.)7 , (1839) 0 AD and EII 522 and (Jewell v. Christle)8 , (1867) 2 CP 296. Further, as Parke, B. Himself put it during the course of arguments in (1853) 138 ER 1254 : "Unless the contrary appears the Court will presume that the award dispose finally of all the matters is difference." and to repeat a sentence from the extract quoted earlier : "Where an award is made de premisses, the presumption is, that the arbitrator intended to dispose finally of all the matters in difference ; and his award will be held final, if by any intendment it can be made so." It is obvious that while dealing with the submission that the award is incomplete, the Court must proceed with the assumption that the award disposes finally all the matters . In the present case, apart from the assumption, I am satisfied that the Arbitrator has finally decided all the matters in dispute between the parties and has taken into account all the assets and liabilities of the firm while passing the award. In view of this finding , the second submission of Mr. Nain for setting aside the award must fail. 14. The third submission made for setting aside the award is that the Arbitrator has put unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner prohibiting her from carrying on business in the name and style which includes the word "Corporation." The agreement of reference permits the Arbitrator to put reasonable restraint on their carrying on business in such a manner that the business of other partner would not suffer. By paragraph 7 of the award, the arbitrator has prevented the petitioner for a period of two years from the date of the award from carrying on business in the name of "M/s. Datamstics Corporation" and also from using the word "Corporation" in any name in which she will carry on business. Mr. Nain made no grievance about the restrictions imposed in respect of the name "M/s. Datamatics Corporation" in which the firm is carrying on business but the learned Counsel submitted that the restraint provided by the award for the use of the word "Corporation" is entirely unreasonable. Mr. Mr. Nain made no grievance about the restrictions imposed in respect of the name "M/s. Datamatics Corporation" in which the firm is carrying on business but the learned Counsel submitted that the restraint provided by the award for the use of the word "Corporation" is entirely unreasonable. Mr. Nain also submitted that the restraint on use of the word "Corporation" is contrary to the provisions of section 27 of the Indian Contract Act. The learned Counsel submitted that as this part of the award is illegal, it is necessary to set aside the entire award. In my judgment the submission is devoid of any merit. Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act provides that every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void. I fail to appreciate how the provisions of this section are attracted on the facts of the present case. The Arbitrator has not prohibited the petitioner from carrying on any business or trade but has merely restrained her from using the word "Corporation" in any name in which she will carry on business. The submission of Mr. Nain that the restraint is unreasonable is also without any substance. The arbitrator has imposed an identical restraint on respondent No. 1 also by paragraph 8 of the award. There is one fact of the matter which cannot be overlooked. The award was declared on March 31,1975 and more than 5 years have elapsed from that date. The restraint on the petitioner from using the word "Corporation" was to remain to force for a period of only two years from the date of the award and, therefore, now at this stage , the submission has lot its force and has merely become academic. In my judgement, the award cannot be set aside on this count. 15. The next ground of attack is that the directions given by the arbitrator in paragraph 21 of the award are totally erroneous. As mentioned herein above, in paragraph 21 of the award. The arbitrator has directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 2,51,524/- to respondent No. 1 and the main controversy in this petition centres round on this direction. Mr. As mentioned herein above, in paragraph 21 of the award. The arbitrator has directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 2,51,524/- to respondent No. 1 and the main controversy in this petition centres round on this direction. Mr. Nain submitted that the arbitrator has arrived at this figure by an improper mode of calculation and the learned Counsel wanted to place reliance upon various documents on record. I did not permit the learned Counsel to make any use of the record of the arbitrator for challenging the validity of the award as, in my judgment , the award can be set aside provided there is an error apparent on the face of award itself and not on the face of record. Mr. Nain, realising this position, raised two-fold contentions about the correctness of the direction contained in paragraph 21 of the award. The first submission is that Arbitrator has not distributed the entire assets of the partnership concern. This submission cannot be entertained because the petitioner desired that this Court should examine the material on record for recording finding. It is not permissible to do so in a petition filed under section 30 of the Arbitration Act. Mr. Nain then submitted that the Arbitrator has arrived at a figure by taking in to account the difference in the valuation of the assets of the firm and this mode of computation is erroneous. The learned counsel submitted that the award should be set aside on the ground that the arbitrator has failed to apply the proper norms for distribution of the assets of the firm. It was also claimed that the arbitrator has failed to comply with the provision of the Partnership Act in connection with the distribution of assets. Mr. Mehta, on the other hand, rightly pointed out that by the terms of reference the arbitrator is conferred with wider powers and it was permissible for the arbitrator to distribute the assets by taking accounts and by consultation with any expert. Mr. Mehta submits that the award itself indicates that the arbitrator has consulted the Chartered Accountants and has arrived at the figure after considering the pros and cons of the matter. In my judgment , the submission of Mr. Mehta is sound deserves to be upheld. Mr. Mehta submits that the award itself indicates that the arbitrator has consulted the Chartered Accountants and has arrived at the figure after considering the pros and cons of the matter. In my judgment , the submission of Mr. Mehta is sound deserves to be upheld. It is not permissible for the petitioner to claim that this Court should enter into the accounts maintained by the parties and determines afresh what is the amount due from the petitioner to respondent No. 1. In my judgment, no error has been pointed out on the face of the award to warrant setting aside of the award. 16. The next grievances of Mr. Nain is that the Arbitrator was in error in foisting the liability of payment to the retiring partners of the amounts due from the firm. The respondents Nos. 2 to 5 agreed to retire from the partnership firm on receiving from the remaining partners certain amounts agreed between the parties. The Arbitrator directed the petitioner to make the payment by directions given in paragraph 23 of the award. The grievance of Mr. Nain is that the Arbitrator should not have directed the petitioner alone to pay the said amounts but both the petitioner and respondent No. 1 should have been asked to pay the same. The submission has no merit. The Arbitrator has directed the petitioner to pay the said amounts but while determining the final liability of the petitioner to respondent No.1 has given credit for the same. Paragraph 27 of the award provides that the liabilities of the firm M/s. Datamatics Corporation relating to computering and staffing divisions are to be paid by the petitioner. The Arbitrator directed the petitioner to make the payments while distributing the assets and liabilities of the firm. I do not find any irregularity committed by the Arbitrator. Mr. Nain then submitted that the further direction given by the Arbitrator in paragraph 23 of the award for payment of income tax and other taxes due in respect of the profits earned or credited to the account of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 is fully incorrect. The Arbitrator has directed both the Petitioner and respondent No. 1 to equally share the income-tax and other taxes due in respect of the profits earned or credited in the account of respondents Nos. 2 to 5 till the end of March 31, 1974. 2 to 4 is fully incorrect. The Arbitrator has directed both the Petitioner and respondent No. 1 to equally share the income-tax and other taxes due in respect of the profits earned or credited in the account of respondents Nos. 2 to 5 till the end of March 31, 1974. I fail to appreciate what grievances the petitioner could have in respect of this direction. The parties were in agreement that the firm stands dissolved from March 31, 1974 and till that day, the retiring partners are entitled to the profits earned. The respondents Nos. 2 to 5 retired from the partnership on receipt of certain fixed amounts without insisting upon the exact amount of profit. In these circumstances, if the surviving partners are required to pay the taxes due in respect of the profits earned by the retiring partners, I find no illegality in such directions. The challenge to the award on this part must fail. 17. The last submission in support of the petition is that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself in exceeding his jurisdiction. What is urged in support of this submission is that the parties had never agreed to refer the Arbitrator by exceeding jurisdiction has given direction in paragraph 22 of the award for payment of a sum of Rs. 12,400/- to respondent No. 1 for household expenses. In this connection, it is necessary to mention that the parties to this petition being close family members were residing together and had maintained an account in a Bank which is situated near to their residence. The respective parties used to draw various amounts from this account towards their household expenses and the amount credited in this account was from the funds of the partnership concern. It is not in dispute that the parties have incurred household expenses. The Arbitrator has directed that the petitioner should pay an amount of Rs. 12,400/- to respondent No. 1 for household expenses paid by respondent No. 1 for the period April 1, 1974 to March 31, 1975. The Arbitrator has obviously taken in to account the fact that the amounts were withdrawn from the accounts by all the partners for household expenses and the respondent No. 1 has spent for the expenses between the concerned period. Mr. Nain submitted that the Arbitrator has no Jurisdiction to pass any such direction because the question of household expenses was never referred. Mr. Nain submitted that the Arbitrator has no Jurisdiction to pass any such direction because the question of household expenses was never referred. The submission is not correct. Although, there is no reference for the household expenses were incurred from the account maintained by the firm and it was open for the Arbitrator to take the dealings of that account into consideration. I do not find any illegality committed by the Arbitrator in this connection. The challenge to the award on this part must fail. These are all the contentions raised by the petitioner in support of the reliefs claimed in the petition and, in my judgment, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the present proceedings. 18. Before parting with this matter, one submission of Mr. Mehta requires consideration. The learned Counsel submitted that the award should not be set aside as it has already been acted upon by the parties. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and respondent No. 1 are in possession of the premises allotted to them and are also doing the business which has come to their share. It is equally not in dispute that the respective parties have withdrawn the amounts from the accounts which came to their share. The present proceedings appear to be prosecuted merely because the partner wants to avoid the liability of payment of Rs. 2,51,524/- awarded in favour of respondent No. 1. Mr. Mehta submitted that as the petitioner herself has acted upon the award and has taken advantage of the same, it would not be just and proper to set aside the award and set at naught everything which has been done by the parties for last more than 5 years. There is merit in the submission of the learned counsel. Apart from this consideration , as i have found that each and every challenge against the award is without any basis, the present petition for setting aside the same must be dismissed. 19. Accordingly, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. -----