Chandrika Prasad v. District Judge, Rae Bareli — 1980 DIGILAW 914 (ALL)

ORDER K.N. Goyal, J. - These two writ petitions arise out of proceedings under S. 21 (1)(b) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, initiated by Lachman Prasad who is opposite party No. 2 in each of these petitions against the petitioners of Writ Petn. No. 1675 of 1976, namely, Jiya Lal and others. The case of Lachman Prasad was that Jiya Lal and others were his tenants and that the buildings occupied by them respectively were in a dilapidated condition and required to be demolished and reconstructed. Jiya Lal and others denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the applicant Lachhman Prasad and themselves. They had been inducted into the premises by the previous owner. It appears that the previous owner had executed a sale deed in favour of Lachman Prasad. Chandrika Prasad who is the petitioner in Writ Petn. No. 1674 of 1976 made an application for impleadment. His contention was that the actual purchasers were Lachman Prasad and himself jointly and that the particular premises which were in the occupation of Jiya Lal and others later came to belong to Chandrika Prasad alone. This contention of Chandrika Prasad was accepted by the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority also found that the building was in a dilapidated condition and it required to be demolished and that the other conditions for grant of an order of eviction under S. 21(1)(b) were satisfied. However, in view of the finding recorded by it that Lachman Prasad was not the landlord, the applications were dismissed. In appeals filed by Lachman Prasad it was contended that Chandrika Prasad had been wrongly allowed to contest the applications. The District Judge upheld this contention of Lachman Prasad and, accordingly declined to hear Chandrika Prasad. Thereafter, he considered the entire evidence and agreed with the Prescribed Authority that the building required to be demolished and reconstructed and that Lachman Prasad had fulfilled other requisite conditions laid down in Rule 17 of the Rules made under the Act. It was also held that Lachman Prasad was the landlord and that Chandrika Prasad had been falsely set up by the tenants in order to save themselves from eviction. 2. On behalf of the petitioners it has been contended that Chandrika Prasad had a right to be heard as he had been impleaded by the Prescribed Authority. It was also held that Lachman Prasad was the landlord and that Chandrika Prasad had been falsely set up by the tenants in order to save themselves from eviction. 2. On behalf of the petitioners it has been contended that Chandrika Prasad had a right to be heard as he had been impleaded by the Prescribed Authority. The District Judge as the appellate Court was, however, entitled to take a different view of the matter and could hold that the order of the Prescribed Authority allowing Chandrika Prasad to intervene was illegal. I am inclined to agree with the learned District Judge in holding that in a suit by alleged landlord against his alleged tenant a rival claimant to ownership is not a proper or necessary party and the order of the Prescribed Authority allowing Chandrika Prasad to intervene was not justified. 3. In proceedings under the Act normally the question of title does not arise at all, but whenever it is raised, the Prescribed Authority is obliged to decide it. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on D.S. Victor v. The District Judge (1978 All LJ 910). The matter is, however, concluded by an authority of the Supreme Court, namely, Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Ratan Singh ((1963) 2 SCJ 475). In this case a Constitution Bench took the following view : "It is true that the Act does not in terms authorise the authorities under the Act to determine finally the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Act proceeds on the assumption that there is such a relationship. If the relationship is denied, the authorities under the Act have to determine that question also, because a simple denial of the relationship cannot oust the jurisdiction of the tribunals under the Act. True, they are tribunals of limited jurisdiction, the scope of their power and authority being limited by the provisions of the Statute. But a simple denial of the relationship either by the alleged landlord or by the alleged tenant would not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act, because the simplest thing in the world would be for the party interested to block the proceedings under the Act to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant. But a simple denial of the relationship either by the alleged landlord or by the alleged tenant would not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act, because the simplest thing in the world would be for the party interested to block the proceedings under the Act to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant. The tribunals under the Act being creatures of the Statute have limited jurisdiction and have to function within the four corners of the Statute creating them But within the provisions of the Act, they are tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and their orders are final and not liable to be questioned in collateral proceedings like a separate suit or application in execution proceedings. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention that as soon as the appellant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act was completely ousted." It was also observed as follows : "Such a decision may not be res judicata in a regular suit in which a similar issue may directly arise for decision." 3A. Jiya Lal and others had taken the premises on lease from the previous owner. The previous owner executed a sale deed in favour of Lachman Prasad. Such a sale deed has the effect of creating the relationship of landlord and tenant between the vendee and the old tenants. It was so held by me in Banshidhar Kala v. M.K. Gupta (Civil Revision No. 126 of 1978) D/d. 30-10-1979 and in Prem Shankar v. Maikoo Lal (Writ Petn. No. 697 of 1980) D/d. 7-7-1980. The same view has been taken in Smt. Shanti Devi v. Vindhyachal Prasad (1980 All Rent Cas 213) : (1980 UPLT NOC 57) and a Division Bench case of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in P.B. Pathak v. Dr. Riyazuddin (ILR (1980) Madh Pra 49): (AIR 1976 Madh Pra 55). It was held that Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act creates statutory attornment and has the same effect as contractual attornment so that because of the transfer of the leased property the transferee ipso facto acquires all the rights of the lessor and a new relationship is created between the transferee and the lessee. It was held that Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act creates statutory attornment and has the same effect as contractual attornment so that because of the transfer of the leased property the transferee ipso facto acquires all the rights of the lessor and a new relationship is created between the transferee and the lessee. The view taken by the learned District Judge that the evidence of alleged payment of rent by Jiya Lal and others to Chandrika Prasad was got-up evidence and could not be believed in the fact of the sale deed cannot be said to be perverse or manifestly erroneous and does not require to be interfered with in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. This finding is binding on Jiya Lal and others the petitioners in Writ Petn. No. 1675 of 1976 though not on Chandrika Prasad, the petitioner in Writ Petn. No. 1674 of 1976. Thus Chandrika Prasad is not in any way prejudiced by the order passed in these proceedings and it may be open to him to reagitate the matter in the Civil Court. 4. The concurrent findings of the two authorities on dilapidation and compliance with the provisions of Rule 17 are unassailable and have not been seriously questioned 5. I thus find no force in these writ petitions which are hereby dismissed, but no order is made as to costs.