JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C. J. 1. BECHULAL obtained a compromise decree against Nanhu Kumar for recovery of Rs.5,802/- on December 21, 1950. Bechulal, the decree-holder, put the decree in execution. The western portion of house No. D-47/176 was attached and put up for auction. At the auction, it was purchased by the appellant Har Narain Sahu for Rs. 4, 800/-. The sale was confirmed on July 18, 1954. On September 6, 1954, the auction-purchaser obtained possession. 2. ON March 17, 1954, one Narain Das and Smt. Boda filed suit No. 160 of 1954 against Nanhu Kumar, Bechulal as well as the auction-purchaser Har Narain for the declaration that the plaintiffs were the owners of the property and the sale in execution of the decree in favour of Bechulal was illegal and ineffective. The suit was decreed on 23-5-1959. It was declared that the attachment and sale of the property in suit in execution of the decree of suit No. 119 of 1950 was Illegal and ineffective as against the rights of the plaintiffs. The decree-holder Bechulal filed an appeal which was dismissed on May 7, 1960. This decree became final. 3. HAR Narain, the auction-purchaser, on July 28, 1959, filed an application under Section 47 of the CPC claiming refund of the purchase money. He, on May 9,1961, filed an independent suit (suit no. 42 of 1961) against Bechulal, decree-holder in the first suit, and the heirs of Narain Das (the plaintiffs of the second suit) for recovery of Rs. 4, 800/-, the auction-sale price. The trial court decreed the suit as well as execution application under Section 47 of the CPC for recovery of Rs. 4,800/-. The defendants went up in appeal which was allowed and the decree set aside. The suit as well as the application under section 47 of the CPC were dismissed. 4. AGGRIEVED, the auction-purchaser Har Narain has filed the present two second appeals. The lower appellate court held itself bound by a Pull Bench decision of this Court in Amar Nath v. Chotelal Durga Prasad, 1938 AWR 668. When the appeals were heard by a learned Single Judge, he felt that this Full Bench required reconsideration. He, therefore, referred the case to a larger Bench. The matter has now been placed before this Division Bench. 5. When the appeals were heard by a learned Single Judge, he felt that this Full Bench required reconsideration. He, therefore, referred the case to a larger Bench. The matter has now been placed before this Division Bench. 5. WE have heard learned counsel and, in our opinion, the view taken by the Full Bench of our Court in Amar Nath's case and which has stood for the last 40 years, does not require reconsideration. It is true that there is a difference of opinion between the various High Courts on the question decided by the Full Bench, but that, in our opinion, is not sufficient to merit reopening of the question. 6. THE Full Bench in Amar Nath's case held that there in no warranty of title to a purchaser of immovable property at court auction. The auction-purchaser has no right to recover the purchase price by a suit from the decree-holder in case it subsequently turns out that what he had purchased did not belong to the judgment-debtor. A statutory right was granted under the CPC of 1877 and 1882 by which an auction-purchaser could sue to recover the purchase price under those Codes. With the repeal of the Code of 1882 by the Code of 1908 that statutory right came to an end, as the present CPC made no such provision. There is no right, either in law or in equity, for an auction-purchaser to recover under such circumstances. This Full Bench case is applicable to a situation where, in a subsequent suit, at the instance of a stranger-third party, it is declared that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property which was auction-sold. For the appellant, reliance was placed upon an earlier Full Bench in Bindeshari Pershad Tewari v. Badal Singh, AIR 1923 All. 394. In that case, the decree which was executed by sale of immovable property, itself was set aside in a subsequent suit instituted by a third party-stranger. The question was whether the sale which had been duly confirmed could still be held to subsist in the eye of law, when the decree, in the execution of which it was held, itself has been set aside. The question was whether the sale which had been duly confirmed could still be held to subsist in the eye of law, when the decree, in the execution of which it was held, itself has been set aside. The Full Bench ruled that the cases where the question of warranty of title in an auction sale is emphasized were not cases where the validity of the decree under which the sale was held, was in dispute. They emphasized that in the present case the plaintiff claimed and obtained a declaration that not merely the sale but the decree on which it was based had no effect as against him. The decree-holder, therefore, obtained from the auction purchaser under an invalid decree, money to which they have no right and there is a clear equity in favour of the purchaser entitling him to recover it back. The basic principle enunciated by the Full Bench was : "It is a well established principle that the auction-purchaser is not bound to look beyond the decree. If a decree is in existence, he is entitled to assume that it is a valid decree........." 7. A distinction between a defect in the judgment-debtor's title to the property sold and the case where there was no jurisdiction to sell the property is recognised in the well known case of Dorab Ali Khan v. Abdul Aziz, 5 Indian Appeals 116. 8. ANOTHER principle which was emphasized is that the act of Court should not be permitted to do any injury to any litigant. When it transpired that the decree itself was void, it was obvious that the entire proceedings were without jurisdiction and the Court had taken money from the purchaser and paid it to the decree-holder when it had no jurisdiction to do so. In such a case, it was the act of the Court which injured the auction-purchaser. He was hence entitled to recover. Bindeshari's case is not at all attracted to the present case. Here the original decree, which was put in execution, has not been assailed or set aside. It subsists. The execution court had jurisdiction to execute it. Since there is no warranty of title in an execution sale, the court cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction in auctioning the property which ostensibly belonged to the judgment-debtor. Here the original decree, which was put in execution, has not been assailed or set aside. It subsists. The execution court had jurisdiction to execute it. Since there is no warranty of title in an execution sale, the court cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction in auctioning the property which ostensibly belonged to the judgment-debtor. In court auctions, the title of the judgment-debtor to the property sought to be auctioned is not maticulqusly examined. If, subsequently, it is found that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property, it does not render the execution proceedings without jurisdiction because the court initially did not grant any warranty of title. This distinction which has always been upheld leads to different positions as is evident from the decisions in AIR 1923 Allahabad 394 and 1938 AWR 668. The present is a case which is, on facts, akin to the 1938 case. There in a subsequent suit, it had been held that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property auctioned. The auction-purchaser had to suffer the loss. He cannot claim refund of the money from the decree-holder or the third party-stranger who were not guilty of any fraud, etc. He put the decree into execution and was paid money which was due under the decree. In our opinion, the suit as well as the execution application were rightly dismissed. 9. THE appeals have no force and are accordingly dismissed, but we make no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.