S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision application under sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act filed by the original defendants against whom a decree for possession has been passed by the learned Trial Judge and is confirmed by the Appellate Court. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this proceeding lie in a very narrow compass. ( 3 ) THE respondent is the landlady of the suit residential premises which consist of a small room situated in Mangrol town of Mangrol Taluka of Junagadh District. The monthly rent is Rs. 15. 00. The original tenant was the deceased husband of the petitioner No. 1 defendant No. 1 and the father of minor petitioners Nos. 2 to 4. The original tenant of this suit room was served with a notice by the respondent landlady deman- ding arrears of rent which had then became due for more than six months. The said notice dated 23/04/1970 was served on the tenant on 24/04/1970 The said notice was as per the provisions of sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. The original tenant could not comply with the said notice perhaps due to economic difficulties. The respondent landlady also did not immediately take any step to evict him and in the meanwhile the origi- nal tenant expired leaving his wife-petitioner No. 1-and his three minor children as his heirs and legal representatives. That ultimately the respo- ndent landlady filed Regular Civil Suit No. 314 of 1973 on 26/12/1973 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Dn ) Mangrol for obta- ining possession of the suit room on the ground that the original tenant was served with a notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act was in arrears of rent from 1-8-72 to 30/04/1972 and thereafter also the present defendants petitioners did not pay any rent. Consequently the respondent landlady filed the aforesaid suit against the heirs and legal representatives of the original deceased tenant. ( 4 ) THE petitioners defendants contested the suit by filing their written statement at Exh. 12. Petitioner No. 1 for herself as well as for her minor children contended that the suit was not maintainable. Consequently the respondent landlady filed the aforesaid suit against the heirs and legal representatives of the original deceased tenant. ( 4 ) THE petitioners defendants contested the suit by filing their written statement at Exh. 12. Petitioner No. 1 for herself as well as for her minor children contended that the suit was not maintainable. She admitted that she was in arrears of rent from 1-8-1971 but she con- tended that the plaintiff had refused to accept the rent though it was sent by Money Order. The learned Trial Judge framed various issues at Exh. 19. Ultimately a decree was passed after recording the evidence of the parties in favour of the respondent landlady and agai- nst the petitioners defendants. The learned Trial Judge found that the petitioners were tenants in arrears and were not entitled to protection under the Bombay Rent Act as they were not ready and willing to pay the rent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 5 ) THE learned Trial Judge decreed the suit against the petitioners when the learned Trial Judge took the view that the petitioners were liable to be evicted under the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act as they had failed to comply with the notice under sec. 12 (2) which was demanding rent for more than six months. They hada lso tno raised the question of standard rent within one month from the receipt of the suit notice. ( 6 ) THE petitioners carried the matter in appeal being Civil Appeal No. 114 of 1976 before the District Court at Junagadh. The said appeal came up for hearing before the learned Appellate Judge Junagadh. The learned Appellate Judge took the view that the case was governed not by sec. 12 (3) (a) but by sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act as the plaintiff had also demanded Education Cess from the tenants and as the education Cess was not payable by month it could not be said that the rent demanded from the tenant was payable by month and consequently one of the most important conditions for the applicability of sec. 12 (3) (a) namely that the rent must be payable by month was not satisfied in the present case. 12 (3) (a) namely that the rent must be payable by month was not satisfied in the present case. But the learned Appellate Judge confirmed the decree of the Trial Court by holding that the petitioners tenants had failed to deposit regularly in the trial Court the rent amount and standard rent and permitted increases and hence they had forfeited the protection afforded under sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act. Consequently the decree for possession as passed by the trial court against the petitioners was confirmed though on the alternative ground of non-compliance of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 7 ) AS stated above the dissatisfied petitioners defendants have come to this court by way of the present petition challenging the decrees for possession passed by both the court below. ( 8 ) MR. G. G. Malik the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners raised the following two contentions in support of the revision application: (1) The suit filed against the petitioners was not maintainable as the landlady has not served on the petitioners who are the sta- tutory tenants with any notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act and consequently the suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent was not maintainable against them; and (2) It was alternatively contended by Mr. Malik that even assuming that the suit was maintainable against the petitioners even then the learned Trial Judge committed a grave procedural error in passing the impugned order below application Exh. 34 directing the petitioners defence to be struck off and the said order is quite de hors sec. 11 (4) and is ultra vires and null and void. Mr. Malik therefore contended that the learned Trial Judge wrongly refused permission to the petitioners defendants to defend the proceedings and had passed an ex parte order against them and hence the proceedings were required to be remanded to the trial court to enable the petitioners to contest the suit on merits. ( 9 ) MR. S. M. Shah for the respondent landlady on the other hand supported the decree passed by both the courts below against the petiti- oners. ( 10 ) SO far as the first contention of Mr. Malik is concerned it will have to be decided in the light of certain admitted facts which emerge from the record of this case. S. M. Shah for the respondent landlady on the other hand supported the decree passed by both the courts below against the petiti- oners. ( 10 ) SO far as the first contention of Mr. Malik is concerned it will have to be decided in the light of certain admitted facts which emerge from the record of this case. The original sole tenant of the suit room was the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners namely Koli Karsan Khima. He was a tenant of the respondent landlady on a monthly rent of Rs. 15/ -. He had fallen in arrears of rent for more than six mo- nths precisely from 1-8-1971. He was duly served with a notice under sec. 12 (2) by the respondent landlady demanding all the arrears of rent from them. The said notice was served on the original tenant on 24/04/1972 The original tenant did not comply with the said notice and did not remit any amount nor did he raise any dispute as to standard rent and even though more than a month elapsed after the service of the notice to him he did nothing towards the compliance of the said notice by making any effort nor did he care to reply to the same within one month. Thereafter about a year passed and in July 1973 the original tenant died. The landlady also seems to have waited enough before going to the court perhaps with a view that if the arrears were paid up she may continue the tenant in the premises; but in the meanwhile the tenant died in July 1973 and thereafter the respondent landlady filed the present suit for possession against the petitioners who are the heirs and legal representatives of the original tenant. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid facts will show that admittedly notice was given to the sole tenant of the suit premises under sec. 12 (2) by the respondent landlady and even though one month had expired since the service of the notice on the original tenant the said notice was not complied with by the original tenant. It is also an admitted position that the respondent landlady after the death of the original tenant did not serve a fresh notice under sec. 12 (2) by the respondent landlady and even though one month had expired since the service of the notice on the original tenant the said notice was not complied with by the original tenant. It is also an admitted position that the respondent landlady after the death of the original tenant did not serve a fresh notice under sec. 12 (2) on the present peti- tioners who are the heirs and legal representatives of the original tenant but straight away filed this suit against them relying on the earlier notice which was served on the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners namely Koli Karsan Khima. Mr. Malik contended that as the original tenant Koli Karsan Khima was a statutory tenant once he died before any effective order was passed against him he died as a statutory tenant. The present petitioners were admittedly staying with him as members of his family. Consequently under sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act they were entitled to become the statutory tenants of the suit premises as the statutory tenancy of the original tenant was transmitted to them by opera- tion of the aforesaid statutory provision. Mr. S. M. Shah for the landlady also states that the petitioners were staying with the deceased tenant as members of his family. Thus there is no dispute that the petitioners would be statutory tenants of the suit room under the provisions of sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act. But the question is whether they are required to be served with a fresh notice or whether the earlier notice served on the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners under sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act would enure for the benefit to the landlady while she filed the present suit against the heirs and legal representatives of the original statutory tenant. Mr. Malik in support of his submission heavily relied upon a Full Bench decision of this court in the case of BABUBHAI @ JAYAN- TILAL KALYANBHAI and ORS. V. SHAH BHARATKUMAR RATILAL and ORS. REPORTED IN 21 G. L. R. 103. Mr. Malik in support of his submission heavily relied upon a Full Bench decision of this court in the case of BABUBHAI @ JAYAN- TILAL KALYANBHAI and ORS. V. SHAH BHARATKUMAR RATILAL and ORS. REPORTED IN 21 G. L. R. 103. The Full Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case has taken the view that under the State Rent Control Act the concept of contractul tenancy has lost much of its significance and force and the restricted area under the various State Rent Acts had done away to a large extent with the requirement of the Law of Contract and Transfer of Property Act. Having regard to the definition of word tenant where a person continues in occupation after determination of contractual tenancy with or without the assent of the landlord a person continuing in occupa- tion accordingly is entitled to continue in occupation on the same terms and conditions as before till an order of eviction is made against him under the relevant provisions of a State Rent Act. So far as the restri- cted area under the S7ate Rent Acts is concerned the distinction between a contractual tenancy and a statutory tenancy is done away with and the extent of the tenancy under the State Rent Control Acts would be the same irrespective of the fact whether the contractual tenancy subsists or is terminated. If that is so there is some estate or interest in 3. tenancy under the Bombay Rent Control Act which will be heritable on the demise of the original tenant. Therefore the conclusion is inescapable that all the heirs of an original deceased tenant would be entitled to succeed to that estate or interest which is protected by the Rent Act till the jural relat- ionship of landlord and tenant is snapped by an order or decree of eviction made under the relevant provisions governing the question of eviction. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion the Full Bench of this Court has heavily relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. DHANPAL CHETTIER V. YASODAI AMMAL A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1745 and also on the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of DAMADILAL and ORS. V. PARASHRAM and ORS. (1976) 4 S. C. C. 855. V. PARASHRAM and ORS. (1976) 4 S. C. C. 855. It has been further observed by the Fall Bench that till She question of successor tenant is decided as per the provisions of sec. 5 (11) (c)of the Rent Act it cannot be said that the landlady cannot file a suit against the succe- ssor-in-interest of the deceased tenant. But in such an eventuality the successors-in-interest of the deceased tenant may decide inter 5e as to who will be treated as transmitted tenants under sec. 5 (II) (c) and if there is no such agreement on the part of the heirs of the deceased tenant the matter can be decided in the suit itself if both the parties agree to that course otherwise 1be suit has to be stayed and the question has to be resolved by a separate proceeding under sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act. As stated above there is no dispute that the petitioners are the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased tenant Koli Karsan Khima. ( 12 ) MR. Shah for the respondent landlady drew my attention to para 5 of the written statement Exh. 12 wherein the petitioners themse- lves have stated that the petitioners are the lawful tenants of the respon- dent landlady. Thus all of them claim to be the successor tenants after the death of the original tenant Hence it can be said that there is now no dispute inter se the defendants as to who will be successor tenants after the death of the original tenant. Thus all the petitioners tenants claim to be the statutory tenants of the suit premises having got the original statutory tenancy transmitted to them under the provisions of sec. 5 (c) of the Rent Act. Mr. Shah for the respondent landlady also accepts this position. Now in the background of these proved and adm- itted facts the short question that has been posed for consideration is to be resolved and the question is as to whether the respondent landlady can straight away file a suit against the petitioners relying upon the earlier notice which was given under sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act to the original tenant Koli Karsan Khima whose legal representatives are the present petitioners. 12 (2) of the Rent Act to the original tenant Koli Karsan Khima whose legal representatives are the present petitioners. It is true that as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Babubhais case (supra) the statutory tenancy continues till a decree for possession is passed against the erstwhile tenant. When the respondent landlady served the suit notice to the original tenant under sec. 12 (2) he was a statutory tenant and continued to be so till he died in July 1973 and his heirs and legal representatives are sought to be evicted in the present proceedings on the basis of the earlier notice given to the original tenant under sec. 12 (2 ). It is obvious that the petitioners claim statutory tenancy through the original tenant and as successor tena- nts through him. Consequently the claim of due compliance with the provisions of sec. 12 (2) as put forward by the petitioners cannot be placed on a higher pedestal than the claim of the original statutory tenant himself. When the original tenant was served with a notice under sec. 12 (2) the said notice was not complied with by him within one month after the receipt of the notice by the original tenant. Consequently a comp- leted cause of action arose in favour of the respondent landlady to seek possession of the suit premises from the statutory tenant or his succe- ssor-in-interest. After the cause of action had matured in favour of the landlady the original statutory tenant died and his statutory tenancy devolved upon the petitioners and they got it transmitted to them through the operation of sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Act. When the statutory tenancy rights of the original tenant devolved upon the petitioners the petitioners got all the statutory tenancy rights which their predecessor-in-interest had but hedged in with the cause of action that had accrued in favour of the respondent landlady against the original statutory tenant. Conseque- ntly it cannot be said that the respondent landlady could not file the present suit straight away against the petitioners on the basis of the cause of action that had already accrued to the respondent in the life time of the original statutory tenant. Acceptance of the contention of Mr. Malik would result into a very anomalous situation. The statutory tenant who was served with a notice under sec. Acceptance of the contention of Mr. Malik would result into a very anomalous situation. The statutory tenant who was served with a notice under sec. 12 (2) did not comply with the said notice for the requisite period as provided by sec. 12 (2) of the Act. Thereafter he died and the respondent filed this suit subsequently against the heirs and legal representatives of the original tenant on the basis of the completed cause of action in her favour against the estate of the deceased statutory tenant. It is obvious that the petitioners did not claim any independent interest in the said estate. It may be stated here that in a given case a suit may be filed against the statutory tenant who may die pending the suit and his heirs who are residing with him are brought on record. Even then it is submitted by Mr. Malik a fresh notice under sec. 12 (2) would be required to be given to them If the contention of Mr. Malik is accepted the aforesaid result would logically follow as in principle that there would be no difference between a situa- tion in which the statutory tenant who was served with a notice under sec. 12 (2) and who did not comply with the said notice in the meantime died and his heirs and legal representatives are sued upon on the basis of the completed cause of action which had accrued to the landlady as compared to another situation in which a suit was filed against the statu- tory tenant himself who had failed to comply with the notice under sec. 12 and who himself died pending the suit and his heirs were brought on record as it is now well settled by the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench in Babubhais case (supra) that so long as a statutory tenant has not suffered a decree for possession he continues to be the statutory tenant and subsequently if his heirs are brought on record and who claim transmitted statutory tenancy rights under sec. 5 (11) (c) even they can claim a fresh notice under sec. 12 (2) with the result that a suit properly instituted against the original statutory tenant would get frustrated only because such a tenant dies pending the suit and before any decree is passed against him. 5 (11) (c) even they can claim a fresh notice under sec. 12 (2) with the result that a suit properly instituted against the original statutory tenant would get frustrated only because such a tenant dies pending the suit and before any decree is passed against him. Thus for no fault of the plaintiff his properly insti- tuted suit would become incompetent due to such an extraneous event over which he can have no control. This would result in an anomalous and a totally unjust situation. Mr. Maliks submission therefore cannot stand scrutiny. It must be stated here that once the statutory tenant is served with a notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Act and once he failed to comply with the said notice during the requisite period as provided by the said provisions of sec. 12 (2) a completed cause of action accrues to the landlord concerned and if before the suit is filed or even subseque- ntly if such a tenant dies and his heirs and legal representatives are sued upon or subsequently brought on record as successor tenants under sec. 5 (11) (c) they can be sued upon and or the suit can be proceeded with against them without serving them with a fresh notice under sec. 12 (2 ). A mere look at sec. 12 (2) shows that before a suit can be filed by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases as a condition precedent one months notice in writing demanding the standard rent or permitted increases has to be served on the concerned tenant in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 Once this condition precedent is fully complied with the landlord concerned may file the suit after a number of months and if in the meantime the original statutory tenant dies and his heirs and legal representatives continue to represent the estate of the statutory tenant it would obviously not be necessary to serve a fresh notice to his heirs under sec. 12 (2) as the condition precedent for filing a suit for possess- ion against the estate of the deceased statutory tenant is already satisfied. 12 (2) as the condition precedent for filing a suit for possess- ion against the estate of the deceased statutory tenant is already satisfied. Once such a notice was given to a statutory tenant during the life time and if he failed to comply with the said notice during the requisite period as laid down by sec. 12 (2) the question of serving a fresh notice again to his heirs for the same cause of action does not ar-ise. Consequently the first submission of Mr. Malik cannot be accepted. It must be held that no such fresh notice was required to be served on the petitioners when they were sued upon on the ground that they were representing the estate of the deceased statutory tenant and had become the statutory tenants on account of the transmitted tenancy in their favour under sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Act and that as the estate of the deceased statutory tenant had be- come liable to be proceeded against for non compliance with the provisions of sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act by the original statutory tenant. Slightly in a different context the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the question whether a fresh notice under sec. 12 (2) would be required to be given because of the change of circumstance that may occur after the service of such notice on the tenant concerned in the case of VASUMATI GAURISHANKER BHATT V. NAVIRAM MANCHHARAM VORA and ORS. 4 G. L. R. 969. The Supreme Court had to examine a contention on behalf of the tenant that after he was served with a notice under sec. 12 (2) sec. 12 (3) (a) as it was then existing underwent a substantial transformation and was made very rigorous. The tenant contended that after he was served with the notice under sec. 12 (2) which was not complied with by her the case of the landlord was to be judged in the light or the earlier sec. 12 (3) (a) which was less rigor- ous prior to its amendment. After its amendment said provision of sec. 12 was made very rigorous. It was contended by the tenant that if the landlord wanted to take advantage of amended sec. 12 (3) (a) by filing a suit after the amendment of sec. 12 (3) he should have served a fresh notice to the tenant. After its amendment said provision of sec. 12 was made very rigorous. It was contended by the tenant that if the landlord wanted to take advantage of amended sec. 12 (3) (a) by filing a suit after the amendment of sec. 12 (3) he should have served a fresh notice to the tenant. This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court by holding that what sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Control Act requires is that in cases where there is no dispute between the land- lord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases if the landlord is able to show that the tenant is in arrears for a period of six months or more and the said arrears continued inspite of the fact that a notice was served on him before the institution of the suit and no payment was made within a month thereafter the landlord is entitled to get a decree for ejectment against the tenant. Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act as amended by the Amending Act LXI of 1953 cannot be read as requiring the landlord to issue a fresh notice after the amended section came into force. It is true that sec. 12 (3) (a) refers to a notice but in terms it refers to a notice served by the landlord as required by sec. 12 (2) and in sec. 12 (2) the legislature has made no amendment when it amended sub-sec. (3 ). Sec. 12 (2) never required the landlord to state to the tenant what the consequence would be if the tenant neglected to pay the arrears demanded from him by the notice. Therefore if the notice served as required by sec. 12 (2) prior to the institution of the suit is in order and the tenant is shown to have neglected to comply with the notice until the expiration of one month thereafter sec. 12 (2) is satisfied and sec. 12 (3) (a) comes into operation and the court is bound to pass a decree for eviction against the tenant The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court therefore makes it clear that for satisfying the require- ment of sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act. 12 (2) is satisfied and sec. 12 (3) (a) comes into operation and the court is bound to pass a decree for eviction against the tenant The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court therefore makes it clear that for satisfying the require- ment of sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act. the only condition is that a notice of demand must be given to the concerned tenant and if he fails to comply with the same within one month after the service of such notice the land- lord gets a right to file a suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent. I would further mention that in the present case during the requisite period the statutory notice under sec. 12 (2) was not complied with by the concerned tenant. Any subsequent change in position of parties due to death of either party cannot whittle down the effect of sec. 12 (2) notice which was duly given at the proper time and which came into full force when the said notice was not complied with by the concerned tenant within a period of one month from the service of the said notice to him. The comp- liance of sec. 12 (2) becomes complete at that stage and does not get in any way whittled down by any subsequent development. In such a situation a cause of action accrues in favour of the landlord and a suit can be filed under sec. 12 (2) against the concerned tenant or his successors whoever they may be at the relevant time. The first submission of Mr. Malik has therefore got to be repelled. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .