N. C. MUKHERJI, S. M. GUHA ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 10th May, 1978 passed by Sri Sukumar Guha, Judge, 10th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta. The plaintiff is the appellant in this Court. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff brought a suit for recovery of khas possession. The plaintiff's case may, briefly, be stated as follows: - The plaintiff and his three brothers became owners of a premises No. 88a, Bechu Chatterjee Street, Calcutta - 6, by purchase; Biswanath Sahoo, since deceased, father of the defendant Ram Palat Sahoo, was a tenant under them in respect of one room in the ground floor of this premises at a rental of Rs. 22/- payable according to English Calendar. By the decree dated 12. 12. 72 passed in Partition and Administration Suit No. 306 of 1971 in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta, between the aforesaid owners, demarcated southern portion of premises No. 88a, Bechu Chatterjee Street was allotted to the share of the plaintiff. The room in occupation of the defendant's father fell to the share of the plaintiff. After demise of Biswanath Sahoo, the defendant is in occupation of the room and after passing of the said decree, the defendant became a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the room in suit on the previous terms and conditions. It is the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff reasonably requires the room in suit for his own use and occupation and the defendant is a defaulter in payment of rent since November, 1968. The tenancy was determined by a combined notice to quit and the notice of the suit dated 21. 6. 74. In spite of service of the notice, the defendant has not vacated the suit room. Hence the suit. ( 3 ) THE defendant contested the suit stating that Biswanath who was a tenant under the plaintiff and his brothers in respect of the room in suit died on 26. 1. 64 leaving behind him the defendant as his son and two daughters Kamala Devi and Ramrati Devi as his heirs and legal representatives to inherit the tenancy in the suit premises and as such, the suit alone is bad for nonjoinder and/or misjoinder of parties. 1. 64 leaving behind him the defendant as his son and two daughters Kamala Devi and Ramrati Devi as his heirs and legal representatives to inherit the tenancy in the suit premises and as such, the suit alone is bad for nonjoinder and/or misjoinder of parties. It was also contended that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff does not reasonably require the disputed room for his own use and occupation. An objection was also taken to the effect that the notice to quit is not legal, valid and sufficient and it was not duly served upon the defendant and that the defendant is not a defaulter as alleged. The learned Judge found in favour of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit premises. But the learned Judge found that the defendant is not the sole tenant under the plaintiff, that he along with his two sisters became tenants under the plaintiff on the death of the defendant's father and as such, the suit is bad for nonjoinder of the two sisters Kamala Devi and Ramrati Devi as tenants. In that view of his finding, the learned Judge dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has come in appeal. ( 4 ) ONLY one point of law is involved in this appeal. As has been stated earlier, the learned Judge found that the defendant is not the sole tenant. He along with two sisters became tenants under the plaintiff on the death of the defendant's father and as such, the suit is bad for non-joinder of the two sisters. Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherji, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, contends that there is no satisfactory evidence on record to show that the defendant's father left two sisters Kamala Debi and Ramrati Debi. We have scrutinized the evidence and we are satisfied that it has been proved by the defendant that defendant's father, on his death, left the defendant and his two sisters Kamala Debi and Ramrati Debi. Mr. Mukherji then submits that the suit premises was let out for business purposes. It is not a residential premises. The defendant's father was himself carrying on business. After his death, the defendant alone continued to carry on the said business. The defendant's daughters were nowhere in the picture. Mr. Mukherji then submits that the suit premises was let out for business purposes. It is not a residential premises. The defendant's father was himself carrying on business. After his death, the defendant alone continued to carry on the said business. The defendant's daughters were nowhere in the picture. That being so, it cannot be said that the suit bad for non joinder of necessary parties. Mr. Mukherji, in support of his contention, refers to a decision, reported in (1) AIR 1978 Supreme Court 955 (Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde ). In this case, their Lordships were considering the definition of tenant in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947 ). Considering the said definition, their Lordships held that ?the tenant means a tenant in respect of residential premises and not to business premises?. It was further held that ?member of a person's family cannot get protection under the said section?. The definition of tenant is to the following effect: - ?in relation to the premises let for business, trade or storage any member of the tenant family carrying on business trade or storage with the tenant in the said premises at the time of the death of the tenant as may continue after his death, to carry on the business, trade or storage, as the case may be in the said premises and as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court?. Interpreting the above definition of tenant their Lordships held as above. We are concerned with the definition of tenant as found in section 2 (h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The definition reads as follows: - ?tenant meant any person by whom or on whose account or behalf, the rent of any premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable and includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or in the event of such person's death, such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction. ? Mr. Mukherji contends that tenant includes on tenant's death such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death. We do not agree with Mr. Mukherji. ? Mr. Mukherji contends that tenant includes on tenant's death such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death. We do not agree with Mr. Mukherji. The definition is very clear to say that a tenant is a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is payable. The definition further provides that it includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or in the event of such person's death, such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death. In our opinion, ?in the event of such person's death? refers to the person who dies after the termination of the tenancy. Tenancy is heritable and it is the ordinary law that on a tenant's death all his heirs will inherit the tenancy. Mr. Manindra Nath Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, in support of his contention that the learned Judge was right to hold that the suit was bad for non joinder of parties refers to a recent Bench decision, reported in (2) 80 C. W. N. 187 (Asha Gupta and anr. v. Sipra Dutta and Ors. ). Their Lordships have held that ?where during the pendency of a suit for eviction of the tenant governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 the tenant died and only those heirs of the tenant who were ordinarily residing with him were substituted, all the heirs of the tenant were necessary parties and ought to have been substituted. ). Their Lordships have held that ?where during the pendency of a suit for eviction of the tenant governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 the tenant died and only those heirs of the tenant who were ordinarily residing with him were substituted, all the heirs of the tenant were necessary parties and ought to have been substituted. ?their Lordships interpreting the definition of tenant under section 2 (h) of the Act found as follows: - ?when a lessor instituted a suit for eviction of a lessee on the allegation that the lease having been validly determined under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, he is entitled to recover possession from the lessee, he can succeed only on proof of valid determination of the lease so that in the suit it is as much upon to the lessee as to all his heirs and legal representatives to claim and establish that thee having been no determination of the lease their right to continue in occupation as a lessee and not merely as a statutory tenant still subsists, there is no provision in the said Act which derogates from this right of a lessee and his heirs and legal representatives. Therefore, when a tenant dies pending a suit for his eviction, all his heirs and legal representatives, in case he dies intestate become necessary parties and they are requires to be substituted in place of the deceased tenant although all such heirs and legal representatives may not have been given rights, privileges and protections of a statutory tenant under the said Act. Mr. Mukherji, in this connection refers to a decision, reported in (3) A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1745 (V. Dhanpal v. Yesodai Amal ). In this case, it has been held that ?in order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act, it is not necessary to give notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and is mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of a tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. Determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and is mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of a tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to find the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even though it has been found that there is no necessity of determination of tenancy according to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in action under any State Rent Control Act, even then the legal position is that heirs of the tenant are necessary parties. In the present case, the tenant died long before the determination of the tenancy and as such on tenant's death all his legal heirs become necessary parties. The Supreme Court cases referred to by Mr. Mukherji are , therefore, of no help to the appellant. We fully rely on the decision reported in 80 C. W. N. 187 and hold in agreement with the learned Judge that the defendant's two sisters are necessary parties and they having not been impleaded in the suit, the suit is bad for non-joinder for necessary parties. In the result, the appeal is dismissed on contest. There will be, however, no order for costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.