Baij Nath v. Bilas Rai — 1980 DIGILAW 930 (ALL)

JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - This is a plaintiff's second Appeal. 2. The suit relates to an accommodation situate in Muzaffarnagar. The plaintiffs are the owners thereof. They are thus its landlords. Under a registered deed of lease dated February 7, 1949, the predecessors of the plaintiffs let out the accommodation to the defendants for a period of three years. That lease expired on January 31, 1953. Under the lease it was open to the defendants to induct sub-tenants. They did so from time to time even after the expiry of the period of lease. Depending upon the number of sub-tenants inducted by the lessees, the plaintiffs modulated the amount of rent payable to them. In 1967 the plaintiffs sought the ejectment of the defendant-respondents-tenants from the accommodation in suit on several grounds. The grounds were that the tenants had sub-let the accommodation; that they materially altered it; that they caused damage to the property wilfully and had created nuisance and also that they had put the premises demised to them to a user different than the one for which it was so demised. 3. The defendants contested the suit on a number of grounds. They denied that they had materially altered the accommodation in any manner or had caused damage to the property. They also denied the allegation that they had put the demised premises to a user inconsistent with the purpose for which it had been let out to them or that the had created nuisance. As regards the charge of sub-letting, the defendants pleaded that the sub-tenants had been inducted by them during the period of subsistence of the deed of lease in their favour and that they had not inducted any fresh sub-tenants thereafter. In some instance according to them, the heirs of the sub-tenants were residing at the time of the suit after the death of the sub-tenants subsequent to the expiry of the period of lease. The plaintiffs, according to them knew about it and continued to accept rent from the defendants without any objection. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, as many as ten issues were framed by the trial court. These were :- "1. Whether the defendants have caused substantial damage to the property in dispute as alleged in the plaint ? 2. Whether the defendants have materially altered the property in suit as alleged in the plaint ? 3. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, as many as ten issues were framed by the trial court. These were :- "1. Whether the defendants have caused substantial damage to the property in dispute as alleged in the plaint ? 2. Whether the defendants have materially altered the property in suit as alleged in the plaint ? 3. Whether the defendants have sublet the accommodation without the consent of the plaintiffs as alleged in the plaint ? 4. Whether the defendants are using the house in suit for a purpose other than that for which it was taken ? 5. Whether the defendants have created a nuisance alleged in the plaint ? 6. Whether the plaintiffs have waived the notice ? 7. Whether the notice served upon the defendants is valid ? 8. Whether the defendants have sublet the house with the consent of the plaintiffs as alleged in para 18A of the W.S. ? 9. To what relief if any are the plaintiffs entitled ? 10. Whether the suit is barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence?" 5. After discussing the evidence on record elaborately, the trial court found in favour of the defendants on these issues. It further found that rent was due from the defendants for the period between September 19 and November 2, 1967. It amounted to a sum of Rs. 210. The trial court, consequently, dismissed the suit for the relief of the ejectment of the defendants on the grounds on which it was sought but decreed it for recovery of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 210. It may be noticed that the grounds upon which the plaintiffs sought to the ejectment of the defendants were those on which a landlord was entitled to seek ejectment of his tenant under the provisions of U.P. Act III of 1947 which applied to the premises in suit. The decree of the trial court was affirmed by the lower appellate court before which the plaintiffs took the matter in appeal. Hence, the present second appeal. 6. In the present Second Appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants has attempted to justify the plaintiff's claim for the ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises on the various grounds upon which that claim was raised at the trial. Hence, the present second appeal. 6. In the present Second Appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants has attempted to justify the plaintiff's claim for the ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises on the various grounds upon which that claim was raised at the trial. It has been argued that the finding of the courts below that the defendants had not materially altered the accommodation or caused wilful damage to the property in suit or that they had not put the demised premises to a use inconsistent with the one for which it had been let out to them and further that they had not created any nuisance was erroneous. It is difficult to accept the submission of the learned counsel in this respect. On the facts found by the trial court and which finding has been affirmed by the lower appellate court, it is obvious that the conclusion in respect of these grounds for ejectment of the defendants drawn by the courts below does not suffer from any legal infirmity. I do not find any reason to take a view different from the courts below in that regard. 7. Considerable argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of the plea that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for the ejectment of the defendants on the ground that they had sublet the accommodation even on the findings recorded by the courts below. It has been urged with some vehemence that admittedly, in some instance, the heirs of the sub-tenants, inducted during the period of subsistence of the lease, have remained in occupation of portions of the property sublet after the expiry of the period of lease, subsequent to the death of the sub-tenant in question after the year 1952. Since, proceeds the argument, the tenants did not have any right after the expiry of the period of the lease to induct sub-tenants, the continuance of these heirs in exclusive possession of the property and acceptance of rent from them by the tenants clearly established that the tenants had inducted them as sub-tenants. In any case, says the learned counsel, the legal effect of this state of affairs would be that the tenants would be deemed to have sublet the accommodation at a time when they had no right to do so and had thus made themselves liable for ejectment. In any case, says the learned counsel, the legal effect of this state of affairs would be that the tenants would be deemed to have sublet the accommodation at a time when they had no right to do so and had thus made themselves liable for ejectment. My attention was drawn to some decisions in this regard. 8. The question as to whether after the expiry of the period of lease in their favour where the possession of the tenants in a property, governed by Rent Control Act, is protected by the provisions of such Act, the terms of their tenancy became different from the ones which they had during the currency of the lease in their favour was considered by the Supreme Court in a recent decision. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal ( AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) a Bench of seven Judges of the Supreme Court went into this question in the context of the requirement or otherwise of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for sustaining a suit for the ejectment of the tenant in that situation. The Supreme Court, after review of a large number of decisions, laid down that even after the expiry of the lease in favour of the tenant under the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant continues to be so on the same terms and conditions as before until his tenancy comes to an end by filing of a suit for his ejectment. The Supreme Court, on this view, negatived the contention that before such a suit for ejectment of the tenant could be brought, his tenancy had to be terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decision seems to be that in a case where the possession of a tenant is protected under the Rent Control Act, the fact of the expiry of the period of lease in favour of the tenant would not make any difference in so far as the terms and conditions under which he was inducted as a tenant are concerned. The decision seems to be that in a case where the possession of a tenant is protected under the Rent Control Act, the fact of the expiry of the period of lease in favour of the tenant would not make any difference in so far as the terms and conditions under which he was inducted as a tenant are concerned. The decision of the Supreme Court thus appears to be a complete answer to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the acceptance of rent from the heirs of the sub-tenants by the tenants, after the death of the sub-tenants subsequent to the expiry of the period of lease in favour of the tenants, would amount to induction of sub-tenants in the premises without any right to do so. Besides, in the instant case, it is obvious from the findings recorded by the two courts below that no new person has been inducted by the tenants as a sub-tenant after the year 1952 - when the lease in their favour expired by efflux of time and further that the heirs of the original sub-tenants were continuously in occupation of the property let out to the sub-tenants and that the plaintiffs had full knowledge about it and continued to accept rent from the tenants. The plaintiffs clearly acquiesced in the situation. 9. The decision in Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar Dutta, AIR 1980 SC 226 does not run counter to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chettiar ( AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) (supra). In this case, the Supreme Court only laid down that the status of a lessee continuing in possession after the expiry of a valid lease in his favour is that of a statutory tenant and that he is neither a licencee nor a trespasser when his possession is protected by the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The Supreme Court was not called upon nor did it decide the question of the rights of such tenants in the matter of subletting etc. To quote the words of the Supreme Court, "A person remaining in occupation of premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately called a statutory tenant. In other words, he acquires the status of irremovability (see Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. case). To quote the words of the Supreme Court, "A person remaining in occupation of premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately called a statutory tenant. In other words, he acquires the status of irremovability (see Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. case). Statutory tenant being a person who enjoys the status of irremovability, would enjoy the protection of the statute until he is evicted from the premises under the enabling provisions of the statute. A statutory tenancy would, therefore, come to an end on either the surrender of premises by such a tenant or if a decree of eviction is passed against him. (See Hiralal Vallabhram v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai, (1967-3 SCR 343); ( AIR 1967 SC 1853 ). It thus clearly transpires that the appellant was a tenant and continued to be a tenant and was entitled to protect its possession by appropriate proceeding unless evicted in course of law." 10. It is noticeable that the decision in the case of Chettiar ( AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) was rendered by the Supreme Court on August 23, 1979 while that in the case of Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1980 SC 226 ) was rendered on September 14, 1979. In case the Supreme Court was inclined to make a departure from what was laid down by it in Chettiar case, it would have said so. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary to discuss now the other decisions which have been cited by the learned counsel for the parties. 11. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs.