ORDER Chandra Pal Singh, J. - 1. By this petition, the petitioner Nathusingh seeks interference of this Court with the judgment of the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain in Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1979. affirming the judgment of the Municipal Judicial Magistrate First Class. Ujjain in Criminal Trial No. 1727 of 1977 finding the accused-petitioner guilty of selling adulterated buffalo milk prohibited under section 7 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter called the Act) add sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for six months with Rs. 1000/- fine and in the alternative further rigorous imprisonment for three months under section 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act. 2. On 13-5-1977 at about 7 a.m. Satyanarayan Gupta (PW 1). the Food Inspector in the Municipal Corporation, Ujjain in the presence of David (PW 2) and one Ambaram stopped the petitioner on Engineering College Road within the limits of the Corporation and bought for him 660 ml. of buffalo milk for Rs. 1.50 so that it could be later on analysed by a Public Analyst. The petitioner passed the receipt (Ex. P. 5) in this regard. Satyanarayan Gupta (PW 1) divided this bought milk in three equal parts filling each of them in three separate clean and dried bottles and poured 18 drops of formalin in each of them. They were sealed. Necessary memoranda were prepared, One of the sealed bottles was sent to the Public Analyst and the Public Analyst vide his report contained in the document (Ex. P.10) found that buffalo milk was below standard, it being deficient both in the contents of milk fat and milk solids non fat, they being respectively 4.7 per cent and 8. 6 per cent (as against 5 per cent and 9 per cent) showing deficiency of 0.3 and 0.4 per cent respectively. On these facts when charged with and tried for selling adulterated buffalo milk prohibited under section 7(1) and made punishable under section 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act, the petitioner denied his guilt, In the defence, it was suggested that the milk sold was not buffalo mille and it was contended that there had been no compliance with - the provisions contained in sections (2) of the Act, The learned Magistrate finding the case against the petitioner provide beyond reasonable doubt, convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid, The petitioner's appeal failed. 3. 3. The first contention for the petitioner is that the milk sold was not buffalo milk but simply milk. In support of this contention, it was argued that the words 'Bhains Dhudh' in the receipt (Ex. P. 5) and the memo (Ex. P. 7) have been super-imposed, Both the Courts below did not find any force in this contention, It is purely a finding of fact based upon the evidence of Satyanarayan (PW 1), who even though a Food Inspector is a good witness. 4. The second and final contention, however, is that there was no compliance with the provisions contained in section 13(2) of the Act. 4. The second and final contention, however, is that there was no compliance with the provisions contained in section 13(2) of the Act. Section 13(2) of the Act lays down as follows :- "(2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under subsection (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the articles of food was taken, and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under section 14-A, forward, in such manner, as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or, persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory." Rule 9-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955, which is also relevant in this regard, runs as follow:- "9.A Local (Health) Authority to send report to person concerned-The Local (Health) Authority shall immediately after the institution of prosecution forward copy of the report of the result of analysis in Form III delivered to him under sub-rule of rule 7, by registered post or by hand as may be appropriate, to they person from whom the sample - of the article was taken by the Food Inspector and simultaneously also to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particular has been disclosed under section 14-A of the Act: Provided that where the sample conforms to the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder, and no prosecution is intended under sub section (2), or no action is intended under section (2-E) of section 13 of the Act, the Local (Health) Authority shall intimate the result to the vender from whom the sample has been taken and also to the person, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under section 14-A of the Act, within 10 days from the receipt of the report from the Public Analyst. 5. 5. The use of the word 'shall' in both the sub-sections and the rule is not conclusive of the matter By preponderance of authorities [For example, State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohd. ( AIR 1978 SC 933 ), R.B. Sugar Co. v. Rampur Municipality ( AIR 1965 SC 895 ), M.B. Risaldar v. C.A. Gandhi (1978-2 Cri. L.J. 1032) and Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad v. J. Murlidhar (1977-2 Cri. L.J. 1634)] and only because the word 'shall' has been used in a rule it does not become mandatory, (or imperative) the rule still may be directory. The Supreme Court in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad ( AIR 1962 SC 1694 ) came to observe as follows:- "The question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specific provision which, for instance, sets out the consequences of the omission to observe the requirement', but on the purpose for which the requirement has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provision of the Act and the general scheme-thereof. It would, inter alia, depend on whether the requirement is insisted on as a protection for the safeguarding of the right of liberty of person or of property which the action might involve. The employment of the auxiliary verb 'shall' is inconclusive and similarly the mere absence of the imperative is not conclusive either." In R.B. Sugar Co. v. Rampur Municipality, (supra) the Supreme Court came to observe as follows: "The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it, appears' mandatory inasmuch as it uses the word 'shall' or is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion weather a particular provision is mandatory or directory"• Similarly the Gujarat High Court in M.B. Risaldar v. C.A. Gandhi (supra) while interpreting the fore runner of the rule in question came to observe as follows ;- "The provisions of R. 9(1) of the rules with regard to the manner in which a copy of the report of the Public Analyst is to be sent to the person from whom the sample is taken, cannot be said to be mandatory despite the use of the word 'shall' in It. In order to place a proper construction, it is necessary to find out the consequences which the statute bas laid down as a result of noncompliance with the direction. The consequence may be penal, the consequence may be that a particular order is passed is invalidated, the consequence may' be that a particular obligation is imposed, or the consequence may be not stated in the law at all When no consequence is apparent in the law it is reasonable to take the view that although the legislature has med the expression 'shall' it may be construed as directory or procedural rather than mandatory in the strict sense of the term. The legislature may be anxious that a particular procedure may be followed. Rule 9(j) lays down no penalty for its non-compliance. When a statute requires that a thing should be done in a prescribed manner or form but does not set out the consequences of non-compliance, it is reasonable to construe the same as directory." 6. But in the present case there was no compliance with the provisions contained in the section and in the statutory rule at all. Simply because in this case the prosecution had been launched on 8-8-77 and the petitioner had been ordered to appear before the trial Court conditional upon his furnishing solvent security in a sum of Rs. But in the present case there was no compliance with the provisions contained in the section and in the statutory rule at all. Simply because in this case the prosecution had been launched on 8-8-77 and the petitioner had been ordered to appear before the trial Court conditional upon his furnishing solvent security in a sum of Rs. 2,000 and the warrant had been served upon him on 29-8-77, it cannot be inferred that there had been compliance with the provisions contained in section 13(2) of the Act or the rule in question. So also, if the petitioner had remained absent on 7-9-77 even intentionally his mere absence would not imply the discharging of duty cast upon the Food Inspector by tile term, of section 13(2) or rule 9-A. In this cases of Babulal v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1971 SC 1977 ) relied upon by the trial Court and Ajitprasad v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1972 SC 1631 ) relied upon by the learned Judge of the appellate Court, their lordships were not interpreting the present section 13(2) as such which after the Amendment Act No.34 of 1976 is substantially different and was in operative when the alleged offences in those cases had taken place. Moreover, in those cases and in also other cases- Jairam v. State of M.P. (1977 JLJ 782) and Hemchand v. State of M.P. (1978 MPLJ Short Note 50), there was substantial compliance with the terms of the section. 'Where a person is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden'. When a duty is cast upon a public servant to do a particular thing in a specified manner that duty has to be done in that manner or not at all. (See generally Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (AIR 1936 Privy Council 253(2) though it was a case regarding the exercising of powers by a Magistrate while recording a confession.) 7. (See generally Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (AIR 1936 Privy Council 253(2) though it was a case regarding the exercising of powers by a Magistrate while recording a confession.) 7. In the case of Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad v. J. Murlidhar [1977(2) Cri LJ 1634] where there was non-compliance with the rule 9(j), the forerunner of the rule 9-A now in its modified form, their Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had upheld the acquittal of the accused in that case on that account Our High Court also in Shivlal v. State (Criminal Revision No. 92 of 1979 decided on 8-2-1980) per P.D. Mulye J. and in Kanwarlal S/o Bheru v. State of M.P. (Criminal Revision No. 91 of 1979 decided on 20-2-1980) per S.R. Vyas, J. holding the provisions mandatory, acquitted the petitioners in those cases. In these circumstances there being no evidence that the provisions contained in section 13(2) of the Act and rule 9-A of the Rules had been complied with, the conviction of the petitioner under section 7(1) of the Act and the sentence awarded to him under section 16(1) (a) (i) of the Act are bad in law. 8. In consequence, the revision petition is allowed. The conviction and the sentence of the petitioner are set aside. His personal and ball bonds shall cease to be binding on him.