JUDGMENT : P.K. Mohanti, J. - This appeal has been preferred under the following circumstances: In Title suit No. 128 of 1960, the Respondents obtained a decree for recovery of possession and permanent injunction against the Appellant. The decree was passed on 26-11-1965 and it was confirmed by this Court on 3-12-1973 in Second Appeal No. 204 of 1970. The Respondents levied execution of the decree in Execution Case No. 42 of 1974 before the Munsif, Balasore. The Appellant judgment debtor filed an objection u/s 47, CPC which was registered as Misc. Case No. 87 of 1975. The objection was that the estate comprising the land in dispute had vested in the State Government under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act by virtue of the Government notification No. 27478 dated 27.4.1963 published in the Orissa Gazette dated 27.4.1963 and that on an application u/s 8-A of the said Act, the land in dispute had been settled with the Appellant by the Estates Abolition Collector by his order dated 15-9-1964 passed in Rent Fixation Case No. 2133 of 1963-64. It was contended that after the vesting the Respondents-decree-holders ceased to have any subsisting interest in the land and were not entitled to recover possession of the same. The objection found favour with the Executing Court. On appeal, the lower appellate Court repelled the objection on the grounds (1) that the Appellant-judgment-debtor at no stage of the litigation had put forward the claim that the land in dispute had been settled in his favour under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act; and (2) that the alleged settlement was invalid since there was no service of notice as required by law and the order of settlement did not contain the signature of the Estates Abolition Collector. Agrieved by the appellate order, the Appellant has come up in Second Appeal. It is urged on behalf of the Respondents that the land in dispute is not an estate and it has not vested in the State Government. 2. Admittedly, the land in dispute is Brahmottar Bahel land. The Appellant's specific case was that the land had vested in the State Government by virtue of the Government notification issued u/s 3-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. This was not denied in the counter filed by the Respondents before the Executing Court. 2. Admittedly, the land in dispute is Brahmottar Bahel land. The Appellant's specific case was that the land had vested in the State Government by virtue of the Government notification issued u/s 3-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. This was not denied in the counter filed by the Respondents before the Executing Court. The Executing Court also observed in paragraph 3 of its order that the Respondents did not challenge the settlement of the land in favour of the Appellant in the above mentioned rent fixation case, but their contention was that the Appellant obtained the settlement acting as a trustee on their behalf. Dalziel's Settlement Report reveals that Brahmottar is a revenue free estate and such estates in the district of Balasore are known by their General Numbers. The numbering of the Khewats was in the serial order of the General Number. In the present case the decree under execution was in respect of "General No. 15507, Brahmottar Bahel, 2nd part Khewat, Khata No. 21, Plot No. 82 with an area of 0.42 acre and plot No. 91 with an area of 1.27 acres." There can, therefore, be no doubt that the land in dispute was an estate and it vested in the State Government by Government notification dated 27-4-1963 which was duly published in the Orissa Gazette. 3. Section 5 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act expressly provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, on the publication of the notification in the Gazette u/s 3-A of the Act the entire estate shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the intermediary shall cease to have any interest in such an estate other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act. All these consequences, therefore, ensued with effect from the date of publication of the notification. The decree for possession thus lost its efficacy by virtue of the express provisions of the Act referred to above and it was rendered incapable of execution by operation of the law and the Respondents were divested of their proprietary right over the land in dispute. The decree for possession thus lost its efficacy by virtue of the express provisions of the Act referred to above and it was rendered incapable of execution by operation of the law and the Respondents were divested of their proprietary right over the land in dispute. The right accrued to the Respondents under the decree by virtue of their proprietary right would not, under the scheme of the Act, prevail over the statutory consequences following the vesting of estate in the State Government and would be lost to the proprietor In the case of Haji Sk. Subhan Vs. Madhorao, the Respondent filed a suit for possession of certain lands and based his claim on his proprietary right. The suit was decreed and the decree was upheld by the High Court by its order dated 20th April, 1951. Between the closing of the arguments in the appeal before the High Court, sometime before March 31, 1951, and the delivery of judgment on April 20, 1951, the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (M.P. Act No. 1 of 1951) came into force. This fact was not brought to the notice of the High Court. The Respondent-decree-holder filed execution application for the recovery of costs and delivery of possession on July 23, 1951. On August 31, 1951 the Appellant filed an objection to the application for delivery of possession on the ground that the Respondent-decree-holder had no right to recover possession as he lost his proprietary rights to the lands and the Appellant had acquired rights to occupy them under the M.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 subsequent to the confirmation of the decree for possession by the High Court. Their Lordships held that the proprietary rights in the estate vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances as a consequence of vesting and that no person could acquire any right over the land under a decree passed in his favour subsequent to the vesting of the estate on the notified date and that, therefore, the Respondent did not acquire the right to possess the land under the decree in his favour. In the case of Sri Vidya Sagar Vs. Smt. Sudesh Kumari and Others the Plaintiff and Defendants 5 and 6 were co-sharers in proprietary interest of certain lands. In the case of Sri Vidya Sagar Vs. Smt. Sudesh Kumari and Others the Plaintiff and Defendants 5 and 6 were co-sharers in proprietary interest of certain lands. The Defendants 5 and 6 sold a certain share of the land in favour of Defendants 1 to 4. The Plaintiff thereupon filed a suit for pre-emption and obtained a decree which was confirmed by the High Court in Second Appeal on 27th April, 1970. The Plaintiff also deposited the consideration of the sale deed in Court on August 20, 1969, as ordered. The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 was brought into force in the district where the property was situated with effect from July 1, 1970. The Plaintiff then filed an execution case for delivery of possession after the enforcement of the Act in the area. An objection was taken by the judgment-debtors u/s 47, CPC that the decree had become inexecutable to view of the provisions of the Act. Their Lordships held that since all rights and title in the proprietary land ceased to exist and vested in the State, the decree to that extent became devoid of substance in as much as the proprietary interests with regard to which alone the decree was passed had vested in the State and nothing survived in favour of the erstwhile proprietors. It was observed that the Plaintiff could execute the decree for delivery of possession only on the basis that he had the proprietary right in the land on the basis of which, as a co-sharer therein, he had obtained the decree of pre-emption and since there was vesting of the property under the Act and emergence of a new species of property, which was not even the subject-matter of the decree, the decree became incapable of execution. 4. It was next contended on behalf of the Respondents that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree and has to execute it as it stands. In my opinion, this principle is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is true that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to construe the decree and find out the true effect thereof. The objection of the Appellant is not with respect to the invalidity of the decree or with respect to the decree being wrong. It is true that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to construe the decree and find out the true effect thereof. The objection of the Appellant is not with respect to the invalidity of the decree or with respect to the decree being wrong. His objection is based on the effect of the provisions of the Act which has deprived the Respondents of their proprietary rights including the right to recover possession over the land in suit. In these circumstances, the Executing Court can refuse to execute the decree as it has become inexecutable on account of the change in law and its effect. I am fortified in this view by the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Haji Sk. Subhan Vs. Madhorao referred to above - vide paragraph 39. 5. One of the grounds taken by the Appellate Court in repelling the objection u/s 47, CPC was that the settlement of the land in favour of the Appellant was invalid since there was no service of notice as required by la wand the order of settlement did not contain the signature of the Estates Abolition Collector. No such objection was, however, taken in the counter filed by the Respondents before the Executing Court. Be that as it may, the question whether the land has been settled with the Appellant or not is immaterial. The fact remains that the Respondents have ceased to have any subsisting interest in the land and hence they are not entitled to recover possession by virtue of the decree under execution. 6. In the premises aforesaid, the appeal is allowed, the decision of the Appellate Court being reversed and that of the Executing Court being restored. It is made clear that the decree for recovery of possession is incapable of execution. The execution case shall, however, proceed for realisation of the amount of costs decreed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed