ORDER R.S. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation dismissing the review petition and allotting four chaks to the petitioner. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that the Asstt. Consolidation Officer proposed different chaks to the different tenure-holders. The petitioner being dissatisfied to the proposed chaks, filed an objection which was disposed of by the Consolidation officer allotting him three chaks. The order of the consolidation officer was affirmed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation in appeal filed by the petitioner. The petitioner preferred a revision against the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The main grievance of the petitioner was that he had more than 71 annas worth bara land on plot No. 507 etc., but he has been given a chak of only 51 annas there. He claimed more bara land at this place. Further he claimed that 3 chaks allotted to him be reduced to one or at the most two chaks. The Dy. Director of Consolidation on scrutiny found that the applicant had 79.50 annas worth bara land but has received 51.03 annas bara land there. Therefore, he allotted him an area worth 28 annas by carving out from the land allotted to chak holder no. 175 with the object to increase bara land to the petitioner. But the result of the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation was that the petitioner's chak was increased and instead of three, he was allowed to have 4 chaks. It appears that while giving more bard land to the petitioner, the Dy. Director of Consolidation overlooked the other aspect of the case, that the chak of the petitioner will be increased. Therefore, when the Petitioner preferred a review and when this fact was brought to the notice of the Deputy Director of Consolidation he realised the mistake and by his order dated 29-6-1970, adjusted the chaks of the petitioner in such a way that the petitioner was allowed to have only 3 chaks. The contesting respondents being aggrieved by this order, filed a restoration application against the order passed in review. The order was recalled and after hearing both the parties, by order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation dated 7-8-1972, the review petition was rejected as not maintainable. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders before this Court by this writ petition. 3. The order was recalled and after hearing both the parties, by order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation dated 7-8-1972, the review petition was rejected as not maintainable. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders before this Court by this writ petition. 3. An objection was raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petition has been filed highly belated as the petitioner knew fully well that the review petition is not maintainable. Therefore, he is not entitled for exclusion of the time spent in conducting the review petition. He placed reliance on Manhoo Mal v. Muloo, ( AIR 1964 All 213 ) : (1963) All LJ 731) (FB), wherein it has been held that where a review petition has been dismissed by the Board of Revenue, the only order passed in review can be considered in the writ petition as the previous order of the Board of Revenue was not challenged within 90 days. Shiv Behari Sharma v. Addl. District Judge, Kanpur, ((1978) 4 All LR 142 (1978 All LJ 1386)) is a case arising out of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, wherein it has been held that there is no provision for review under this Act. Therefore, the order rejecting the review application cannot be challenged in writ petition. Moreover, two different orders cannot be challenged in one and the same writ petition. Normally, writ petition is filed within 90 days of the impugned order and the applicant was held to be guilty of latches or undue delay. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of Smt. Lachmana v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (1966 Rev Dec 419) wherein the division bench of this court has taken a view that the Dy. Director of Consolidation has inherent jurisdiction to review its order, the petitioner was led away and availed the remedy of the review before the Dy. Director of Consolidation. 5. The Consolidation of Holdings Act has made no provision for review. This view has been taken in number of decisions of this Court, that the Dy. Director of Consolidation has no power of review, but from the facts of this case, it appears that on the basis of wrong advice, the petitioner filed a review petition. Director of Consolidation. 5. The Consolidation of Holdings Act has made no provision for review. This view has been taken in number of decisions of this Court, that the Dy. Director of Consolidation has no power of review, but from the facts of this case, it appears that on the basis of wrong advice, the petitioner filed a review petition. Moreover, the petition has been admitted and after a lapse of several years, it would not be in the interest of justice to reject the claim of the petitioner on this ground. Therefore, I overrule the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. 6. Now coming to the merits of the case, this fact is clear that the Dy. Director of Consolidation has allowed four chaks to the petitioner. The Consolidation of Holdings Act has been enacted with the main object to consolidate scattered holdings of tenure-holders. Section 19 of the Act has been enacted to carry out that object. 7. In Bajai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1970 All WR (HC) 305) it has been held that:- "The provision of Section 19 (i)(e) clearly means that compactness of the area is the primary consideration. In deed, this is the whole object of consolidation under the Act. In carrying out this object of compactness the largest part of holding of a tenure-holder should be located "as far as possible", where the largest part of his holding originally lay. In other words, the second requirement of location has to be linked up with compactness. The proviso clearly shows that the principle that no tenure holder should be given more than 3 chaks must prevail over the requirement mentioned earlier unless there is approval in writing given by the Dy. Director of Consolidation. This implies that the approval will be given only in exceptional cases. Writing must, therefore, indicate why a case is exceptional so as to condone violation of the prohibition. The proviso merely clarifies and specifies the limits within which the primary and basic principle of compactness could be sacrificed in the interests of a far location of plots." 8. In the instant case, it appears that while giving one relief to the petitioner by providing more bara land, the Dy. Director of Consolidation forgot this fact that his order will be increasing his chaks. In the instant case, it appears that while giving one relief to the petitioner by providing more bara land, the Dy. Director of Consolidation forgot this fact that his order will be increasing his chaks. That is why, when review petition was filed, he rectified his mistake and amended his order in such a way that the petitioner's chaks were not increased. But ultimately, the order passed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation was recalled by him and review petition was dismissed, as not maintainable. Nevertheless, this fact is clear from his judgment that no reason has been assigned by him, no ground what to talk of special ground has been assigned for increasing the petitioner's chaks. Therefore, the order passed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation is in clear violation of Section 19. 9. In view of what has been discussed above the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained in law and it deserves to be quashed. 10. In the result, I allow this writ petition and quash the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation and direct him to decide the case afresh according to law and in the light of the observations made above. However, in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.