ORDER K.N. Goyal, J. - This writ petition arises out of consolidation proceedings. In the basic year Khatauni the petitioners as well as the opposite parties were recorded as co-tenure holders. The opposite parties preferred an objection against the entry of the names of the petitioners. The parties are collaterals, being descendants of a common ancestor Pooran who had three sons, namely, Misri, Gangai and Shanker. The petitioners are legal representatives of Shanker while the opposite parties belonged to the branches of Misri and Gangai. The contention of the opposite parties was that the land had been acquired only by Misri and Gangai and not by Shanker. Two lease deeds executed in 1919-1920 were also produced by the opposite parties showing the names of Misri and Gangai only to the exclusion of the name of Shanker, as lessees. The claim of the petitioners that Misri and Gangai had acquired the land in representative capacity was rejected by all the consolidation authorities, who held that there was no likelihood of the exclusion of the name of adult brother of 27 years of age when the land being acquired not in the name of the eldest brother alone but in the names of two other members. Shanker was about 27 years of age at the time the land was acquired. Gangai had no son. After his death his widow Smt. Pachai's name was recorded. His daughters had either died or had married. It has further been held by the consolidation authorities that Shanker had died during the life time of Smt. Pachai and that the name of Shanker's sons namely, the original petitioners Parmeshwari Din, Satya Narain and Ram Bali, were mutated after Smt. Pachais death. This mutation order is dated 24-5-58. Thus from 1365 Fasli the names of the petitioners continued to be recorded in the Khatauni right up to the basic year viz., 1373 Fasli, the village having been notified for consolidation operations on 19th, July, 1965. 2. While the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation as appellate Court took the view that the petitioners were in possession and had continued as such without any objection by the opposite parties right from 1363 Fasli (this appears to be inadvertently mentioned in shead of 1365 Fasli) and accordingly he allowed the petitioners ? 2. While the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation as appellate Court took the view that the petitioners were in possession and had continued as such without any objection by the opposite parties right from 1363 Fasli (this appears to be inadvertently mentioned in shead of 1365 Fasli) and accordingly he allowed the petitioners ? share, the Deputy Director of Consolidation on revision held that as the petitioners or their father had not participated in the joint acquisition of land, they could not get any right as they were not legal heirs of Smt. Pachai. 3. The findings with regard to the sequence of deaths of persons mentioned above and also with regard to the acquisition of land by Misri and Gangai to the exclusion of Shanker could not be seriously assailed before me and must be accepted to be correct. No manifest error could be pointed out in these findings and they cannot be interfered with in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The only question seriously canvassed before me is that on the findings as recorded by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation, the petitioners claim should have been upheld on the basis of estoppel and acquiescence. Two questions arise in this connection. The first is whether co-tenancy rights in Sirdari holding can be acquired by estoppel and acquiescence. The second contention raised on behalf of the opposite parties is that this plea should not be entertained as it was not pleaded before the Consolidation authorities. 4. Taking the second question first it is no doubt well settled that in a civil suit no amount of evidence can be looked into in respect of a matter not pleaded. It is also well settled that estoppel and acquiescence should be specifically pleaded. But these rules are not strictly applied in consolidation proceedings. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court in Pritam Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation (1978 RD (HC) 327) : (1978 All LJ 186) that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to consolidation proceedings. But these rules are not strictly applied in consolidation proceedings. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court in Pritam Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation (1978 RD (HC) 327) : (1978 All LJ 186) that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to consolidation proceedings. Their Lordships observed in para 15 of (R.D.): (para 23 of All LJ) of the report that where a comprehensive issue was framed in the following terms namely; "what are the rights and title of the recorded tenant in Khata No. 3", all aspects of the matter, including the question of abandonment, although not specifically pleaded can be considered by the consolidation authorities. In the instant case the issue No. 2 framed by the consolidation officer was whether petitioners were co-tenure holders in the Khata in dispute. The frame of this issue is equally comprehensive. Thus, if on the facts brought on the record the question of estoppel and acquiescence can be raised, the consolidation authorities cannot refuse to entertain the same. It further appears that the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation while deciding the appeal did refer to the relevant circumstances namely, the petitioner's possession and non-objection by the opposite parties to the mutation of the petitioners names after Smt. Pachai's death. As the relevant questions had been raised and only the application of law was required, it will not be proper to shut out the plea of estoppel and acquiescence merely on the ground of absence of specific plea in that behalf, having regard to the fact that we are dealing with consolidation proceedings and not with a Civil Suit. 5. On the question, whether co-tenancy rights can be acquired in a Sirdari holding by estoppel and acquiescence, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Gaya Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation" ((1976) 2 ALR 618): (1977 All LJ 7) in which a Division Bench of this Court held that co-tenancy rights could be acquired in an ex-prorietary holding which under the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, was not transferable. In taking this view, their Lordships approved the view taken by Gangeshwar Prasad, J., in Dudh Nath v. Smt. Dharrajja (1964 RD 324). In that case co-tenancy rights in relation to occupancy tenancy under the U.P. Tenancy Act, though non-transferable, were held to be capable being acquired by estoppel and acquiescence. In taking this view, their Lordships approved the view taken by Gangeshwar Prasad, J., in Dudh Nath v. Smt. Dharrajja (1964 RD 324). In that case co-tenancy rights in relation to occupancy tenancy under the U.P. Tenancy Act, though non-transferable, were held to be capable being acquired by estoppel and acquiescence. It was further held that sirdari rights can consequentially be acquired under Section 19 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act by a person who had acquired co-tenancy right by estoppel and acquiescence in respect of an occupancy holding. Learned Counsel for the respondents has relied on Kalawati v. Consolidation Officer (1968 All LJ 126). In this decision the learned single Judge noted that the position under the U.P. Tenancy Act was well settled; a person could become a co-tenant by estoppel and acquiescence. His Lordship added that under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, however, transfer of a sirdari holding was not merely prohibited by Section 153, just as transfer of an occupancy tenancy holding was prohibited under the U.P. Tenancy Act but the interest of a sirdar on the execution of a transfer by him became extinguished under Section 190 (1) (cc) of U.P. Act, No. 1 of 1957. This clause (cc) was however brought on the statute book by U.P. Act No. 37 of 1958 on 9-11-1958. It is well settled that this clause is not retrospective. If, therefore, rights had been acquired by estoppel and acquiescence before 7-11-1958, then the subsequent enactment of clause (cc) cannot have the effect of taking away these rights. In the instant case the mutation order is said to have been passed earlier. 6. Mere mutation order cannot, however, confer rights on the petitioners if the mutation order is shown to be clearly incorrect and if it had not been actually acted upon. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not recorded any finding on the question of possession, either affirming or disagreeing with the finding of the A.S.O.C., on this point. The matter is, therefore, to be decided afresh by the revisional authority. 7. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not recorded any finding on the question of possession, either affirming or disagreeing with the finding of the A.S.O.C., on this point. The matter is, therefore, to be decided afresh by the revisional authority. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondents has pointed out that the petitioners had not filed any appeal against the part of the order of the Consolidation Officer which went against them, and as such to the extent that the Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation has disallowed the petitioner's claim, the petitioners cannot be allowed to reagitate the matter. This is undoubtedly correct, and it will be for the Deputy Director of Consolidation to consider the case after taking the same into account. 8. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation Annexure-4 is hereby quashed. The Deputy Director of Consolidation shall readmit the revision at its original number and decide it afresh in accordance with law. No order as to costs.