JUDGMENT - FACTS: - The petitioners-tenants occupied a part of the building originally owned by the husband of the respondent who had executed a will on 31-1-1944 bequeathing the house to the respondent. On the death of the husband in 1949, the respondent became the full owner of the property. The will obliged the respondent to give education to Ramanlal her son who at the time of the will was only 10 years old. The respondent was also directed by her testator husband that she should get him married. There-after the will proceeded to give the following direction:- “If he desires to do independent business Rs. 10,000 should be paid to him as capital for his business.” The respondent filed a suit, against the petitioners for possession of the suit premises on various grounds. In so far as the ground under section 13(1), (g), Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 which prevailed in the final Court of fact, it was the case of the respondent as set out in the plaint and as deposed to by Ramanlal, her son, in the Court of first instance that the suit premises were required for the expanding business of Ramanlal who had in his possession small premises regarded as insufficient by him for the expanding business. The trial Court by its judgment and order dated 16th November, 1976 dismissed the respondents suit for possession holding that the respondent had failed to prove that there was on her part bonafide or reasonable requirement of the suit premises for her own use and occupation. While coming to this conclusion the trial Judge took into consideration the accommodation that was available to Ramanlal for his business. The trial Judge also held that greater hardship would be caused to the petitioners if a decree for possession were passed. This decision of the trial Judge was challenged by the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1977 which was heard and partly allowed by the 2nd Extra Joint Judge of Pune by his judgment and order dated 20th April 1979. It had been contended before the appellate Judge that the requirement of the suit premises for the expanding business of Ramanlal was not tantamount to the requirement of the same by the respondent who is the landlady of the suit premises. It had been contended before the appellate Judge that the requirement of the suit premises for the expanding business of Ramanlal was not tantamount to the requirement of the same by the respondent who is the landlady of the suit premises. The respondent herself had not stepped into the witness-box in the trial Court and thus there was an infirmity in the evidence led on behalf of the respondent. The infirmity was sought to be corrected to some extent at least by examining Ramanlal himself for whose benefit ultimately the possession of the suit premises was being sought. The 2nd Extra Joint Judge, after considering the authorities which were cited before him and after examining the provisions of section 13(1), (g) of the Bombay Rent Act, formed an opinion that the requirement of the suit premises for the business of the son was covered by the said legal provision. On facts he differed with the trial Judge and came to the conclusion that the premises which were in the occupation of Ramanlal were insufficient for his expanding business. While weighing comparative hardship that would be caused to the parties he came to the conclusion that the hardship that would be caused to the petitioners could be reduced by passing a decree for part only of the premises. This he did under the second part of sub-section(2) of section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act. Aggrieved by the afore: said decision of the appellate Judge the petitioners approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. JAHAGIRDARR. A., J.: - Having in paragraphs 1 to 20 referred to the facts and considered the following decisions, 47 BLR 825, Institute of Radio Technology v. Pandarang Baburao A.I.R. 1953 Nag. 144, Balbhadra Beharilal v. Premchand Lalchand. A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 22, Shankarlal Shionarayan Rathi v. Addl. Deputy Commissioner. A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 51, V. M. Deshmukh v. K. M. Kothari. A.I.R. 1955 Patna 496, Bidubhusan Sen v. Commissioner of Patna Division.(1967) VIII Gujrat Law Reporter 620, Mohanlal Narottamdas v. Bechardas. Civil Revision Application No. 751 of 1950 decided on 23-11-1950 by Chagla C. J. Jayantilal Muljibhai v. Ochhelal Vithaldas Parikh and A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2368, Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Tolwala, the Judgment proceeds:-] 21. A.I.R. 1955 Patna 496, Bidubhusan Sen v. Commissioner of Patna Division.(1967) VIII Gujrat Law Reporter 620, Mohanlal Narottamdas v. Bechardas. Civil Revision Application No. 751 of 1950 decided on 23-11-1950 by Chagla C. J. Jayantilal Muljibhai v. Ochhelal Vithaldas Parikh and A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2368, Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Tolwala, the Judgment proceeds:-] 21. I must now proceed to enumerate the propositions which can be said to have been established by the various decisions which I have taken the opportunity of reviewing so far: (1) The requirement mentioned in section 13(1), (g) must be the requirement by the landlord and not the requirement by somebody else. (2) The words “for occupation by himself” do not restrict the pro- posed occupation to the occupation of landlord aione but may include the occupation by members of his family. * (3) When there is a dependant of the landlord the requirement for his occupation may be the requirement by the landlord. (4) In a given case members of the family of the landlord may not be joint in residence but the condition of the requirement for occupation by himself is satisfied if the members are joint in estate. (5) In a given case the landlord may be dependent upon a person for whose use and occupation the premises are sought to be recovered. In such a case the condition in section 13(1), (g> can be said to be satis- fied if it could be shown that it was necessary for the landlord that the other person should occupy the premises. Implicit in this proposition is the case of an old person requiring the presence of some person in or near the premises which is occupied. (6) Even if emotionally the landlord feels that a relation of his, such as his daughter or son-in-law, should stay with him, it can be regarded as the requirement by the landlord of the premises for occupation by himself. (7) In case of non-residential premises if the landlords interests are shown to be linked with the occupation of those premises by some one for whom he is seeking the possession of the suit premises such as a partner, then it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for occu- pation by himself is established within the meaning of section 13(1), (g). (1), (8) If there is a nomral or legal obligation on the landlord to provide accommodation to a particular person then the requirement by the landlord for occupation of that person may squarely fall under section. 13(1), (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. 22. Underlying the above propositions is the basic fact that the requirement is by the landlord and not by somebody else on his behalf. It may be the requirement for somebody else but not by somebody else. In all cases-the requirement must be by the landlord himself. It is also implicit in the-above propositions which have emerged from the examination of the various, cases that there must be a nexus between the interests of the landlord and the occupation of the premises by himself or by somebody else. If there is. no nexus of the interests of the landlord with the occupation of the premises, then the condition mentioned in section 13(1), (g) cannot be said to have-been fulfilled. Section 13(1), (g) says that the premises must be reasonably and bom fide required by the landlord. The bona fide requirement is in the first place a state of mind though it may be something more. It must, therefore, be deposed lo by the person who is requiring the premises under section 13(1), (g) namely, the landlord. If the landlord does not step into the witness-box to bring before the Court legal evidence for proving his requirement, then it cannot be said that he reasonably and bona fide required the premises as mentioned in section 13(I), (g). The landlord can delegate the authority to .conduct a case but foe cannot delegate the duty to depose. 23. While examining the rival contentions of the parties, I have mentioned in sufficient details the evidence that has come on record in this case. However, it would be useful if I enumerate again the facts which have been established. The respondent, who is the landlady, has not been examined in support of her case nor has she been examined as a witness on commission. On this ground alone the suit of the respondent ought to have been dismissed because the bonafide requirement which, as I have mentioned above, is a state of mind and something more must be proved in this case. On this ground alone the suit of the respondent ought to have been dismissed because the bonafide requirement which, as I have mentioned above, is a state of mind and something more must be proved in this case. Ramanlal, the respondents son, is said to be her constituted attorney but that could only be for the purpose of conducting the case but his evidence cannot be substituted for the legal evidence of the landlady herself. 24. Even if the material which has been brought on record by the examination of Ramanlal in support of the respondents case is considered, it does not show that: (a) the respondent is a dependent on Ramanlal or on his business or that Ramanlal is depending on the respondent for his livelihood or on any part of her income; (b) any inter-relationship between the interests of the respondent and the occupation of the suit premises by Ramanlal exists; (c) that there is any obligation on the part of the respondent to provide accommodation to Ramanlal(the will at the. most speaks of provision off certain monetary assistance). Considering all the facts and circumstances which have been brought on record in legal evidence I am satisfied that the case of the respondent does not fall under one or the other of propositions enumerated by me above. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the respondent has failed to prove the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the suit premises for occupation by herself or for any other person within the meaning of section 13(1) {g) of the Bombay Rent Act. Therefore, the suit will have to be dismissed. 25. In view of the fact that the suit is liable to be dismissed, it becomes unnecessary to refer to the question of comparative hardship. If, however, that question is to be decided, I am inclined to agree with the finding of the learned appellate Judge who has by decreeing the suit for part of the premises only struck a just balance between the hardship that may be caused to Ramanlal and to the petitioners. 26. In the result, this petition must succeed. If, however, that question is to be decided, I am inclined to agree with the finding of the learned appellate Judge who has by decreeing the suit for part of the premises only struck a just balance between the hardship that may be caused to Ramanlal and to the petitioners. 26. In the result, this petition must succeed. The decree passed by the learned 2nd Extra Joint Judge of Pune in Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1977 is set aside and the decree passed by the Additional Judge of the Court of Small Causes in Regular Civil Suit No. 3146 of 1974 is restored. On the facts and circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs in all the Courts. Petition allowed. ------