JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners claim relief for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing order of the Chancellor of the University of Allahabad dated October 6, 1979, and also for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Executive Council of the University of Allahabad to refrain from considering the report of the Selection Committee dated February 24, 1979, making recommendation for the appointment to the post of Reader in the Department of Physics. 2. Dr A.N. Bishnoi and Dr. S.N. Srivastava, the two petitioners, are employed as Lecturers in the Department of Physics in the University of Allahabad. On 14-1-1978 an advertisement was issued by the University of Allahabad, hereinafter referred to as the University, inviting applications for appointment to one permanent post of Reader in the Department of Physics. The petitioners and many others made applications for the same. A Selection Committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act, held the selection on February 24, 1979, and made its recommendation to the Executive Council. The Executive Council, however, failed to consider the recommendations within the requisite period of four months from the date of the meeting of the Selection Committee. A meeting of the Executive Council was convened for September 10, 1979, for considering the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Before the Executive Council could meet the petitioners filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the Executive Councils jurisdiction to consider the recommendation of the Selection Committee on the ground that on the expiry of four months period from the date of the Selection Committee meeting the Executive Council had ceased to have any authority to consider the same, instead it could be considered by the Chancellor only as contemplated by the proviso to Section 31 (8) (a) of the Act. On 6-9-1979, a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition in limine on the ground of its being premature with an observation that the Executive Council is constituted of responsible members who will consider the provisions of Section 31 (8) (a) while considering the recommendations of the Selection Committee. The Executive Council met on 10th September, 1979, but this matter was not considered, ultimately the Executive Council considered the matter on 27th September, 1979. The Executive Council met on 10th September, 1979, but this matter was not considered, ultimately the Executive Council considered the matter on 27th September, 1979. The Executive Council adopted a resolution referring the matter to the Chancellor with a request that the former may permit the latter to consider the recommendation of the Selection Committee and to make appointments. The Chancellor by his order dated 6th October, 1979, directed the Executive Council to consider the recommendation of the Selection Committee and to take a decision in the matter. A meeting of the Executive Council of the University was convened for October 27, 1979, to consider the report of the Selection Committee. But before the Executive Council could consider the report of the Selection Committee and take a final decision in the matter, the petitioners again approached this Court by means of this petition challenging the order of the Chancellor dated 6th October, 1979, and obtained a stay order: 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that after the expiry of four month's period the Executive Council has no jurisdiction to consider the recommendation of the Selection Committee, instead the Chancellor alone is empowered under the Act to consider the recommendation of the Selection Committee. The Chancellor has no jurisdiction to refer back the matter to the Executive Council. Section 31 of the Act provides for appointment of a teacher of the University. According to the provisions contained therein the Executive Council of the University is the appropriate authority to appoint a teacher on the recommendation of the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee is constituted in accordance with section 31 (4) of the Act. Section 31 (8) (a) provides for consideration of the recommendation by the Executive Council. It reads as under: "31 (8) (a). In the case of appointment of a teacher of the University, if the Executive Council does not agree with the recommendation made by the Selection Committee, the Executive Council shall refer the matter to the Chancellor along with the reasons of such disagreement, and his decision shall be final. Provided that if the Executive Council does not take a decision on the recommendations of the Selection Committee within a period of four months from the date of the meeting of such Committee, then also the matter shall stand referred to the Chancellor, and his decision shall be final", 4. Provided that if the Executive Council does not take a decision on the recommendations of the Selection Committee within a period of four months from the date of the meeting of such Committee, then also the matter shall stand referred to the Chancellor, and his decision shall be final", 4. The recommendation of the Selection Committee is required to be considered by the Executive Council and if the Executive Council does not agree with the recommendation made by the Selection Committee, it has to refer the matter to the Chancellor along with reasons of such disagreement, whereupon the Chancellors decision shall be final. The proviso to sub-section (8) (a) further lays down that if the Executive Council does not take a decision on the recommendations of the Selection Committee within a period of four months from the date of the meeting of the Selection Committee, then also the matter shall stand referred to the Chancellor and his decision shall be final. The Executive Council of the University is Chief Executive authority to administer the University. Section 31 (1) confers power on the Executive Council to appoint a teacher on the recommendation of Selection Committee. If the Executive Council does not agree with the recommendation of the Selection Committee it has no jurisdiction to disregard the recommendations of the Selection Committee or to make appointments on its own. The legislature had laid down a mandatory rule by enacting S. 31 (8) (a) laying down that in the event of disagreement of the Executive Council with the recommendation of the Selection Committee, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor together with reasons of its disagreement. The Chancellor is then required to consider and take a decision in the matter and his decision shall be final and binding. 5. Section 31 (1) which confers power on the Executive Council to make appointment on the recommendation of the Selection Committee does not prescribe any period during which the Executive Council must reconsider the recommendations. The Executive Council is free to consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee at its own convenience. The legislature intervened by adding a proviso to Section 31 (8) (a) by the U. P. Act No. V of 1977. The Executive Council is free to consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee at its own convenience. The legislature intervened by adding a proviso to Section 31 (8) (a) by the U. P. Act No. V of 1977. The proviso lays down that the Executive Council should consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee within a period of four months from the date of the meeting of the Selection Committee. If, however, the Executive Council fails to do so then the Executive Council shall cease to have any jurisdiction to take decision on the recommendations of the Selection Committee. On the expiry of the period of four months from the date of the meeting of the Selection Committee and on the failure of the Executive Council to take a decision on the recommendation within that period, the matter shall stand referred to the Chancellor by operation of law. The legislative intent is clear that if the Executive Council fails to take a decision on the recommendation of the Selection Committee within a period of four months then it ceases to have any authority to consider or take a decision, instead the power to consider the recommendation and take a final decision in the matter is conferred on the Chancellor. 6. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the Selection Committee made its recommendations on 24-2-1979, and on that very day it submitted its recommendations to the Executive Council. The period of four months as contemplated by proviso to Section 31 (8) (a) expired on 24th June, 1979 but the Executive Council could not consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee. On the expiry of four months period the Executive Council ceased to have any jurisdiction to take decision in the matter. As noted earlier, the Executive Council proceeded to take decision in the matter at its meeting convened for September 10, 1979, but it refrained to do so on account of the petitioners having filed a writ petition in this Court. Although the writ petition was dismissed but the Bench made certain observations. The Executive Council in pursuance of the observations made by this Court, referred the matter to the Chancellor in accordance with the proviso to Section 31 (8) (a) of the Act. Although the writ petition was dismissed but the Bench made certain observations. The Executive Council in pursuance of the observations made by this Court, referred the matter to the Chancellor in accordance with the proviso to Section 31 (8) (a) of the Act. The Chancellor did not consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee nor he took any decision in the matter, instead he referred the matter back to the Executive Council for taking decision on the recommendations of the Selection Committee. It was urged before us that by referring back the matter to Executive Council the Chancellor has passed orders as contemplated by the proviso to S. 31 (8) (a) of the Act. We are unable to accept this contention. 7. The proviso to S. 31 (8) (a) requires the Chancellor to consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee and to take a decision in the matter. The chancellor is under a statutory duty to perform his functions and he cannot abdicate his duty by referring back the matter to the Executive Council. The legislative intent is clear that the Chancellor should himself decide the matter, namely, he is under a mandatory duty to consider the recommendation of the Selection Committee and to direct for appointment of the teacher. The Chancellor cannot delegate this function to the Executive Council or to any other authority. The Chancellor has in the instant case conferred jurisdiction on the Executive Council to consider the recommendation of the Selection Committee, although the legislature has made express provision taking away jurisdiction of the Executive Council on the expiry of four months. The Chancellor has made an attempt to do an act indirectly which is prohibited by the Act. The legislature has given a clear mandate to the Chancellor to consider the matter himself, he cannot refuse to discharge that function by referring back the matter to the Executive Council. No provision of the Act or statute was placed before us empowering the Chancellor to delegate his authority to the Executive Council. In our opinion, it is the Chancellor and Chancellor alone who is under a statutory duty to consider and take a decision on the recommendation of the Selection Committee, whereupon his order shall be final. The Chancellor's order as contained in his letter dated 6-10-1979 is illegal and is liable to be quashed. 8. In our opinion, it is the Chancellor and Chancellor alone who is under a statutory duty to consider and take a decision on the recommendation of the Selection Committee, whereupon his order shall be final. The Chancellor's order as contained in his letter dated 6-10-1979 is illegal and is liable to be quashed. 8. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel appearing for Sri Ashok Kumar Gupta, Dr. Hari Kishore and Dr. G.K. Gupta respondents, urged that unless the recommendation of the Selection Committee is considered and a final decision is taken and appointment is made the petitioners have no legal right to approach this Court challenging the recommendations of the Selection Committee. According to the learned counsel the petition is premature, he placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1954 of 1978 : ( AIR 1980 SC 881 ), Mrs. Kunda S. Kadam v. Dr. K.K. Soman. In that case Public Service Commission had recommended the name of the respondent of that case to the Municipal Corporation for appointment in service. While the recommendation of the Public Service Commission was under consideration, a writ petition was filed challenging the recommendation of the Public Service Commission, which was allowed by a Division Bench on the ground that the person in whose favour recommendation was made did not possess the essential qualification. On appeal the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that time had not arrived for the Court to adjudicate upon the merits as the writ petition itself was premature in the instant case, the situation is different. The petitioners have not sought any relief against the recommendation of the Selection Committee, instead their grievance is that the recommendation of the Selection Committee cannot be considered by the Executive Council on the expiry of a period of four months, instead it should be considered by the Chancellor who is the appropriate authority under the Act. The main question raised by the petitioners is that the recommendation of the Selection Committee is going to be considered by the Executive Council which has no power to do so and the Chancellor who is the statutory authority has refused to exercise his jurisdiction in accordance with law. The writ petition is not premature and the ratio of Supreme Court decision in Kadam's case (supra) is not applicable to the instant case. 9. The writ petition is not premature and the ratio of Supreme Court decision in Kadam's case (supra) is not applicable to the instant case. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the Selection Committee was required to hold selection and make recommendations for one permanent post of Reader but it exceed its jurisdiction in making the recommendation in respect of two temporary posts which were advertised later on. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the University, it is stated that an advertisement was published by the University inviting application for two temporary posts of Readers in the Department of Physics. The applications were to be submitted by 24th February, 1979. Both the petitioners applied for the two temporary posts of Readers in pursuance of the said advertisement. In paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit of Sri B.M. Singh, Registrar of the University, it is admitted that the applications received for the two temporary posts including those of the petitioners were not placed before the Selection Committee. In paragraph 6 of the said affidavit, it is further stated that only those applications which were made for the permanent post of Reader were placed before the Selection Committee and applications made for the temporary posts in pursuance of the advertisement dated 22nd January, 1979, were not placed before the Selection Committee. The Registrar has further stated that if and when other applications for temporary posts are placed before the Selection Committee in future the petitioners application shall be placed before the Selection Committee for consideration. In view of these averments, it is clear that the applications made for the two temporary posts of-Readers were not placed before the Selection Committee and the relevant papers were not submitted to it for consideration. In the circumstances the Selection Committee could not make any recommendation in respect of the two temporary posts which were advertised in January, 1979, and the last date for making application expired only on February 24, 1979, namely, the date the Selection Committee made recommendations. 10. During the course of hearing a controversy was raised as to whether the Selection Committee had made recommendation for appointment to one permanent post of Reader only or it had made recommendation for the two temporary posts also. 10. During the course of hearing a controversy was raised as to whether the Selection Committee had made recommendation for appointment to one permanent post of Reader only or it had made recommendation for the two temporary posts also. Learned counsel for the University stated that the recommendations made by the Selection Committee had not been made public and as such he was not in a position to make any statement in the matter, but he placed the recommendations of the Selection Committee before us in a sealed cover. On a perusal of the same we found that the Selection Committee made recommendations for appointment to three posts of Readers in the Department of Physics, one permanent post and two temporary posts. The Selection Committee has not given any reasons as to why it made recommendation for three posts we do not want to go into the matter further in detail as in our opinion it is for the Chancellor to consider this question and to take a decision in the matter. We would however, express our concern that when separate advertisement was issued and applications were invited for the two temporary posts of Readers, it would have been fair and proper that the recommendation for the said two posts would have been made only after considering the applications which had been received by the University in pursuance of the advertisement published on January 27, 1979. In the absence of the necessary records including the applications and the biodata of the applicants who had applied for the two temporary posts, the Selection Committee could not effectively Judge the merit or suitability of the applicants who had applied for the temporary posts. 11. The petitioners have made a representation to the Chancellor which has not been disposed of. Since we are of the opinion that the Chancellor should consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee, it would be fair and proper that the petitioners representation is also considered by the Chancellor. 12. In the result we allow the petition and quash the order of the Chancellor as contained in the letter dated 6-12-1977, and direct the Chancellor to consider the recommendation of the Selection Committee and take a decision in the matter. While considering the recommendation of the Selection Committee the petitioner's representation may also be considered. The petitioners are entitled to their costs.