Data Din v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad
1980-10-10
K.P.SINGH
body1980
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is against the judgment of Shri Lalta Prasad, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, dated 10-2-72 whereby the petitioners' revision petition has been dismissed. 2. In the basic year disputed plot no. 780/19 measuring 2 Bigha 10 Biswa was recorded in the names of Mohan and Sheo Murat, sons of Bihari, and one Ram Prasad had filed an objection to be recorded along with Mohan and Sheo Murat over the disputed plot as Sirdar. Similarly, the petitioner Data Din and others had also filed objection claiming Sirdari right in the disputed land on the basis that they were in possession over the disputed land for more than statutory period and that the Ex-Zamindar had settled the disputed land with them. 3. The Consolidation Officer, through his judgment, dated 17-7-71, held that the disputed land should be recorded in the name of Gram Samaj and the objections were rejected. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Consolidation Officer, the petitioners as well as Sheo Murat and others preferred appeals which were dealt with by the appellate authority through its judgment, dated 18-9-71. It was held that the contesting opposite parties Sheo Murat and others were ordered to the recorded in varg 4 and the appeal of the petitioners was dismissed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate authority the petitioners had preferred a revision petition which has been dismissed through the impugned judgment dated 10-2-72. Now the petitioners have approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the appellate authority and the revisional court have patently erred in ordering opposite parties 4 to 6 in the present writ petition, namely Mohan Lal, Ram Prasad and Sheo Murat to be recorded over the disputed land in varg 4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the ruling of this Court reported in 1971 R.D. 106 Ram Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation requires reconsideration and at least over the property of Gaon Sabha the entry of trespasser in the consolidation record should not be made. 5. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the disputed land being property of Gaon Sabha, the petitioners had every right to challenge a wrong entry even in favour of third person. 6.
5. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the disputed land being property of Gaon Sabha, the petitioners had every right to challenge a wrong entry even in favour of third person. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party Gaon Sabha has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and he has contended that the petitioners have no right in the disputed land and their claim has been rightly negatived by the consolidation authorities, hence no interference can be made at the instance of the petitioners. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to the provisions of Section 28 and Rule 55 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and has contended that no question of recovering compensation from a trespasser of the Gaon Sabha property arises, hence the entry of trespasser over the property of Gaon Sabha should not be made. He has emphasised that the purpose mentioned in para 4 of the ruling reported in 1971 R.D. 106 Ram Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation is not relevant in the case of Gaon Sabha property, hence the aforesaid ruling requires reconsideration. To my mind, the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are devoid of merits. It is true that the ruling mentioned supra dealt with the case of a tenure-holder and in that connection the learned Judges have made the following observation :- "....... The recording of the name of the person who is in illegal possession helps in identifying the person from whom the Consolidation Officer will take possession at the time of its delivery to the tenure holder who has been allotted that land. It also facilitates the recovery of compensation by the allottee. It will, thus be seen that the recording of the name of such an occupant does subserve a definite purpose in carrying out the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. In our opinion, Lakhan's case (1970 R.D. 269) does not lay down the law correctly." 8. According to Section 28 and R. 55 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the consolidation authorities have 'been empowered to give actual possession to the land management Committee over the land allotted to it, hence there is no difference between a trespasser over the property of Gaon Sabha and a trespasser over the tenancy land of tenure holder.
According to Section 28 and R. 55 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the consolidation authorities have 'been empowered to give actual possession to the land management Committee over the land allotted to it, hence there is no difference between a trespasser over the property of Gaon Sabha and a trespasser over the tenancy land of tenure holder. When the delivery of possession over the property of the Gaon Sabha to the latter is to take place one of the purposes mentioned in the ruling is present in the case of a trespass over the property of Gaon Sabha, hence I do not agree with the learned counsel for petitioners that the ruling commented upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and reported in 1971 R.D. 106 Ram Lal v. Dy. Director of Consolidation needs reconsideration. Rather, I think that the observations made therein are binding on me and I see no reason to take any different view from the view expressed therein. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his second contention invited my attention to the ruling reported in 1970 R.D. 469 Brij Bhushan Tiwari v. State of U.P. wherein it has been mentioned that if the Land Management Committee colluded with any one that should not be a ground for non-interference in a reference made by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. Relying upon the aforesaid observation, the learned counsel for the petitioners has taken a stand that the petitioners are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution even when they have no right and title to the disputed land. During the course of argument the learned counsel for the petitioners conceded that it is difficult for him to establish the claim of the petitioners regarding Sirdari right in the disputed land but he has pressed that the disputed land being public property, the petitioners have every right to get the name of trespassers removed from the disputed land and that the petitioners have every right to challenge the orders of the Consolidation authorities.
It is necessary to mention here that a learned single Judge of this court in 1973 All WR (HC) 238 Rameshwar Sahai v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow, has observed in para 11 to the following effect: ".........In my opinion the phrase "interested person" is wide enough to include contesting respondents as the property in dispute being the property of Gaon Sabha, every adult member in the village was entitled to raise objection in respect of the Gaon Sabha property specially when the contesting respondents came with the allegations that the Gaon Sabha had colluded with the petitioners in allotment of land or creation of leases in their favour." 10. However, the above mentioned ruling is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the Gaon Sabha has been held entitled to the disputed land and that Gaon Sabha has not colluded in conferring any right upon the opposite parties nos. 4 to 6. Rather, the opposite parties Nos. 4 to 6 are liable to eviction at the instance of the Gaon Sabha. 11. In Special Appeal No. 247 of 1972 Ambika Singh v. Bibhuti Singh, it has been emphasised that a person should be interested in his own right so as to be entitled to file an objection under Section 9 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It has also been emphasised that unless a person was a member duly authorised by the Land Management Committee his objection would not be maintainable on the ground that he was himself an interested person under Sec. 9 (2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. To my mind, in the present case the petitioners are mere trespassers qua the disputed land on the findings recorded by the Consolidation authorities. They are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. In 1967 R.D. 400 Ram Niwaj v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, a learned single Judge of this Court has observed as below:- "It is true that the language of Section 9 (2) is rather wide and entitles a person interested in disputing the correctness of a particular entry to file an objection thereunder but there is nothing in that provision of law to lay down that such a person interested in the matter can do so for the benefit of another.
In the absence of any such express provision in Section 9 (2) the general rule of law, i.e. no person can plead for another without authority from that other must prevail. It is a basic principle of law that a person cannot initiate a legal proceeding on behalf of or for the benefit of another without any authority from that person." 13. In the present case the petitioners are claiming right against the Gaon Sabha. No question of any authority from Gaon Sabha arises in their case. In the disputed property the petitioners could claim right on the basis of easement, prescription etc. which they have not claimed and their right on the basis of prescribing Sirdari right due to continuous possession for more than statutory period has failed. The claim of the petitioners based on easement or prescription etc. cannot be investigated by the Consolidation authorities. In such a circumstance I do not consider it a fit case where interference should be made with the impugned judgments at the instance of the petitioners. 14. In the result, the writ petition lacks merits and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, I dismiss the writ petition and direct the parties to bear their own costs.