ORDER K.N. Goyal, J. - This writ petition arises out of proceedings relating to allotment of chaks in consolidation proceedings. The parties namely, the petitioner and respondent No. 1, are real brothers, and separate chaks were allotted to them. The notification under Section 20 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act took place on 11th March, 1973 and delivery of possession is said to have taken place in June. 1973. The petitioner had first made an application on 9th November, 1974 for mutual exchange under Sec. 53, but the respondent No. 1 had not joined the petitioner in making the said application. Then on 4th January, 1975 he filed an objection under Section 20. On 13th March, 1975 the Consolidation Officer rejected the objection as time-barred. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, who after considering the case on merits, set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and modified the chaks as per request of the petitioner. The respondent took the matter in revision and the learned Assistant Director held that the Settlement Officer Consolidation had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against, the order of the Consolidation Officer declining to condone the delay in the filing of the objection under Sec. 20. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner has come to this court. 2. It was held in Samharoo v. State of U.P. ( 1967 RD 201 ): (1967 All LJ 463) by a Division Bench of this Court that an order allowing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not an order under Section 9 or Section 10 and as such was not appeal-able under Section 11. Although the case related to the allowing of an application under Section 5, the reasoning on which their Lordships based their conclusions covers equally an order rejecting an application under Section 5. It was observed as follows (at p. 465 of All LJ):- "The proceedings started on an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act are separate proceedings from these under Section 9 or Section 10 of the Act. It is only after an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed that an objection can be entertained. In other words the proceedings started on an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act have to precede those relating to the objections. It is only after an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed that an objection can be entertained. In other words the proceedings started on an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act have to precede those relating to the objections. It is true that the application under Section 5 is made for entertaining a time-barred objection, but that does not mean that is an application made under Section 9 or 10 of the Act. That is an application only for permission to invoke the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of the Act. It is a proceeding which is fully concluded before the actual proceedings under Section 9 or 10 are started." It will be seen that the provisions of Sections 9 to 11 are on par with those of Sections 20 and 21 of the Act, though they pertain to different stages of consolidation proceedings. Accordingly, the view expressed in this case should govern proceeding under Sections 20 and 21 as well. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has however placed reliance on Mst. Isharaji v. Commissioner ( 1968 RD 123 ): (1968 All LJ 205) in which a learned single Judge has held that even an order passed ex parte in default of appearance is an order appealable under Section 11. This ruling does not deal with a case under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but with an adjudication in which the objection has already been entertained and subsequently on some date of hearing one of the parties absents himself or itself. Thus, the view expressed in this ruling does not in any way help the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed the analogy of civil appeals and has referred to some decisions relating thereto. The provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are however special provisions which have been expressly considered in the aforesaid Division Bench decision which is binding on me. 5. It has next been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Assistant Director should have decided the question on merits in exercise of suo motu powers. In support of this contention he has relied on Rama Kant Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. (1974 All LJ 834): ( AIR 1975 All 126 ). 5. It has next been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Assistant Director should have decided the question on merits in exercise of suo motu powers. In support of this contention he has relied on Rama Kant Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. (1974 All LJ 834): ( AIR 1975 All 126 ). This Full Bench decision does not, however, apply to this case because in the present case there was no time-barred revision. The revision was against an order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was contended to be without jurisdiction. The Deputy Director of Consolidation could therefore either uphold or reject the objection of the revisionist against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The Full Bench ruling was thus not attracted to the case. 6. In the result, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.