JUDGMENT K. N. Singh, J. - This petition is directed against the order of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Utter Pradesh, Lucknow, dated 2 May 1973, refusing to grant approval to the management's proposal to dismiss the respondent-workman from service. 2. Udalraj, respondent 2, was employed as a workman in the petitioner's company at Kanpur. On 10 December 1971, the management of the petitioner's company issued a chargesheet against the respondent-workman making allegations that be had fraudulently taken wages of two workmen, Vipat and Mangall by presenting forged wage-slips. The respondent-workman submitted his explanation and denied the charges. The management was not satisfied with the explanation of the workman and it decided to hold a domestic enquiry. The domestic enquiry was conducted and the workman was afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witness produced by the petitioners and also to produce his own witnesses. The management produced ten witnesses in support of the charges. The workman cross-examined the two witnesses and be also produced witnesses in his defence: After the conclusion of the enquiry, the inquiring officer held that the charges was fully proved against the work- man. The management accepted the findings recorded by the inquiring officer and by order, dated 8 March 1972, It took a decision to dismiss the workman from service. Since a dispute relating to bonus was pending before the Industrial Tribunal between the workman of the factory and the management, the management made an application before the Industrial Tribunal under S. 6 E (21, of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for obtaining approval of.the Tribunal for the dismissal of the workman. The management's application was contested by the respondent- workman. The management-produced the entire record of the domestic enquiry before the Tribunal and It examined the inquiring officer and the other witnesses to show that domestic enquiry was fair and pro- per. The Tribunal, by its order, dated 2 May 1973, held that the findings of the inquiring officer were perverse and, therefore, it withheld the approval to the management's proposal to dismiss the respondent-workman from the service. Aggrieved, the petitioner-company has approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, for quashing the said order of the Industrial Tribunal. 3. The Tribunal, by its order, dated 2 May 1973, held that the findings of the inquiring officer were perverse and, therefore, it withheld the approval to the management's proposal to dismiss the respondent-workman from the service. Aggrieved, the petitioner-company has approached this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, for quashing the said order of the Industrial Tribunal. 3. Section 6 E of the Uttar Pradesh Indus- trial Disputes Act, 1947, lays down that during the pendency of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, an employer shall not change the conditions of service of a workman. Sub-section (2) further lays down that during the pendency of such proceedings the employer shall not discharge or dismiss a workman, unless approval Is obtained from the Labour Court or Tribunal before whom the proceeding Is pending. 4. In Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Its workmen, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 160, Supreme Court considered the scope of S 31 (1)(bl of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 (Central Act), and held that the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by an Industrial Tribunal in such circumstances is a very limited one. The Supreme Court observed thus t "The legal position Is that where a proper enquiry has been held by the management, the Tribunal has to accept the finding arrived at In that enquiry unless it is perverse or unreasonable and should give the permission asked for unless It has reason to believe that the management is guilty of victimisation or has been guilty of unfair labour practice or is acting mala fide." 5. The above observation of the Supreme Court was affirmed in subsequent cases also. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court are well known but the difficulty arises in its application. The question whether the findings are perverse or not. Is a complex one and many times Industrial Courts commit mistake In determining this question. In Central Bank of India Ltd., New Delhi v. Pakash Chand Jai, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 983, the Supreme Court laid down test for finding out the perversity of a finding recorded by Tribunal or an inquiry officer. 1 he Supreme Court held that the test of perversity of a finding recorded by a Tribunal or an enquiry officer will be that the said finding is not supported by any legal evidence at all. 1 he Supreme Court held that the test of perversity of a finding recorded by a Tribunal or an enquiry officer will be that the said finding is not supported by any legal evidence at all. If the finding recorded by the enquiry officer is one which no reasonable person could have arrived at on the material before it, then the finding would be perverse. If the findings of the enquiry officer are based on legal evidence it cannot be held to be perverse, similarly if the findings are possible on the evidence, then those findings cannot be said to be perverse merely because another view is possible. 6. The above principles were again reiterated in Delhi Cloth and General Milli Company v. Ludh Budh Singh, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1031. The supreme Court emphasised that once it is proved that the management has not acted ma/a fide and that there has been a proper enquiry and that the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer is a possible one, on the evidence lea before it, the Tribunal cannot substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the enquiry officer, though it has come to a different conclusion on the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer. It the findings of the enquiry officer in the domestic inquiry do not suffer from any of the aforesaid defects, it is not open to the Industrial Tribunal to withhold approval to the management's proposal while exercising Its powers under S. 6E of the Act. 7. Bearing In mind the above principle, we would now consider whether the industrial Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction refusing to grant approval to the management's proposal. The charge against the respondent-workman was that he had fraudulently obtained payment of wages of two other workmen Vipat and Mangali, by producing forged pay-slips. In support of this plea, the management examined ten witnesses before the enquiry officer, out of them two were eye witnesses, namely, Prom Nath and B. B. Mal. These two witnesses testified that the respondent workman had taken payment twice at the payment counter. It is noteworthy that the respondent-workman did not cross-examine any of the two witnesses even though opportunity was given to him for the same at the domestic enquiry. These two witnesses testified that the respondent workman had taken payment twice at the payment counter. It is noteworthy that the respondent-workman did not cross-examine any of the two witnesses even though opportunity was given to him for the same at the domestic enquiry. The enquiry officer considered the evidence of the witnesses and he placed reliance on the testimony of the aforesaid two eye witnesses in holding the charge proved against the workman. The Tribunal has not held that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer were vitiated on the ground that the same were based on in admissible evidence or that they were not based on any legal evidence. The Tribunal has further not recorded any finding that the management acted mala fide in taking the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent-workman or that it was guilty of victimisation or of unfair labour practice. The Industrial Tribunal, however, reappraized the evidence produced before the domestic enquiry and came to the conclusion that there was no direct evidence to prove the charge against the workman. In Para. 6 of its order, the Industrial Tribunal observed that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the inquiry officer does not lead to the presumption that the forged pay-slips were produced by the workman or that he received the payments. As noted earlier, the enquiry officer had placed reliance on the direct testimony of two eye witnesses. The Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to reappraize the evidence or to disbelieve the testimony of the eye witnesses like an appellate Court. The Tribunal was not entitles to sit in appeal over the findings of the enquiring officer. The findings of the enquiry officer were based on legal evidence and the conclusions arrived at by him were reasonable. The Tribunal exceeded Its jurisdiction In reapprazing the evidence to come to a different conclusion like an appellate Court. 8. Learned counsel for the workman urged that in Para. 10 of its order, the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the workman was falsely implicated. It Is true that in Para. 10 of its order, the Tribunal has observed that the workman participated In hunger strikes in the factory and be had taken part In the demand for bonus, therefore, the possibility of the workman being falsely implicated cannot be ruled out. It Is true that in Para. 10 of its order, the Tribunal has observed that the workman participated In hunger strikes in the factory and be had taken part In the demand for bonus, therefore, the possibility of the workman being falsely implicated cannot be ruled out. This finding of the Tribunal cannot be sustained, as it travels in the realm of conjectures and surmises. There was no evidence on record to sustain this finding. The management's action cannot be interfered merely on the basis of the remote possibility. 9. Learned counsel then urged that the Industrial Tribunal has recorded finding that the enquiry officer's finding was perverse, therefore, the Tribunal has rightly acted within its jurisdiction In withholding the approval. No doubt in Para. 11 of the impugned order the Tribunal held that the findings of the Inquiry officer are perverse but it failed to record any reason for the same. As noted earlier, the findings of the inquiry officer could not be held to be perverse, unless, a further finding was recorded that the findings of the Inquiry officer were not based on any legal evidence or that they were so unreasonable that no reasonable person could come to that conclusion. 10. In view of the above discussion, it Is clear that the Tribunal has acted in excess of its jurisdiction in refusing to grant approval to the management's proposal for dismissal of the workman from service. The charges against the workman had been fully proved at the domestic enquiry and he was given full opportunity to lead evidence. In the circumstances, the Industrial Tribunal was not justified In rejecting the management's proposal for granting approval to their proposal. 11. We, therefore, allow the writ petition Industrial Tribunal, dated 2 May 1973. and quash the impugned order of the Parties shall bear their own costs.