JUDGMENT (1.) THIS is an application for reconsideration of the Judgment and Order dated the February, 1980 passed by me in Civil Rule No. 1194 (W) of 1979 only. (2.) THE said Civil Rule No. 1194 (W) of 1979, along with others, where the actions taken by the Respondents or purported to have been taken by them in refusing the facilities of booking of coal in Smalls or clubbing of them, have been sought to be refused by the Respondents, pursuant to the Notifications as mentioned in the Judgment, have been challenged. Such coal matters, on being a signed, were heard as group, cases on inverse dates from 14th January, 1980 to 29th January, 1980 and as mentioned in the judgment, Mr. Soumen Ghose, who was appearing for the petitioners in all the Rules, undertook that arguments in Civil Rule Nos. 1194 (W) of 1979, 1187 (W) of 1979, 1199-93 (W) of 1979 1195 (W) of 1979, 2575-80 (W) of 1979, 2583 (W)-89 (W) of 1979, 2773-74 (W) of 1979, 2776-2777 (W) of 1979 and] -1235-36 (W) of 1979, would only be advanced and not in other cases. It was also agreed by the learned Advocates appearing that the arguments of the petitioners in all those cases would be advanced first and thereafter, the Respondents would reply one after the other. In fact, such procedure was followed and perhaps that has created some difficulty for the petitioners and may be, for that reason, the present application has been filed, and that too for the reasons as indicated hereinafter would not have ordinarily referred to the circumstances but am making a reference to such facts as otherwise I would not be justified in some of my conclusions in this order. Mr. Soumen Ghose, initially opened his arguments in Civil Rule No.1194 (W) of 1979 and after proceeding for a day or two, he left his arguments because of circumstances beyond, his control, as he informed the Court that on medical advice, he would not attend court. He informed that he was suffering from Cervical Spondylosis. Such prayer was allowed, on the specific assurance of Mr. Ghose that the cases would hot be adjourned and the hearing would continue. He mentioned that Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, who was appearing in the case of Baldev Prasad Agarwalla v. Union of India (Civil Rule N6s. He informed that he was suffering from Cervical Spondylosis. Such prayer was allowed, on the specific assurance of Mr. Ghose that the cases would hot be adjourned and the hearing would continue. He mentioned that Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, who was appearing in the case of Baldev Prasad Agarwalla v. Union of India (Civil Rule N6s. 1235-36 (W) of 1979) would continue with his arguments and thereafter Mr. Mukherjee would be followed by others. Mr. Ghose, of course prayed for liberty to conclude his arguments, if necessary, after the other learned Advocates in the other Rules and if necessary, also to give his reply after the arguments by the learned Advocate for the Respondents. The said prayer was allowed. It should also be noted that during the temporary absence of Mr. Ghose, while the hearing of Civil Rule No. 1194 (W) of 1979, was continuing, his junior Mr. Shyam Sundar Manna read and placed the petition and all petitions in these Railway matters are in the same line and language. (3.) MR. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, in his turn could not come in time to argue civil Rule No. 1235 (W) 1236 (W), of 1979 on 18th January, 1980 and as such, in his absence and with the object of facilitating his appearance I asked Shri Shyam Sundar Manna, who was also appearing in this case as a junior to Mr. Soumen "Ghose, to continue with the arguments, till Mr. Mukherjee was available. Mr. Manna read the petition which as mentioned herein before was in the same line and language of the petition in Civil Rule No. 1194 (W) of 1979. I allowed him to continue with the reading of the petition, considering his unfortunate position, as being a Junior he was not in a position to do otherwise However, after some time Mr. Mukherjee came and took up the arguments. He even could not complete his submissions and contended that on and from 21st January, 1980, Mr. Soumen Bose, would take up this argument in civil Rule Nos. 2773-74 (W) of 1079, as mr. Mukherjee would not be available for sometime. Such prayer was also allowed. (4.) BUT, on the date as fixed Mr. Soumen Bose was not available and as such Mr. Manna, also a Junior in that case, placed the petition again. Such opportunity had to be given to Mr. 2773-74 (W) of 1079, as mr. Mukherjee would not be available for sometime. Such prayer was also allowed. (4.) BUT, on the date as fixed Mr. Soumen Bose was not available and as such Mr. Manna, also a Junior in that case, placed the petition again. Such opportunity had to be given to Mr. Manna, as otherwise the cases would have been adjourned. When the petition was reread in the circumstances as mentioned above Mr. Noni Coomar. Chakraborty, who was appearing in the case of Vishan and Ors v. Union of India, and Ors, Civil Rule No. 2575-80 (W) of 1979), appeared and argued the Rules in full. After Mr. Chakravarti, Mr. Soumen Bose, argued in full the case of R. K. Agarwalla and Ors v. Union of India (Civil Rule Nos. 2773-74 (W) of 1979.). (5.) THEREAFTER, the Respondents opened their submissions through Mr. P. N. Das in Vishandas's Case (Supra), and completed his submission: Then Mr. R. N. Das started reply to the submissions as made in the case of Sakti Narayan. But he did not complete his Submissions, as he was required to be present in another proceeding. In his absence Mr. A. C. Bhabra, took up his arguments in reply in the case of R. K. Agarwalla and Ors v. Union of India (Supra). He again did not complete his submissions, as he was engaged in another proceeding and in such circumstances Mr. R. N. Das took up his unfinished arguments in Vishan Das' Case (Supra). This time also, Mr. R. N Das could not complete his submissions and in his absence Mr. A. C. Bhabra took up his unfinished arguments in R, K. Agarwalla case (Supra). After Mr. Bhabra had completed his arguments, mr. S. P. Chowdhury, gave reply in Vishan Das' case (Supra) and was followed by Mr. P. K. Ghose in the case of Baldev Prasad (Supra.). (6.) AFTER the submissions and replies were completed in the manner as indicated, the Court wanted Mr. Soumen Ghose to give his replies or to complete his submissions, pursuant to the liberty as mentioned and in his absence Mr. Shyam Sundar Manna, his junior, was asked to advance his arguments in reply. But the said Shri Manna could not reply and pleaded his inability to put forward the replies ff the absence of Mr; Soumen Ghose. Soumen Ghose to give his replies or to complete his submissions, pursuant to the liberty as mentioned and in his absence Mr. Shyam Sundar Manna, his junior, was asked to advance his arguments in reply. But the said Shri Manna could not reply and pleaded his inability to put forward the replies ff the absence of Mr; Soumen Ghose. Then, the Court had to close the hearings and really had reserved the judgment. After all then Mr. Ghosh, before the Judgment was delivered, wanted to put forward his replies, which was not allowed, on objections being raised by the Respondents and as such, on 11th February, 1980, the Judgment was delivered, rejecting the contentions of the petitioners as raised and thus discharged the Rules, with a direction on the Railway authorities that they should made available, wagons to the respective indenters for booking of coal in Smalls, Subject to availability of wagons and after duly following the preferential Traffic Schedule. It is not the case of the petitioner that the points as urged were not duly recorded or noted. But the petitioner has contended that the points as raised, have neither been dealt with nor determined on the basis of the arguments as advanced. They have made such submissions mainly regarding their contentions in respect of Rule 301 of the Goods Tariff No. 35 Part 1. This was the first branch of attack to the Judgment in question. and for reconsiderations of the same. It was secondly argued that I was wrong in observing that the determination in Satya Narayan Murarka v. Union Of India, 78 CWN 884 were distinguishable in the facts of the case and I should have referred the matter for adjudication or consideration before the learned Division bench. It was thirdly contended that since there was no evidence of misuse of the opportunities, by the petitioners, the determination as made on that basis ware perverse and improper. It was thirdly contended that since there was no evidence of misuse of the opportunities, by the petitioners, the determination as made on that basis ware perverse and improper. The fourth submission of the petitioner was that although the vires of the amendment and or addition to section 28 of the Indian Railways Act, was argued the same has not been duly determined It was fifthly contended that although arguments were advanced on Rules 301 and 701 of the Goods Tariff, No. 35 Part 1 and to the effect that without corresponding amendment under both the said Rules, the amendment notifications could not be given effect to or considered Mr. Ghose sixthly contended that the submissions as made in the affidavit in reply of the petitioner, have not been duly dealt with or considered, apart from contending seventhly that the effect, import and purport of the Judgment in F. M. A. 263 of 1978 have not been considered and so also the effect of the determinations in the case of M/s Raichand Amulakh Shah and Anr. v. Union of India AIR 1984 S. C. 1268. It was eighthly contended by Mr. Ghose that, I was wrong in holding that the English decisions as mentioned in the Judgment, had application and ninthly, public purpose, in this case was not appropriately disclosed. It was also contended that the arguments en infringement of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, have not been duly determined. It was eighthly contended by Mr. Ghose that, I was wrong in holding that the English decisions as mentioned in the Judgment, had application and ninthly, public purpose, in this case was not appropriately disclosed. It was also contended that the arguments en infringement of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, have not been duly determined. (7.) THE application was affirmed and filed on 25th February, 1980 and from the findings as arrived at by me amongst others, which are mentioned in paragraph 3 of the application and are to the following effect : (a) no discrimination between coal, and coke for their booking, (b)the restriction sought to be imposed is not unreasonable and is certainly intelligible and a nexus to the object which can surely be claimed to be one of public purpose, (c)power or privilege which was given to the traders was misused and if such misuse was sought to be checked by imposing restrictions that would not be unreasonable (d) the traders created problem with a view to disrupt the smooth supply of coal to the people and the same was done by misuse, (e) on the facts of the case the de termination in the case of Satya Narayan Murarka is distinguishable, (f) the Railway Authorities have authority to ask for pre-payment of freight in respect of booking of coal in smalls and such power has been included in section 27 and section 28 of the Indian Railways Act and the pre-payment of freight is not violating of Article 14 of the Constitution of India The Challenge against "to-pay" is belated and without any appropriate late explanation for such belated challenge, (g) section 41 of the Railways, Act is certainly a bar under Article 220 of the Constitution of India as other remedy is available. There may be exceptional circumstances but the case under consideration does not come within such exceptional circumstances (1889) 22 Q. B. D. p 642 (1892) 2 Q. B. D. p 229 (1978) 1 S. C. C. p 37. There may be exceptional circumstances but the case under consideration does not come within such exceptional circumstances (1889) 22 Q. B. D. p 642 (1892) 2 Q. B. D. p 229 (1978) 1 S. C. C. p 37. It appears that the petitioner or his learned Advocate had access to the records and although they have taken the grounds as mentioned above and more particularly in paragraph 15 of this application, they have not preferred any appeal, which they could have done even without a certified copy of the Judgment or Order, under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. (8.) IT is true that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, in view of the Explanation to section 141, would not be available in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such on being asked, Mr. Ghose contended that this application was not an application under section 151, but one for reconsideration of the Judgment and Order under the inherent powers of the court make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Although section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not be available in a case like this, yet the principles underlying the section on the question of jurisdiction of the Court to review 01 reconsider its judgment and Order may be looked into or applied. Thus, the Court, even in a proceeding under Article 228 of the Constitution of India has inherent power to act expedite justified viz. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the same exists or to prevent abuse of the powers of the Court. In this matter, for the principles regulating the exercise of inherent powers, the determinations in the case of Hukumchand v. Kamalanand I. L. R. 33 Calcutta-927 by Woodruff J., which has been reiterated by Mookherjee, J". in Sashibhusan v. Ramdhan Nath, 20 C. L. J. 433, may be looked into or considered. Inherent powers are such as are used to secure the end of justice and no order Should be made except with the end as mentioned above, in view. Such inherent power being also very wide, the Courts should use the same or act on that basis with due care and guard. Inherent powers are such as are used to secure the end of justice and no order Should be made except with the end as mentioned above, in view. Such inherent power being also very wide, the Courts should use the same or act on that basis with due care and guard. The Courts will have no power to make such orders in terms of or in excise of its inherent powers which can be secured or obtained in appeal. It is not that all wrongs or no consideration which can be cured by a court in exercise of its inherent power and the Court can only review or reconsider its order, when the Courts is in seizing of the case or retains jurisdiction of the same. Such inherent power amongst others, may be used unexercised, to take cognizance of things which go to the root of the subject, matter of controversy between the parties and an appeal being a creature of statute, there is no inherent power of the Court to sit in appeal from an order even if the order is wrong and is likely to substantial justice. The Court can grant relief on the basis of a subsequent legislation to do complete justice between the parties. The grounds as put forward by Mr. Ghose now, may be good and substantial grounds in an appeal but they in my view would not be justified to be brought in for consideration by an application for reconsideration. In fact, the effect of Mr. Ghose' contention are that he wants this Court- particularly to sit in appeal on its own determination which in my view is neither possible nor permissible and I further find that by this application Mr. Ghose has really intended to give his reply to the arguments as advanced by the Respondents, even though, in spite of opportunity, he failed to do so in appropriate time. This also in my view is not possible arid permissible. As mentioned above, it is not the case of the petitioner, that the points as urged have not been noted by me in my determination dated 11th February, 1980 and as such I am of the view that when points as argued, have been noted, but have not been, according to the petitioner, answered directly or according to their desire, would mean that such point has been negative and answered against the petitioner. The above would be applicable in, case of the allegations of the petitioner now that the points regarding Rule 301 have not been answered duly. Even if a point has not been answered duly as claimed by the petitioner, that would not be a case for reconsideration the more so when such point can be agitated in an appeal duly filed and preferred. I am further of the view that when amendments at the appropriate places in Rule 701 have been incorporated, no further incorporation by amendment in Rule 301, as claimed by the petitioner, was either required or necessary. Same as aforesaid, the other points as put forward in support of the application for reconsideration; require no further consideration, as I have already dealt with them in my Judgment dated 11th February, 1980. I further find and reiterate that the determinations in Satyanarayana Murarka v. Union of India (Supra), are distinguishable in the facts of this case. (9.) I hold that since no new ground for any change in the circumstances of law, has been put forward, in support of the application for reconsideration, there is nothing to be reviewed or reconsidered and the reasons in a Judgment or Order, if do not satisfy a party, that would not give rise to review or reconsideration. I am further of the view that by the present application, Mr. Ghose has sought to give a reply to the submissions of the Respondents in the Coal Cases as disposed of, indirectly, which he could not give directly, for the reasons and background as mentioned above. (10.) FOR the reasons as mentioned above I find that the present application is not a bonafide one and devoid of any substance and as such, the same is rejected, In the circumstances of this proceedings I could have saddled the petitioner with cost but I am not doing so as I feel that in filing the petition, perhaps the petitioner had no hand.