JUDGMENT A. N. Verma, J. - This petition by a tenant is directed against an order passed by the I Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated 24-1-1980 allowing an appeal of the landlord, the respondent No. 3, under section 22 read with 21(2)(a) of U. P. Act No, 13 of 1972 and directing the eviction of the petitioner from a portion of house No. 6 (old)/8(New) Hastings Road, Allahabad. 2. These are the relevant facts : One Smt. Binapani Mittra was the owner and landlady of the aforesaid house. The petitioner has been in occupation of the southern portion of that house while the northern portion thereof has been in occupation of the owners and landlords. On 9-4-1974 Smt. Binapani Mittra filed the aforesaid application giving rise to this petition on the assertion that the portion in her occupation was not adequate for the needs of her family which then consisted of herself, an insane son, a widowed daughter, a daughter-in-law, two grand-daughters, and that therefore, she bona fide needed the accommodation under the tenancy of the petitioner for the residence of her family. While the application was pending, Smt. Binapani Mittra died. The present owner and landlord Gopal Chandra Mitra was thereupon substituted on the record of the case as the son and heir of Smt. Binapai Mitra. After his substitution Gopal Chandra Mitra got the application amended and he set up his own need. It was alleged that Gopal Chandra Mitra himself intended to reside at Allahabad in the house in question along with this two sons, wife and a daughter in addition to his insane brother. It was said that Gopal Chandra Mitra was planning to establish a factory at Ghaziabad with a branch at Allahabad. His elder-son who was then temporarily employed in Maharashtra had decided to come to Allahabad permanently after Gopal Chandra Mitra had set up the factory and join his father in the said business. The other son of Gopal Chandra Mitra was completing his studies for his degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Institute of Technology at Varanasi and that he too had decided to reside at Allahabad with the family. It was said that the accommodation at present at the disposal of Gopal Chandra Mitra was entirely inadequate for his needs and those of his family. 3. It was said that the accommodation at present at the disposal of Gopal Chandra Mitra was entirely inadequate for his needs and those of his family. 3. The application was contested by the petitioner after the death of Binapani Mitra, and after Gopal Chandra Mitra had been substituted, the petitioner filed an additional written statement. The substance of the case of the petitioner was that he was not a tenant of the premises. He was there in his own right. Smt. Binapani Mitra had entered into a written agreement on 10-1-1974 under which she agreed to transfer by sale the accommodation in dispute for a consideration of Rs. 65,000/-, out of which she had already accepted Rs. 35,000/- towards part consideration and the remaining Rs. 30,000, was to have been paid at the time of the registration of the sale deed. Under the said agreement the petitioner was to have become full owner of the accommodation after four months of the execution of the agreement. The application of the landlady was, therefore, not bona fide at all. They (the landlord and his family) had sufficient accommodation already at their disposal even if it be assumed that Gopal Chandra Mitra and his two sons genuinely desired to settle down at Allahabad. It was however denied that Gopal Chandra Mitra had any plan to settle down at Allahabad. The same thing was said about the two sons of Gopal Chandra Mitra also. As for himself the petitioner asserted that he would suffer irreparable loss if he was evicted. He was practicing as an Advocate of the Allahahad High Court. He had three sons and three daughters, besides his wife and some other relations and that there was no other suitable alternative accommodation where he might shit his family. 4. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the application of the landlord on the finding that his need was not bona fide or pressing and that the accommodation already in his possession in the same house was sufficient for the needs of the family. 5. Aggrieved, the landlord filed an appeal which, as mentioned above, was allowed. The appellate court disagreed with the Prescribed Authority and held that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide and that it was more pressing than that of the tenant. 5. Aggrieved, the landlord filed an appeal which, as mentioned above, was allowed. The appellate court disagreed with the Prescribed Authority and held that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide and that it was more pressing than that of the tenant. In regard to the agreement for sale set up by the petitioner, the learned I Additional District Judge held that the same appeared to have been forged and manufactured for the purpose of this litigation and that no claim could, therefore, be founded upon it. The plea of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act set up by the landlord was, therefore, rejected. It may be mentioned that the Prescribed Authority made no comments on the genuineness or otherwise or even the effect of the alleged agreement for sale. 6. Impugning the correctness and legality of the order passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, learned counsel for the petitioner first submitted that the finding in regard to the genuineness of the agreement set up by the petitioner is visited by a patent misconception of basic facts. It was argued that the original of the agreement was not required by the Prescribed Authority to be filed. It was only directed to be produced for the perusal of the landlady/landlord. The petitioner had in compliance with that order produced the original and the landlady and her counsel had even examined the same when produced. The appellate court was, therefore, wrong in drawing adverse inference oil the mistaken impression that despite the orders of the court, the petitioner had not cared to file the original agreement. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties on the above question at some length, I find no substance in the argument. In reply to the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner setting up the aforesaid agreement for sale, Smt. Binapani Mitra filed a counter-affidavit (see annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit) categorically denying having executed any agreement in favour of the petitioner. She alleged that the agreement set up by the petitioner was a forged and fabricated document having been manufactured for the purpose of this litigation. She alleged that the agreement set up by the petitioner was a forged and fabricated document having been manufactured for the purpose of this litigation. It was asserted that bitter litigation had been going on between the parties ever since 1969 with the filing of a suit by her against the petitioner in respect of certain alleged acts of nuisance committed by the petitioner and that it was inconceivable that Snit. Binapani Mitra would execute an agreement while that litigation was still going on. It was also asserted that in November, 1973 Smt. Binapani Mitra had applied to the Government of Uttar Pradesh through the District Magistrate for permission to transfer the premises in favour of her son Sri Gopal Chandra Mitra and his wife Snit. Shanta Mitra in pursuance of an agreement executed by Suit. Binapani Mitra in their favour on 1-2-1966. The said permission was granted in terms of the Government order No. 271/LC-21-(74-75) dated 23-10-75. In pursuance of the said permission the agreement dated 1-2-1966 had also been registered on 24-10-75. Under these circumstances, it was obvious that the agreement set up by the petitioner was a forged document. 8. Having regard to the aforesaid pleadings, it was obvious that the plea founded upon the agreement set up by the petitioner could not possibly have been adjudicated without the petitioners filing the agreement and making it a part of the record. The plea of the petitioner based on the agreement could, therefore, have been disposed of on the short ground that without the original no finding was possible thereon. 9. However, even on facts the appellate court cannot be said to be wrong in observing that the petitioner had failed to file the original agreement despite the orders of the court. In pursuance of an application made by Smt. Binapani Mitra before the Prescribed Authority for a direction calling upon the petitioner to produce the document in the court so that she could effectively meet the plea based on that agreement, the court directed the petitioner to produce the document for the perusal of the other side. After a few adjournments, the document was produced by the petitioner on 21-11-1974 and it appears that the agreement was examined by counsel for Smt. Binapani Mitra on that date. If the matter had rested there, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner might have had some force. After a few adjournments, the document was produced by the petitioner on 21-11-1974 and it appears that the agreement was examined by counsel for Smt. Binapani Mitra on that date. If the matter had rested there, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner might have had some force. However, from a perusal of the order sheet of the Prescribed Authority, it appears that the Prescribed Authority passed the following order, after hearing counsel for the parties on the question whether the original should not be filed in the court. "Heard the partities counsel. It is necessary that the original agreement be brought tat the court. Let it be brought on 29-5-1976 for the perusal of the court to appreciate the argument. Fix 29-5-76 for argument. Fix 10-7-1976 for hearing as prayed for by the parties counsel". Despite the above order of the court however, the petitioner did not produce the original agreement. Thereupon, an application was moved on behalf of the landlord on 21-4-1978 (see annexure-CA-V to the counter-affidavit). In this application, it was asserted by the landlord that despite the orders of the court dated 24-4-1976, the petitioner had not produced or filed the original agreement. It was, therefore, prayed that the defence of the petitioner be struck off. No objection was filed to this application. However, argument were heard on the merits of the application under section 21, and as, mentioned above, the Prescribed Authority disposed of the application without reference to the agreement for sale. The aforesaid facts make it clear that the court had not only directed the production of the agreement for the perusal of the landlady and her counsel, but had later directed the petitioner to produce the original for its own perusal for the obvious reason that it was impossible for the courts below to give any finding on the existence or genuineness of the agreement set up by the petitioner without having the advantage of having a look at the agreement. The appellate court was, therefore, justified in drawing adverse inference against the petitioner from his failure to file the agreement for sale. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, fails. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, next submitted that the appellate court allowed the application of the landlord without giving any finding whether the need of the landlord was bona fide. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, fails. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, next submitted that the appellate court allowed the application of the landlord without giving any finding whether the need of the landlord was bona fide. It was urged that the appellate court preoccupied itself only with the question of comparative hardship. In support learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of this court reported in 1979 Allahabad Law Journal (Prem Kumari Jain v. District Judge & others), 1980 All. L.J.54. I find no substance in this argument either. While there can be no dispute that an application under section 21(i)(a) cannot be allowed without a finding that the landlord requires the accommodation bona fide, in my view, in the present case such a finding has been recorded by the appellate court. 11. The appellate court adverted to the need of each and every member of the family of Gopal Chandra Mitra and believing the affidavits filed on his behalf,the appellate court reached the conclusion that Gopal Chandra Mitra does bona fide require the accommodation in dispute for his family. This is clear from a bare perusal of the judgment of the appellate court. The appellate court has accepted the plea of the landlord that he could not for various reasons set up a factory at Ghaziabad and that he genuinely desires to settle down at Allahabad. The plea of the landlord that his elder son, who had taken up a temporary employment at Maharashtra had given up that job and had returned to Allahabad has also been accepted. The case of the landlord with regard to his second son has also been accepted. The appellate court has observed that the brother of the landlord is insane and becomes violent at times and that therefore, a separate apartment was necessary for the confinement of that brother. The appellate court has noticed the various difficulties which the landlord is facing on account of lack of adequate accommodation. In fact all the factors relevant for determining the question whether the landlords bona fide requires the building under tenancy have been adverted to and considered by the appellate court. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the appellate court did not give a finding on the question whether the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation in dispute. In fact all the factors relevant for determining the question whether the landlords bona fide requires the building under tenancy have been adverted to and considered by the appellate court. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the appellate court did not give a finding on the question whether the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation in dispute. As regards the case reported in 1979 Allahabad Law Journal 319 (supra), all that has been laid down there is that the finding that the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation in question is a condition precedent to the grant of an application under section 21(i)(a). There can be no quarrel about this proposition. However, such a finding has been given in the present case. The case (Ram Bahu v. Additional District Judge, Agra) is equally inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The decision lays down that a finding based on irrelevant considerations or material which is non-existent can be reviewed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India In the present case, the finding recorded by the appellate court cannot be said to be based either on irrelevant considerations or upon any material which did not exist on the record. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that the finding of the appellate court on the question of comparative hardship is patently erroneous and arbitrary. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court (Muni Lal v. The Prescribed Authority), AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29. that a finding whether upon a comparison of respective hardship, the landlord was likely to suffer more than the tenant cannot be reviewed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being a finding on a pure question of fact. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the finding recorded by the appellate court on the question of relative hardship is neither erroneous nor arbitrary. At any rate, it does not suffer from any error of law, much less one apparent on the face of the record. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the finding recorded by the appellate court on the question of relative hardship is neither erroneous nor arbitrary. At any rate, it does not suffer from any error of law, much less one apparent on the face of the record. The appellate court considered the hardship likely to be caused to the tenant and the members of his family and compared it with that likely to be suffered by the landlord, and the various members of the latter's family and upon a comparison of the hardship likely to be caused to the two parties, the appellate court found in favour of the landlord. The factors which have been taken into account by the appellate court in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion cannot he said to be irrelevant or improper. The appellate court has taken note of the fact that the brother of the landlord is insane and is prone to become violent at times when he starts beating up the other. members of the family and that, therefore, a certain amount of segregation is necessary. A separate or exclusive apartment has, therefore, to be found for that brother. The appellate court has also considered the possible difficulties likely to be caused to the various members of the two families and it is after a comparison of the hardship likely to be caused to the tenant from the grant of the application that the appellate court allowed the appeal of the landlord. The decision cited by learned counsel for the respondent fully applies to the facts of the present case. I agree that it is not permissible to set aside the finding recorded by the appellate court in these proceedings upon a mere reappraisal of the evidence. 14. In view of what has been stated above this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. I agree that it is not permissible to set aside the finding recorded by the appellate court in these proceedings upon a mere reappraisal of the evidence. 14. In view of what has been stated above this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. In view however, of the fact that the petitioner is a practising lawyer and under the impugned orders, he is being deprived nor only of his residence but also his Chambers and further having regard to the fact that it may take him some time before he finds an alter-native accommodation, both for his residence as well as Chambers, I direct that the petitioner shall not be evicted from the premises in dispute until the 30th June, 1981. The petitioner shall hand over vacant possession of the accommodation in dispute to the respondent, landlord within this period. He shall pay to the respondent-landlord a consolidated sum equal to the rent of the building, as damages for use and occupation for the aforesaid period that is from today to 30th June, 1981 within a period of one moth from today, failing which it will be open to the respondent-landlord to enforce the order of eviction against the petitioner immediately.