ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against orders passed by the courts below refusing to set aside an ex-Parte decree for the ejectment of the petitioner from certain premises of which the respondent No. 3 was the landlord. 2. These are the relevant facts : The respondent No. 3 as the landlord of the premises in question filed a suit for the ejectment of the petitioner. A suit was registered on 8 11.1978 and 7.7.1979 was the first date for the hearing of the suit. The petitioner was not present when the suit was called out for hearing. The court proceeded exparte and decreed the suit on 27.7 1979 itself. On 1 8 1979, the petitioner moved an application for the setting aside of the ex-Parte decree on the allegations that he was not served with the summonses of the suit and neither did he have any knowledge of the fact that any suit had been filed by the landlord against him. It was also asserted that the petitioner came to know of the suit and the ex-parte decree only upon the inspection of the file of the case on 29.7.1979. Along with the application for setting aside of the ex-parte decree the petitioner also, in the purported compliance of section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, deposited a sum of Rs. 1,522.95 P. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff had claimed, in addition to the decree for ejectment, the sum of Rs. 1131.70 P. as arrears of rent from 1.9.1977 till the date of the determination of the tenancy and mesne profits, pendente Lite and future, at the rate of rent for the premises. Upon this application, the court passed an order on 1.8.1979 that the application be registered and notices be issued to the opposite party fixing 15.9.1979 for the hearing of the application. The plaintiff in response to the notices issued to him, filed an objection. In the objection one of the pleas raised was that the application of the petitioner was liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the petitioner had not deposited the entire sum which was due under the decree. It was asserted that the petitioner bad not deposited the mesne profits decreed under the suit amounting to Rs. In the objection one of the pleas raised was that the application of the petitioner was liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the petitioner had not deposited the entire sum which was due under the decree. It was asserted that the petitioner bad not deposited the mesne profits decreed under the suit amounting to Rs. 742.36 P. The court upheld the objection of the petitioner on the ground that he had not deposited the entire amount due under the decree, which according to the trial court was Rs. 2406/-. The trial court did not go into the merits of the application under section 17. 3. Aggrieved by the order passed by the trial court, the petitioner filed a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, but without any success. Hence this petition. 4. The first point submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the courts below arred in law in taking into account the sum decreed as mesne profits. It was submitted that until court fee was paid on the sum decreed as mesne profits, the same was not payable by the defendant and consequently, the defendant was not required to deposit the amount claimed as mesne profits under section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. 5. I find no substance in this argument. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act requires deposit in the court of all sums of money which are due from the defendant under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment. In my judgment, the sum decreed as mesne profits was certainly due from the defendant both under the decree as well as in pursuance of the judgment. The fact that court fee had not been paid until the making of the application by the petitioner was relevant only for determining the question of the recoverability of the amount decreed as mesne profits in execution. It, however, did not detract from the fact that the amount was claimable and due under the decree. In the case reported in A.I.R. 1978 Supreme Court, 287, their Lordships of the Supreme Court considering a somewhat similar argument held that though rent which had become time barred might have not been recoverable, nonetheless those amounts were certainly due from the defendant. In the case reported in A.I.R. 1978 Supreme Court, 287, their Lordships of the Supreme Court considering a somewhat similar argument held that though rent which had become time barred might have not been recoverable, nonetheless those amounts were certainly due from the defendant. Their Lordships drew a distinction between recoverability of an amount and the fact that it is due from the defendant. I, therefore, hold that the petitioner was liable to deposit the amount of mesne profits also under section 17 even though the plaintiff had not paid court fees on that amount till the date. 6. The next point, which has considerable substance, submitted by the petitioner was that in view of the fact that the court itself issued notices upon the petitioner's application for setting aside of the ex-parte decree on 1.8.1979, the petitioner was entitled legitimately to assume that the court had treated the deposit made by the petitioner as sufficient compliance with the formalities prescribed under section 17 and, that therefore, it was not proper for the courts below to dismiss the petitioner's application as incompetent after the expiry of the limitation, on the ground that the petitioner bad not deposited the entire sum due under the decree. In support, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on two decisions namely, A.I.R. 1931 Allahabad 727 at page 730 and A.I.R. 1977 Allahabad 390, the former being a Full Bench decision of this Courts. 7. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand urged that the provisions of section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act were mandatory and the petitioner was bound to deposit the entire amount due under the decree irrespective of the directions of the court. The decisions cited above by the counsel for the petitioner were sought to be distinquished by counsel for the respondent on the ground that those cause were not cases of deposits under the first part of the proviso to section 17 but were concerned with the sufficiency of security for the purpose of due compliance with the decree under the latter part of the said proviso. 8. Having given the matter a careful thought I am clearly of the view that the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded and that the argument is fully supported by the observations made by the Full Bench in the case of Ram Bharosey (supra). 8. Having given the matter a careful thought I am clearly of the view that the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded and that the argument is fully supported by the observations made by the Full Bench in the case of Ram Bharosey (supra). In the Ram Bharosey' case (supra) the Full Bench was concerned with the interpretation of the proviso to section 17. After an exhaustive analysis of the said provision, the Full Bench laid down certain guidelines for due compliance with the provisions of section 17. The learned Judges of the Full Bench observed that if within 30 days of the ex-parte decree the applicant files an application for setting aside an ex-parte decree along with some security, but the applicant does not specifically ask for a direction of the court as regards the sufficiency or otherwise of the security furnished by him and the court does not in fact give any directions but merely issues notice on that application, the court shall be taken to have approved of the deposit of cash or the security offered as the case might be. It was held that under the aforesaid circumstances, the court shall be deemed to have impliedly accepted the security as sufficient under that provision. Mukherji, Judge., observed that it would not be right and proper to reject the application afterwards on the ground that the security was not sufficient under the circumstances mentioned above, i.e. where the court issues notice upon the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree within the period of limitation. The reasoning given by Mukherji, J. was that if the court had instead of issuing notice on the application for setting aside of the ex-parte decree rejected it on the ground of non-compliance with the proviso to section 17, it would have still been open to the applicant to make good the deficiency within the period of limitation. The Full Bench observed thus at pages 730 and 731 : "Where an applicant, without formally applying for the court's direction, makes an application for setting aside an ex-parte decree and furnishes security with it, and the Court directs a notice to issue to the other side, it must be taken that the Court is cognizant of the fact that the applicant has furnished security as required by Section 17, Small Causes Courts Act. The order that notice should issue may be taken as an approval by the Court of the security furnished, in the circumstances disclosed by the applicant in his application and affidavit (if any). We may also take it that, the Court, by implication, gave the applicant a direction that he should furnish security of the kind actually furnished by him. This is not a mere attempt to get over what may be believed to be rather hard directions of the law. If the Court instead of issuing a notice in the case just mentioned, rejects this application because its direction has not been obtained, and if limitation has not already expired, it would be open to the applicant to make a fresh application and to furnish such security as the Court may direct. A party cannot suffer by the act of a Court, and therefore, we must accept the position that the Court has given the direction, according to law to the furnishing of the security actually furnished, where the Court instead of rejecting the application of the defendant directs that a notice should issue." 9. To my mind, the aforesaid observations apply with full force to the facts of the present case. In the case before me too, the court had chosen to issue notices upon the application of the petitioner fixing 15-9-1979 for the hearing of the application. It had directed the registration of the application and by the same order ordered issue of notices to the opposite parties. This was done on 1-8-1979, that is, well within time. The petitioner was, therefore, entitled justifiably to assume that his application was in order. If the court had not issued notices upon the petitioner's application, the conclusion would have been different. The distinction lies in the fact that by the act of the Court's issuing notice the applicant is led to believe that the formalities required to be complied with under the proviso to section 17 have been daly observed by the applicant. The dictum laid down in the case of Ram Bharosey (supra) by Mukherjee, J., is, therefore, equally applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. The dictum laid down in the case of Ram Bharosey (supra) by Mukherjee, J., is, therefore, equally applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the cases cited by the petitioner's counsel are distinguishable on the ground that the principle of an implied decision that the security furnished, whether in cash or in kind, is applicable only to those cases where the applicant seeks to rely on the latter part of the proviso to section 17 i.e. where directions are sought as regards the security required to be furnished under the second part of the proviso to section 17. Counsel contended that that principle could not be applicable where the party chooses to make a deposit under the first part of the proviso to section 17. 11. In my judgment, the principle that no one ought to suffer on account of an act of the court is equally applicable where the court issues notices upon the application filed by the defendant for setting aside of an ex-parte decree even in the case of the deposits. For, in that case also the litigant may legitimately infer from the act of the Court that the deposit made by him is sufficient. The litigant is certainly prevented by the act of court from making good the deficiency within the period of limitation which he might have done had it not been for the fact that the court had issued notices upon the application thereby implied by holding that the deposit made by the applicant was sufficient. The observations quoted above from the Full Bench decision are thus equally applicable even to the cases of all deposits. 12. In view of what has been stated above, the trial court was not justified in dismissing the petitioner's application on the technical ground that the petitioner had not deposited the entire sum due under the decree on 1-8-1979. On the facts of the present case the court should have permitted the petitioner to make good the deficiency and should have considered his application on merits. The revisional court has also for the same reason committed an error in dismissing the petitioner's revision. 13. In view of what has been stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are quashed. The revisional court has also for the same reason committed an error in dismissing the petitioner's revision. 13. In view of what has been stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are quashed. The case is remanded to the learned Judge Small Causes Court or to the court exercising powers of a Small Causes Court at Bijnor for disposing of the petitioner's application for setting aside of the ex-parte decree on merits according to law, having regard to the observations made in the judgment. There will be no orders as to costs.