ORDER A. N. Varma, J. - This is a tenant's petition. It is directed against orders passed by the courts below allowing an application moved by the plaintiff-respondent for striking off the defence of the petitioner on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Order 15 rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The courts below have held that the first date of hearing in the suit was 11.2.1977 and that on the defendant's own case as pleaded in the written statement, he was in arrears since 1.1.1977 which he did not deposit together with the interest at the rate of 9% per annum as required under Order 15 rule 5 before the first date of hearing of the suit. 2. These are the relevant facts : A suit was filed against the petitioner by the respondent No. 3 for ejectment and for recovery of certain arrears of rent. The suit was filed on 9.12.1976 that is before the Amendment of Order 15, rule 5 by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976. While registering the suit on 9.12.1976, the court directed that summons fixing 11.2.1977 for hearing and written statement be issued to the defendant (Petitioner). On 11.2.1977 the court held that the service of summonses on the defendant was sufficient and that 12.5.1977 be fixed for the hearing of the suit. On 12.5.1977 the petitioner moved an application for leave to file written statement on or before 15.7.1977. The court allowed that application and directed that 15.7.1977 be fixed for filing of the written statement. On 15.7.1977 the Presiding Officer was on leave. The date for filing of the written statement was adjourned to 4.8.1977. On 4.8.1977, the petitioner filed his written statement and on the same date, the court fixed 23.9.1977 for final hearing of the suit. The suit was, however, adjourned on 23.9.1977 to 28.10.1977 for final hearing. On 28.10.1977 on behalf of the petitioner an application was filed for permission to deposit the entire arrears of rent admitted to be due and for condonation of delay in depositing the same. The application was also accompanied by an affidavit stating that the petitioner had acted upon the advice given to him by his counsel that it was not necessary to make the deposit before that date. The application was also accompanied by an affidavit stating that the petitioner had acted upon the advice given to him by his counsel that it was not necessary to make the deposit before that date. Subsequently, on 20.3.1978 the plaintiff moved an application (13-C) for striking off the defence of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had not complied with the requirements of Order 15 rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure by making the deposits before the first date of hearing, which according to the plaintiff was 11.2.1977, the date fixed in the summons issued to the petitioner. The trial court allowed the application of the plaintiff and directed that the defence of the petitioner be struck off. The petitioner filed a revision against that order but without any success. The revisional court also held that the date of the first hearing of the suit was 11.2.1977 and that, inasmuch as admittedly the petitioner had not made any deposit of the amount admitted to be due on him before that date, his defence was liable to be struck-off, 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the facts established on the record, the first date of hearing within the meaning of Order 15 rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code was 28.10.1977 and the courts below fell into a mainfest error of law in holding that 11.2.1977 was the date of first hearing of the suit. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am clearly of the view that the date of first hearing of the suit was 28.10.1977. Counsel for the respondent did not dispute the fact that the matter would be governed by the provisions of Order 15 rule 5 as they stood prior to the Amendment made in those provisions by U.P. Act No. 57. of 1976. The case will, therefore, have to be decided with reference to the provisions of Order 15 rule 5 Civil Procedure Code as they stood prior to their Amendment and in accordance with law laid down by the authorities of this court on the interpretation of Order 15 rule 5 C.P.C., as it then stood. 5. of 1976. The case will, therefore, have to be decided with reference to the provisions of Order 15 rule 5 Civil Procedure Code as they stood prior to their Amendment and in accordance with law laid down by the authorities of this court on the interpretation of Order 15 rule 5 C.P.C., as it then stood. 5. According to the settled view of this court, the first date of hearing in a suit for the purpose of application of Order 15 rule 5 (as it stood prior to its Amendment) would be the date when the court applies for the first time its mind to the pleadings of the parties. Obviously, therefore, 11.2.1977 cannot be regarded as the date of first hearing as on that date the court merely fixed 12.5.1977 for the hearing of the case. Again on 12.5.1977 the case adjourned to 15.7.1977 for filing of the written statement, 12.5.1977 could also not be regarded as the date of first hearing, as 15.7.1977 was fixed merely for filing of the written statement. Even that date therefore, could not be regarded as the first date of hearing. In Bankey Behari v. Gopal Das, 1977(2) R.C.J. 279, a Division Bench of this court observed in para 15 of the report that a date fixed merely for filing the written statement could not be regarded as the date fixed for the hearing of the suit. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied on the observations made by the Division Bench in paragraph 14 of the report to the effect that it was conceivable that the date of filing of the written statement might also be the date of hearing of the suit, if in the summonses issued to the defendant fixing the date of filing of written statement, that date was also fixed for the hearing of the suit. I do not think that the observations made in paragraph 14 of the report helps the respondents. For I have already observed above, that in view of the fact that the court did not apply its mind to the facts of the case on 11.2.1977, that could not be regarded as the date of the first hearing of the suit. The conclusion might have been otherwise had the first explanation added to Order 15 rule 5 by the aforesaid Amendment been applicable to the present case. The conclusion might have been otherwise had the first explanation added to Order 15 rule 5 by the aforesaid Amendment been applicable to the present case. But as already observed, the case has to be decided on the basis of Order 15 rule 5 (as it stood prior to its Amendment). 6. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1980 Allahabad Weekly Cases 124. He placed emphasis on the observations made in paragraph 9 of the report to the effect that on 16th September, 1976 which was the date fixed for filing of the written statement was the first date on which any hearing in the suit could be said to have taken place. I do not think that in that decision it was laid down that a date fixed merely for filing the written statement could be regarded as the date fixed for the hearing of the suit. From a persual of the facts of that case as set out in that decision, it seems that 16th September, 1976 was fixed nor only for filing of the written statement but also for the hearing of the suit and that on that date the defendant did file his written statement. Under these circumstances, therefore, the Bench observed that 16.9.1976 could be regarded as the first date fixed for hearing of the suit. The decision cited above by the learned counsel for the respondent is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. 7. The result, therefore, is that none of the dates 12.5.1977, 15.7.1977 and 4.8.1977, which were fixed only for filing the written statement, would be regarded as the date fixed for hearing of the suit, in view of the observations made by the Division Bench in the case of Bankey Behari (supra). In the case of Ladli Prasad v. Shri Ram Shah Billa, 1975 Allahabad Weekly Cases 602, a Division Bench of this Court observed thus : "Order XV relates to disposal of suit at the first hearing. This stage is arrived after the defendant has filed his written statement, the parties have been examined under Order 10, if considered necessary to clarify the points in controversy, documents on which parties relay have been produced and admission and denial obtained; and necessary issues framed as provided under Order 14. After the framing of the issues the case is ready for hearing. After the framing of the issues the case is ready for hearing. This is the stage when Rule 5 of Order 15 comes into play. This is anterior to the stage when the parties examine their witnesses. At the stage of rule 5 of Order 15 the court is not required to record finding on disputed questions of fact which can be done only after the parties have led evidence in support of their conflicting claims." 8. Following the aforesaid decisions I hold that the first date of hearing in the present case was 28.10.1977. On that date, as mentioned above, the petitioner had moved the aforesaid application for leave to deposit the amount. The trial court ought to have permitted the defendant to make the deposit on that date as the defendant was within his rights to do so. The court committed a patent illegality in not allowing that application. The courts below refused to permit the petitioner to make the deposit on the erroneous impression that 11.2.1977 was the date of first hearing of the suit. The courts below fell into a further error of law in striking off the defence of the petitioner again on the erroneous ground that the petitioner had not made the deposits before 11.2.1977. 9. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the main basis upon which the orders passed by the courts below are founded was unsustainable. In my view, the trial court committed an illegality in not having permitted the petitioner to make the deposits on 28.10.1977. 10. In view of what has been stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 respectively on 22.8.1979 and 17.7.1979 are quashed. The case is remanded to the learned Judge Small Causes Court, Haridwar for disposing of the petitioner's application dated 28.10.1977 according to law. There will be no orders as to costs.