ORDER A.N. Verma, J. - The controversy in this case stands concluded by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Sunil Kumar Mukherjee v. Kabiraj Bindu Madho Bhattacharya, reported in 1978 All Rent Cas 74 : (1978 All LJ 1382). 2. The relevant facts for the determination of the controversy in this case are that the petitioner filed a suit for ejectment of the respondent No. 2 from a shop. In this suit before the first date of hearing, purporting to take the advantage of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the tenant deposited the entire amount of rent contemplated under that provision in the court. This move of the tenant was opposed by the landlord on the ground that the benefit of the aforesaid provision was not available to the tenant, inasmuch as, the tenant had acquired in vacant state a residential building in the same city. The trial court upheld the objection of the landlord and held that the proviso to Section 20 (4) barred the right of the tenant to claim protection contemplated under Section 20 (4), inasmuch as, the tenant had acquired a residential building in the same city. The suit of the petitioner was consequently decreed. 3. Against the decree passed by the trial court, the tenant filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The revisional court disagreed with the trial court and held that, inasmuch as, the building under tenancy was admittedly being used by the tenant for commercial or business purposes, the acquisition of a residential accommodation by the tenant could not attract the application of the proviso to Section 20 (4). On the finding, therefore, that the tenant had complied with the provisions of Section 20 (4), as a result of the deposits made by him, the revisional court allowed the revision and dismissed the suit of the petitioner. Hence this petition. From the facts narrated above, it is obvious that the only question which falls for determination in this petition is whether the proviso to S. 20 (4) of the aforesaid Act is attracted to the facts of the present case. In order to appreciate the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, it will be necessary to have Section 20 (4), in so far as.it is relevant, extracted here. It reads thus: "20 (4). In order to appreciate the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, it will be necessary to have Section 20 (4), in so far as.it is relevant, extracted here. It reads thus: "20 (4). In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of subsection (2) if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same as rent) together with interest thereof at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlords costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing of decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. 4. In the case of Sunil Kumar Mukherji (supra) a learned single Judge of this court had occasion to deal with precisely the same controversy. After analysing the provision and the principle underlying thereunder, the learned Judge observed thus: "The purposes of the proviso is clear and it is that in case the tenant has an alternative accommodation which he can use for the purpose for which he is occupying the building under his tenancy, he should not be given the benefit of sub-section (4). In the instant case, however, since the premises in question were occupied by the applicant admittedly not for residential purpose but for running a press, namely, for commercial purpose, his having built a residential building in the year 1958 would not deprive him of the benefit which he was entitled to in view of his having made the deposit as contemplated by sub-section (4). Another argument was addressed by counsel for the applicant, namely, that the proviso applied only to such buildings which had been constructed after the coming into force of the Act did not refer to such buildings which may have been constructed before its commencement. The argument is plausible but I am not expressing any final opinion on the matter, inasmuch as, the revision can be allowed on the ground already stated above." 5. I am in respectful agreement with the above statement of law. In my opinion, in the context of the aforesaid statutory provision and the purpose of the enactment of which the said provision is a part, it is obvious that the proviso to Section 20 (4) would be attracted only to those cases where the building under tenancy is in the use of the tenant for residential purpose. If the building under tenancy is being used by the tenant for the commercial or business purposes, it is obvious that the acquisition by the tenant of a residential accommodation cannot in the context of things, be relevant for determining whether the tenant ought not to be held entitled to claim the benefit contemplated under Section 20 (4). In my opinion, the tenant was clearly entitled to claim the I benefit of Section 20 (4) and the learned District Judge has rightly held so. 6. In view of what has been stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs.