JUDGMENT This Rule is directed against the judgment dated April 30, 1977 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 8th Court, Alipore in Rent Control Appeal no. 68 of 1976 setting aside the judgment dated November 27, 1973, passed by the Rent Controller, Calcutta, in Rent Control Case no. 309 of 1979. The petitioner Jatindra Kumar Chakraborty made an application under section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, on May 26, 1973 against the opposite parties who were the landlords in respect of premises no. 46, Simla Road in the town of Calcutta for the alleged disconnection of electric line of the tenant petitioner, Sri Jatindra Kumar Chakraborty before the Rent Controller, Calcutta and on the said application the said Rent Control Case no. 309 of 1973 was started. The learned Rent Controller by his judgment dated November, 27, 1973, came to the finding that the landlords opposite parties illegally disconnected the electric supply to the premises of the tenant and, accordingly, directed for restoration of supply of electricity to the said premises within a month and he also directed that the landlords opposite parties should pay a fine of Rs. 100/- each and out of such fine, if realized, a sum of Rs. 100/- would be part to the complainant as compensation. Against the said adjudication made by the learned Rent Controller the landlords preferred the said Rent Control Appeal no. 68 of 1976 to the 8th Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Alipore and by his judgment dated April 30, 1977, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the said appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the application of the tenant petitioner under Section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Against the said adjudication of that Additional District Judge an application under Article 227 of the Constitution read with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was moved by the tenant petitioner and is aforesaid the instant Rule was issued on such application. 2. At the outset of the hearing Mr. Mitra, the learned Counsel appearing for the landlords opposite parties, raised two preliminary objections about the maintainability of the instant rule. 2. At the outset of the hearing Mr. Mitra, the learned Counsel appearing for the landlords opposite parties, raised two preliminary objections about the maintainability of the instant rule. He submitted that in the absence of any formal complaint within the meaning of section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code the said application under section 31 was not maintainable or in any event the learned Rent Controller could not that the said application as a complaint and pass the said penal order of fine on the landlords opposite parties. Mr. Mitra submitted that to constitute a complaint within the meaning of section 4 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code there shall not only be allegations of the crime committed by party but there should also be a prayer to punish the accused. Mr. Mitra contended that in the instant case although there was an allegation that the landlord illegally disconnected the electric supply but no prayer was made to the extent that the accused should be punished in accordance with law and, accordingly, the said application under section 31 could not be treated as a complaint within the meaning of section 4 (1) of the Criminal procedure Code. For this contention Mr. Mitra referred to a Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (1) Durga Dutt Khema v. The State, reported in 54 C.W.N. at page 916. Dasgupta, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Court held in the said decision that to constitute a complaint within the meaning of section 4 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code there must be a prayer to inflict punishment on the accused. In the said case also a complaint was lodged before the Metropolitan Magistrate by the tenant for interfering with the essential supply in the tenanted premises but no specific prayer was made in the said case to impose penalty on the landlord and their Lordships held in the said case that as the said complaint could not be constituted as complaint within the meaning of section 4 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code the learned Magistrate was not competent to treat the said petition as complaint and proceed on the same. Mr. Mr. Mitra also referred to a decision of the Allahabad High Court made in the case of (2) Tej Singh v. State, reported in AIR 1965 Allahabad at page 508 and also another decision of the Patna High Court made in the case of (3) Hameshwar Prasad v. Bhatu Mahton & Others., reported in AIR 1958 Patna at page 11. In all the said decisions section 4 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code was taken into consideration and it was held that to constitute a complaint there must be a prayer for inflicting punishment on the accused. Mr. Mitra also referred to another Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (4) Subodh Chandra v. Jamser Mondal, reported in AIR 1949 Calcutta at page 55. In the said decision the import of section 4 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was taken into consideration by the Division Bench and Chief Justice Harries speaking for the Court held that to constitute a complaint, suitable prayer for imposing penalty should also be made. In reply to the said contention of Mr. Mitra, Mr. Chakraborty, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in the instant case no complaint was lodged with the learned Magistrate but an application under section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, was made before the Rent Controller and in the said application allegations about the overt acts committed by the landlords in disconnection the electric supply to the tenanted premises were specifically made. He submitted that there is no standard form to make a complaint and a complaint under section 4(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code can be made both orally and in writing. He submitted that the Rent Controller had exclusive jurisdiction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act to deal with an application containing allegations of interferences with essential supplies in the tenanted premises by the landlords and in the rules framed under the Premises Tenancy Act, it has been provided for that for disposing of such application containing allegations of criminal nature the Rent Controller will follow as far as possible the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Mr. Chakraborty contended that for a proceeding before the Rent Controller under Sec. 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 a complaint within the meaning of section 4(1) of the code of Criminal Procedure need not be made and he submitted that the application filed before the Rent Controller wall quite in accordance with the provisions of section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the learned Rent Controller was quite justified in passing the said order of penalty. In this connection, Mr. Chakraborty referred to the decision of (5) Bhimappa Dassappa B. Sannover v. Laxman Soma Gonda, reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. at page 1153. In the said decision the Supreme Court held that there is no form prescribed for lodging a complaint under section 4(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the complaint may be made either orally or in writing. If from the allegation made it transpires that the accused has been charged with some overt acts constituting an offence under the law such allegations will constitute a complaint within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Chakraborty also referred to a decision of the court made in the case of (6) B. Halder v. P.M. Chakraborty reported in A.I.R. 1967 Calcutta at page 6. It was held in the said decision that the Rent Controller was not a Court within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code and as such no appeal could be preferred and revisional application could be made against an order passed by the Rent Controller under the Criminal Procedure Code, but his order could be challenged in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution. Mr. Chakraborty also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Commissioner of (7) Income-tax v. Calcutta Discount Company, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. at page 1358. It was held in the said decision that procedural technicality must not influence Tribunals or Courts in granting reliefs. Mr. Chakraborty also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Commissioner of (7) Income-tax v. Calcutta Discount Company, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. at page 1358. It was held in the said decision that procedural technicality must not influence Tribunals or Courts in granting reliefs. He submitted that even assuming that a formal prayer for imposing punishment on the guilty landlords was required to be made in an application under section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, absence of such formal prayer was of very little consequence and the Tribunal was not debarred in granting relief if the Tribunal was satisfied that the landlord was guilty of the overt acts complained of in the petition. Mr. Chakraborty also submitted that the Rent Control legislation in a country suffering from acute shortage of accommodation is a beneficial legislation and the terms of such beneficial legislation must necessarily be liberal. For the said contention Mr. Chakraborty referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (8) Moni Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohr, reported in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. at page 299. Relying on the said decisions, Mr. Chakraborty submitted that the said application under section 31 was not liable to be dismissed in limine simply because a prayer was not made specifically to impose punishment on the guilty landlords. He submitted that the application contained allegations to the effect that the landlords disconnected the electric supply to the tenanted premises and under the provisions of section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the Rent Controller was competent to entertain the said application under section 31 and to dispose of the same in accordance with law. 3. After considering the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties on the question of maintainability of the said application under section 31, I am inclined to accept the contention made by Mr. Chakraborty. In my view, under the provisions of section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 31 of the said Act if the application contains allegations of overt acts interfering with essential supply and/or easement attached to the tenanted premises. Chakraborty. In my view, under the provisions of section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 31 of the said Act if the application contains allegations of overt acts interfering with essential supply and/or easement attached to the tenanted premises. Accordingly, the said application under section 31 of the Premises Tenancy Act made by the tenant is not liable to be dismissed for want of a formal prayer to impose punishment and the Rent Controller was quite competent to entertain the said application and to decide the same on merits. 4. Mr. Mitra also raised another preliminary objection to the effect that in the instant case the landlords determined the contractual tenancy of the tenant and instituted a suit for eviction against the tenant and the Court of Appeal below decreed the said suit for eviction and the tenant thereafter preferred an appeal before this Court against the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Appeal below. The said appeal is pending adjudication before the this Court and by an interim order the operation of the decree passed by the Court of Appeal below has been stayed. Mr. Mitra contended that the said application under section 31 was made at a point of time when the contractual tenancy was determined and the tenant was only enjoying the personal protection from eviction under the provisions of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act as a statutory tenant. 5. Mr. Mitra submitted that in any event after the passing of the decree for eviction by the Court of Appeal below which has not yet been set aside the said tenant even ceased to be a statutory tenant within the meaning of section 4 (h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and as such an application under Section 31 must fail on that score. 6. Mr. Chakraborty in reply to the said objection of Mr. Mitra, submitted that when the said complaint was made by the tenant no decree for eviction was passed against him and the adjudication by the Rent Controller and also the adjudication made by the Appellate Tribunal were made at a point of time when there was no decree for eviction against the tenant. According to Mr. Mitra, submitted that when the said complaint was made by the tenant no decree for eviction was passed against him and the adjudication by the Rent Controller and also the adjudication made by the Appellate Tribunal were made at a point of time when there was no decree for eviction against the tenant. According to Mr. Chakraborty it is not necessary to decide as to whether a statutory tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act can be equated at per with the contractual tenant. He submitted that so long a tenant or a statutory tenant was entitled to remain in possession under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act he was entitled to enjoy the benefits of essential supplies and/or the easement annexed to the tenanted premises and if a landlord had interfered with such essential services and/or the easement annexed to the tenanted premises of a statutory tenant, the statutory tenant was entitled to make the said application under section 31 and the Rent Controller having exclusive jurisdiction to decide such an application under section 31 would also be competent to dispose of the said application on merits. In my view, the said contention of Mr. Chakraborty is of substance and I am inclined to accept the same. 7. In my view, even after the determination of the contractual tenancy but before any decree for eviction is passed against the tenant, the statutory tenant is entitled to make an application under Section 31 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act on the allegation that electric supply was disconnected by the landlords and the Rent Controller having exclusive jurisdiction to decide an application under Section 31 will be, in such circumstances, competent to decide the said application. 8. So far as the merits of the adjudication made by the learned Additional District Judge are concerned, Mr. Chakraborty submitted that the learned Additional District Judge failed to consider the evidences adduced in the said proceeding before the Rent Controller and acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in not considering the said evidences in their proper perspective. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that the learned Additional District Judge failed to consider the evidences adduced in the said proceeding before the Rent Controller and acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in not considering the said evidences in their proper perspective. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that no evidence was adduced on behalf of the landlords in the said proceeding before the Rent Controller and it was specifically stated by the tenant and one of his sons that the landlords illegally disconnected the supply of electricity to the tenanted premises. No. suggestion was given to the witnesses examined on behalf of the tenant in respect of the said statements made by the witnesses that the landlords had disconnected the supply of electricity. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that the landlords had opportunity to lead evidence in support of their case and to put suggestion in the cross-examination that the witnesses had not stated correctly that the landlords had disconnected the electric supply and when such suggestion was not given it must be presumed that the landlord accepted the case of disconnection of the electric supply and as such they had nothing to cross-examine the witnesses. Mr. Chakraborty referred to Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (9) A.E.O. Caraplet v. A.Y. Derderian, reported in AIR 1961 Calcutta at page 359. P.B. Mukharji J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Court held that whenever the opponent has declined to avail of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination it must follow that he believed the testimony given by the witnesses and he also believed that such testimony could not be disputed. It was also held in the said decision that when suggestions are not given in the cross-examination to dispute the correctness of a testimony of a witness it must be held that such testimony was accepted to be correct and the said principle was a rule of essential justice and not merely a technical rule of evidence. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that although P.W.2, who was one of the sons of the tenant, specifically stated that the landlords disconnected the electric supply and admitted such disconnection in his presence, no cross-examination was made on that score on behalf of the landlords and no suggestion was given to the said witnesses that the said statement was incorrect. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that although P.W.2, who was one of the sons of the tenant, specifically stated that the landlords disconnected the electric supply and admitted such disconnection in his presence, no cross-examination was made on that score on behalf of the landlords and no suggestion was given to the said witnesses that the said statement was incorrect. He submitted that in such circumstances the Court of Appeal below should have accepted the said testimony to be correct on the basis of the principle enunciated by this Court in the Carapiet's case as stated hereinbefore. Mr. Chakraborty submitted that unfortunately the Court of Appeal below referred to the evidences of P.W.2, and observed that it was not understood actually who admitted what. Mr. Chakraborty also contended that the learned Judge also acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in proceeding on the footing that there was nothing to show that any electricity charge was paid by the tenant although as a matter of fact a number of electricity bills were filed before Rent Controller in the said proceedings. Accordingly, Mr. Chakraborty contended that adjudication made by the Court of Appeal below was improper and interference in revision is called for against such improper adjudication made by the Court of Appeal below acting illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. 9. Mr. Mitra, the learned Counsel, however, submitted on behalf of the landlords opposite parties that the Court of Appeal below referred to the evidences adduced in the proceeding but did not accept the said evidences to be correct. He submitted that even assuming that the Court of Appeal below mis-appreciated the evidence adduced in the case and on such mis-appreciation came to an erroneous finding no interference is called for against a finding of fact even if erroneous under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Mitra contended that the Court of Appeal below was competent to decide the fact either correctly or incorrectly but simply because the decision was not correct, interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is not called for. Mr. Mitra also submitted that the Court of Appeal below was quite justified in holding that there was nothing to show that any electricity bill was paid by the tenant. Mr. Mitra also submitted that the Court of Appeal below was quite justified in holding that there was nothing to show that any electricity bill was paid by the tenant. He submitted that it would appear from the records the after the evidences were closed, the tenant made an application for recalling P.W.2, for further cross-examination for proving electricity bills. The Rent Controller allowed such prayer for re-examination of P.W.2. to prove electricity bills. But for reasons best known to the tenant, the said P.W.2, was never examined and the electricity bills were not proved. Accordingly, the said electricity bills could not have been considered by the Court below but the trial court had placed reliance on the said electricity bills though such bills were not proved in accordance with the Evidence Act. Mr. Mitra submitted, that simply because the learned Tribunal put exhibit marks on the said electricity bills it could not be contended that the said bills were proved in the case and as such the Tribunal was called upon to consider the said bills. For this contention, Mr. Mitra referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (10) Sait Tarojee Khemch v. Y. Satyam, reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. at page 1865. It was held by the Supreme Court in the said decision that the mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with its proof. Mr. Mitra also submitted that the Court of Appeal below also took into consideration the positive evidence made by the witnesses that there was no electricity since March, 1963. He drew the attention of the Court to the deposition of P.W.3, Santi Kumar Bhattacharjee who stated that there was electricity in the house of the tenant but there was no such electric supply since March, 1963. Mr. Mitra submitted that the Court of Appeal below relied on the said evidence given by the witnesses of the tenant and held that there was no electricity since March, 1963 and as such the allegation of disconnection of the electric supply on March 26, 1973 could not be believed. 10. Mr. Mitra submitted that in the aforesaid circumstances, there was a no error apparent on the face of the record but on the contrary there was positive evidence that in the tenanted premises, there was no electricity since 1963. 10. Mr. Mitra submitted that in the aforesaid circumstances, there was a no error apparent on the face of the record but on the contrary there was positive evidence that in the tenanted premises, there was no electricity since 1963. Hence, the decision made by the Court of Appeal below must be held to be reasonable and this Court would be very slow in interfering with the impugned order of the appellate tribunal particularly when such order virtually amounted to an acquittal of an accused person, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. Mr. Chakraborty, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, in reply to the aforesaid contention of Mr. Mitra submitted that the said electric bills were filed along with a certified copy of the decision of the learned Magistrate in a proceeding under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the said electric bills were marked as exhibits and by the consent of parties formal proof of the said documents was dispensed with. For this contention Mr. Chakraborty referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (11) Kalyan Peoples' Co-operative Bank v. Dulhanbibi Acqual Amin Sahab Patil, reported in (1962)2 S.C.R. page 343. In the said case, some evidences were recorded by a Board of Arbitration Tribunal but before the closure or evidence one of the members had relied and the Board had to be reconstituted with a member in place of the said retired member. Before the subsequent Board the evidence recorded by the earlier Board were allowed to be used without any objection and the Supreme Court held that where the parties expressly or impliedly agreed to use evidence adduced before the previous Board, the party would not be permitted to object later on for such use of the evidence in the later proceeding. In my view, the said decision of the Supreme Court has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It has not been recorded by the learned Rent Controller that the parties agreed to dispense with the formal proof of the documents filed in the proceeding and/or by consent of parting, the said documents were exhibited and Mr. It has not been recorded by the learned Rent Controller that the parties agreed to dispense with the formal proof of the documents filed in the proceeding and/or by consent of parting, the said documents were exhibited and Mr. Mitra is quite justified in contending that simply because exhibit marks were put on the documents filed by a party it could be held that the said documents were proved and exhibited in the proceeding in accordance with law and as such the Tribunal was competent to consider the same. Mr. Chakraborty also submitted that the evidence adduced by P.W.3, to the effect that there was no electric supply since 1963 was obviously a mistake and it must be held that the said witness really meant that then was no electricity since 1973 and not since 1963. He therefore, submitted that the learned appellate Tribunal was wrong in replying on the said incorrect evidence of P.W.3 and deciding the case on the basis of the said evidence. 12. After considering the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties it appears to me that the statement of the said witness, Shanti Kamal Bhattacharjee, P.W.3, to the effect that there was no electricity since 1963 contradicts the evidence adduced by the tenant and his son. Unfortunately it was not contended before the Rent Controller at any point of time that a wrong recording was made with regard to such deposition of P.W.3, and no application was also made for correcting the statement of the said witness. It may be noted that there is a serious dispute between the parties as to whether there was an existing electric line on March 26, 1973 in the tenanted premises. In such circumstances, it cannot be held that the Appeal Court was patently wrong in placing reliance on the evidence of the said P.W.3. I have already indicated that the tenant petitioner for reasons best known to him, did not take any step to get the electric bills proved and exhibited in accordance with law, although on the prayer of the tenant, even after the closure of evidence, such opportunity was given by the learned Controller. I have already indicated that the tenant petitioner for reasons best known to him, did not take any step to get the electric bills proved and exhibited in accordance with law, although on the prayer of the tenant, even after the closure of evidence, such opportunity was given by the learned Controller. In the absence of proof of such bills and on the face of the statement made by P.W.3, the Appeal Court cannot be held to be wholly unjustified in coming to a finding that the case of disconnection was not properly proved. In such circumstances, in my view, no interference in revision is called for under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the Rule, therefore, fails and is discharged without, however, any order as to costs. Let the records be sent down as expeditiously as practicable.