ORDER A. N. Varma J. - This is a landlord's petitioner. It was initially filed by two persons. One Madhusudan Singh Jaiswal and the other Janardan Singh Jaiswal. the two brothers, who owned the building under tenancy. Madhu Sudan Singh Jaiswal,dies during the pendency of this petition and has been substituted by his heir and legal representatives. 2. The two aforesaid landlords filed an application under section 21(1) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for an order of eviction against Surendra Singh, the tenant, who is arrayed as respondent No. 3. The application was based on the assertion that there had been a partition in the family of the landlords as a result of which two properties mentioned in the schedule given at the foot of the application under lists "A" and "B" had come to the share of the landlords, while the accommodation in which the landlords were residing until the making of the application had fallen to the share of the other collaterals. The said collaterals had served notice on the landlords to vacate the premises in which they were then residing with their families. The landlords did not have any other accommodation for the residence of their families. It was said that the building in question had two portions one in occupation of Surendra Singh and another in occupation of Kumari Geeta Singh another tenant of the landlords. The portion which was in occupation of Surender Singh was stated to be needed for the residence of the family of Madhusudan Singh Jaiswal while that in occupation of Kumari Geeta Singh was said to be needed for the residence of the family of Janardan Singh Jaiswal. Subsequently, these landlords have been ejected in pursuance of a decree obtained by their collaterals. Thereafter, these landlords started residing as licensees with their relations The landlords were, therefore, hard- pressed for the accommodation. 3. The application was contested by the tenant, who denied that the need of the landlords was either genuine or pressing. It was said that the tenant would suffer irreparable loss if he is ejected from the accommodation in dispute. 4. The Prescribed Authority appears to have substantially accepted the version of facts as given by the landlord as regards the availability of accommodation with them and recorded a categorical finding that the need of the landlord was genuine. It was said that the tenant would suffer irreparable loss if he is ejected from the accommodation in dispute. 4. The Prescribed Authority appears to have substantially accepted the version of facts as given by the landlord as regards the availability of accommodation with them and recorded a categorical finding that the need of the landlord was genuine. However, the Prescribed Authority imposed a condition on the landlords. They were directed to make the accommodation belonging to the landlords fit for being used as a residence by the tenant within the months of making of the order by constructing a both room, a kitchen and a laterine for the tenant, failing which the application of the landlord was to stand rejected. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, both the landlords and the tenant filed appeals. The learned District Judge Mirzapur allowed the appeal of the tenant and dismissed that of the landlord. The result was that the application of the landlord stood dismissed in toto. Hence this petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that of the order passed by the appellate court is on the face of it arbitrary and unsustainable in law. Many of the basic facts referred to in the judgment of the learned District Judge, Mirzapur are demonstrably wrong. It was also contended that the finding of the learned District Judge that the landlord did not bona fide require the accommodation for their personal use and occupation is on the face of it unsustainable having arrived at without any application of mind to the evidence on record or even to the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority to the contrary. Counsel also assailed the finding on the issue of relative hardship as being totally unsustainable. 7. Counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that the application of the landlords against Kumari Geeta Singh having been allowed and the petitioner No.2 Janardan Singh Jaiswal having got the portion which was under the tenancy of Kumari Geeta Singh, the need of the landlords stood fully satisfied. Counsel also submitted that the findings recorded by the appellate court are findings which are not vitiated by any error of law and are, therefore, not liable to be reviewed In these proceedings. 8. Counsel also submitted that the findings recorded by the appellate court are findings which are not vitiated by any error of law and are, therefore, not liable to be reviewed In these proceedings. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the order passed by the appellate court is manifestly unsustainable in law. The first error disclosed by the judgment of the appellate court is that it starts with a premise which is demonstrably wrong. The learned District Judge has observed that it was admitted to the parties that the landlords were occupying the ground floor and the first floor of the building which comprised five big rooms and two verandahs and two courtyards on the ground floor and two small rooms and two shops etc. On the first floor. Counsel for the respondents was unable to point out any such admission which might have been made on behalf of the landlords. On the contrary, I find that the Prescribed Authority itself found that the landlords were occupying the first floor only of the house mentioned under item No. 1 in list "B" in the schedule given at the foot of the plaint. Further more, the consistent case of the landlords was that they were residing on the first floor accommodation of the aforesaid building. The first premises on which the decision of the appellate court is founded is thus demonstrably wrong. 9. The next observation which I wish to make is that on a mere general and vague observation that the landlords had been getting the accommodation vacated from their other tenants and disposing them of to third persons, the appellate court jumped to the conclusion that the landlords did not bona fide require the accommodation for their personal use and occupation. 10. In the schedule given at the foot of the application, the landlords had disclosed the list of the properties owned by them. From a perusal of the same, it appears that some of the properties were simply godowns. The case of the landlords was that the property disposed of by them was a godown and not a residential accommodation. The relevent question to be determined, therefore was whether the landlords had disposed of any residential accommodation after getting them vacated by their tenants. The case of the landlords was that the property disposed of by them was a godown and not a residential accommodation. The relevent question to be determined, therefore was whether the landlords had disposed of any residential accommodation after getting them vacated by their tenants. The learned District Judge ought, therefore, to have considered which properties had been disposed of by the landlords and what was their nature. 11. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners also seems to be correct. There has been practically no consideration of the issue whether as between the landlords and the tenant, who would suffer greater hardship. The learned District Judge has disposed of this issue on the short ground that it had not been pointed out by the landlords that the tenant had any other alternative accommodation available with him in the town. This was an entirely unsatisfactory way of disposing of an important issue. As has been repeatedly observed by this Court that the burden of proving relative hardship is on both the parties. Each has to demonstrate what hardship shall be suffered by it if the application is decided one way or the other (See the case reported in 1980 U. P. Rent Control Cases 285). The issue of relative hardship had, therefore, to be considered objectively with reference the concrete facts existing on the record and it could not be disposed of on the mere ground that the landlord had not pointed out that the tenant had any other accommodation available with him. It was equally for the tenant to prove that in spite of best effort, there was no accommodation available to him in the same town. 12. As regards the contention that the application of the landlords against Kumari Geeta Singh stands finally allowed, it is necessary to point out that in their application under section 21 of the Act, the landlords had set up the case that both the portions in the building in question, that is, the portion which was in the tenancy of Kumari Geeta Singh as well as Surender Singh were needed for the two families of Madhusudan Singh Jaiswal and Janardan Singh Jaiswal. The mere fact, therefore, that the landlord's application stands allowed against Kumari Geeta Singh is not and could not automatically lend to the conclusion that the need of the landlord had ceased. 13. The mere fact, therefore, that the landlord's application stands allowed against Kumari Geeta Singh is not and could not automatically lend to the conclusion that the need of the landlord had ceased. 13. Counsel for the respondents also submitted that Madhusudan Singh Jaiswal has died and that the need of his heir Ashok Kumar Jaiswal is neither bona fide nor pressing as he is already usefully occupied and is doing business outside Mirzapur. Various other subsequent facts are alleged in the counter-affidavit. As 1 am remanding the case to the appellate court, it may consider the subsequent developments also in deciding the question whether the landlord's need is bona fide or not, and if bona fide, whether it is more pressing than that of the tenant. 14. In view of what has been stated above this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the learned District Judge dated 6.3.1975 is quashed. The case is remanded to the learned District Judge Mirzapur for disposing of the two appeals according to law, having regard to the observation made in the judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs.