JUDGMENT V. D. Misra, C. J. (Oral),—This is a case where Himachal Road Transport Corporation (H. R. T. C), th3 appellant, finds that the lives of hum an beings are cheaper than the buses they run. Otherwise, as we will presently discuss, we cannot understand why a dilapidated condemned bus was still on the road. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of Mr. Roop Singh Thakur, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Mandi. The ill-fated bus was No. 1569. Admittedly, before it was converted into a bus, it was run as a truck. According to the case of the appellant himself the maximum mileage which is allowed for a bus is 1,50,000 miles. Thereafter, the bus is to be condemned. In the instant case, the bus had already done 2,41,072 kilometers. There is a dispute whether it comes to more or less than 1,50,000 miles. Calculations show that it comes at least to very near the maximum mileage if not more. But, admittedly, the maximum mileage for a truck before it is to be condemned was much less. Keeping these in view it is but apparent that the bus in question was a dilapidated condemned bus which the appellant had decided not to take off the road. We are not hare concerned with the problems of the Transport Corporation. We are more concerned with the human lives and the safety of the citizens who pay for the ride. They do not pay to be killed. 3. Before we come to the grounds which have been urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, we may record that the corporation, as the record shows, has behaved worse than a cantankerous litigant. When the respondents asked for compensation, the present appellant took all conceivable frivolous pleas in defence. These were : petition is time barred ; petitioners have no cause of action ; petition his not been brought on the prescribed form ; petition is not properly verified ; as well as that the petitioners are not the legal representatives of the deceased. The record shows that the appellant led no evidence or urged anything in respect of these issues onus of which was on the appellant. This clearly demonstrates how the appellant-corporation is out to defeat the claims of the unfortunate persons who are to bear the loss of their near and dear ones. 4. The record shows that the appellant led no evidence or urged anything in respect of these issues onus of which was on the appellant. This clearly demonstrates how the appellant-corporation is out to defeat the claims of the unfortunate persons who are to bear the loss of their near and dear ones. 4. We may also at this stage refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Trustees Bombay Port v. Premier Automobiles Ltd., [AIR 1974 SC 923] : "We are of the view, in reiteration of earlier expression on the same lines, that public bodies should resist the temptation to take technical pleas or defeat honest claims by legally permissible put marginally unjust contentions, including narrow limitation it is doubtful morality to non-suit solely on the grounds of limitation a plaintiff who is taken in by seemingly responsible representation only to find himself fooled by his credibility. Public institutions convict themselves of untrustworthiness out of their own mouth by resorting to such defences." A division bench of the Gujarat High Court in Visava Hiraben v, Ishwar-Bharti Karsanbharti Gauswami and another, [AIR 1977 Gujarat 146], while commenting on the conduct of the public bodies raising technical pleas observed thus : "The law relating to compensation in motor accident cases has been enacted by the State for the benefit of the dependents of the unfortunate victims and it is surprising that when it comes to the implementation of the said law, the limbs of the State should try to defeat a claim not on merits but on technical plea such as "narrow limitation” One could only hope that bearing in mind the injunction of the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case, the second opponent would desist from raising such pleas in future at least in cases where the delay is not inordinate." Another judgment may also be noticed. It is from the State of Haryana v Darshan Devi and others, [1979 ACJ 205]. It reads : "The second principle the State of Haryana has unhappily failed to remember is its duty under Article 41 of the Constitution to render public assistance, without litigation, in cases of disablement and undeserved want. It is from the State of Haryana v Darshan Devi and others, [1979 ACJ 205]. It reads : "The second principle the State of Haryana has unhappily failed to remember is its duty under Article 41 of the Constitution to render public assistance, without litigation, in cases of disablement and undeserved want. It is a notorious fact that our highways are graveyards on a tragic sale, what with narrow, neglected roads reckless, unchecked drivers, heavy vehicular traffic and State Transport buses often inflicting the maximum casualties The victims, as here, are mostly below the poverty line and litigation is compounded misery." It may be noticed, as already stated, that the present appellant had un-successfully raised all technical and other pleas which one could think of without trying to substantiate any one of could think of without trying to substantiate any one of them. 5 The first contention raised by Mr. Rattan Singh, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that the claimants have failed to prove the negligence or rashness of the driver and that the burden of proof was on the petitioners-respondents. He has taken us through the statements of some of the witnesses to show that none of them has stated about the negligence of the driver. We are afraid that the whole approach to the question is absolutely erroneous. The persons travelling in the bus had stated that the bus was overloaded and even some persons were sitting on the engine/bonnet of the bus. The bus had been taken very near the outer edge of the road from where it fell into the khud. As many as nine parsons, including the driver, were killed and many received injuries. 6. The only person who was produced on behalf of the appellant was the conductor Mast Ram. He was confronted with his earlier statement made before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kulu who held an enquiry into this accident This conductor had expressly stated before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the bus was overloaded and it had to be started by pushing it over some distance. However, before the Tribunal he had the audacity to swear that the bus was not carrying any extra passenger at all. We do not know why the Tribunal did not order the prosecution of this conductor for perjury. Be that as it may, he was rightly disbelieved. 7. However, before the Tribunal he had the audacity to swear that the bus was not carrying any extra passenger at all. We do not know why the Tribunal did not order the prosecution of this conductor for perjury. Be that as it may, he was rightly disbelieved. 7. In the circumstances of this case the maxim of res ipsa loquitur applies. The buses are not supposed to leave the road and roll down into the khuds. If they do so, a heavy burden lies only on the appellant to show that all reasonable care had been taken and there was no negligence. These facts are within the knowledge of the appellant which ha should have come forward with. 8. In a case decided by the Division Bench of this court reported as State of Punjab v. Harbhajan Lal Kochhar and others, [1980 ACJ 437] the following observations of Asquith, L. J. in Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd., were reproduced : "If the defendants omnibus leaves the road and falls down an embankment and this without more is proved, then res ipsa loquitur there is a presumption that the event is caused by negligence on the part of the defendants, and the plaintiff succeeds unless the defendants can rebut this presumption” 9. We now come to the next contention of Shri Rattan Singh. It is urged that the compensation awarded in respect of the deceased is highly unjust. According to the learned counsel, the deceased, who was working as a clerk of an Advocate in Kulu and was also a lambardar, could not be making Rs. 400 to Rs. 500 monthly. We have been taken through the statement of Shri Bhupinder Singh, Advocate, whose munshi the deceased was. He has categorically stated that the deceased was earning not less than Rs. 400 or Rs. 500 per month. A Harijan Lambardar named Chhalu, P. W. 15, was examined to show that the income of the deceased as Lambardar was about Rs. 100 to Rs. 200 per month. It appears from the statement of Chhalu that he has succeeded the deceased as Lambardar. It may be noticed that the cross- examination of these two witnesses was not conducted to show that it was not possible for the deceased to make that much of money. We, therefore, find nothing wrong in the Tribunals taking the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. It may be noticed that the cross- examination of these two witnesses was not conducted to show that it was not possible for the deceased to make that much of money. We, therefore, find nothing wrong in the Tribunals taking the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 400 per month. On the other hand we find that the multiplier of only fifteen years purchase was used when the age of the deceased at the time of death was 35 or 36 years only. However, we would not like to say anything more. 10. Before parting, we would like to express our dismay that the Tribunal did not award costs to the respondents. It is a notorious fact that every person who comes to the court has to spend heavily in addition to the fees of the lawyers and court fee stamps etc. Awarding of costs hardly means a fair pro portion of the amount which a litigant infect spends. Even according to the general rule that the cost should follow the event, a successful litigant should not ordinarily be denied his costs. 11. The appeal is dismissed in limine. Appeal dismissed. -