ORDER P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. An interesting question of some importance is raised for decision in this case. In response to a citation issued to the respondent in a petition for grant of letters of administration with the Will annexed the respondent appeared in court and after taking time filed his objection. That objection is on record. At that stage the petitioner moved the court praying that the proceedings should be declared non contentious and the application for grant of letters of administration disposed of accordingly. This was objected to by the respondent who had contested the validity of the Will in the objection. The reason for seeking the order of the court that the proceedings were to be treated as non contentious was that, as required by the rules, the respondent had failed to enter a caveat and file an affidavit within 14 days of the entry of the caveat as required by the rules framed by the High Court under the Indian Succession Act. The court below did not agree with this contention and held that notwithstanding the failure to enter caveat the respondent was entitled to contest the proceedings and the proceedings for grant of letters of administration had to be disposed of not as non contentious proceedings. The petitioner in the petition has filed this revision against that order. 2. It may be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions in the Indian Succession Act to appreciate the contentions of the parties in this case. S.264 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 confers jurisdiction on the District Judge to grant or revoke probates and letters of administration in all cases within his District. S.268 makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings of the court of the District Judge in relation to the grant of probate and letters of administration save as otherwise provided in the Act. Of course, this will be to the extent the circumstances of the case permit. An adjudication by a court in a probate application is a proceeding in rem. A probate or letter of administration shall have effect over all the property and estate, movable or immovable of the deceased throughout the State in which the probate is granted. Of course, this will be to the extent the circumstances of the case permit. An adjudication by a court in a probate application is a proceeding in rem. A probate or letter of administration shall have effect over all the property and estate, movable or immovable of the deceased throughout the State in which the probate is granted. The proviso to S.273 contemplates probate and letters of administration by the High Court which will have, unless otherwise directed by the grant, effect throughout the other States. Such probates granted under the proviso to S.273 are to be notified by the issue of a certificate to certain other courts including each of the other High Courts. S.276 deals with the contents of an application for probate and S.278 deals with the contents of an application for letters of administration. S.284 which is particularly relevant for the purpose of this case deals with the lodging of caveats and the procedure thereon. That section reads: "284. (1) Caveats against the grant of probate or administration may be lodged with the District Judge or a District Delegate. (2) Immediately on any caveat being lodged with any District Delegate, he shall send copy thereof to the District Judge. (3) Immediately on a caveat being entered with the District Judge, a copy thereof shall be given to the District Delegate, if any, within whose jurisdiction it is alleged the deceased had a fixed place of abode at the time of his death, and to any other Judge or District Delegate to whom it may appear to the District Judge expedient to transit the same. (4) The caveat shall be made as nearly as circumstances admit in the form set forth in Schedule.5". When once such a caveat has been lodged no proceedings are to be taken on a petition for probate or letters of administration until after notice to the person by whom the same has been entered has been given. This is provided in S.285 of the Act. When the proceedings for probate or letters of administration become contentious that has to take the form of a regular suit according to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioner for probate or letters of administration shall be the plaintiff, and the person who has appeared to oppose the grant shall be the defendant. When the proceedings for probate or letters of administration become contentious that has to take the form of a regular suit according to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioner for probate or letters of administration shall be the plaintiff, and the person who has appeared to oppose the grant shall be the defendant. It may be useful to set down the provision in S.295 of the Act here. That reads thus: "295. In any case before the District Judge in which there is contention, the proceedings shall take, as nearly as may be, the form of a regular suit, according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in which the petitioner for probate or letters of administration, as the case may be, shall be the plaintiff, and the person who has appeared to oppose the grant shall be the defendant". It is pertinent to note that the Act does not specify at what stage a proceeding for grant of probate or letters of administration turns to be contentious. The indication in S.295 is that it would be treated as a suit when there is contention. 'Contention', no doubt, is a term to which reference has been made in the explanation to S.286 as meaning the appearance of anyone in person, or by his recognised agent or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf, to oppose the proceeding. 3. On a close consideration of the relevant provisions I do not think that there is any scope for the plea that unless a caveat is entered by a person who intents to oppose an application for the grant of letters of administration the proceedings should be declared non contentious, and ought not to be treated as a suit as contemplated by S.295 of the Act. It is true that provision has been made to enable a caveat to be lodged. That does not necessarily mean (I am now speaking de hors the rule framed by the High Court in 1970 to which I will make reference in due course) that unless a caveat is filed any person to whom a citation has been issued by the court one who intents to oppose the grant of the letters of administration is precluded from raising his objection. There is no provision in the Act which would justify such a view being taken. There is no provision in the Act which would justify such a view being taken. The provision in regard to lodging of a caveat is to be understood as an enabling provision intended to protect the rights of any person who may be interested in protecting himself against the grant of letters of administration without his having notice of the filing of such application. A decision in a probate application is one not only affecting parties to it but one which affects the whole world being a judgment in rem and therefore the advisability of a provision for protection of the interests of persons interested in opposing an application by alerting the court to the need of issuing citation to them. A caveat serves this purpose. A person may lodge a caveat and once that is lodged he is entitled to notice before the court passes the order on any application for probate or letters of . administration. He gets intimation so much so that he can ascertain whether the facts stated in the application for probate or letters of administration are true and he can then decide whether he should oppose the grant. May be that probate or the letter of administration is prayed for in accordance with what he considers to be the legitimate right of the applicant and himself. May be it is not the grant of any letters of administration to the applicant that is really opposed but the grant in the manner prayed for. That means he must have occasion not necessarily to oppose the grant of letters of administration but to ascertain and satisfy himself whether the application is objectionable. That opportunity he gets by lodging a caveat, for, when once he does that he is protected since there can be no disposal without notice to him. The term 'caveat' is defined as a notice not to do an act, given to some officer, ministerial or judicial, by a party having an interest in the matter. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. I, P. 437). "It is a formal caution or warning not to do the act mentioned, and is addressed frequently to prevent the admission of Wills to probate, the granting of letters of administration." The filing of a caveat to the probate of a Will does not by itself constitute a contest, for, a person who files a caveat need not contest at all. Therefore the provision in S.284 of the Indian Succession Act enabling a person to file a caveat by itself need not be taken to be one which obliges any person who desires to contest an application for grant of letters of administration to file caveat in the first instance. De hors any other provision I would have no hesitation in thinking that a caveat may not be obligatory. That this is the position has been held by the Punjab Chief Court in Khazan Das v. Ram Saran Das (6 IC 650). The provision that caveat 'may' be lodged was noticed by that court and the court was of the view that the law does not say that anyone wishing to oppose an application 'must' lodge a caveat. Therefore non filing of a caveat was considered to be inconsequential in that case. The same view was expressed by the High Court of Calcutta in Bhobatanni Debi v. Hari Charan Banarjee (36 1916 IC 38). In that case a citation was issued to the respondent and the respondent, on the basis of such citation appeared and claimed her right to be heard. The mere non filing of a caveat did not involve any consequence adverse to the person who sought to oppose the grant in that case. 4. Rules are now in force in this State relating to proceedings under the Indian Succession Act in the High Court and in the Subordinate Courts. These rules dated 29th June, 1970 were published in the Gazette, dated 28th July 1970 and from that date they came into force. It appears that it was the decision of this Court in Chithalan v. Ammu Amma and others ( 1968 KLJ 123 ), that alerted this Court to frame rules under the Indian Succession Act, for, it was noticed by a Division Bench of this Court in that decision that while in other States rules have been framed under the Act such rules have not been framed in this State. The case which was dealt with in that decision was one where there were applications for grant of letters of administration and probate in respect of the estate of one and the same person. In none of those applications the procedure envisaged by the Indian Succession Act had as such been adopted. The case which was dealt with in that decision was one where there were applications for grant of letters of administration and probate in respect of the estate of one and the same person. In none of those applications the procedure envisaged by the Indian Succession Act had as such been adopted. It was not as if at any stage the proceedings were treated as if they were suits and thereafter as contentious suits they were dealt with. Evidently this came to the notice of the court in that case. This court was of the view that the rules framed for trial of applications for the grant of probate or letters of administration by the Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts and the rules of the probate practice in English Courts (Tristram and Coote's Probate Practice, 19th Edition) so far as they apply can be usefully followed until rules are framed binding on this Court. It was also noticed that these rules indicate that when a caveat is entered after an application is made for grant of probate or letters of administration objection supported by an affidavit shall be filed within the time fixed in the rules and the objection shall state the right and interest of the caveator and the ground of objection to the application. The Division Bench observed that the procedure consistent with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act and reaffirmed by the rules in force in the several High Courts should have been followed in the trial of the petitions notwithstanding the absence of rules framed by the High Court of Kerala. The Division Bench further observed thus: "If that had been done, we are constrained to observe that many of the complaints raised before us regarding the illegality and irregularity in the trial could have been avoided". 5. But the more important and relevant point is that the Division Bench did not consider the absence of filing of a caveat in those cases as in any way fatal to trying those applications as suits as contemplated by S.295 of the Act. In fact the court noticed in Para.7 in regard to the petitions which the court dealt with that no caveat was entered by any of the objectors to the Original Petitions. In fact the court noticed in Para.7 in regard to the petitions which the court dealt with that no caveat was entered by any of the objectors to the Original Petitions. But the court nevertheless said thus: "Persons opposing the grant should have been made defendants or respondents to O.P. 705 of 1964 and it should have been numbered as a suit. None of these courses were adopted". The mere fact that caveat was not entered did not result in the consequence of the proceedings being considered as non contentious. S.295 of the Act, as already mentioned, refers to 'contention' and the explanation to S.286 explains the term contention as 'appearance to oppose a proceeding'. 6. Now I will consider whether the framing of the rules later did make any difference. It goes without saying that the situation under the Indian Succession Act before rules were framed under the provisions of the Act cannot be changed materially by the framing of the rules. In other words the rules cannot be read as going beyond the provisions of the Act. The rules have to be read and understood as subserving the provisions of the Act and as intended to implement the general purpose of the Act. 7. A non contentious proceeding has been defined in the rules under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the rules) thus: "4. Non contentious proceedings.- Non contentious proceeding shall include proceedings for obtaining probate and letters of administration (with or without the Will annexed, and whether general, special or limited) where there is no contest as to the right thereto or where there has been contest, it has been terminated, and all ex parte proceedings to be taken in the court in matters of testacy and intestacy, not being proceedings in any suit, and also the procedure of lodging caveats against the grant of probate or letters of administration". R.15 deals with the issue of citation to all persons having superior or equal right to the grant, unless such persons have signified their consent to the application. R.22 deals with caveat. Any person intending to oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration shall either personally or by his advocate file a caveat as prescribed in Schedule V to the Act. R.22 deals with caveat. Any person intending to oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration shall either personally or by his advocate file a caveat as prescribed in Schedule V to the Act. The rule further provides that the notice of the filing of the caveat shall be given to the petitioner or his advocate in Form No. 8. It is the language of the rule that has led to the controversy in this case. The rule says that "any person intending to oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration shall either personally or by his advocate file a caveat". According to learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner, there is a mandatory requirement under the rule and hence without filing such a caveat there shall be no opposition to the grant of probate or letters of administration. In this context reference may be made to Form No. 8 also. This is a form of a notice of caveat to be issued by the court to the advocate for the petitioner. That informs the advocate for the petitioner that a caveat was filed in the office of the court in the petition by the persons specified therein. R.23 deals with filing of an affidavit in support of the caveat. Where a caveat is entered after an application has been made for grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed, the affidavit or affidavits in support shall be filed within fourteen days of the caveat being lodged. Grounds of objections, among other things, are to be stated in that affidavit. R.24 deals with a case where a caveat is filed before the application for grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the Will annexed is presented. In such a case when the application is subsequently presented notice is to be issued to the caveator forthwith calling upon such caveator to file his affidavit or affidavits in support of his caveat within fourteen days from the service of such notice. R.25 deals with the consequence of non filing of affidavit and that rule reads thus: "25. Consequence of not filing affidavit.- Where the caveator fails to file any affidavit in support of his caveat as required in R.23 or 24, the caveat may be discharged by an order to be obtained on application to the court". R.25 deals with the consequence of non filing of affidavit and that rule reads thus: "25. Consequence of not filing affidavit.- Where the caveator fails to file any affidavit in support of his caveat as required in R.23 or 24, the caveat may be discharged by an order to be obtained on application to the court". A caveat becomes ineffective on the failure to file affidavit. R.26 which refers to conversion of application into suit is also relevant and that rule reads thus: "26. Conversion of application into suit.- Upon the affidavit in support of, the caveat being filed, notice whereof shall simultaneously be given by the caveator to the petitioner, the proceedings shall be ordered by the Court to be numbered as a suit in which the petitioner for probate or letters of administration shall be the plaintiff and the caveator shall be the defendant, the petition for probate or letters of administration being registered as and deemed as a plaint filed against the caveator, and the affidavit filed by the caveator being treated as his written statement in the suit. The procedure in such suit shall, as nearly as may be; be according to the provisions of the code". I may also make reference in this context to Form No. 5 which relates to the notice of citation for personal service. This I am referring to because it was noticed in this form that was served upon the respondent in this case and is to be served on any respondent in accordance with R.17. That gives notice to the respondent that the petition for the grant of probate or letters of administration shall be heard on the specified date and that the respondent may appear on that date to show cause why such probate or letters of administration should not be granted. That further gives notice that if no cause is shown the court will proceed to grant such probate or letters of administration, the absence of the respondent notwithstanding. This form is part of the rules framed by the High Court and it does not call upon any objector to file a caveat. On the other hand it calls upon the objector to file his objection. If in response to such notice objection is filed the objection must necessarily be considered, for, the filing of an objection is not an empty formality. On the other hand it calls upon the objector to file his objection. If in response to such notice objection is filed the objection must necessarily be considered, for, the filing of an objection is not an empty formality. It is the form which points out what course is to be adopted. In this case pursuant to the receipt of this notice the respondent appeared. The respondent applied for time to file objection. The court granted time posting the case to a specific date for filing objection. He did file objection to the grant on that day. It is in this context that the application was made by the petitioner to declare the proceedings non contentious evidently relying upon the language of R.22 that any person intending to oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration has necessarily to file a caveat. What the respondent did was to respond as he was called upon to and nevertheless it is now contended that it would not be sufficient. 8. I do not understand R.22 as obliging a person to file a caveat even when a citation has been issued to him to file his objection and he does file objection. R.22 has to be read and understood in the context of the scheme of the Act. The purpose of a provision must weigh with any court while applying that provision or a rule made in furtherance of that provision. I have already indicated that the purpose of S.284 of the Indian Succession Act is not to lay an obstacle in the path of a person who desires to object to the grant of probate or letters of administration but is an enabling provision giving a person who desires to be notified of the motion for grant of probate or letters of administration an opportunity in order that he may contest if he finds that contest is called for. Viewing R.22 in that background it appears to me that if a person requires notice from the court of any motion for grant of probate or letters of administration he must lodge a caveat. In other words if he does not lodge a caveat he cannot have a complaint later that he did not have occasion to know of the proceeding. But the failure to lodge a caveat does not preclude him from filing objection. In other words if he does not lodge a caveat he cannot have a complaint later that he did not have occasion to know of the proceeding. But the failure to lodge a caveat does not preclude him from filing objection. If he wants to oppose the grant and for that purpose he requires the benefit of a response to the caveat he shall file a caveat. If he does not seek the advantage arising from lodging a caveat he is not obliged to file a caveat. In this view I am not called upon to consider whether the provision in R.22 is mandatory or directory. The rule has to be read as an enabling provision only and not as precluding a person invited to court to oppose an application and responding appropriately thereto from being precluded under the rule to object. That is not the content of the rule. 9. Had I been called upon to consider whether the rule as mandatory or otherwise I would have had no hesitation to say that it is directory only. It is now well settled that whenever a court is called upon to construe the character of a provision several factors need to be born in mind by the court. The nature of the provision, its setting and context, the purpose sought to be achieved, whether non compliance with the provision is of material consequence to any of the parties, whether the provision is intended to confer a benefit, are matters which are of relevance in deciding whether the provision is mandatory or not. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. V. K. Kangan ( AIR 1975 SC 2190 ), while considering the nature of the requirement of a notice under R.3(b) of the Land Acquisition Rules, "one must look into the subject matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured." The court further said thus: "No doubt, all laws are mandatory in the sense they impose the duty to obey on those who come within its purview. But it does not follow that every departure from it shall taint the proceedings with a fatal blemish. The determination of the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law maker. But it does not follow that every departure from it shall taint the proceedings with a fatal blemish. The determination of the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law maker. And that has to be gathered not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequences which would follow from construing it in one way or the other. We see no reason why the rule should receive a permissible interpretation instead of a peremptory construction". Provisions of statutes arising for construction call for such construction in the light of the object of the provisions construed. There may be statutes intended to confer safeguards on persons who may consent against their own interests because of the situation in which they are. I may illustrate by reference to the provision that came up before the Supreme Court in Ramachandra v. Govind ( AIR 1975 SC 915 ). S.5(3)(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act enables a tenant to terminate tenancy at any time by surrendering his interest as a tenant in favour of landlord. But this was the subject of a proviso "provided that such surrender shall be in writing and shall be verified before the Mamlatdar in the manner prescribed". It was the nature and character of this provision that came up for decision in that case. That the provision was intended to confer benefit of the tenant was certainly of consequence. Keeping this in view the court said thus: "Thus the imperative language, the beneficent purpose and importance of these provisions for efficacious implementation of the general scheme of the Act all unerringly lead to the conclusion that they were intended to be mandatory. Neglect of any of these statutory requisites would be fatal. Disobedience of even one of these mandates would render the surrender invalid and ineffectual". Keeping the provision in R.22 in the proper perspective it is difficult to assume that the law was anxious to defeat on a technical approach the rights of a person who wanted to object to the grant of letters of administration. In fact there would be anxiety on the part of the court to secure an opportunity for contest wherever there is scope for contest. Such opportunity is not to be defeated by technical rules. In fact there would be anxiety on the part of the court to secure an opportunity for contest wherever there is scope for contest. Such opportunity is not to be defeated by technical rules. If so I would not think that in the context in which the rule appears and in the background of the provisions to which I have made reference, I would have no hesitation in holding that the rule was directory and not mandatory if that called for decision in this case. 10. Even otherwise I could reach the same result by another process. The notice issued to the party by way of citation called for compliance in the manner indicated therein and when a party complies with it the consequence must naturally follow. A party cannot be told that you have complied with the direction by the court but it is of no consequence and notwithstanding such compliance you will be found to be a defaulter. I therefore find that the court below was right in treating the proceedings as contentious. The court should proceed in accordance with S.295 of the Act. 11. In the light of what has been pointed out here a look into R.22 and Form No. 5 in the rules by the High Court is called for. 12. I have tried to deal with S.295 of the Indian Succession Act and allied provisions a little exhaustively here because it is of common knowledge that the Subordinate Courts are quite often ignoring the said provisions in trying petitions for probate and letters of administration. In every case for grant of letters of administration or of probate under the Act it would be necessary and advisable to keep in view the provisions to which attention has been drawn here. 13. Before closing I must place on record my appreciation for the efforts of counsel on both sides and particularly the junior counsel for the petitioner Sri James Vincent who has shown considerable industry in the study of the case and has taken pains to highlight the law on the point. The Revision is dismissed. No costs.