JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - The Petitioners, the workmen of the Orissa Police Co-operative Syndicate, a society registered under the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 and admittedly an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, have filed this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the quashing of the decisions of the Industrial Tribunal holding that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference made to it by the Government of two questions, namely, whether the workmen of the Orissa Police Co-operative Syndicate Limited, were entitled to any medical and house rent allowances, and if admissible, the rates thereof. 2. The Petitioners contend that since 1968 they have formed a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 in the name and style of 'Orissa Police Co-operative Syndicate Employees Union'. At various times disputes have been referred by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication and awards have been passed and implemented. Some disputes have also been resolved in course of conciliation proceedings. In 1974 the Union submitted a Charter of Demands to the employer, (hereinafter called the Syndicate) claiming payment of medical allowance and house rent allowance to the employees. Conciliation proceeding ending in failure, the Government in exercise of its powers u/s 10(1) read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, referred the following disputes to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication: 1. Whether the workmen of Orissa Police Cooperative Syndicate limited, Cuttack, are entitled to any medical allowance. If so at what rate? 2. Whether the workmen of Orissa Police Co-operative Syndicate Limited, Cuttack are entitled to house rent allowance? If so, at what rate? 3. Before the Tribunal, the Syndicate raised a question of maintainability of the reference contending that having regard to Section 68 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962, the reference was not competent and disputes, if any, was capable of being adjudged by the registrar or his nominee as provided in the Co-operative Societies Act. The question of maintainability was heard as a preliminary issue and the Tribunal held: ...Explanation I to Sub-section (1) of Section 68 of the Orissa Act has clearly taken the matter out of the realm of judicial interpretation and put it in express words as a part of the statute itself. The question of maintainability was heard as a preliminary issue and the Tribunal held: ...Explanation I to Sub-section (1) of Section 68 of the Orissa Act has clearly taken the matter out of the realm of judicial interpretation and put it in express words as a part of the statute itself. The Legislature has clearly stated that a claim in respect of any sum payable by a society to a past or present servant shall be a dispute and that too a dispute touching the business of the society within the meaning of the section, and as such with regard to such a claim there is no scope for any judicial interpretation on the meaning of the expression 'touching the business of the society. In view of such clear and express statutory explanation, obviously the principle decided in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Others, and Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Others Vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal and Others, can not have any application to the facts of this case. In Orissa the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies has exclusive jurisdiction with regard to claims in respect of any sum payable by the society to its past or present servants or employees and he has been duly authorised under law to decide the matter. Rule 78 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules, 1965 empowers the Registrar, the Arbitrator or any other person deciding the dispute to give its decision or award in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience. On the aforesaid holding the Tribunal declined jurisdiction and gave decision against the employees. 4. Mr. S.B. Nanda, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, made the following submissions: (a) The tribunal has missed the core of the problem. The question should have been decided against a broad canvass, namely, whether the dispute between the employer and employees partook the character of an industrial dispute and if so, the forum for its adjudication; (b) An industrial dispute-was out side the purview of Section 68 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act and was not a dispute 'touching the business of the society'. (c) The jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate such an industrial dispute should have been decided by taking into account the objects, schemes and purposes of the two Acts and the powers of the created authorities to grant relief thereunder; (d) The Tribunal should have held that in regard to the dispute, the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act was the general statute and the Industrial Disputes Act was the special statute and the provisions of the latter Act would prevail over that of the former; (e) The tribunal erroneously distinguished the two Supreme Court decisions in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Others, and Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Others Vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal and Others. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Farkhundali Nannhay Vs. V.B. Potdar and Another, was inapplicable and had in fact been distinguished by a Full Bench of the said High Court in Rambhau Jairam Dhamange and Others Vs. The President, Vinkar Co-operative Society Ltd., Chanda and Others, . (f) There is a consensus of judicial opinion in the country holding the disputes partaking the character of industrial dispute was outside the jurisdiction of the Registrar and of the Civil Courts and is entertainable only by the authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. Mr. Nanda drew our attention to a catena of the decisions of the Supreme Court and various High Courts, in furtherance of the aforesaid submission and we would notice such of them as are apt in course of our judgment. 6. Mr. C.V. Murty appearing for the Syndicate strongly relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Farkhundali Nannhay Vs. V.B. Potdar and Another, and of the Calcutta High Court in Workmen's Co-operative Industrial Home, Ltd. Vs. First Industrial Tribunal and Others, and submitted that having regard to the non-obstante clause in Section 68(1), the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were not attracted and the Registrar alone had jurisdiction to entertain the disputes. He referred to Sub-sections (3) and (4) of the Section 68 which are to the following effect: (3) No dispute referred to in this section shall be entertained in any Civil Court and the decision of the Registrar in this respect shall, subject to the provisions of Section 70 be final. He referred to Sub-sections (3) and (4) of the Section 68 which are to the following effect: (3) No dispute referred to in this section shall be entertained in any Civil Court and the decision of the Registrar in this respect shall, subject to the provisions of Section 70 be final. (4) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. He further submitted that the Legislature intended that a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken against the employee could not be adjudicated u/s 68. Dispute regarding disciplinary action alone had been taken out of the purview of adjudication u/s 68 of the Act. Nothing deterred the Legislature to exclude other types of industrial disputes as exceptions. According to him, the intention, therefore, was clear that except dispute regarding disciplinary action, other types of disputes could be decided by the Registrar. 7. Sri D.P. Mohanty made a motion to us that he had matters pending wherein identical questions are involved and was permitted by us to argue. He laid stress on Explanation I to Section 68 and contended that having regard to the said provision, any dispute involving monetary claim being a dispute touching the business of the society within the meaning of Section 68, the Registrar alone was the authority to entertain and adjudicate the said dispute and the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act being a special Act could override the Industrial Disputes Act, which is a general Act. He further drew attention to Section 121 ousting jurisdiction of Civil Court and Revenue Courts in respect of any dispute required u/s 68 to be referred to the Registrar. 8. Sri R.K. Patra, learned Additional Government Advocate, placed almost all the decisions of the various High Courts and the Supreme Court assisting us in the exposition of the principle. We are indebted to all of them for their assistance. 9. The questions do not present such difficulty after assistance has been rendered to us by way of reference to a host of authorities and to the exhaustive treatment of the Industrial Law in Malhotra's Law of Industrial Disputes. We are indebted to all of them for their assistance. 9. The questions do not present such difficulty after assistance has been rendered to us by way of reference to a host of authorities and to the exhaustive treatment of the Industrial Law in Malhotra's Law of Industrial Disputes. From the contentions raised by the counsel, the following questions are distilled for consideration: (i) If a dispute part-taking the character of an industrial dispute between the employees of a co-operative society and the society is an issue to be entertained and decided by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies u/s 68 of the Orissa Cooperative Societies Act or is the dispute to be resolved under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act? and (ii) Whether such a dispute is one touching the business of the society? 10. To appreciate the problem, it is necessary to understand the objects and schemes of the two Acts. From the statement of objects of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 we gather that the enactment is to specially provide for development of co-operation. The preamble does not throw much light, which reads: An Act to consolidate and amend law relating to Co-operative Societies. Like similar Acts in the other States the object is to strengthen and develop co-operative movement in the State. The object is promotion of economic interest of the members of the society in accordance with co-operative principles. 11. The scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. in Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. D.J. Bahadur and Others, . The I.D. Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions, provide the mechanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure so that the energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in counter productive battles and assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of good will. Industrial peace is a national need and, absent law, order in any field will be absent. Chaos is the enemy of creativity sans which production will suffer. Thus, the great goal to which the I.D. Act is geared is legal mechanism for canalising conflicts along conciliatory or adjudicatory processes. The objective of this legislation and the component of social justice it embodies were underscored in the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Chaos is the enemy of creativity sans which production will suffer. Thus, the great goal to which the I.D. Act is geared is legal mechanism for canalising conflicts along conciliatory or adjudicatory processes. The objective of this legislation and the component of social justice it embodies were underscored in the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and Others, thus: To sum up, the personality of the whole statute, be it remembered has a welfare basis, it being a beneficial legislation which protects labour, promotes their contentment and regulates situations of crisis and tension where production may be imperilled by untenable strikes and black mail lock-outs. The mechanism of the Act is geared to conferment of regulated benefits to workmen and resolution, according to a sympathetic rule of law, of the conflicts, actual or potential, between managements and workmen. Its goal is amelioration of the conditions of workers tempered by a practical sense of peaceful co-existence, to the benefit of both-not a neutral position, but restraints on laissez faire and concern for the welfare of the weaker lot. Empathy with the statute is necessary to understand not merely its spirit, but also its sense. The I.D. Act deals with industrial disputes, provides for conciliation, adjudication and settlements, and regulates the rights of parties and the enforcement of awards and settlements.... ...The statutory regulation of industrial disputes is comprehensive, as is manifest from the rest of the Act. Chapter V prohibits strikes and lockouts; Chapter V-A deals with lay-off and retrenchment and Chapter VI puts teeth into the provisions by enacting penalties. Importantly, Section 29, which proceeds on the footing of equal sanctity for awards and settlements, punishes breaches. The learned Judge has further observed: We get the picture of a parliamentary project designed to deal, not piecemeal, but wholesale, with a special subject of strategic concern to the nation, viz., the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Let us be perspicacious about the purpose and sensitive ambit the social focus of the I.D. Act in a developmental perspective. Parliament has picked out the specific subject of industrial disputes for particularised treatment, whether the industry be in the private or public sector or otherwise. Let us be perspicacious about the purpose and sensitive ambit the social focus of the I.D. Act in a developmental perspective. Parliament has picked out the specific subject of industrial disputes for particularised treatment, whether the industry be in the private or public sector or otherwise. Our country, with so much leeway to make up, can not afford paralysing processes in production of goods and services and whoever be the employer-Government, quasi public, charitable or profit making private enterprise-both sides viz., workmen and management shall abide by the discipline adopting the mechanics and using the machinery under the I.D. Act. This prelude makes the burden lighter and illumines the canvass for proper exposition. The interpretation has of necessity to be purposive and not pedantic or too literal. 12. Can a dispute partaking the character of industrial dispute be said to be one touching the business of the society u/s 68(1) of the Act? We have to ascertain what is the meaning of the expression "touching the business of the society". This expression is found in all the similar Acts in force in the various States. It is worthwhile to extract the relevant provisions in the Orissa Act: 68. Disputes which may be referred to arbitration: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by a society or its committee against a paid servant of the society, shall be referred to the Registrar if the parties thereto are among the following namely: (a) the society its committee, past committee, any past or present officer any past or present agent, any past or present servant or the nominee, heir or legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society or the liquidators of the society; or (b) a member, past member or a person claiming through a member, past member or a deceased member of the society or of a society which is a member of the society; or (c) a surety or a member, past member or a deceased member whether such surety is or is not a member of the society; or (d) any other society or the liquidator of such society. Explanation I--A claim in respect or any sum payable to or by a society by or to a per son or society or a liquidator mentioned in Clause (a) to (d) shall be a dispute touching the business of the society within the meaning of this section even in case, such claim is admitted and the only point in issue is the ability to pay and the manner of enforcement of payment. xx xx xx 13. The Supreme Court had occasion to interprete the expression 'touching the business of a society' in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Others. The main point was whether the dispute could be referred by the Registrar for arbitration under Sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. It was contended that the dispute which relates to title and recovery of possession of the premises by eviction of the occupiers was not within the purview of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act and the reference by the Registrar was incompetent. It was also contended that the non-obstante clause ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the dispute fell squarely within the ambit of Section 91. The Supreme Court held that the word "business" has been used in a narrower sense and it meant actual trading or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and bye laws and proceeded to observe: While we agree that the nature of business which a society does can be ascertained from the objects of the society, it is difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects can be said to be r art of its business. We, however, agree that the word "touching" is very wide and would include any matter which relates to or concerns the business of a society, but we are doubtful whether the word "affects" should also be used to defining the scope of the word "touching". One other limitation on the word "dispute" may also be placed and that is that the word "dispute" covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee. One other limitation on the word "dispute" may also be placed and that is that the word "dispute" covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee. It seems to us very doubtful that the wad" dispute" would include a dispute between a landlord society and a tenant when the landlord society has not been set up for the purpose of constructing or buying and letting out houses. In the presence of various Rent Acts which give special privileges to tenants it would be difficult to say that such disputes were entitled to be referred to the Registrar. Of course, this result may also follow from the interpretation of the Rent Act and the Co-operative Societies Act by applying other principles of construction. and after noticing the special provisions of the Rent Act for fixation of standard rent and specific grounds on which eviction of tenant possible etc., observed: If the matter is heard by the Registrar, none of these provisions would apply. We can hardly imagine that it was the intention of the Legislature to deprive tenants in buildings owned by co-operative societies of the benefits given by the Rent Act. It seems to us that the Act was passed, in the main to shorten litigation lessen its costs and to provide a summary procedure for the determination of the disputes relating to the internal management of the societies. But under the Rent Act a different social objective is intended to be achieved and for achieving that social objective it is necessary that a dispute between the landlord and the tenant should be dealt with by the Courts set up under the Rent Act and in accordance with the special provisions of the Rent Act. This social objective does not impinge on the objective under lying the Act. It seems to us that the two Acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act, should apply.... In Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Others Vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal and Others a dispute having arisen between certain Co-operative Central Banks in the State of Andhra Pradesh and their workmen, a reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal. In Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Others Vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal and Others a dispute having arisen between certain Co-operative Central Banks in the State of Andhra Pradesh and their workmen, a reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal. An objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground that u/s 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, the dispute was to be referred for decision to the Registrar. The Tribunal and the High Court rejected the objection of the Banks to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court adopted their earlier dictum in Deccan Merchant's case (supra) which was to the following effect: One other limitation on the word "dispute" may also be' placed and that is that the word "dispute" covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee.... and held: ...We must proceed on the basis that Section 61 of the Act requires reference of a dispute to the Registrar only if the dispute is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee, and further the dispute between the co-operative society and the employee touches the business of the society ill the sense explained by this Court in that case. It further held: it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to he a dispute touching the business of the society.... 14. Our attention has been drawn to the case of Warna Sahallari Sekhar Karkhana Ltd. v. Vitrairao Ananda Rao Deshmukh 1969 U.J. (S.C.) 105. In the said case it was held that a claim might at the most be considered to affect the business of the society; but was not a matter "touching the business of the society". Coming to the decision of the various High Courts, we find an opposite case in Salim M. Merchant v. Shivram Gopal & Famous Cine Litho Works 1954 (I) LLJ 559. The next is The Majoor Sahakari Bank Ltd. Vs. N.N. Majmudar and Another. In that case the dismissal of an employee was the subject matter of dispute and the question was if the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the same. The next is The Majoor Sahakari Bank Ltd. Vs. N.N. Majmudar and Another. In that case the dismissal of an employee was the subject matter of dispute and the question was if the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the same. Chief Justice Chagala analysed the object and scheme of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act and Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1947 and observed: The second Respondent is not claiming to assert any civil rights against the Petitioners. What he is claiming is certain rights which are now conferred upon workmen and employees as a result of principles of social justice which are now almost universally acknowledged all the world over. There is no right of reinstatement under civil law which can be enforced by an employee against his employer. No contract of personal service can be specifically enforced by a Civil Court nor does a Civil Court determine whether the wages paid to an employee are proper wages or not. Civil Courts are bound down by the law of contract and it is under the law of contract that the Civil Courts decide disputes between a master and his servant. Industrial Courts decide the disputes between a master and his servant on principles of social justice and whereas the Civil Courts consider what are the actual terms of the contracts regulating the rights of master and servant the Industrial Courts consider not the terms of contract but what is just and fair and what is proper for the master to pay to his servant. In Co-operative Milk Societies Union Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Others. P. B. Mukherji, J., observed: ...Can a dispute between the cc-operative society and its own workmen be said to be a dispute touching the business of a co-operative society? Strictly speaking, dispute between a co-operative society and its workmen does not relate to the actual business of a co-operative society and therefore does not touch the business of the co-operative society.... ...Wages, wage scales and dearness allowance do not appear to be fit or proper matters capable of being the subject of civil litigation. What will be the wage scale in an establishment cannot appropriately be the subject of a civil litigation. What should be the general wages or what should be dearness allowance equally do not appear to be matters capable of being the subject of civil litigation.... What will be the wage scale in an establishment cannot appropriately be the subject of a civil litigation. What should be the general wages or what should be dearness allowance equally do not appear to be matters capable of being the subject of civil litigation.... The aforesaid observation was made, though in the context of the definition of "dispute" in Section 2(j) of the Bengal cooperative Societies Act which defined a dispute as meaning any matter capable of being the subject matter of civil litigation excluding a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a Cooperative society, whether such claim be admitted or not. In regard to the definition' 'including a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a co-operative society' the learned Judge observed: ...The claim for fixing wages and wage scales generally and dearness allowances cannot be described as a "claim in respect of any sum which is payable". The question of "payability" of "a sum" in the context of that particular definition seems to be individual debt or individual sum of money and does not appear to include claims for a general wage scale and dearness allowances as a matter of collective bargain between labour and employer.... Continuing the learned. Judge obferved: ...the Industrial Disputes Act is a special statute relating to the settlement of all industrial disputes whether they relate to co-operative societies or other establishments. From that point of view and from the point of view of industrial disputes, the Industrial Disputes Act is the special statute and the Bengal Cooperative Societies Act is the general statute. So long as the dispute is industrial within the meaning of the works "industrial dispute" under the Industrial Disputes Act, that Act has the exclusive jurisdiction.... In Malabar Co-operative Central Bank's case 1964 (1) LLJ 557, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court was called 'upon to decide whether the reference of a dispute between a co-operative society and its employees was capable of being resolved by the Industrial Tribunal. Relying on Co-operative Milk Societies Union Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, and the decision of Rama Chandra Iyer, J., in South Arcot Co-operative Motor Transport Society Ltd. (for ex-servicemen) Devanam-pattinam, Cuddalore Vs. Syed Batcha and Others M. S. Menon, C. J. held: Co-operative Societies are creatures of statute, controlled by their constitution and concerned with their contracts. Relying on Co-operative Milk Societies Union Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, and the decision of Rama Chandra Iyer, J., in South Arcot Co-operative Motor Transport Society Ltd. (for ex-servicemen) Devanam-pattinam, Cuddalore Vs. Syed Batcha and Others M. S. Menon, C. J. held: Co-operative Societies are creatures of statute, controlled by their constitution and concerned with their contracts. Industrial disputes stem, not from the subtle refinements of contractual obligations, but from the tougher jurisprudence of social justice and readjustment. The uplands of the Industrial Tribunals are out of bounds to the Registrar of co-operative societies.... A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Rambhau Jairam Dhamange and Others Vs. The President, Vinkar Co-operative Society Ltd., Chanda and Others was constituted to decide whether Section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act operated as a bar to dispute between a co-operative society and its employee or employees in regard to a demand for a change in the terms of employment or for rein statement of the employee whose services has been terminated, being decided under the law relating to industrial disputes. It held that such a dispute was not cognizable by the Registrar. In Kasturbanagar Co-operative House Construction Society, Madras Vs. K. Soundararajan and Another wherein the claim was for retrenchment compensation, gratuity, leave salary and objection was raised to the institution of the proceeding in the Labour Court. Justice Kailasam held: The scope of Section 51 of the Co-operative Societies Act is limited. It relates only to any dispute touching the business of a registered society and arising between the society and its servants. There is no doubt that the claim for retrenchment compensation is a dispute between the society and its servants, but it is not a dispute touching the business of the registered society. All disputes between the society and its servants cannot be said to be disputes touching the business of the registered society. The dispute contemplated by Section 51 would not comprehend all the benefits to the worker under the Industrial Disputes Act for deciding which a special machinery is set up. In Sankaran Vs. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies T. Chandrasekhara Menon, J., observed: If the Civil Court cannot grant relief to the Petitioner, then the first Respondent (Deputy Registrar) also cannot. The dispute contemplated by Section 51 would not comprehend all the benefits to the worker under the Industrial Disputes Act for deciding which a special machinery is set up. In Sankaran Vs. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies T. Chandrasekhara Menon, J., observed: If the Civil Court cannot grant relief to the Petitioner, then the first Respondent (Deputy Registrar) also cannot. The arbitration provided in Section 69 of the Act is only an alternative to the normal processes of the ordinary Courts. The disputes contemplated in Section 69 are disputes of a nature' which could have been decided by Civil Court but for that provision, the power that could be exercised by an Industrial Disputes Act cannot be exercised by the Registrar. 15. Learned Counsel appearing for the Syndicate and Mr. Mohanty took us through the provisions of the Orissa Cooperative Societies Act and submitted that it was a special Act and being self content for the purpose of successful working of co-operative societies, the provisions clearly excluded the applicability of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. He submitted that the Act having received the assent of the President, any provision of the Industrial Disputes Act which was repugnant to any provision of the Co-operative Societies Act would give way and the provision of the Co-operative Societies Act would prevail. A question, therefore, arises, which of them is special and which of them is general. Is the Industrial Disputes Act a special legislation or general legislation. In this connection reference may be made to Craise on Statute Law, 1963 Edn. 376. The general rule, that prior statutes are held to be repealed by implication by subsequent statutes if the two are repugnant, is said not to apply if the prior enactment is special and the subsequent enactment is general.... There is a well known rule which has application to this case which is that a subsequent general Act does not affect a prior special Act by implication.... Maxwell has stated: When the legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms. 16. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms. 16. The crux of the question is of the Industrial Disputes Act is a general statute or a special statute. If the Industrial Disputes Act is a general statute, question may, however arise if all types of industrial disputes can be adjudicated by the Registrar. If the Registrar is competent or capable of granting reliefs and what is the ambit of the powers of the Registrar u/s 68 of the Co-operative Societies Act? 17. In resolving the aforesaid questions, it is necessary to bear in mind what the Supreme Court said in Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. D.J. Bahadur and Others, : In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. In law we have a cosmos of relativity not absolutes so too in life. The I.D. Act is a special statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes which provides definitionally for the nature of industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an infrastructure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the I. D. Act has one special mission-the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the I.D. Act is a special statute. The I.D. Act has been enacted with the object of securing harmonious relations in the working of the industry, between the employer and the employees by providing machinery for adjudication of disputes between them. The object of the Act is to encourage collective bargaining and maintain industrial peace and to prevent illegal strikes and to provide retrenchment compensation. The aim of the Act is to ensure social justice both to the employer and the workmen. A hurried glance at the relevant provisions of the Act at this stage is over due. The object of the Act is to encourage collective bargaining and maintain industrial peace and to prevent illegal strikes and to provide retrenchment compensation. The aim of the Act is to ensure social justice both to the employer and the workmen. A hurried glance at the relevant provisions of the Act at this stage is over due. Reference of a dispute can be made not withstanding the unwillingness of the employee concerned. A dispute can be individual or collective. When a general reference is made, all employees would be bound by the decision even though they or any of them may not have desired the reference. Section 9(A) fetters the management's right to change the conditions of service of the workmen in respect of certain matters excluding wages and allowances. Section 12 provides for conciliation of disputes. Section 22 imposes certain restrictions on persons employed in public utility services going on strikes and on employers carrying on public utility services in resorting to lock-outs. Section 23 restrains workmen from going on strikes and employer declaring lock-out during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, proceedings before the Labour Court. Tribunal or Industrial Tribunal and within two months after the conclusion of such proceedings, during the pendency of arbitration proceedings and within two months after the conclusion of such proceedings etc., and during the period in which the settlement or award is in operation Chapter V-A provides for compensation to workmen laid off and compensation for retrenchment and in case of closing down of undertaking: reemployment of retrenched workmen. Chapter VI is headed 'penalities' for actions and omissions which are made punishable under the Act. 18. Under the scheme of the Co-operative Societies Act, the Registrar is the substitute for the Civil Court. As the Supreme Court said the object of the Act is to shorten litigation, lessen, its costs and to provide a summary procedure for the determination of the disputes relating to the internal management of the societies. Such reliefs which the Civil Court is incompetent to grant are equally out of bounds of the Registrar. For example, the Specific Relief Act bars reinstatement of an employee, the remedy being one for damages. The Registrar, the substitute for the Civil Court, would be incompetent to grant the relief. An example may illustrate the exposition. Such reliefs which the Civil Court is incompetent to grant are equally out of bounds of the Registrar. For example, the Specific Relief Act bars reinstatement of an employee, the remedy being one for damages. The Registrar, the substitute for the Civil Court, would be incompetent to grant the relief. An example may illustrate the exposition. A claim for compensation made by an employee of a society is not a claim arising out of any contract between themselves and society, nor is there any statute by which an obligation has been imposed on an employer to pay a particular compensation. Under the ordinary law a claim for compensation being contrary to the terms of the contract and not being founded on statute would be rejected by Civil Courts, Registrar or arbitrator dealing with civil disputes. The tribunals set up under the Industrial Disputes Act, however, are entitled and often required to go beyond the contractual and statutory rights of the parties for the purpose of settlement of industrial disputes and the maintenance of industrial peace per Tarkunde, J. The jurisdiction which is granted to the Industrial Tribunal is not the jurisdiction of merely administering the existing laws and enforcing existing contracts. Industrial Tribunals have the right even to vary contracts of service between the employer and the employees which jurisdiction can never be exercised by a Civil Court or a Registrar acting under the Co-operative Societies Act. The Civil Court or the Registrar by reason of the limitation of its jurisdiction has to act within the, bounds of its jurisdiction. It cannot travel out side the law or the contract. The disputes contemplated u/s 68 are disputes of a nature which can be decided by the Civil Court, but for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar. To any dispute between a society and its workmen the Registrar must, therefore, apply the ordinary law of master and servant, which does not recognise a right in an employee to continue in service, if his employer does not want him. Similarly, the Registrar cannot go out side the terms of the employment and change or alter the conditions of service. He can enforce the contract between the parties, but he cannot impose any new obligations. As he cannot grant such relief, it follows that he cannot try an industrial dispute in which demands, nor covered by the contract of employment, are made. He can enforce the contract between the parties, but he cannot impose any new obligations. As he cannot grant such relief, it follows that he cannot try an industrial dispute in which demands, nor covered by the contract of employment, are made. Under Section 68, the Registrar gets jurisdiction if he is approached by a party to the dispute. A reference, however, may be made in order to secure industrial peace even when a contesting party is unwilling to apply for such reference. In sum, the question in cases like this is not whether the dispute touches the business of the society, but where the nature of dispute is such that it comes within the category of disputes covered by Section 66(1). The purpose of the section is not to resolve all controversies touching the business of the society; but to provide different forum for adjudication of such disputes which are cognizable by the Civil Courts. In other words, the arbitration provided is an alternative to the normal process of the ordinary Courts and not to the extraordinary process of adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. "One of the important things in industry is to put employees in their proper grades, so as to see that they are paid according to their grades and the like" (per Lord Denning, R. v. Post Office ex parte Association of Scientific Technical & Managerial staffs 1981(1) All. E.R. 139. Such a relief is inconceivable to be had from Civil Court or the Registrar. The Industrial Tribunals or Labour Courts are not trammeled by the inhibitions of contractual obligations or rights and can, in disregard of well known concepts of law, readjust rights and obligations in a manner conceived to be just in the light of socio-economic changes that are taking place in various countries in this century. The jurisdiction exercised by such Tribunals and Labour Courts is, therefore, entirely different and though as was observed by the Judicial Committee, there may be said to be a 'lis' and through there may be a judicial process involved, they do not function as Courts nor do they exercise powers of a Court or are they inhibited by rules of law which must guide and control the decisions of Courts. A dispute can be raised by a body of workmen and this can be done even against the wishes and will of the concerned workman. A dispute can be raised by a body of workmen and this can be done even against the wishes and will of the concerned workman. In such a dispute between the body of workmen and the employer the aggrieved employee is often out of picture or at least not necessary in the picture. This dictum of Govindan Nair, J. squarely answers the problem. It is worth recalling to mind, what Ludwig Teller said in Labour Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. I, page-536: Industrial arbitration may involve the extension of an existing agreement, or the making of a new one, or in general the creation of new obligations or modifications of old ones, while commercial arbitration generally concerns itself with interpretation of existing obligations and disputes relating to existing agreements. and the observations of Bhargava, J.: The jurisdiction which is granted to Industrial Tribunals by the I.D. Act is not a jurisdiction of merely administering the existing laws and enforcing the existing contracts. Industrial Tribunals have the right to vary the contracts of services between employer and the employees which jurisdiction can never be exercised by a Civil Court or the Registrar acting under the Co-operative Societies Act. (Central Bank's case). and close this discussion with the words of S.K. Das, J., in Rohtas Industries v. Brijnandan AIR 1057 S.C. 1. A Court of law proceeds, on the footing that no power exists in the Courts to make contracts for people, and the parties must take their own contracts. The Courts reach their limit of power when they enforce contracts which the parties have made. An Industrial Tribunal is not so fettered and may create new obligations or modify contracts in the interests of industrial peace to protect legitimate trade union activities and to prevent unfair practice or victimization.... 19. On the touch stole of the interpretation given by the Supreme Court and other High Courts to the expression "touching the business of a society" and the spectrum of the schemes and purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act it is clear that an industrial dispute does not come within the per view of disputes contemplated by Section 68 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act. This, however, is not the journey's end. We have to meet the projected hurdles namely, the non-obstante clause in and Explanation I to Section 68. 20. This, however, is not the journey's end. We have to meet the projected hurdles namely, the non-obstante clause in and Explanation I to Section 68. 20. It was contended that having regard to the non-obstante clause, the jurisdiction of the Registrar is absolute and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act must give in. The answer has been given by the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Others, : The sentence namely, 'notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force clearly ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts if the dispute falls squarely within the ambit of Section 91(1).... 21. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Rambhau Jairam Dhamange and Others Vs. The President, Vinkar Co-operative Society Ltd., Chanda and Others, observed: ...The non-obstante clause must be read in its context, Sub-section (1) of Section 91 in effect provides that the disputes mentioned therein shall be tried by the Registrar. It therefore, provides for the forum of trial. The non-obstante clause excludes the operation of other laws, which confer jurisdiction on some other Court, authority or Tribunal to try such disputes. If there is any other law, which lays down that a matter which u/s 91 the Registrar has jurisdiction to decide, may be tried by some other Court, authority or Tribunal, then the application of that law is excluded by the non-obstante clause. But this clause does not alter or modify the substantive rights of the parties, nor does it confer any additional powers on the Registrar. 22. The last point to be touched is Explanation I to Section 68. Once the scope of ambit of Sub-section (1) is clear, the Explanation offers no difficulty. It takes the character from the principal provision. As Justice P.B. Mukherjee said in Co-operative Milk Societies Union Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, . ...The question of "payability" of "a sum" in the context of that particular definition...seems to be individual debt on individual sum of money and does not appear to include claims for a general wage scale and dearness allowances as a matter of collective bargain between the labour and employer. 23. State of West Bengal and Others, . ...The question of "payability" of "a sum" in the context of that particular definition...seems to be individual debt on individual sum of money and does not appear to include claims for a general wage scale and dearness allowances as a matter of collective bargain between the labour and employer. 23. As we have reached the conclusion that industrial disputes between a society and its workmen are not capable of being resolved by the Registrar, Explanation does not offer any difficulty and it does not deflect us from the clear course indicated by the object, scheme of the two Acts as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the High Courts. In our opinion, the Tribunal went wrong in distinguishing the decisions of the Supreme Court and relying upon the decision in Farkhundali Nannhay Vs. V.B. Potdar and Another, which had been distinguished by a latter Full Bench in Rambhau Jairam Dhamange and Others Vs. The President, Vinkar Co-operative Society Ltd., Chanda and Others and in founding the decision on Explanation (1). It is inconceivable that a Civil Court or the Registrar could grant medical allowances or house rent allowances, if the claims were outside the service conditions or contract for services. But under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act the claims were entertainable and the Tribunal would not reject the claim solely on the ground that the claims were out side the service conditions or contract of service. The Tribunal was in error that t he Registrar of the Co-operative Societies were competent and had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the two items of disputes and the reference to it was not maintainable. 24. In the result, the writ application is allowed and the award of the. Tribunal is quashed and it is declared that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the dispute referred to it for adjudication. Five years in the "meanwhile have elapsed. The Tribunal is directed to dispose of the reference within three months from today. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. N.K. Das, J. 25. I agree. Final Result : Allowed