Singh, J.- This Criminal Revision is from the judgment and order dated 11.9.73 of the Sessions Judge, U.A.D. at Jorhat, whereby the conviction and sentence of the accused petitioner under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, here­inafter called the 'Food Act', was upheld. 2. The District Food Inspector, Jorhat, entered the shop of M/S Badrinarayan Bagunath Prosad, Golaghat, on 7.12.71 and purchased 750 grams of Khesari dal, served a notice that the sample was taken for analysis; and the Public Analyst reported the sample to be of Khesari dal, coloured with pro­hibited coaltar dye. At the trial P.Ws 2 and 3 stated that the Khesari dal was stored not in the shop but in the inner verandah. The defence was that the same was stored not for sale but for use as fodder for the petitioner's own cattle. The trial court held that under the circumstances it was stored for sale, though there was no direct evidence to that effect. P.W.I stated that he found Khesari dal exhibited in the accused's shop a long with other food stuff. The Public Analyst did rot reveal that the sample of Khesari dal was adulterated. The trial court therefore held the petitioner guilty under section 16(1)(a) of the Food Act read with section 7(iv) on the ground of violation of Rule 44-A read with the Assam Government Notification No. MPH. 332/61 /152 dated 10.3.66 published in the Assam Gazette of March 23, 1966 Part II A issued under Rule 44-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, which banned cultivation of Khesari gram and possession and sale of Khesari gram, Khesari dal, Khesari flour and the mixture of Khesari gram and dal and their products throughout the entire State of Assam with effect from 1st April, 1966. The cultivation, possession and sale of Khesari dal being thus completely banned, the Court held that the storing or mere possession was itself an offence being violative of the Rule 44-A read with the Notification, irrespective of whether it was meant for fodder for cattle or human food. Accordingly the petitioner was convicted as above. 3. The cultivation, possession and sale of Khesari dal being thus completely banned, the Court held that the storing or mere possession was itself an offence being violative of the Rule 44-A read with the Notification, irrespective of whether it was meant for fodder for cattle or human food. Accordingly the petitioner was convicted as above. 3. On appeal, the contention that mere possession was not an offence was upheld; but the appellate court itself re-appreciated the evidence and found the petitioner kept the dal along with other dais in the shop room as stated by P.Ws 1 and 3 who also staled that the petitioner had 5/6 bags of dal in his godown as well. P.W. 2 said that the dal had been taken from a bag lying in the inner verandah and that the accused had some catle of his own. The appellate Court, however, from the evidence on record held that the petitioner had stored the Khesari dal for sale, for human consumption like the other commodities similarly stored in the shop, and accordingly the conviction was upheld. Hence this revision petition. 4. Mr. J.P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the accu­sed-petitioner, assials the conviction and sentence mainly on two counts-(i) that mere possession or storage of Khesari dal is not an offence under the Food Act and Rules framed thereunder; and (ii) that the learned Sessions Judge erred in convicting the petitioner under section 7 (iv) without specific charge. 5. In support of his first contention, counsel relies on AIR 1976 SC 621 -Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Laxmi Narain Tandon where it has been held that if it is found that an article of food is not intended for sale and if in the poss­ession of a person who does not fulfill the character of a seller, conveyer, deliverer, consignee, manufacturer or store for sale, such as is referred to in sub-section (1) (a) and (2) of section 10 of the Act, the Food Inspector will not be compe­tent under the law to take a sample and on such sample being found adulterated to validly launch prosecution thereon, and that the expression 'store' in section 7 means "storing for sale'' and consequently storing of an adulterated article of food for purposes other than for sale shall not constitute an offence under section 16(1)(a) of the Act. 6. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that the trial court no doubt held that mere possession was an offence but the appellate court correctly held on the materials on record in the instant case that the petitioner did not merely possess but he stored the Khesari dal for sale for human consump­tion. 7. We do not find any material to disturb the finding of both the Courts below that the accused-petitioner stored the prohibited Khesari dal for sale for human consumption. This conclusion was drawn on the basis of the evidence of P. Ws 1, 2 and 3 and the representation made in the circum­stances of the case, namely, that the dal was exhibited along with other articles of food in the shop and the bag wherefrom the sample was collected lay in the inside verandah and there were as many as 5/6 bags of such dal in the godown as well. The Food Inspector served notice that he was collecting sample of food for analysis and the defence was that it was not at all meant for sale, but for use of the petitioner's own cattle as fodder which was not credible. The decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned counsel for the petiti­oner is of no assistance to him. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. K. Krishnamurty, AIR 1980 SC 538 to which we made a reference in the analogous Criminal Revision 148 of 1974 also demolishes the conten­tion of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The first contention which has no force is rejected. 8. In regard to the second contention, Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that alteration of the offence from one under section 7 clause (iv) to one under section 7(v) is not permissible, unless there was specific charge to cover it. The first contention which has no force is rejected. 8. In regard to the second contention, Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that alteration of the offence from one under section 7 clause (iv) to one under section 7(v) is not permissible, unless there was specific charge to cover it. He relies on Bhim Sen vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 281 , where the charge against the appellant was that he sold the food to the Food Inspect or "aerated water" which was found on analysis to have sucrose content of 0.38 per cent as against the prescribed standard of 5 per cent and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act and the basis of the charge was that sucrose contained less than the prescribed standard and the sucrose content should have been at least 5 per cent where in fact it was very much less than 0.38 per cent while according to the Director of Central Food Laboratory the sucrose content was nil and it was obvious that the aerated water may contain sucrose or may not contain sucrose and if it does not contain sucrose, it would not in any way detract from the standard of quality prescribed for aerated water. The charge against the appellant mentioned only aerated water and nothing more which was also the evidence of the prosecution and even in the cross-examination of the appellant under section 342 of Cr. P. C. it was not suggested that he sold sweetened aerated water and the so-called deficiency of sucrose content did not involve in violation of the standard of quality prescribed for aerated water. It was however con­tended that according to the Certificate of the Director, Cen­tral Food Laboratory the sample of aerated water sold by the appellant contained non-permitted coaltar dye and conse­quently it was adulterated and the appellant was convicted for selling it on the ground. It was held that it did not form the subject-matter of the charge against the appellant nor was it put to him in his examination under section 342 of the Cr, P. C. and it was therefore not open to the State to urge this ground for the first time at that stage in order to support the conviction. 9. It was held that it did not form the subject-matter of the charge against the appellant nor was it put to him in his examination under section 342 of the Cr, P. C. and it was therefore not open to the State to urge this ground for the first time at that stage in order to support the conviction. 9. Learned Public Prosecutor, however, does not dispute that the offence committed by the petitioner falls under clause (v) and not clause (iv) of section 7. Clause (iv) deals with article of food the sale of which is for the time being prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health which is defined to mean the Director of Medical and Health Services or the Chief Officer in charge of Health Administra­tion in a State by whatever designation he is called. the Noti­fication under Rule 44-A of the Rules was issued by the State Government making even cultivation and possession offences, but in E. B. Mills vs. Secretary, Govt. of Assam, 1974 Cr, L.J, 575 it was held that the Notification to the extent it sought to create an offence beyond those under Rule 44-A was bad. The offence must, therefore, be for contravention of Rule 44-A read with the above Notification. Section 7(v) deals with any article of food in contravention of any other provision of the Food Act or any Rub made thereunder. This being the position contra­vention is of clause (v) and not of (iv) of section 7. 10. We find however no force in thy contention of the learn e 3 counsel for the petitioner. The accused was charged for having stored for sale prohibited Khesari dal which is punisha­ble under section 16(1)(a)(ii) read with section 7(v) of the Act. As the facts proved constitute an offence for contravention of Rule 44-A read with Notification of the State Government, Assam, the accused is punishable under section 16(1)(a)(ii)/7(v) of the Act. No prejudice can be caused to the accused, as it was the sub­ject-matter of the charge. The case of Bhim Sen (Supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no material bearing on the present case. No prejudice can be caused to the accused, as it was the sub­ject-matter of the charge. The case of Bhim Sen (Supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no material bearing on the present case. In the case before the Supreme Court, adulteration of the aerated water with non-permitted coalter dye was never a subject-matter of the charge, nor was it put to the accused in his examination under section 342 Cr. P. C. 11. Being under the predicament, Mr. Bhattacharjee sub­mits that the case may be leniently dealt with in view of the facts that the case is nearly a decade old; that petitioner has already undergone imprisonment of about 6/7 days and ends of justice requires a lenient treatment as the case falls under sec­tion 16(1)(a)(ii). Mr. Bhattacharjee relies on AIR 1951 SC 631, 1979(1) F.A. cases 193, 194 and unreported Judgments of High Court in Criminal Revisions 103 of 1975 and 104 of 1975 disposed of on 18.6.1980. 12. In our opinion taking, into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that it is not necessary for the petitioner to be sent back to jail. We think that the period of imprisonment already undergone by the petitioner and the payment of fine of Rs. 1,000/- will meet the ends of justice. In default of payment of fine petitioner shall undergo imprison­ment for the period of six months as ordered by the trial Court. With the modification of sentence indicated above, the revision petition is dismissed.