This is the second occasion that the petitioner has come up before this Court with a Writ application on the same subject matter though with a different context. The first petition in this Court was numbered as Civil Rule No. 368/79 wherein the peti­tioner had challenged the validity and legality of the judgment and order of the learned Assistant District Judge, Jorhat, dated 7.8.79 declaring the election of the petitioner from Pub-Konwarpur Gaon Panchayat as void under Rule 58 (c) of the Assam Pancha-yati Raj (Constitution) Rules 1973-for short 'the Rules'. An election petition was filed by Respondent No. 3 challenging the election of the petitioner as President of Pub-Konwarpur G. P. against the order declaring the petitioner elected on 5.2.79. As the matter was disposed of on issue No. 9, the petitioner moved this Court on the ground that by an amendment petition dated 12.3.79, the respondent No. 3 sought to urge a new ground chal­lenging the election of the petitioner which was admittedly filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Rule 52 of the Rules. The new charge as put by Respondent No. 3 as additional ground was to the effect that the petitioner was disqualified to be nomi­nated/elected or to remain as a member or president of the Gaon Panchayat in view of the provisions under Section 12 of the Act as he was convicted under section 419/420 of the Indian Panal Code in C. R. Case No. 168/77 of the Sibsagar Criminal Court and let off after admonition under Section 360 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The present petitioner resisted the amendment petition and submitted objection on 19.7.79 on various legal grounds. On the basis of the said petition stating the additional ground, the learned court below framed an issue being Issue No. 9 to the following effect: "Whether the Respondent No. 2 is disqualified to be nominated, elected and to remain as a member of President of the Gaon Panchayat under Section 12 of the Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972 he having been convicted in C. R. Cass No. 168 of 1977 of Sibsagar Criminal Court under section 419/420, I.P.C". The said issue was framed on the allegation of the Respon­dent No. 3 that the petitioner was convicted under section 419/420, Indian Penal Code and he was as such disqualified to be elected under the provisions of Section 12 of the Assam Pancha­yati Raj Act, 1972-hereinafter called "the Act". The petitioner being aggrieved by the said order the learned Assistant District Judge in setting aside the election of the petitioner on that score alone, came to this Court mainly on the ground that the petition by adding a new charge ought not to have been entertained in view oi' the provision of Rule 52 of the Rules being filed beyond the period of limitation. The second ground of attack was that the learned Trial Court allowed the amendment and disposed of the whole case holding that the petitioner was disqualified to be elected on the basis of the decisions on Issue No. 9. The said Civil Rule No. 368/79 was heard and disposed of by my learned brother Hansaria, J. My learned brother allowed the petition by the order dated 14.3.80 and set aside the impugned order of the learned Assistant District Judge with a direction to decide afresh "as to whether the amendment sought for should be allowed". After remand, as directed by this Court, the matter was heard by the learned Assistant District Judge on the point as to whether the amendment of the election petition by putting a new charge should be allowed or not. The learned Assistant District Judge in considering the petition for amend­ment came to a definite finding that the amendment petition was admittedly barred by limitation. The learned Judge took into consideration as to whether there is any special circums­tance appearing in the case for which such amendment sought for is justified or the ends of justice demands such an amend­ment even after the period of limitation and, in considering the above aspect of the matter, allowed the petition by the order dated 4.9.80 and directed the amended petition to form a part of the original election petition. It is against this order that the petitioner has come up before this Court for the second time. 2. It is against this order that the petitioner has come up before this Court for the second time. 2. Though the facts of the case and the crucial point as raised for consideration lie within a narrow compass but the point involves a substantial question of law as to whether such amendment petition containing a charge (which is apparently barred by limitation) can be allowed to form a part of the original election petition on the ground that the allegations contained in the petition for amendment, if found correct, shall disqualify the petitioner to hold the office and/or to be elected by virtue of section 12 of the Act. 3. To appreciate the above proposition of law, it is not necessary further to repeat the facts of the case again which has already been stated at the very outset of my judgment. Mr. B. K. Das, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions which are his main grounds of attack viz. (A) that the petition for amendment by adding a nsw charge with a new cause of action, being apparently bsyond period of limitation as prescribed under Rule 52 of the Rules, no amendment could be allowed either by applying the provi­sions of general law of the Civil Procedure Code or under any special circumstance. (B), As the new charge, as alleged in the amendment petition did not find place in the original petition in any form whatsosver, the question of allowing such an amendment beyond time under the guise of alternative relief cannot arise and (C) if the amendment sought for is disallowed, the aggrieved party is not left without remedy. 4. All the above points though raised in the earlier petition in Civil Rule No. 368 of 1979 before my learned Brother Hansana, J. were not required to be answered as a direction was made to the learned Court below to decide the petition for amendment afresh on its merits. The concluding portion of the judgment in the above mentioned Civil Rule No. 368 of 1979 may be stated hereunder :- "I do not propose to express any opinion whether amend­ment should have been allowed or not, as it is essentially the function of the trial Judge. The concluding portion of the judgment in the above mentioned Civil Rule No. 368 of 1979 may be stated hereunder :- "I do not propose to express any opinion whether amend­ment should have been allowed or not, as it is essentially the function of the trial Judge. But as he proceeded to decide the issue on merits without clearing the threshold hurdle, his final order has to be regarded as in excess of jurisdiction, or being vitiated by an apparent error. As I have come to this conclusion, it is not necessary to examine other points urged by Shri Das. The result is that the petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the learned Assistant District Judge is directed to first decide whether amendment should be allowed. He would thereafter proceed in accor­dance with law. Parties are left to bear their own costs." 5. Mr. D.C. Mahanta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 3 had contended that by virtue of the provisions of section 12 of the Act, the petitioner becomes disqualified to hold the office as he was convicted earlier before holding the election. Therefore, according to Mahanta, if the amendment is not allowed, the Respondent No. 3 would be deba­rred to take his legal stand on the basis of Section 12 of the Act. The learnsd Counsel has further submitted that the impugned order is an interlocutory one and the remedy being discretionary, the High Court may not interfere with the impugned order in its writ jurisdiction. The barned Counsel further contended that to meet the ends of justice, the petition for such amendment though made out of time, can be allowed under the General Law of the Civil Procedure Code as pre scribed under the provi­sions of Order 6, Rule 17. Before considering the rival con­tentions of the parties, the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules need to be looked into in its proper perspective. Rule 52 of the Rules prescribs the period of limitation for presenting an election petition under the Act, which runs as follows:- "52. (i) The election petition shall be presented within 15 days of the date of declaration of the result of the elec­tion by the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional officer, as the case may be." 6. Rule 52 of the Rules prescribs the period of limitation for presenting an election petition under the Act, which runs as follows:- "52. (i) The election petition shall be presented within 15 days of the date of declaration of the result of the elec­tion by the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional officer, as the case may be." 6. On a plain reading of the above Rule, it is very clear that a period of limitation has been prescribed to present an election petition. Now, the pertinent question to be decided is as to whether this period can be extended by applying the other general provisions of law more specifically by applying the provi­sion of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, or in case it is found, that there apperas a special circumstance for its consideration which demands that such period can be extended or amendment may be allowed to meet the ends of justice. Turning to the impugned order passed by the learned Court below, it appears, that the learned Court below while disposing the petition for amendment, took into consideration the only question as to whether there exists any special circumstance or ends of justice demands such an amendment even after the period of limitation. The learned Trial Court while considering this aspect of the matter, adopted the principle of law as laid down by their Lordships in the Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1957 SC 357 (Leach & Co. Ltd. vs. M/s. Jardine Skinner & Co.) upon which the learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance. In the aforesaid case, the points for consider­ation before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was with regard to an amendment of the plaint in a suit. In considering the provision of Order 6, Rule 17 and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, their Lordships held:- "It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of application. In considering the provision of Order 6, Rule 17 and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, their Lordships held:- "It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be or­dered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interest of justice." The provision of Order 6, Rule 17 is no doubt has a wide-range. But the present case is on a different context under a special law, namely, the Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972 and the Assam Panchayati Raj (Constitution) Rules which are to be construed strictly. Therefore the decision of the Supreme Court, cited above, being on a different point has no direct bearing in this case. 7. Mr. B. K. Das, learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred another decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1957 SC 444 (Harish Chandra Bajpai vs. Iriloki Singh). That was a case relating to an election matter under the "Representation of the People Act, 1951. In considering the various provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and also provi­sions of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, their Lordships observed :- "Public interest equally demanded that election disputes should be determined with despatch. That is the reason why a special jurisdiction is created and tribunals are consti tuted for the trial of election petitions. Having regard to the circumstances the order of amendment would be open to grave criticism even if had been made in an ordinary litigation, and in an election matter, it was indefensible. Even if the Tribunal had the power under Order 6, Rule 17 to permit an amendment raising a new charge, it did not under the circumstances exercise sound and judicial discretion in permitting the amendment in question." Their Lordships had examined various earlier decisions inclu­ding the interpretation as laid down in Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 316-317 to examine the above proposition which I feel is not necessary to narrate in so many words. The decision of the case in Birbeck vs. Bullard (1886) 2 T.L.R. 273 (J) was also considered by their Lordships and quoted the relevant findings. "The application was to amend the petition by adding a new charge, and it was held that, that could not be done after the expiry of the period of limitation fixed in the Act for filing an election petition, and the decision was put on the ground that the power to grant amendment, was 'subject to the provisions of the Act". In paragraph 24 of Harish Chandra (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed thus:- "We have now to decide whether on the principles stated above, the order of amendment dated 28.11.53 was right and within the competence of the Tribunal. To decide that, we must examine whether what the respondent sought to raise by way of amendmsnt was only particulars in respect of a charge laid in the petition, or whether it was a new charge. 8. Therefore, on taking the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and also of subsequent decision reported in AIR 1972 SC 1302 , it is clear that the provision of the special Act if lays down a prescribed period of limitation for filing a election petition, that must be strictly adhered to. Thus the con­clusion may also be arrived at that Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot lift the ban of limitation imposed by the provision of Rule 52 of the above Rules. No amendment of the election petition can be allowed to give an opportunity to the election petitioner to add a new charge, which has no reference in any manner in the earlier petition, if the same is not within the period of limitation prescribed therefore even if a special circumstance exists. The other contention raised by Mr. Mahaeta, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 to the effect that the impugned order being an interlocutory order, this Court will not interfere in its writ jurisdiction is devoid of substance, for the simple reason that the impugned order has decided a pertinent question and legal right of the party. By the impugned order the learned Court below finally disposed of the matter of dispute as to the legal right of the parties relating to the issue in the subject matter of the case. By the impugned order the learned Court below finally disposed of the matter of dispute as to the legal right of the parties relating to the issue in the subject matter of the case. Upon hearing the learned Counsels for the parties and on perusal of the records, I am constrained to hold that the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court is without jurisdiction and it must be set aside. It is casually mentioned here that if the petitioner has incurred disqualification, section 25 (1) of the Act would be applicable in his case, as observed by my learned brother Mr. Hansaria, J. while disposing of the earlier Civil Rule No. 368/79. In other words, the aggrieved party is not left without remedy. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court in allowing the amendment of the election petition adding a new charge beyond the period of limitation, is set aside, and the learned trial Court is directed to dispose of the election petition pending before it on its merit at the earliest. The parties will bear their own costs. Send down the records if called for.