Judgment : This petition is filed by the petition under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, seeking to quash the entire proceedings pending on the file of the IXth Additional Special Judge, Madras, in C.C. No. 27 of 1980. 2. C.C. No. 27 of 1980 arises with reference to the charges levelled against the petitioner herein under sections 409, 467, 471, Indian Penal Code, and under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 3. It appears from the facts of the case that the petitioner was working as a shroff in the Port Trust and during the course of his duties he was entrusted with funds of the Port Trust for disbursement to the staff for various purposes including leave travel concession, that the petitioner has originally misappropriated the amounts for him and caused wrongful loss to the department and that the petitioner has brought pay vouchers and the attestations of the officers thereon were taken by the petitioner on false representation that the parties were in dire need of cash by abusing the support he had with the officers. It is also the case of the prosecution that the petitioner has committed criminal breach of trust as a public servant, besides committing forgery on certain false vouchers and used the same having reason to believe that they are forged and thus the petitioner rendered himself liable under the aforesaid sections of the Indian Penal Code and under Central Act II of 1947 as amended. The contention of the petitioner is that he is not liable for the charges levelled against him and the investigation was done in a perfunctory manner by a Sub-Inspector of Police who has no experience in investigation. According to the petitioner, he is prejudiced because the First Information Report was laid without the concurrence of the Chairman of the Port Trust. That apart, the petitioner contends that there is no compliance as required under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and that the concurrence obtained from the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras to proceed with the case against the petitioner is contrary to law and invalid. That apart, the petitioner contends that there is no compliance as required under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and that the concurrence obtained from the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras to proceed with the case against the petitioner is contrary to law and invalid. It is on these grounds the petitioner contends that the permission accorded by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to the Sub-Inspector of Police, C. E. I., S. P. E., Madras to conduct the investigation against the petitioner is illegal and contrary to law. 4. The main point urged by the learned Counsel Mr. Lenin appearing for the petitioner and argued before me is that the order, dated 24th September, 1979, passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate according permission, to conduct an investigation against the petitioner is not a speaking order and that the Sub-Inspector of Police cannot conduct the investigation in the matter on the allegations levelled against the petitioner herein. The question for consideration is whether the permission accorded by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras to conduct the investigation by the Sub-Inspector of Police, C. B. I., S. P. E. Gov., Madras against the petitioner, on the allegations levelled against him, is justified and legal. 5. The investigation was conducted against the petitioner and it was found that the petitioner has committed certain offences. A petition, dated 22nd September, 1979, along with a copy of the First Information Report was filed by the Superintendent, C.B.I., before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, seeking permission under section 5-A of Central Act, II of 1947, to conduct investigation by the Sub-Inspector of Police. The Magistrate on 24th September, 1979, after considering the requisition together with the First Information Report filed by the Superintendent, C. B. I., has accorded permission under section 5-A of Central Act II of 1947 to the Sub -Inspector of Police to proceed with the investigation as prayed for. What prompted the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to accord sanction was the contents of the petition, dated 22nd September, 1979, filed by the Superintendent, C. B. I., with the enclosure, i.e., First Information Report, wherein it was made clear that no Deputy Superintendent of Police or Inspector of Police is free at present, to whom the investigation could be entrusted. What prompted the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to accord sanction was the contents of the petition, dated 22nd September, 1979, filed by the Superintendent, C. B. I., with the enclosure, i.e., First Information Report, wherein it was made clear that no Deputy Superintendent of Police or Inspector of Police is free at present, to whom the investigation could be entrusted. The main attack of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the Sub -Inspector of Police cannot conduct the investigation and that apart, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, by his order, dated 24th September, 1979, has not made it clear, that he was satisfied on the petition of the Superintendent, C. B. I., that permission should be accorded to conduct the investigation by the Sub-Inspector of Police. I may at this stage state, that the order of the Magistrate, dated 24th September, 1979, refers to the requisition made by the. Superintendent, C. B. I., and it is after reading all the papers placed before him, the Magistrate has accorded sanction. 6. That apart, this order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, according permission to conduct the investigation against the petitioner by the Sub-Inspector of Police, was questioned by the petitioner in Crl.MP. No. 3179 of 1980 in C.C. No. 27 of 1980 before the Special Judge, City Civil Court, Madras contending that the permission accorded by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to conduct the investigation, is without the authority of law and such an investigation conducted is null and void. The Special Judge (IX, Additional Sessions Judge), City Civil Court, Madras, after going through the petition filed before him, and also alter hearing the arguments of the respective Counsel appearing for the parties, came to the conclusion that there was no error of law committed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in according permission to conduct the investigation by the Sub-Inspector of Police and thus dismissed the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition on 12th February, 1981. During the course of the enquiry in Crl.M.P. No. 3179 of 1980, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was examined before the Special Judge and the Magistrate’s, evidence was recorded. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was also subjected to severe cross-examination. During the course of the enquiry in Crl.M.P. No. 3179 of 1980, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was examined before the Special Judge and the Magistrate’s, evidence was recorded. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was also subjected to severe cross-examination. The Special Judge (IX Additional Sessions Judge), City Civil Court, Madras, has held, by his order, dated 12th February, 1981, that the permission has been granted by the Magistrate, under section 5-A of Central Act II of 1947, lawfully and after due consideration. The petitioner, in spite of the order of the Special Judge, questions the validity of the order passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate before this Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. 7. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, on the order passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in according permission to the Sub-Inspector of Police to conduct the investigation, contends that prima facie, the order of the Magistrate is not a speaking order and if it is not a speaking order, the order according permission by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has to be set aside. It is at this stage necessary to extrate the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, which is as follows: “Permission is accorded to Shri P.K. Mankar, Sub-Inspector of Police, C.B.I., S.P.E., Gov., Madras to conduct investigation in the abovesaid case”. The learned Counsel contends that it is not clear from the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate that he has applied his mind in granting permission to the Sub-Inspector of Police to conduct the investigation against the petitioner herein. 8. It should be seen that the Superintendent, C.B.I., has filed a petition before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate clearly bringing to the notice of the Magistrate that no Deputy Superintendent of Police or Inspector of Police is free to whom the investigation could be entrusted in the instant case and therefore, he sought the permission of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to conduct the investigation by the Sub-Inspector of Police, C.B.I. The Superintendent, C.B.I., has also placed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, a cony of the First Information Report, filed in this case. That apart, it is clear from the oral evidence adduced by the Magistrate before the Special Judge in Crl.M.P. No. 3179 of 1980. That apart, it is clear from the oral evidence adduced by the Magistrate before the Special Judge in Crl.M.P. No. 3179 of 1980. that he has perused the papers and after satisfying himself with the records, permission was granted under section 5-A of Central Act II of 1947 to the Sub-Inspector of Police to conduct the investigation against the petitioner. The relevant evidence of the Magistrate before the Special Judge is: 9. The learned Counsel Mr. Lenin appearing for the petitioner, relying on the observations of the Supreme Court reported in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Narayana1, contends that permission to conduct investigation by a Subordinate Officer should not be accorded and such permission, if accorded has to be considered illegal. In the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court the facts were that permission was sought from the Magistrate by the Inspector of Police at his own initiative without getting into contact with the Superintendent of Police or the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Inspector of Police sought permission of the Court on the ground that he was informed that the Superintendents of Police and the Deputy Superintendents of Police were engaged in administrative matters and that they were unable to take up the investigation of either of the cases. It was found in that case, that the Inspector of Police did not take any permission either from the Deputy Superintendent of Police or Superintendent of Police or inclined to know whether the Deputy Superintendents of Police or the Superintendents of Police were really engaged in any other case. It was under those circumstances, the Supreme Court observed at Page 812: "It seems to us that the procedure adopted is wholly unwarranted by the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It may be that the Inspector thought that it was not necessary that the Superintendent of Police or the Deputy Superintendents of Police should themselves write to the Magistrate or apply that the Inspector of Police be authorised to investigate but it seems to us that they must be in the picture before the Inspector of Police applies for permission. In other words they must tell the Inspector of Police that they are too busy to take up the investigation of the case or they must on this ground authorise him to apply to the Magistrate to permit him to investigate the case. In other words they must tell the Inspector of Police that they are too busy to take up the investigation of the case or they must on this ground authorise him to apply to the Magistrate to permit him to investigate the case. This procedure which has been adopted by-passes the provisions of the Act and nullifies the objective of Parliament that the senior Officers should ordinarily investigate such cases. The High Court in our view rightly held that the grant of permission to investigate the case is not merely a mechanical act and the Magistrate had erred in giving the sanction." The facts of that case are different from the facts of the instant case. In the instant case, the Superintendent C.B.I., has filed a petition before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate seeking permission from the said Magistrate to investigate the matter by the Sub-Inspector of Police, C.B.I. While seeking permission, the Superintendent, C.B.I, has placed the First Information Report before the Magistrate which is evident from the petition filed by the Superintendent of Police. Under such circumstances, permission was accorded by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to the Sub-Inspector of Police, C.B.I, to conduct the investigation against the petitioner. When once sufficient materials were placed before the Magistrate, namely, the entire vase mentioned in the First Information Report, the Magistrate satisfied himself and accorded permission to the Sub-Inspector Police, C.B.I, to conduct the investigation against the petitioner. That apart, as stated above, before the Special Judge, where this point of according sanction was questioned, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was examined on this aspect and from the evidence of the Magistrate placed before me, apart from the findings of the Special Judge. I am of the view that there is no illegality in the sanction accorded by the Chiew Metropolitan Magistrate. 10. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi2, it has been observed: "When a Magistrate is approached for grating permission under section 5-A, he is exnected to satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons for authorising an officer of a lower rank to conduct the investigation. 10. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi2, it has been observed: "When a Magistrate is approached for grating permission under section 5-A, he is exnected to satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons for authorising an officer of a lower rank to conduct the investigation. The granting of such permission is not to be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of routine but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy underlying it." In Union of India v. Mahesh Chandra1, it has been observed: "All that section 5-A enjoins is that if investigation is to be conducted by a Deputy Superintendent of Police he does not require any order from a Magistrate. But if investigation is to be conducted by an officer of the lower rank then the permission of a Magistrate of the First Class is necessary. Giving the words their ordinary meaning investigation by a Deputy Superintendent of Police and investigation by an officer of the lower rank authorised by a Magistrate are placed on the same footing. There does not appear to be any priority given to one or the other. The object underlying in both the cases is to save public servants from frivolous and vexatious harassment at the instance of disgruntled persons. It is the high rank of a police officer that provides a guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecution and in the case of an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police it is the Magistrate who wards against such an eventuality. Consequently all that the Magistrate has to see before granting permission is. whether there is a prima fane rase or not. If he considers that the information in frivolous or vexations, he should refuse permission to investigate. There is no warrant for the proposition that he can give permission to an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police only if it is proved to his satisfaction that a Deputy Superintendent of Police is unable to undertake the investigation. If he considers that the information in frivolous or vexations, he should refuse permission to investigate. There is no warrant for the proposition that he can give permission to an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police only if it is proved to his satisfaction that a Deputy Superintendent of Police is unable to undertake the investigation. Where the Magistrate perused the First Information Report before giving permission it could not be said, that he did not satisfy himself regarding good and sufficient reasons to conduct the investigation." Relying on these observations in the above decision, the learned Public Prosecutor contends that materials were placed before the Magistrate by the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., in seeking permission to conduct the investigation by the Sub-Inspector of Police, C.B.I., and though the Magistrate has not mentioned them in his order, yet he has granted permission on the basis of the materials placed before him and, therefore, such permission under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is valid and is not vitiated due to any error of Law or material irregularity. I agree with the contention of the Public Prosecutor . 11. In this case, it is clear from the petition filed by the Superintendent of Police, C.E.I., that the First Information Report was placed before, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate along with the petition filed by him. That apart, when the Magistrate having come to the witness box, at the instance of the petitioner, before the Special Judge, deposes that he has satisfied himself after seeing the records and granted permission, it cannot be said that the Magistrate did not satisfy himself regarding good and sufficient reasons to conduct the investigation by the Inspector of Police or passed a mechanical order, as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. All the papers were placed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, and the Magistrate, after perusing the First Information Report, accorded permission to conduct the investigation by the Sub-Inspector of Police, C.B.I. Under the circumstances, the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Magistrate has acted mechanically without applying his mind, in according sanction under section 5-A of Central Act II of 1947, is not justified. Therefore, I am of the view that this petition has to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. 12. Therefore, I am of the view that this petition has to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. 12. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner orally sought permission of this Court to grant him leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Since this matter is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court, I am of the view that the permission sought for has to be rejected and it is accordingly rejected.