Judgment K.N. Misra, J. 1. HEARD learned counsel for the petitioner Sri S. P. Tripathi and perused the impugned orders passed by opposite parties nos. 1 to 3. 2. THE dispute is now confined to plots nos. 427 and 434 of Khata nos. 23 B and 23 C. It is not disputed that Niga was the Bhumidhar of the aforesaid plots in question. He had on 15th January 1974 executed an agreement for sale in respect of the said plots to Rajdeo opposite party no. 6. Subsequently on 14th March 1974 he executed a registered mortgate deed in favour of Tameshwar opposite party no. 4 and the said mortgagee was in possession over the aforesaid two plots. During consolidation operations petitioner Smt. Bhagwatia filed an objection 'under Sec. 9-A(2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming that she is daughter of Niga and as such she inherited the property of Niga upon his death. There was certain other plots besides the aforesaid two plots in dispute. Smt. Bhagwatia was held to be daughter of Niga and her name was recorded on the land recorded in the name of Niga. In respect of the aforesaid two plots her claim was rejected by the Consolidation officer vide order dated 16th January 1980 holding that since Niga had executed a registered mortgage deed in favour of Tameshwar and possession was also delivered to the mortgagee on the basis of the aforesaid possessory mortgage deed and as such the said mortgagee Tameshwar became Bhumidhar of the land in question in view of the provisions contained under Sec. 164 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order which was rejected by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) vide order dated 19th December 1980 and the revision filed by the petitioner was also rejected by the Deputy Director Consolidation vide order dated 23rd March 1981. The petitioner has challenged the orders passed by opposite parties nos. 1 to 3 in respect of the aforesaid two plots in question. 3. The petitioner has challenged the orders passed by opposite parties nos. 1 to 3 in respect of the aforesaid two plots in question. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that since Niga was mortgagor of the land in question and it was stipulated in the mortgage deed itself that -the property would be liable to be redeemed within a period of three years and as such the petitioner being daughter of Niga inherited the land in suit and she stepped into the shoes of her father as mortgagor and her name, be therefore, recorded as Bhumidhar over the land in dispute. In support of his argument learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision of the Board of Revenue in Deo Narain v. Amar Deo Singh, 1971 R. D. 270, wherein it has been held that ; "In the instant case the transaction shows that the defendant was entitled to cultivate the land and get the profits therefrom in lieu of the interest of money advanced by him. There is no mention in the documents executed by him that the possession was being transferred for the purposes of securing the payment of the money advanced, which is the specific condition laid down in Sec. 164 of the Act. Thus in view of the legal position enunciated above I am of the opinion that the transfer of possession through the two hand notes is not hit by Sec. 164 of the Act and it would not be correct to say that the transaction would amount to sale." 4. THIS decision is clearly distinguishable. In the aforesaid case, as was apparent from the two hand notes executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant the latter was put into possession over certain portions of plots in dispute only in lieu of interest and not for the purposes of securing the payment of money advanced as a loan to the plaintiff. The defendant was not given right under the hand notes to get the land sold off for non-payment of loan. The, transaction thus did not amount to mortgage of land. The object of the mortgage is to secure payment of money and the mortgaged property is liable to be sold for non payment of loan. The defendant was not given right under the hand notes to get the land sold off for non-payment of loan. The, transaction thus did not amount to mortgage of land. The object of the mortgage is to secure payment of money and the mortgaged property is liable to be sold for non payment of loan. The language used in Section 164 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is exacty the same as under Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, which defines mortgage. Section 164 of the said Act applied to usufructary mortgages where possession is transferred to the transferee for the purposes of securing any payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan and existing or future debt or the performance of any engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. In the present case the petitioner's father had executed a registered mortgage deed and possession was transferred to the mortgagee for securing payment of loan the mortgagee could sell the land for n0n payment of loan. The transaction thus amounts to a usufructary mortgage of Bhumidhari land which would be deemed to be sale under Section 164 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 5. A simple mortgage of Bhumidhari land is not prohibited under the provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the same would not be hit by Section 164 of the said Act. It is provided under Section 155 of the Act that no Bhumidhar shall have the right to mortgage any land belonging to him as such where possession of the mortgaged land is transferred or is agreed to be transferred in future to the mortgagee as security of the money advanced. It is thus apparent that what is actually prohibited under the Act is transfer of possession for securing the payment of money advanced by way of loan or debt. It is thus apparent that what is actually prohibited under the Act is transfer of possession for securing the payment of money advanced by way of loan or debt. The next relevant provision to be referred is.Section 164 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act itself, which reads as follows : "Any transfer of any holding or part thereof made by a bhumidhar by which possession is transferred to the transferee for the purpose of securing any payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, and existing or future debt or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the document of transfer or any law for the time being in force, be deemed at all times and for all purposes to be sale to the transferee and to every such sale the provisions of Sections 154 and 163 shall apply." 6. IT is apparent from the aforesaid section that the usufructuary mortgage of Bhumidhari land, where possession is transferred as security for payment of loan, would be covered by the provisions of Section 164 and notwithstanding anything contained in the document of transfer or any law for the time being in force, it would be deemed to be sale to the transferee itself. IT, therefore, follows that the covenant contained in the usufructuary mortgage deed in question that the mortgagor would be entitled to redeem the property by making payment of loan and within a period of three years is of no consequence as the transfer by way of usufructuary mortgage in question would be deemed to be sale under Section 164 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Learned counsel next placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in second appeal no. 3072 of 1962, Mahadeo Pandey v. Surja Bhan Singh, 1964 U. P. Revenue Cases 315, wherein Hon'ble Gangeshwar Prasad, J. held that : "A person, who has been put in possession of a land for appropriating its profits towards the interest of loan advanced by him to the owner of the land is really in possession on behalf of the owner, because the profits accruing from the land are utilised not for his own benefit but for the benefit of the owner and they constitute payment of interest made by the owner. In law, it is the owner himself who is in possession." 7. IN the aforesaid case the question regarding legal status of the person who was put in possession in lieu of the interest was considered in the light of provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act which was then in force when the possession was transferred to the creditor and his possession was considered to be on behalf of the owner himself. IN the above mentioned case the interpretation of the section 164 of the UP ZA and LR Act was not involved nor it was dealt with. The provisions of section 164 of the said Act were not attracted to the facts of the aforesaid case. The aforesaid case is thus clearly distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts of the present case, where the question involved is whether usufructuary mortgage would or would not be deemed to be a sale as provided under section 164 of the said Act. 8. LEARNED counsel next contended that the usufructuary mortgage cannot be deemed to be sale from the very inception and the mortgagor's right to redeem the mortgaged property cannot be denied to him. I am unable to agree with this contention. Under section 164 of the UP ZA and LR Act it is provided that such a transaction would be deemed at all times and for all purposes to be sale to the transferee. It thus, follows that it would be deemed to be sale from the very inception i. e. from the date of execution of the usufructuary mortgage and transfer of possession in pursuance thereof to the mortgagee. The provisions of section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act would, therefore, not be applicable to such mortgage and the mortgagor will have no right to redeem the mortgage and to claim possession from the mortgagee by offering to make payment of loan amount. The aforesaid statutory right of redemption as provided under section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act would not be available to the mortgagor Bhumidhar in view of the provision of section 164 of the UP ZA and LR Act according to which for all times and for all purposes it would be deemed sale to the transferee. The aforesaid statutory right of redemption as provided under section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act would not be available to the mortgagor Bhumidhar in view of the provision of section 164 of the UP ZA and LR Act according to which for all times and for all purposes it would be deemed sale to the transferee. If the transfer amounts to sale by legal fiction under the aforesaid deeming provision, the transferor would be left with no right to redeem the property in question. The provisions with regard to the rights of mortgagor and mortgagee contained in the chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act would not apply to such mortgages which are hit by the provisions of section 164 of the UP ZA and LR Act. A deeming provision in a statute postulates that a thing deemed to be something else is not, in fact, the thing which it is deemed to be. In other words, when a thing is deemed to be something else, it is to be treated as if it is that thing, though in fact it is not. See Additional Income Tax Officer v. E. Alfred, AIR 1962 SC 663 and Dattu Apparao v. D. G. Shendge, AIR 1968 Bombay 361. The Supreme Court in Additional Income Tax Officer (Supra) held that : "A deeming provision creates a legal fiction. The effect of such a legal fiction is that a position which otherwise would not obtain is deemed to obtain under the given circumstances and the court is entitled to and rather bound to give effect to statutory legal fiction." 9. IN this view of the matter I am of the opinion that under the deeming provision contained under section 164 of the UP ZA and LR Act the transfer of any holding or part thereof made by a Bhumidhar by which possession is transferred to the transferee for the purposes of securing any payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, would be deemed to be a sale to the transferee notwithstanding anything contained in the document of transfer or any law for the time being in force. The usufructuary mortgage in question has thus, rightly been held to be sale to the transferee opposite party. Tameshwar, opposite party no. The usufructuary mortgage in question has thus, rightly been held to be sale to the transferee opposite party. Tameshwar, opposite party no. 4 though in reality was a mortgagee in possession but under the aforesaid provision of the Act he would be treated as if he was a vendee, because by the said deeming provision such a transfer would be deemed to be a sale to the transferee. IN this view of the matter I do not find that any error has been committed by opposite parties nos. 1 to 3 in recording the name of opposite party no. 4 as Bhumidhar over the aforesaid two plots in question. 10. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, In the end, contended that as the petitioner was daughter of Niga and as such upon his death she inherited the plots in dispute and her name should have been recorded as Bhumidhar as she had a subsisting right of redeeming the aforesaid two plots which were mortgaged by his father Niga. I am unable to agree with this contention. As already observed above the petitioner's father Niga, as soon as he executed the aforesaid mortgage with possession in respect of the said plots in favour of Tameshwar, ceased to be Bhumidhar of the land in question as under law the said mortgage became sale under the provisions of section 164 of the UP ZA and LR Act. Since Niga's rights as Bhumidhar had extinguished upon the execution of the aforesaid mortgage deed, which amounted to sale, there was nothing left to be inherited by the petitioner in the said property. The petitioner's name, therefore, could not be recorded as Bhumidhar over the aforesaid two plots and I do not find any error in the impugned orders passed by opposite parties nos. 1 to 3. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed in limini. Petition dismissed.