JUDGMENT K.N. Seth and K.C. Agarwal, JJ. - Mohammad Furkan, the petitioner was a student of LL.B. (Final) in the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. In the year 1979-80, he was elected as the vice-president of the students union. On account of disturbances in the University, the Vice-Chancellor closed the University for two months from 31st January, 1981, to 2nd April, 1981. The University was again closed on 12th May, 1981. According to the petitioner, he was served with a notice dated 14th July, 1981, by the Vice-Chancellor on 15th July, 1981, stating that on the recommendations of the Disciplinary Committee the petitioner had been expelled with immediate effect for a period of one year. Challenging the aforesaid order of the Vice-Chancellor, the present writ petition had been filed, inter alia, on the grounds that the petitioner having not been afforded any opportunity to defend himself in the proceedings taken against him, the order expelling him was invalid. The second ground taken was that there was no evidence on record to establish the involvement of the petitioner in the incident on account of which he had been punished. The third ground was that the order of the Vice-Chancellor was bad having not given reasons for the same. The fourth ground taken ;by the petitioner was that the Vice-Chancellor had no power to inflict punishment of explusion. 2. The petition was presented before us on 23rd October, 1981, on which date we directed the counsel appearing for the University to file a counter-affidavit, which had been filed on 3rd November, 1981. The petitioner had also filed re-joinder to the same. 3. In the counter-affidavit, the allegation of the petitioner that he had been a brilliant student of the University has been strongly denied. The counter-affidavit annexes a chart of the academic performance of the petitioner which is mentioned in the LL.B. Classes, is as under : "LL.B. 1977 did not pass the examination till now. Further to show his outstanding dues Rs. 1,686 achievements in LL.B. Course a report from the Dean faculty of law is being filed as Annexure CA-1. The counter-affidavit annexes a chart of the academic performance of the petitioner which is mentioned in the LL.B. Classes, is as under : "LL.B. 1977 did not pass the examination till now. Further to show his outstanding dues Rs. 1,686 achievements in LL.B. Course a report from the Dean faculty of law is being filed as Annexure CA-1. As regards the petitioners claim to be the most disciplined student, it is submitted that he is one of members of action committee and apart from his acts of indiscipline on 17-4-1981, when the meeting of the Executive Council was disturbed, he was further involved in other serious incidents and to quote instances, true copies of reports made by the security staff of the University to the police authorities are being filed as Annexures CA-II, CA-III and CA-IV which shall speak for themselves." 4. In the counter-affidavit, the allegations made were that against the petitioner reports had been received that he had participated in the demonstrations held at the residence of the Vice-Chancellor and had also stopped the students from attending the classes. The allegations against the petitioner further was that he alongwith others had manhandled some of the students who tried to bye-pass the picketers for attending their classes. At the residence of the Vice-Chancellor, the students forced their entry into the building by damaging flower posts and some other properties and threatened the Security Staff on duty. They also indulged in raising objectionable slogans against the University Authorities and creating disturbances. 5. After having received the reports against the petitioner, the Vice-Chancellor sent a notice on 30th April, 1981, calling upon the petitioner to show cause within 48 hours of the receipt of the notice as to why action against the petitioner was not liable to be taken. In this notice, the charge made was that the petitioner alongwith other students forced his entry into Sir Syed House, where the meeting of the Executive Council was being held and raised slogans and thumped the doors of the meeting room, thereby tried to prevent the members of the Executive Council from discharging their duties. 6. In this notice, the charge made was that the petitioner alongwith other students forced his entry into Sir Syed House, where the meeting of the Executive Council was being held and raised slogans and thumped the doors of the meeting room, thereby tried to prevent the members of the Executive Council from discharging their duties. 6. As stated above, the case of the petitioner was that he had not been served with any show-cause notice, but this has been denied in the counter-affidavit and it has been alleged that the show-cause notice was sent to the petitioner by the Vice-Chancellor on 30th April, 1981, through provost and by registered post on 6th May, 1981, on the correct address of his residential hostel. In that connection, paragraph 21 of the counter-affidavit states : "The attitude of the student leaders, including the petitioner, was so violent and hostile that no other manner was possible to effect service on them directly without facing grave risk. In fact, all these students including the petitioner fully knew that show cause notice for disciplinary action has been issued and they deliberately failed to submit their reply or explain their conduct as against the charge." 7. In the rejoinder-affidavit, an attempt has been made by the petitioner to deny the allegations of the counter-affidavit. 8. The first argument, as stated above, was that the petitioner since had not been given a show-cause notice, the action taken against him contravened the statutory provisions as well as the principles of natural justice. For deciding this controversy, the question that arose for decision is whether the notice was taken by the provost (through a teacher of the University) and sent by registered post, was correct or not. For this purpose, we have two versions, one is that of the University and the other that of the petitioner. Out of the two versions, we prefer to believe the version of the University. We have no reason to think that a false affidavit would be filed by the University stating that the notice was taken to the petitioner by the provost and also was sent by registered pest. In the atmosphere that was prevailing in the University, it is not difficult to believe that the petitioner although had received the notices, but still did not appear before the Disciplinary Committee knowingly and deliberately. In the atmosphere that was prevailing in the University, it is not difficult to believe that the petitioner although had received the notices, but still did not appear before the Disciplinary Committee knowingly and deliberately. A person who does not appear despite the service of notice has no right to make a complaint of the violation of the principles of natural justice or that of the statutory provision. The University could do no more than serving the petitioner with a notice calling upon him to give his explanation, and that was done. 9. In Kishan Singh v. The Financial Commissioner, AIR 1980 SC 1661 the Supreme Court held "Since the order was passed after service of notice on the appellant, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that there was violation of the principles of natural justice." 10. We are, therefore, satisfied that the notice was served upon the petitioner. As already observed above, out of the two versions, we believe the one given by the.University, and not by the petitioner who could have every reason to swear a wrong affidavit for getting the order taking disciplinary action against him quashed. When the University had sent a notice to him, there could be no motive to it that the petitioner should not appear for defending himself. 11. The second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that there was no material on the record to justify the taking of the action against the petitioner. We are not impressed by this argument. There were reports against the petitioner before the Disciplinary Committee, the meeting of which was held on 11th July, 1981. The minutes annexed alongwith the counter-affidavit as Annexure VI shows that the case of the petitioner was considered alongwith that of others on the said date. The Committee made a note that all possible efforts w ere made to have the show-cause notices s served on the persons concerned through the provost and registered post. After examining the undelivered envelopes and the remarks made by the postal authorities, the Committee found unanimously that the students were deliberately avoiding acceptance of these notices. After examining the reports on which the allegations were made, the University came to the conclusion that the charge of indiscipline against the students, including the petitioner, was established. After examining the undelivered envelopes and the remarks made by the postal authorities, the Committee found unanimously that the students were deliberately avoiding acceptance of these notices. After examining the reports on which the allegations were made, the University came to the conclusion that the charge of indiscipline against the students, including the petitioner, was established. In these circumstances, it is not correct to say that there was no material before the Disciplinary Committee. The material consisted of the reports made by the teachers who had no animus against the petitioner. 12. Linked with the above, the next argument was about the reasons having not been given by the University in the order expelling the petitioner. We have seen the copy of the order served upon the petitioner as also the minutes filled along with the counter-affidavit. The petitioner had not submitted any reply to the charge. What was required to be considered by the Disciplinary Committee was only the reports made against the petitioner and the attending circumstances. Without going into the question as to whether any reasons were required to be given in these proceedings, suffice it to mention that the petitioner haring not submitted his explanation could not challenge the validity of the order on that ground. The purpose of giving the reasons is to acquaint the person who files the explanation for satisfying him, who is condemned, that what he had to say has net only been heard, but also considered and recorded. But, where as here, no explanation had been given, the order of the Disciplinary Committee cannot be said to be bad. 13. Moreover, on reading of the minutes maintained in the office of the Aligarh Muslim University and the order served upon the petitioner, it is not possible to say that the Disciplinary Committee had not given reasons for arriving at the decision against the petitioner. As said by Beg, J. reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions are arrived at (See AIR 1974 SC 87 ). That can be found in the present case. 14. So far as the power of the Vice-Chancellor is concerned, learned counsel argued that Statutes 35 and 37 confer a very wide power on the Vice-Chancellor which is unregulated and, as such, the same is hit by Article 19 (1) of the Constitution. That can be found in the present case. 14. So far as the power of the Vice-Chancellor is concerned, learned counsel argued that Statutes 35 and 37 confer a very wide power on the Vice-Chancellor which is unregulated and, as such, the same is hit by Article 19 (1) of the Constitution. For the above submission, the argument made was that the petitioner had a fundamental right guaranteed to him under the Constitution and that right is capable of being curtailed capriciously and arbitrarily by the Vice-Chancellor by exercising the power to expel. The power to expel is given to the Vice-Chancellor on the ground that the same is essential for maintaining discipline in the University. The Statute conferring powers on the Vice-Chancellor, to award punishment for maintenance of discipline, does not violate the provisions of Articles 14 or 19 of the Constitution, and hence is not void. (See Ram Chandra Roy v. University of Allahabad, AIR 1956 All. 46). It has been held in this case that although no specific limitation has been placed on the nature and extent of punishment which can be awarded by a Vice-Chancellor, it could not still be said that the power was entirely unfettered and vague. 15. It may be noted here that Section 29 of the Aligarh Muslim University Act makes the Vice-Chancellor responsible for maintaining the discipline and then grants to him only such powers as may be necessary for that purpose. This itself, as said in the cast of Ram Chandra Roy (supra) is a limitation on the powers of the Vice-Chancellor. A student who gets himself enrolled in the University scumbs himself to the disciplinary powers of the Vice-Chancellor, and, as such, the Vice-Chancellor can award any punishment which the circumstances of the case may require. If, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, on the advice of the Disciplinary Committee the Vice-Chancellor thought it to be in the interest of the University to expel the petitioner for one year, the use of the power cannot be said to be illegal. We have no jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere as we do no exercise appellate powers on the authorities like the University. Ours is a supervisory jurisdiction limited to seeing that the authority empowered to pass an order is not guilty of excess or abuse of the same. We have no jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere as we do no exercise appellate powers on the authorities like the University. Ours is a supervisory jurisdiction limited to seeing that the authority empowered to pass an order is not guilty of excess or abuse of the same. We cannot take upon ourselves the job of administering the University. We must not also forget that in a matter of disciplinary proceedings against a student, it is the authorities which run the University, they must be held to have the power necessary to maintain law and order and to exercise in such a manner that the situation calls for. The interference of the High Court may not be justified 16. Counsel next relied upon a ruling of the Supreme Court reported in V.C. Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan, AIR 1979 SC 281 . This was a case under Section 35 of the Advocates Act where an appeal had been taken to the Supreme Court against an action taken by the Disciplinary Committee under the said Act. This case does not lay dow.i any principle of law which may be of any help to the petitioner in advancing his case. Even in this case, the Supreme Court had found the Advocate guilty of professional misconduct and held ; - "When a lawyer has been tried by his peers in the words of brother Desai, there is no reason for this Court to interfere in appeal with the finding in such a domestic enquiry merely because on a repraisal of the evidence a different view is possible." 17. We are unable to find for these reasons that the punishment imposed on the petitioner by the University Is excessive with which we can interfere. What the circumstances required to do was the matter for the University to decide. It is wrong to suggest, as was argued before us, that the petitioner had a brilliant academic career, and that needed a sympathetic view of the whole thing. We only wish to note that the allegations made In the counter-affidavit demonstrated that the petitioner had no brilliant career in the University or before. 18. Another decision relied upon by the petitioners learned counsel was Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 . We only wish to note that the allegations made In the counter-affidavit demonstrated that the petitioner had no brilliant career in the University or before. 18. Another decision relied upon by the petitioners learned counsel was Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 . Reliance had been placed on paragraph 8 of this decision which deals with the requirement of giving of reasons. We have already disposed of this point above. This point does not need any discussion. 19. For the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed under proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of of the Court.