JUDGMENT R.R. Rastogi, J. - By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners pray for the issue of a writ of certiorari directing the respondents to produce the records of the case and quashing the judgments of the Munsif, Mohammadabad, dated 15-9-78 and the 1st Additional District Judge, Ghazipur, dated 13-9-1979. The facts are these. A notice under section 4 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereafter the Act' was issued in 1965 whereby villages Naicho alias Unchadih and Khijirpur, Pargana Dehma, District Ghazipur, were brought under consolidation operations. The petitioners were Bhumidhars in these villages. The provisional consolidation scheme was prepared on 15-2-1968. The appeals in regard thereto were finally disposed of on 6-4-68. On 19-12-68 the present petitioners filed suit no. 135 of 1968 in the Court of the Munsif, Mohammadabad against the Gaon Sabha of village Unchadih through Narsingh Rai, Pradhan, for injunction restraining the latter from interfering with the possession of the petitioners over certain plots of the aforesaid two villages and for recovery of Rs. 10/- as damages. The cause of action for that suit was stated to have arisen between December 3 and 17, 1968. That suit was decided ex parte on 28-7-1979. It may also be noted at this very place that a notification under section 52 of the Act was issued on 20-9-1975 stating that the consolidation operations in the aforesaid two villages had been closed. 2. The petitioners moved execution application under Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C. on 7-7-1979 for execution of the aforesaid decree against the Gaonsabha, Unchadih, through its Pradhan, Shiv Nath Rai and Secretary Ram Pati Lal, respondents 3 to 5. Shiv Nath Rai filed an objection under section 47 C.P.C. contending that in suit no. 135 of 1968 the decree had been obtained by fraud and the Gaonsabha had no knowledge of the suit that the suit having been filed during the pendency of the consolidation operations in these villages, the decree passed therein was without jurisdiction, and hence a nullity. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by section 49 of the Act and, further, that there had been no disobedience of the decree. The execution court allowed the objection and dismissed the execution application by order dated 15-9-78. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by section 49 of the Act and, further, that there had been no disobedience of the decree. The execution court allowed the objection and dismissed the execution application by order dated 15-9-78. There was an appeal filed from that order by the petitioners which was dismissed on 13-9-1979 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Ghazipur, and aggrieved the petitioners had come upon to this Court by way of this writ petition. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents 3 to 5 in which it has been averred that the aforesaid decree had been obtained by fraud because there had been no service of the summons of the same on the Pradhan of the Gaonsabha. The contentions raised in the objection have also been reiterated. The petitioners have filed a rejoinder affidavit. 4. It was submitted before me on behalf of the petitioners by Sri Sankatha Rai that the decree passed in suit no. 135 of 1968 was not a nullity, inasmuch as the cause of action for that suit arose after the finalisation of the consolidation proceedings and secondly because there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Civil Court to entertain that suit. The question of jurisdiction could be decided on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint and those allegations confer jurisdiction on the Civil Court only. That being so, the execution court could not go behind the decree and that it also erred in looking into certain documents with a view to decide the question of jurisdiction. After hearing learned counsel for the parties I am not inclined to agree with the above submissions. 5. In the first instance as noted above, these two villages were brought under consolidation in C.H. Form 23 was prepared on 15-2-1968. It is correct that the appeals in respect thereto were finally disposed of on 6-4-68. There is nothing on the record to show as to when the consolidation proceedings were finalised because after the provisional scheme is confirmed, the statements of proposal are published and allotment orders are issued. Thereafter the scheme is enforced and possession of plots allotted is taken. Compensation for trees etc. is determined. Then under section 27 new revenue records are prepared. Thereafter the scheme is enforced and possession of plots allotted is taken. Compensation for trees etc. is determined. Then under section 27 new revenue records are prepared. Delivery of possession is required to be made within six months of the date on which the scheme has come into force. In my opinion it is only when all these formalities have been completed that the consolidation operations come to an end and a notification is issued under section 52 of the Act. Any way this aspect will not have a very material bearing on the case in view of the findings recorded by the authorities below. 6. The dispute in the civil suit was in regard to some small portions of plots nos. 215, 293, 457, 446, 458 and 105 of village Unchadih and plots nos. 086, 687 and 688 of village Khijirpur. The case of the petitioners was that they were in cultivatory possession of the disputed portions of the plots by including them in their chaks. Each of these plots comprises of a far greater area and it has been found by the learned appellate Court that the disputed areas of the plots of Khijirpur were neither included in the original holdings of the petitioners nor were allotted to them in consolidation proceedings. The areas of these plots allotted to the petitioners were different from the portions which were in dispute in the civil case. Similarly as regards the disputed plots of village Unchadih it has been found that the dispute in that case did not relate to land of which the petitioners, had been adjudicated to be the tenure holders in consolidation proceedings. On this view it has been observed by the learned appellate court that the remedy of the petitioners was to get their right and title determined under section 9 of the Act and that being so, the civil suit was barred by section 49 of the Act. 7. Considerable stress was Laid by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the fact that the cause of action for the civil suit arose after finalisation of the consolidation proceedings. In my opinion this contention is not of much substance because the petitioners were not held to be tenure holders of the disputed areas of these plots in consolidation proceedings. They were not recorded tenure holders of the same in C.H. Form no. 23. In my opinion this contention is not of much substance because the petitioners were not held to be tenure holders of the disputed areas of these plots in consolidation proceedings. They were not recorded tenure holders of the same in C.H. Form no. 23. If the petitioners claimed interest in the same, there were two stages for them to seek the remedy. They could have filed an objection under section 9 (2) of the Act disputing the correctness or nature of the entries in the record or in the extracts furnished therefrom. That was the stage for them to get their right and interest in the disputed laud adjudicated. The second occasion was when the provisional consolidation scheme was prepared in C.H. Form 23 and the disputed areas were not recorded there in their names. They could have filed an objection against the same under section 21 (2) of the Act. They did not do so. In other words, proceedings could or ought to have been taken in regard to the disputed land by the petitioners under this Act and since they did not do so, no civil or revenue court could entertain any suit or proceedings with respect to their alleged rights in such land as provided by section 49 of the Act. It would be seen, therefore, that it was a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction and the decree passed was a nullity. Its invalidity could be set up whenever and where ever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of the execution and even in collateral proceedings, vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340 In that case it was, further, held that a defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. 8. Reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners on certain decisions but I find that they are all distinguishable. 8. Reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners on certain decisions but I find that they are all distinguishable. In Lakhpat Singh v. Dal Singh, 1964 A.L.J. 1049 the effect of a notification under section 4 of the Act had come up for consideration, but, that was at a time when section 5 (2), as it now stands, was not there Under the provision as it now stands one of the consequences upon the publication oi a notification under subsection (2) of section 4 is that every proceedings for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit, preceding is pending, stands abated. It would be seen that the bar in the matter of abatement is absolute. Earlier such suit or proceeding was required to be stayed and after the decision given by the consolidation authorities, the suit or proceeding was to be decided in conformity with the decision given by the consolidation authorities. On this provision the view taken in Lakhpat Singh's case was that if an appeal is decided on merits, in ignorance of the fact that a notification under section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act had been passed, the judgment would be a case of the court acting with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction The same view was taken by a Full Bench of our court in Ram Audit Singh v. State of U.P., 1969 A.L.J. 748 As mentioned above in view of the amendment introduced in the Act latter, the position has undergone a change and one of the consequences of the publication of a notification under section 4 (2) is that the pending proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area which has been made the subject matter of consolidation operations, shall have to be abated. If section 5 is read with section 49. If section 5 is read with section 49. it becomes clear that in respect of declaration of rights or interest in such land the dispute can be raised only before the consolidation authorities. If a dispute could be raised or ought to be raised and was not raised, it cannot be raised subsequently in any civil or revenue court. Suit No. 135 of 1968, therefore, was beyond the jurisdiction of the civil court and that being so the decree passed therein was a nullity. This invalidity of the decree could be set up even at the stage of the execution and the executing court could go behind the decree. In Suba Singh v. Mahtndra Singh, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1667 the Court had occasion to observe that section 49 of the Act which excludes jurisdiction of Civil Courts must be construed strictly. It bars civil suit in respect of "matters arising out of consolidation proceedings" and "matters in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provisions of the Consolidation Act." 9. The petitioners wanted to place reliance on this decision in support of their contention that alter the finalisation of the provisional scheme of consolidation and before the notification under section 52 was issued, if a cause of action arose to them, they could take recourse to a civil suit. In that case the cause of action arose on 13th March, 1956, on the death of one Jagram and it was found that by the time the cause of action arose, the consolidation scheme had been finalised. It has been published and even implemented so far as Jagram was concerned. On these facts, the view taken was that in respect of such a cause of action the remedy lay to the aggrieved party to have recourse to civil litigation. I do not think that this decision helps the petitioners because there the cause of action arose after the consolidation scheme had been finalised, published and implemented in the present case at the most before the filling of the civil spit the provisional scheme could be taken to have been confirmed. There is nothing on the record to suggest that scheme was published and implemented and the record of rights and other revenue records were prepared as required by section 27 (1) of the Act. There is nothing on the record to suggest that scheme was published and implemented and the record of rights and other revenue records were prepared as required by section 27 (1) of the Act. However, when the land in dispute was not allotted in the chak of the petitioners in the provisional scheme, there arose a cause of action to them and they have filed an objection as required under section 21 (2) of the Act. They did not avail of this opportunity. Apart from this section 12 of the Act has been substituted by section 14 of the (Amendment) Act VIII of 19&3. Sub-section (1) of this section now reads that "all matters relating to changes and transfers affecting any of the rights or interests recorded in the revised records published under sub-section (1) of section 10 for which a cause of action had not arisen when proceedings under sections 7 to 9 were started or were in progress, may be raised before the Assistant Consolidation Officer as and when they arise, but not later than the date of notification under section 52 or under sub-section (1) of section 6". In view of this provision now all matters relating to changes or transfers affecting the rights or interest recorded in the revised records, if occurring before the issue of notification under section 52 or section 6 (1) will have to be raised before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. 10. My attention was also invited by the learned counsel for the petitioners to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 77 What has been held in this case is that a suit by co-sharer to challenge deletion of her name in joint khewat in consolidation proceedings on the ground of fraud of co-sharers in possession is not barred be section 49 of the Act. The decision in Suba Singh's case aforesaid has been relied upon. As noted above, in Suba Singh's case when the cause of action are the consolidation scheme had been finalised and implemented and apart from that in regard to matters relating to changes and transfers affecting the rights or interests in the revised records now recourse is required to be taken before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. If the notification under section 52 or section 6 (1) has not made. If the notification under section 52 or section 6 (1) has not made. Further, in Karbalai Begum's case the suit was based on the ground of fraud committed on the plaintiff by her co-sharers by giving her an assurance that her share will be looked after by them and on distinct understanding she had left the entire management on the defendant who also used to manage them. In my opinion, therefore, the decision proceeded on its own facts. In the instant case as I have discussed above, the cause of action to the petitioners arose during the course of the consolidation prongs itself and not after the con-confirmation of the provisional consolidation scheme and as such the aforesaid civil suit was barred by section 49 of the Act, and the decree passed therein could lightly be ignored by the executing court. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion the writ petition has no merits and is accordingly dismissed with costs.