Judgment K.P. Singh, J. 1. THIS writ petition by the State of U. P. is against the judgment of Shri B.C. Jauhari, District Judge, Allahabad, dated 3-1-1979 in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 199 of 1978-Satish Tandon v. State of U. P. and arises out of proceedings for permission to transfer a portion of building no. 35 Rani Mandi, Allahabad, in favour of Smt. Prem Rani Kapoor, under Section 27 (2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. THE Competent Authority, Allababad, through its judgment dated 17-10-1980 rejected the application moved by the opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority the opposite party no. 1 had gone in appeal and the appeal has been allowed and requisite permission was granted to opposite party no. 1 to sell a portion of house no. 35, Rani Mandi, Allahabad. Against the judgment of the appellate authority the State of U. P. has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me relying upon the provisions of Section 5(3) and Section 10(4) of the Act that unless the excess vacant land of the opposite party no. 1 was determined, no permission to transfer the disputed portion of the building could be granted. Since the appellate authority has allowed the appeal preferred by the opposite party no. 1 and has granted permission to sell the disputed portion of the building, it has committed an error apparent on the face of the record and has also created complications in the way of the petitioner, hence the judgment should be quashed. 3. THE learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 has contended before me that the provisions of Section 27 of the Act have been struck down by the Supreme Court and that there is no vacant land sought to be sold by the opposite party no. 1 as the construction stood over the entire area, hence the impugned judgment should not be quashed. It has also been stressed before me that a major portion of the house no. 1 as the construction stood over the entire area, hence the impugned judgment should not be quashed. It has also been stressed before me that a major portion of the house no. 35 Rani Mandi was sought to be sold and permission was granted and the writ petition filed by the State of U. P. has already been dismissed and against the judgment in writ the special appeal is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence no injustice would occur to the petitioner if the disputed portion of the building is sold by the opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition. For no fault of the opposite party no. 1 and the intending purchaser the sale would remain in suspense for sufficient long time which would cause much agony to the seller and purchaser both. 4. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. I have a strong feeling that ordinarily no sale should be permitted unless the extent of vacant land held by the seller has been determined under the provisions of the Act. 4. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. I have a strong feeling that ordinarily no sale should be permitted unless the extent of vacant land held by the seller has been determined under the provisions of the Act. Section 5(3) of the above-mentioned Act reads thus :- "(3) In the State to which this Act applies in the first instance and in any State which adopts this Act under Clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, no person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of this Act shall transfer any such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement under Section 6 and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published under sub-section (1) of Section 10 ; and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void." Section 10(4) of the Act reads as below :- "(4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3)- (i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void ; and (ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land." In view of the above provisions the propriety demands that the ceiling authorities should ordinarily refuse to grant permission to sell and in exceptional cases for justifying reasons the permission to sell should be granted so that a citizen may not feel that he has been deprived of his right to deal with his property even for his emergent and pressing necessity. In this case it is not necessary to give instances for permission to sell in exceptional cases and no hard and fast rule can be laid down for determining the nature of exceptional cases which would depend on the facts and circumstances involved in a particular case. 5. In this case it is not necessary to give instances for permission to sell in exceptional cases and no hard and fast rule can be laid down for determining the nature of exceptional cases which would depend on the facts and circumstances involved in a particular case. 5. IN the present case it was contended before me that the building stood on the entire area sought to be sold hence the ceiling authorities had no jurisdiction to withhold permission to sell. I am unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1. Section 4 (9) of the Act reads as below:- "(9) Where a person holds vacant land and also holds any other land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein, the extent of such other land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person." 6. IN view of the above provisions it is clear that in some cases even the land occupied by a building and the land appurtenant thereto can be taken into account while calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person. Thus the broad contention raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 in this case is not acceptable to me that since the permission relates to a portion of the building and there was no vacant land appurtenant to the building hence the permission to sell could not be refused. In this connection it would be proper to mention the definition of "vacant land" under Section 2(q) of the Act which is as below :- "(q) "vacant land" means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an agglomeration, but does not include- (i) .......................... (ii) in an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before or is being constructed on appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building." 7. IN this case there is no open space land and the opposite party no. 1 sought to sell a portion of the building. No doubt it is true that the opposite party no. 1 holds and is possessed of excess vacant land. IN this case there is no open space land and the opposite party no. 1 sought to sell a portion of the building. No doubt it is true that the opposite party no. 1 holds and is possessed of excess vacant land. According to the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 even if the disputed building comes within the definition of "vacant land" held by the opposite party no. 1 the equities between the parties could be adjusted from the other land held by the opposite party no. 1, hence it was suggested that no interference should be made with the impugned judgment of the appellate authority in the present case. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not resist the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 on any valid ground hence I think that no manifest injustice has occurred to the petitioner in the present case specially when a major portion of the disputed building has been sold and the writ petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed with regard to major portion of the building in question. 8. IT is also not worthy that during the pendency of a litigation if a purchaser purchases property with open eyes, he runs the risk. In view of the provisions of Section 10 (5) and (6) of the Act, the petitioner can take possession of any vacant land vested in the State, hence even if the permission is granted in respect of the disputed portion of the building in question and the purchaser gets possession over the property sold to him he can be evicted by the petitioner. In my opinion, by the grant of permission to sell neither any manifest injustice has occurred to the petitioner not it is likely to occur in future. In my opinion, by the grant of permission to sell neither any manifest injustice has occurred to the petitioner not it is likely to occur in future. Section 10 (5) (6) of the Act reads as below:- "(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under subsection (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice." "(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under subsection (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. 9. SINCE an individual purchaser can be asked to surrender or deliver possession to the State Government and the State Government can take possession by using such force as may be necessary, I think that in the present case by the grant of permission to sell to the opposite party no. 1 neither any manifest injustice has occurred nor it is likely to occur in future. 10. IN view of the provisions of Section 4 (11) of the Act I am doubtful whether the competent authority can declare any land referred to in sub-clause (2) or sub-clause (3) of clause (q) of Section 2 of the Act as excess vacant land under the provisions of the Act. Section 4(11) of the Act reads as below :- "(11) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing in subsections (5), (6), (7), (9) and (10) shall be construed as empowering the competent authority to declare any land referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub clause (iii) of Clause (q) of Section 2 as excess vacant land under this Chapter." Hence, I do not consider it a fit case whether interference should be made with the impugned judgment of the appellate authority granting permission to sell to the opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition. 11. FOR the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 1 in the present writ petition. 11. FOR the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.